Kate Chaney
Curtin · Independent · Australia
“Digital platforms will have a legal responsibility to prevent harm, but the design of this commitment matters enormously, and I want to flag three things that the government must get right. First, there must be a single overarching duty.”
“The government gave stakeholders representing millions of Australians affected by gambling harm a single 45-minute consultation session on the exposure draft, with written submissions due the next day. Emeritus Professor Mike Daube, who took part in that session, described it afterwards as a charade.”
“A doctor who uses the phone, internet, fax, email or video conferencing to provide lawful VAD care risks prosecution and fines greater than $300,000. This means seriously ill patients must attend every consultation in person, travelling long distances while gravely unwell, often more than once, to make and confirm their request.”
“I rise to present a petition signed by more than 13,000 Australians. The petition has been considered by the Petitions Committee and found to be in order. It calls on this House to amend the Criminal Code Act so that it no longer applies to voluntary assisted dying, VAD.”
“She lived in one half of a single house divided into two separate dwellings. She got on well with the quiet single working man next door. This particular morning she was devastated and in shock. The man had hung himself in the shed where she found him, and left a note listing all the people he owed money to including the amounts.”
“No avenue to call up customer service at these companies and request this person be denied an account. Our nightmare never ends. There's nowhere to help us. The only option presented seems to dissolve the marriage and the family.”
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“The first amendment would retain the sunset clause in section 34JF of the ASIO Act so compulsory questioning powers remain subject to regular renewal by parliament. This is the safeguard we've applied since these powers were first introduced, and it's functioned as intended, prompting scrutiny and public justification before each extension. The second amendment requires a mandatory statutory review of division 3 of part 3. At present, the PJCIS may choose to review these powers. My amendment would require it to do so, ensuring the parliament periodically tests whether the powers remain necessary and proportionate in light of contemporary risks and practice. This directly answers concerns that current safeguards are marginal, given the breadth of the regime and the proposed expansion. These amendments do not alter warrant thresholds.”
“Removing this safeguard whilst simultaneously broadening the grounds on which an adult can be subject to compulsory questioning shifts the balance too far from accountability towards permanence. We all accept that the security environment is challenging and that ASIO must have the effective tools it needs at its disposal, but the legitimacy of those tools depends on proportionality and transparency. The bill proposes to expand adult questioning matters to additional heads of security yet makes the questioning framework permanent by repealing the sunset clause. That combination warrants a more careful approach from us. My amendments are straightforward—keep the sunset in place and/or mandate a periodic review. This is about maintaining trust in the way we exercise extraordinary powers, not about tying ASIO's hands.”
“The second amendment provides for the mandatory review of these powers by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. This bill engages some of the most extraordinary powers in our law—compulsory questioning by ASIO. These powers are intrusive and profoundly interfere with multiple rights, including the right to silence, freedom of movement, access to legal representation and the privilege against self-incrimination. They must be paired with robust routine oversight. Since 2003, parliament has applied a sunset clause to ensure periodic rigorous review of these extraordinary powers. On six occasions, parliament has extended the sunset date, because successive parliaments have judged that renewal should be earned and not assumed.”
“by leave—I move amendments (1) and (2), as circulated in my name, together: (1) Schedule 1, item 1, page 3 (lines 4 and 5), omit the item, substitute: 1 Section 34JF Omit "2027", substitute "2030". (2) Schedule 1, page 3 (before line 7), before item 2, insert: 1A Paragraph 29( 1)( ce ) Omit "if the Committee resolves to do so—". These amendments introduce important safeguards, and they do so in different ways by amending different parts of the bill. They could work together or separately to achieve the same policy objective, and, for the convenience of the House, I'll speak to both amendments together. The first amendment would retain the sunsetting clause of division 3 of part 3, the compulsory questioning powers, for an additional five years, until 7 March 2030.”
“Either path respects both the complexity of our security environment and the integrity of our democracy. Either path acknowledges that extraordinary powers deserve extraordinary oversight. I urge the government to consider amending the legislation in this way—to choose measured safeguards today in order to preserve the legitimacy we will rely on tomorrow. This is how we keep Australians safe while strengthening the trust that keeps us together.”
“We cannot afford a false choice between security and rights. Our task is to hold both in view, recognising that the legitimacy of our security laws is itself a national security asset, a measured framework which embeds periodic review and oversight, helps protect against overreach, and sustains the social licence that ASIO needs to do its job effectively. I think there is a credible, constructive middle course: retain the sunset clause consistent with two decades of practice and continue to ensure these powers remain proportionate and appropriate; and/or legislate mandatory periodic reviews by the PJCIS to ensure that parliament periodically tests whether the powers remain necessary and proportionate in light of contemporary risks and practice.”
“Severe but rarely used powers require predictable, independent scrutiny to ensure that they remain necessary and proportionate and are not just permanent and beyond review. Another objection could be, 'Isn't permanent standard for other ASIO powers?' It's true that many of ASIO's special powers, like those concerning surveillance devices and computer access, do not sunset. But compulsory questioning sits in a different category. It compels information from people who may not be suspects, limits rights normally seen as fundamental, and historically was justified as temporary and exceptional. Treating it differently is consistent with its exceptional character. Trust grows when powers are used proportionately and overseen credibly. That's why this bill should balance operational need with visible accountability.”
“Currently that review is discretionary, even though the PJCIS itself said in its inquiry report tabled last week: With the entrenchment of the compulsory questioning powers, regular review, including parliamentary oversight by the committee is more important than ever. I want to address some possible objections to these amendments. Some will ask, 'Won't stronger oversight slow ASIO down?' Well, my proposed amendments to retain the sunset clause and mandate the committee's periodic review of the powers will not burden ASIO's daily operations. They provide legitimate legislative oversight without impeding ASIO's ability to seek or execute questioning warrants. Another objection could be, 'If the powers are rarely used, why do we need strong safeguards?' We need these safeguards because they are coercive and exceptional powers.”
“I will be introducing two amendments which would ensure that the bill functions effectively and responsibly. They reflect alternative routes to improving oversight and accountability. Firstly, I will propose that the sunset clause is retained, extended to March 2030, in order to preserve the discipline of periodic parliamentary review. This approach gives immediate operational certainty to ASIO while reaffirming that extraordinary powers must be regularly justified. As a second safeguard, which could operate with or without my first amendment, I'll introduce an amendment to ensure the mandatory statutory review of these powers by the PJCIS.”
“The test we should apply is not whether ASIO needs tools to protect Australians. I agree that it does. Rather, the test should be whether the combination of permanently entrenching coercive questioning powers and expanding their scope is necessary and proportionate and whether the oversight architecture is strong enough to command enduring public confidence. Compulsory questioning affects the rights of people who may never be charged with an offence. It intrudes on the right of silence and can limit access to counsel in ways that are unusual in our system. These features explain why, for 20-plus years, parliament has insisted on sunsetting to force a recalibration if the security context or operational experience changes. Removing that discipline risks normalising exceptionality.”
“The Law Council has consistently characterised these as extraordinary coercive powers and opposed making them permanent without stronger justification and safeguards, calling for measures such as judicial ratification and enhanced lawyer access. Their central argument is that if scope is broadened then oversight must be strengthened, not relaxed. Across multiple reports in 2025, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights questioned the necessity of repealing the sunset clause, warning that remaining safeguards may be insufficient given the extent of rights interference. The common theme is consistency. Powerful tools should be balanced by predictable, structured scrutiny. That's not anti-security; it's the formula for durable legitimacy, which in turn strengthens compliance, cooperation and public trust.”
“The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is currently empowered to review these extraordinary powers, but only at the committee's discretion. That is, without the sunset clause, there's no automatic cycle of periodic review and public scrutiny. I note that, in a 2024 submission to the PJCIS, ASIO's preference was to not abolish sunsetting but extend it by five years, to 2030. Even though ASIO's position had changed in its 2025 submission to favour making the powers permanent, the organisation specifically recognised that, to fulfil its mission, ASIO must maintain the confidence and trust of the Australian people, parliament and government.”
“They are no substitute for the safeguard provided by periodic review and public scrutiny. We know the powers are rarely used but potentially far-reaching. Only a small number of questioning warrants have been issued since their introduction in the wake of September 11, two decades ago, as limited and temporary measures. Yet the powers remain coercive by design. They compel individuals to appear, produce items and answer questions, and noncompliance is a serious offence punishable by up to five years imprisonment. Rarity does not make these powers ordinary. It underscores why their continued necessity should be tested periodically and transparently. The sunset clause has functioned as an accountability measure that prompts detailed review and parliamentary debate before continuation. Removing it would end that automatic cycle of scrutiny.”
“I accept this, but the challenge for us is to ensure that, in meeting today's risks, we do not erode the trust that underpins our democracy. Oversight mechanisms must match the gravity of the powers involved. Since 2003, parliament has attached a sunset clause to these questioning powers, extended on six occasions, precisely because they are exceptional and require regular justification. The bill would remove that safeguard entirely, even as it broadens the matters for which questioning can occur. That combination—more scope with less review and scrutiny—sharpens the need for parliament to consider proportionate amendments. The additional safeguards proposed in the bill, while welcome, are marginal, especially given the extraordinary powers are now proposed to be expanded and made permanent.”
“That's not just my assessment; it's the consistent language of our human rights institutions and legal profession. Their concerns about proportionality, necessity and safeguards should inform this House in charting a sensible path forward. This bill makes several significant changes to ASIO'S coercive questioning powers under division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act 1979. In short, it proposes to remove the longstanding sunset clause and, at the same time, expand the grounds for which an adult can be subject to compulsory questioning. The bill makes relatively minor adjustments to oversight and reporting in relation to the exercise of these powers. The government argues that the security environment is degrading and that certainty is needed for ASIO'S collection powers.”
“The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 engages some of the most intrusive powers available to the Commonwealth, coercive questioning powers that allow ASIO to compel answers from individuals, including people who are not accused of any offence and minors over the age of 14. They engage multiple fundamental rights, including the right to silence, freedom of movement, access to legal representation and the privilege against self-incrimination. Powers like these demand a careful, evidence based approach and a legislative framework that's proportionate to the threat environment and our democratic values. ASIO'S coercive questioning powers have always been considered extraordinary, even by the standards of national security legislation.”
“Of course, in both instances, those who chose to participate may have been more open to reform, but the overwhelming support shows that community views have evolved as the housing crisis has worsened. This is driven by a fundamental belief that came through strongly in the consultations. Housing should be treated as a necessity, not as an investment for building wealth. People want the next generation to be able to afford to buy a house to live in. The government must consider options for reform and must make these decisions based on the impact on housing affordability, intergenerational equity, budget sustainability and productivity, not politics.”
“In the past, reforms to how we tax property have been constrained by fears of political backlash, particularly following the 2019 federal election, but the political landscape has changed and the appetite for reform in my electorate of Curtin demonstrates this. Curtin has high rates of investment, property ownership, benefiting from the capital gains tax discount and negative gearing. Yet, in late 2024, when my office surveyed 370 constituents, three-quarters supported reform to both the capital gains tax and negative gearing systems. In November 20205, I undertook a community consultation with 240 participants, and two-thirds of those owned at least one investment property. The results were striking. More than 80 per cent supported reform to the capital gains tax discount, and more than 90 per cent supported reform to negative gearing.”
“They face unique pressures of extended postings, isolation from support networks and the intense responsibility of protecting our country. It's essential that they receive better, more holistic support. I welcome these bills, and I hope the establishment of an independent commissioner will lead to tangible improvements in the health, wellbeing and lives of current and former ADF personnel and their families. They deserve a system that supports them with consistency, compassion and integrity.”
“At every stage, witnesses stressed the need for a body capable of identifying systemic risks, providing frank advice and ensuring accountability across Defence, Veterans' Affairs and the broader government ecosystem. These bills respond directly to that call. The independent commissioner will be able to undertake inquiries, gather evidence, examine systemic concerns and, critically, refer matters directly to the minister, or even the Prime Minister, when required. That authority is essential to driving ongoing cultural and structural reform. Many ADF members live, work or transition back to civilian life in my electorate of Curtin. Their service places enormous physical, psychological and moral demands upon them and their families.”
“I rise today to welcome the Defence and Veterans' Service Commissioner Bill 2025 and the accompanying Defence and Veterans' Service Commissioner (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025. These bills implement recommendation 122 of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, a recommendation the commission described as one of its most important. They established the Defence and Veterans' Service Commission as a standalone statutory entity, strengthening its independence and authority. This is a meaningful reform, and I want to acknowledge the government for progressing it. The royal commission heard deeply distressing evidence from current and former ADF members. It revealed systemic issues in Defence culture, leadership, transition pathways, mental health care and departmental processes.”
“Given the disproportionate disadvantage faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people, especially the overrepresentation of young people in out-of-home care and youth detention, this commission will only succeed if its findings drive government action. So today I welcome these bills but I also put the government on notice: independence, powers and resources mean nothing unless matched by the courage to act. This commission gives us the chance to shift the trajectory for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people. My hope is that we seize it—that we listen and we act—and that this commission's reports are not just tabled in this parliament but taken seriously, implemented and responded to with the urgency and respect that First Nations children deserve.”
“This will help to provide a vital lever for sustained scrutiny and action, ensuring the commission's findings, systemic issues and recommendations are placed squarely before the parliament rather than filtered through government agencies. I note, importantly, that this bill has been shaped by significant input from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community representatives and that it's been welcomed by both SNAICC and the Australian Human Rights Commission. These are strong signs, but I want to be clear: a strong commission does not guarantee a strong government response. We've seen too many reports and too many recommendations left to gather dust, including 55 reports from parliamentary committees commissioned by this government and not responded to within the required timeframe. That's a lot of work sitting on the shelf.”
“I also welcome the bill's clarity on the rights, safety, development and wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander young people and that they must be understood in a manner that's consistent with their cultures and their communities. The commission is resourced with $33 million across the forward estimates and more than $9 million ongoing. Proper resourcing is what allows intent to translate into outcomes. It means research, education programs, community engagement and public advocacy can be done well and in partnership with communities. I also welcome the commissioner's capacity to prepare and table reports directly to the parliament.”
“This is the first national role solely focused on First Nations children and young people. The commissioner will be able to hear directly from children, young people and their families, ensuring that their voices are reflected in advice to government and in the design of programs and services. This should never have been revolutionary, but it has the potential to be transformative. From my experience working in various roles attempting to address Indigenous disadvantage, I've learned that the only path to success is listening and co-developing, centring the experience of people affected by policy in the design and development of that policy.”
“I particularly welcome that the bill establishes the commission as a separate statutory agency, with the commissioner recognised as an independent statutory officer. Independence is not symbolic; it's essential. It means the commissioner can speak hard truths, hold government to account and advocate for the safety and rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people without fear or favour. Unfortunately, we have a long history of mostly well-intentioned but ultimately ineffective and sometimes damaging policy, and we need independent voices that can call this out. The power to require individuals or government agencies to provide information or documents, backed by civil penalties for noncompliance, is critical. Without this, systemic issues may remain hidden behind bureaucratic barriers.”
“I rise today to welcome the National Commission for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and Young People Bill and the National Commission for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and Young People (Transitional Provisions) Bill. These bills mark a significant step towards doing what successive governments have failed to do: listen to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people, act on what we hear and build the structural accountability needed to ensure that they are not left behind. The government committed, two years ago, to establishing a legislated independent national commissioner, and I'm pleased to see this promise being honoured.”
“The government should be ambitiously simplifying our workplace relations system to improve productivity. Ambitious tax reform also matters. Australia relies heavily on taxing labour income even as the working age population shrinks. Shifting the tax base away from penalising work and investment would support productivity and long-term fiscal sustainability. Australia's inflation challenge cannot be solved by interest rates alone. Only by expanding the economy's productive capacity can we stabilise inflation. (Time expired)”
“Improving productivity is difficult, but we've had a productivity roundtable that has not yet delivered results, and the Productivity Commission released a five-year report in 2023 that included recommendations on how to improve productivity in education, migration, workplace relations, technology, business dynamism, the Public Service and decarbonisation. These remain good ideas. Reducing unnecessary regulation is an example that's critical. A typical small business must comply with thousands of pages of federal, state and local rules. Regulations are easy to add but hard to remove, and, over time, they accumulate. Our complicated workplace relations regime is a prime example of this. In the construction industry, productivity has gone down over the last 30 years.”
“We live better than people did a century ago not because we work harder but because we produce far more with the same amount of effort. As Paul Krugman famously said, 'Productivity isn't everything, but in the long run it's almost everything.' That's why it's concerning that the RBA has downgraded its medium-term productivity growth assumption to just 0.7 per cent per year. In the nineties and the early 2000s, growth above two per cent was common and supported rising wages and living standards. Today, a lower productivity ceiling weighs directly on incomes and opportunity.”
“In the absence of a market based carbon price, support for decarbonisation relies on ad hoc subsidies and grant programs that often lack transparency, encourage rent seeking and fail to drive economy-wide adjustment. A carbon price combined with targeted industry policies such as R&D incentives and workforce transition support would provide a far more efficient framework, replacing piecemeal interventions with clear economy-wide signals. The most important way to address inflation sustainably is lifting productivity, or working out how to make more goods and services with fewer resources. With high productivity, increased spending leads to more output. With low productivity, it leads to higher prices. It's like the speed limit on the economy. Productivity is also the main driver of rising living standards over generations.”
“What matters now is what we do about it, and it's time for some serious ambition on economic reform. The government can put downward pressure on inflation in a few different ways. One response is reducing government spending. Spending is at its highest level since 1988 other than during the pandemic, and the government needs to reinstate fiscal rules and make ministers and departments more accountable for the blowouts in budget measures. Another approach is improving the efficiency of government spending. Government should be focused on delivering government services more efficiently so we get better bang for our buck and there's an opportunity to do this with our climate and industry policy.”
“Wealthier households without mortgages or living on savings can continue spending, while those already living on the edge are forced to cut back on spending, which is ultimately how higher rates slow the economy. Annual inflation is now at 3.8 per cent, above the RBA's formal target range of two to three per cent. Inflation matters because it erodes our standard of living, particularly for households whose incomes don't keep pace with prices. Right now, there's ongoing political debate about what has caused the recent inflation pressures. The Treasurer points to strong private sector demand—that is, households and businesses spending more. The opposition points to high levels of public or government spending. In reality, both played a role, and finger-pointing does little to solve the problem for your average Australian.”
“Last week the Reserve Bank raised the official cash rate from 3.6 to 3.85 per cent in response to rising inflation. Raising interest rates makes borrowing money more expensive, so businesses and households spend less. This is a blunt instrument that the RBA uses to cool the economy. This is bad news for many Australians, because higher interest rates directly increase the cost of living, particularly for households with mortgages, small businesses carrying debt and rents whose landlords have to pass on their increased mortgage costs. For millions of people it means higher repayments, less disposable income and tougher decisions about everyday spending. Raising interest rates works largely by hurting poorer and more vulnerable households first.”
“If the bill comes back to the House in an improved form in line with the accord recommendations and taking these amendments into account, I'll reconsider supporting it at that stage. I commend these amendments to the House.”
“We in the House also do not want to pre-empt the inquiry, but, unfortunately, the government gives us no choice, as it would prefer to push the bill through the House before the committee reports. While I do not believe this bill should pass as drafted, I think there's an opportunity to introduce amendments to build an impactful and effective ATEC. I want to acknowledge the genuine engagement of the minister with my office and with the sector more broadly and his passion for implementing the universities accord and building a flourishing higher education sector. I thank the minister for his comments in the House and for saying that he'll consider my amendments alongside the Senate inquiry report. I will not divide the House on these amendments.”
“I'll also be supporting an amendment to be moved by the member for Kooyong in relation to student contributions. One of ATEC's functions is to provide advice on the efficient cost and value of higher education courses and programs. However, as drafted, ATEC could only consider Commonwealth contributions, not student contributions. In other words, when assessing how much courses cost, ATEC wouldn't even consider how much students are paying. Both Commonwealth and student contributions must be considered in analysing the cost, value and efficiency of higher education courses and programs, and the member for Kooyong's amendment will ensure student contributions will be considered as well. I understand from the government that it will not support these amendments because it doesn't want to pre-empt the outcomes of a committee inquiry.”
“The universities accord final report, for example, recommended seven commissioners. My amendments would increase the number of commissioners from three to five, remedying this issue. The third intended outcome of these amendments is to make explicit the role of ATEC as a steward of the research sector. This, too, was recommended by the final report of the universities accord and a number of key stakeholders. Research is essential to Australia's long-term productivity, economic strength and international competitiveness, and the higher education sector plays a major role in Australia's research output. My amendments would allow ATEC to prepare reports and advice in relation to research and research training and ensure that the commissioners collectively possess experience in research and research training.”
“This means that the department could, if it so wished, limit ATEC staff and effectively drain it of resources. One of these amendments would require ATEC and the department to enter into an enforceable agreement that would specify minimum staffing levels and standards, providing a level of certainty to ATEC. The second outcome I'm trying to achieve with my amendments is to increase the number of commissioners. As drafted, there's significant concern that three commissioners will be insufficient to provide expertise across a diverse range of fields and areas, such as higher education, VET, tertiary education governance and administration, stakeholder consultation and engagement, regional Australia, research and research training, equity and access, and learning and teaching.”
“As drafted, it appears that ATEC will effectively be an extension of the department, providing advice on the request of the minister. ATEC only has one opportunity a year to provide advice that's not requested by the minister, in the S tate of the tertiary education system report, and that's not enough. My amendments would allow ATEC to initiate its own research and advisory functions, allow ATEC to publish reports with ministerial consultation, rather than ministerial agreement, and clarify that the State of the tertiary education system report can be prepared and published without the request of the minister. Further, ATEC should have some level of control and certainty over staffing arrangements. As drafted, staffing would be almost exclusively controlled by the department.”
“The first outcome would be to provide ATEC with autonomy and independence, as recommended by the Australian U niversities A ccor d— f inal r eport and a wide range of stakeholders. ATEC should have the ability to initiate and publish advice and recommendations on its own initiative rather than solely at the request of the minister, which is how it's currently drafted. Without this independence and autonomy, ATEC won't be able to provide long-term well-evidenced policy advice. Much of the most important policy reforms may not be politically palatable, like reforming the failed job-ready graduates scheme. Without this independence and autonomy, ATEC will not have the opportunity to regularly advise on these issues.”
“Note: The effect of this subsection is that remuneration or allowances of an ATEC Commissioner will be paid out of money appropriated by an Act other than the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 . (4) This section has effect subject to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 (except as provided by subsection (3)). (23) Heading to clause 69, page 47 (line 12), omit " Ministerial agreement ", substitute " Consultation with Minister ". (24) Clause 69, page 47 (lines 15 and 16), omit "seek and obtain the agreement of the Minister", substitute "consult with the Minister". Having consulted with universities and considered the 62 submissions to the committee inquiry, I've drafted these amendments to achieve three key outcomes.”
“(21) Clause 59, page 42 (line 1), omit subparagraph (a)(i), substitute: (i) higher education (including research and research training); (22) Clause 61, page 44 (lines 2 to 11), omit the clause, substitute: 61 Remuneration (1) An ATEC Commissioner is to be paid, by the Commonwealth, the remuneration that is determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. If no determination of that remuneration by the Tribunal is in operation, an ATEC Commissioner is to be paid, by the Commonwealth, the remuneration that is prescribed by the regulations. (2) An ATEC Commissioner is to be paid, by the Commonwealth, the allowances that are prescribed by the regulations. (3) Subsections 7(9) and (13) of the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 do not apply in relation to the office of ATEC Commissioner.”
“(15) Clause 42, page 29 (after line 18), after paragraph (d), insert: (da) the contribution of higher education in progress towards any research, development, innovation or science priorities and targets set by the Commonwealth; (16) Clause 42, page 30 (after line 12), at the end of the clause, add: (6) To avoid doubt, a report is not prepared at the request of the Minister. (17) Heading to clause 58, page 41 (line 1), omit " the Commissioner ", substitute " Commissioners ". (18) Clause 58, page 41 (line 3), omit "The Commissioner", substitute "A Commissioner". (19) Clause 58, page 41 (line 7), omit "the Commissioner", substitute "a Commissioner". (20) Clause 58, page 41 (line 23), omit "The Commissioner", substitute "A Commissioner".”
“(13) Clause 41, page 27 (after line 17), after paragraph (d), insert: (da) the funding of research and research training, including indirect costs of research grants and support for research students; (14) Clause 41, page 28 (after line 25), at the end of the clause, add: Work initiated by the ATEC (4) Within the scope of the ATEC's work plan specified in section 45, the ATEC may initiate its own research and analysis and publish reports, advice and recommendations in relation to the items listed in subsections (1) and (2).”
“(9) Clause 11, page 9 (after line 14), after subparagraph (d)(ii), insert: (iia) the funding of research and research training; and (10) Clause 20, page 13 (lines 9 to 12), omit the clause, substitute: 20 Commissioner There are to be 3 Commissioners. (11) Heading to clause 21, page 13 (line 13), omit " the Commissioner ", substitute " a Commissioner ". (12) Clause 22, page 14 (after line 11), at the end of the clause, add: (4) The Secretary and the ATEC must enter into an enforceable agreement specifying minimum staffing levels and standards.”
“by leave—I move amendments (1) to (7) and (9) to (24), as circulated in my name, together: (1) Clause 2, page 2 (table item 1), omit the table item, substitute: (2) Clause 5, page 4 (line 5), omit "the", substitute "a". (3) Clause 5, page 4 (line 8), omit "the", substitute "a". (4) Clause 9, page 8 (line 10), omit paragraph (c), substitute: (c) 3 Commissioners. (5) Clause 11, page 8 (line 27), omit "if requested by the Minister". (6) Clause 11, page 9 (after line 2), after paragraph (c), insert: (ca) to prepare reports, and provide advice and recommendations to the Minister, the Research Minister and the Science Minister, in relation to research and research training in higher education system and its interactions with the broader research and development system; (7) Clause 11, page 9 (line 4), omit "if requested by the Minister".”
“I will move amendments to make ATEC independent, capable and fit for purpose, and if the government is serious about delivering the accord's vision then it should accept them.”
“I won't make an amendment to remove this role for ATEC, because it's not a bad insurance policy in case future laws are passed to give the minister that power. The accord makes a powerful case for ATEC, and I agree with that case in principle. But I will not support a bill that creates an ATEC that's not independent, not adequately constituted and not equipped to do the job it was created to do. If ATEC is not meaningfully different from the department, if it cannot initiate and publish robust advice, if it cannot build its own capability and if it cannot credibly steward the system over time, then it will not solve the problems that the accord identified. That's why I oppose this bill as drafted.”
“I continue to oppose hard caps as a policy tool. Hard caps are often sold as a housing solution. They are not. Housing supply and structural reform are the real solutions for the housing crisis. International student caps risk damaging Australia's international reputation, undermining a major export industry and destabilising university funding without delivering meaningful relief for our cost-of-living problems. But if the government insists on moving in that direction then it is better that international student caps are set by an expert steward working with universities individually rather than by blunt command-and-control ministerial settings. For now, though, I maintain that setting hard caps is the wrong answer.”