← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES · FORMER

Sophie Scamps

Mackellar · Independent · Australia

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

My question is to the Prime Minister. Every year, more than 400 Australians die by suicide linked to gambling. That's more than 1,000 lives lost since the Murphy report was handed down.

SITTING OF 2026-07-02 · READ IN HANSARD

I rise to speak about absolute legend Charlie Verco, the courageous 24-year-old Mackellar local and Newport surf club member who paddled towards the jaws of a shark to save Leah Stewart, who was being attacked at Coogee Beach on 13 June.

SITTING OF 2026-06-30 · READ IN HANSARD

Charlie's actions reflect the very best of our community and the values that define Australia's surf lifesaving culture. On behalf of the northern beaches community and everyone across Australia, I'd like to thank Charlie for his courage, selflessness and unwavering commitment to serving others.

SITTING OF 2026-06-30 · READ IN HANSARD

Music, film publishing and broadcasting already operate on licensed use of content at scale. The Copyright Act provides a clear and workable framework. Copyright is not the enemy of innovation; it is what allows creators to earn a living from their talent and their work.

SITTING OF 2026-06-25 · READ IN HANSARD

This proposal is also reportedly linked to discussions with major AI tech firms about data centre investment in Australia. Investment must never come at the cost of Australian rights. The Albanese government must not sell out Australians to big tech.

SITTING OF 2026-06-25 · READ IN HANSARD

Right now, we are at a critical crossroad for Australia's creative arts industry, one that may deeply harm this invaluable sector. At the recent AI summit in Sydney, the chair of the Tech Council of Australia, Scott Farquhar, called for copyright reform to encourage AI investment.

SITTING OF 2026-06-25 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 506 lines we hold for Sophie Scamps, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 7 of 11.

  1. (2) The Board must, as soon as practicable after the end of each financial year, give the Minister a written report that: (a) assesses the success of the CEO in performing the CEO's functions during the financial year in an accountable, efficient, outcomes-focused and transparent manner; and (b) includes any recommendations made under or in relation to paragraphs (1)(b) to (e) or paragraph (a) of this subsection; and (c) addresses any other matters prescribed by the rules. (3) The Minister must cause a copy of each report given under subsection (2) to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the Minister receives it. (4) The Board has power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for, or in connection with, the performance of its functions.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. 11B Functions of the Board (1) The Board has the following functions: (a) to appoint the CEO; (b) to monitor, assess and report on the CEO's performance of the CEO's functions; (c) to ensure that the CEO performs the CEO's functions consistently with the object of this Act; (d) to determine the policies and long-term strategic plans of NEPA, and of the CEO in relation to the performance of the CEO's functions, including policies and plans relating to organisational governance and risk management; (e) to determine what proportion of NEPA's budget should be spent on monitoring, compliance, enforcement and assurance; (f) to advise the CEO on any matter relating to the protection of the environment or relating to the object of this Act (at the CEO's request or on the Board's own initiative).

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. (13) Clause 9, page 7 (before line 10), before subparagraph (2)(c)(i), insert: (ia) the Board members; (14) Clause 9, page 7 (after line 15), after subparagraph (2)(d)(i), insert: (ia) the functions of the Board referred to in section 11B; and (15) Clause 10, page 7 (before line 19), before paragraph (a), insert: (aa) the Board; and (16) Clause 11, page 7 (lines 23 to 25), omit the clause, substitute: 11 Function of NEPA The function of NEPA is to assist the Board and the CEO in the performance of their functions. (17) Page 7 (after line 25), after Division 2, insert: Division 2A — The Board Subdivision A — Establishment and functions 11A Establishment The NEPA Board is established by this section.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. Indigenous person means a person who is: (a) a member of the Aboriginal race of Australia; or (b) a descendant of an Indigenous inhabitant of the Torres Strait Islands. (11) Clause 8, page 6 (lines 3 to 7), omit the clause, substitute: 8 Simplified outline of this Part This Part establishes the Board of NEPA and the office of the CEO of NEPA. It also establishes NEPA for the purposes of assisting the Board and the CEO in the performance of their functions. The Board is the accountable authority of NEPA. (12) Clause 9, page 7 (line 8), omit "CEO", substitute "Board".

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. (8) Clause 5, page 3 (before line 28), before paragraph (a) of the definition of entrusted person , insert: (aa) a Board member; or (9) Clause 5, page 4 (lines 3 to 6), omit paragraph (d) of the definition of entrusted person , substitute: (d) a person engaged under section 23 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 by the Board under a written agreement to assist in, or advise in relation to, the performance of the Board's functions or the CEO's functions; or (10) Clause 5, page 4 (after line 12), after the definition of environment , insert: former judge means: (a) a former Justice of the High Court; or (b) a former judge of the Federal Court of Australia; or (c) a former judge of the Supreme Court of a State or Territory.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. (5) Clause 4, page 3 (lines 3 to 5), omit "the CEO's independence by directing the CEO in the performance or exercise of the CEO's functions or powers", substitute "the Board's or the CEO's independence by directing them in the performance or exercise of their functions or powers". (6) Clause 5, page 3 (after line 17), after the definition of advisory group , insert: Board : see section 11A. Board member means a member of the Board and includes the Chair and Deputy Chair. (7) Clause 5, page 3 (after line 18), after the definition of CEO , insert: Chair : see subsection 11D(5). Deputy Chair : see subsection 11D(5).

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. by leave—I move amendments (1) to (34) as circulated in my name together: (1) Clause 2, page 2 (table item 1), omit the table item, substitute: (2) Clause 4, page 2 (line 20), after "Agency,", insert "establishes the Board of NEPA". (3) Clause 4, page 2 (after line 21), after the paragraph beginning "This Act establishes", insert: The Board's functions include appointing the CEO, determining policies and long-term strategic plans for the CEO, advising the CEO and assessing and reporting on the CEO's performance of the CEO's functions. (4) Clause 4, page 3 (line 2), omit "the CEO and".

    SITTING OF 2025-11-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. Finally, a lack of trust in our political system, a lack of trust in our democracy, is something that undermines social cohesion and a sense of wellbeing. Anything we can do to inspire greater trust in our government and our political system is always a great way to grow that social cohesion.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. We know that sometimes it is people like whistleblowers and investigative journalists who need to make these applications anonymously, and we know that there have been many royal commissions coming from investigative journalism, so to cut that out, to shut that out, would be a retrograde step in terms of our transparency. There is one other thing I want to mention. A number of us have said that freedom of information is a cornerstone, a key pillar of our democracy. We need to be moving towards greater transparency and greater accountability, rather than greater secrecy. That's why having an independent, broad based review of our FOI system is incredibly important, and I support the member for Curtin's call for there to be a broad based review of our FOI system.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. I rise in support for the member of Curtin's amendments. I just want to add my voice in calling for a broad review of the Freedom of Information Amendment Bill and of our FOI system—again, not just a committee review, but one that's done independently by experts. We know all previous reviews—the Hawke, Shergold, Faulkner and Thodey—all recommended comprehensive reviews. There are multiple concerns with this bill to change our FOI laws. They include the expansion of the cabinet document exemption, the reintroduction of application fees for FOI requests—something that would shut some people out of their democracy and promote secrecy over transparency—and the removal of the ability for a FOI applicant to remain anonymous or use a pseudonym.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. The amendment I'm moving removes the expansion of the deliberative documents exemption, something that would move us away from a culture of disclosure and towards a culture of secrecy. Our FOI system is critical to the integrity and strength of our democracy, and we must preserve and protect it at all costs. That's why I asked the government to engage in good faith with the crossbench amendments today. There is no urgency to push these changes through, and I ask the government to seriously consider these amendments. I commend the amendment to the House.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. I would urge the government to instead set up an independent, comprehensive review of the FOI system in a way that modernises it to work for, not against, our democracy. However, in place of that, the bill— A division having been called in the House of Representatives— Sitting suspended from 17:00 to 17:13 However, in place of that, the bill should, at the very least, be amended to remove the most egregious elements. These include the member for Indi's amendments to remove the expansion of the cabinet documents exemption and application fees and the member for Kooyong's amendment to remove the restriction on anonymous requests. I thank them both for their tenacity in striving to strengthen the integrity and transparency of our political system.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. Disappointingly, the government has not taken on key recommendations of the 2019 Thodey report to reform the appointment and tenure processes of departmental secretaries. Such reforms would structurally strengthen the independence of the Public Service and improve the ability of public servants to provide frank and fearless advice. Freedom of information is a key pillar of our democracy. It ensures that the Australian people have access to the information they need to understand the decisions and actions of their government. Australia's FOI system does need repair, but the overwhelming sentiment from community experts—and in submissions to the Senate inquiry on this bill—is that this bill is not fit for purpose. Given the strong and broad opposition to the bill, I feel it should be withdrawn.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. A central argument for the government for the proposed expansion of exemptions is that the current provisions constrain the delivery of frank and fearless advice. Certainly, we must protect the Public Service values of impartiality, intellectual rigour and perhaps, most importantly, the willingness of public servants at all levels to offer frank and fearless advice to their superiors and their ministers. Yet the evidence, including from the robodebt royal commission, shows that factors other than FOI are contributing to failures to provide frank and fearless advice. These include the central role of government in appointing and dismissing departmental secretaries, which has the potential to impact the relationship between the secretary and the minister.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. In the words of former Public Service Commissioner Andrew Podger, 'They could be used to refuse access to almost any document.' Specifically, the list includes whether giving access to the document would or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the orderly and effective conduct of a government decision-making process. This is one of many measures in this bill that would reduce government transparency and take our public service in a more secretive direction. As I outlined in my second reading speech, experts, the broader community and my crossbench colleagues have all raised key concerns with this bill, including the expansion of the cabinet documents exemption, the reintroduction of application fees for FOI requests and the removal of the ability for an FOI applicant to remain anonymous or use a pseudonym.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. I move the amendment circulated in my name: (1) Schedule 7, Part 3, page 64 (line 1) to page 65 (line 5), omit the Part. The amendment I am moving today is simple. It removes the changes proposed in this bill to the deliberative documents exemption of the Freedom of Information Act. The bill proposes to expand this exemption by including a new list of 'factors against giving access' in addition to the current 'factors favouring access' and 'irrelevant factors'. This list of factors against giving access to a document in the public interest is overly broad.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. They have conveniently failed to mention that the Hawke review did not recommend expanding the deliberative processes exemption and expressly rejected the claim that FOI would chill the delivery of what is a legal obligation on public servants to give frank and fearless advice. Australia's FOI system is a pillar of our democracy. It certainly needs repair, but this bill is not fit for purpose and I cannot, in all good faith, support it. The government should withdraw this bill and set up an independent comprehensive review of the system that modernises it in a way that works for, and not against, our democracy.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. The idea that we can modernise Australia's FOI system by relying on recommendations from a 2013 review is hard to believe, but, worse, the government has cherrypicked the recommendations from that review. The primary recommendation of the 2013 review that it is now relying on to push through amendments was to undertake a comprehensive review of the FOI system. The government is also silent on the recommendations of both the 2015 Shergold review and 2019 Thodey review into the Public Service that further reviews be conducted into FOI system. And what about the other recommendations in those reviews about strengthening the independence and culture of the Public Service, including, for instance, the Thodey review recommendations to strengthen the processes of appointment and removal of departmental secretaries?

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. There is also no evidence that the government has considered alternative ways of addressing these matters that won't dissuade legitimate FOI applicants, particularly those from poorer or more vulnerable applicants, including potential future whistleblowers. The government is worried about the chilling effect of FOI on government decision-makers, but shows no concern for the chilling effect of these amendments on legitimate applicants. As an example of the legislative process, the bill represents an affront to good lawmaking. There has been no proper consultation on such an important piece of legislation. The government itself admits that it is relying on previous reviews—in particular, the statutory FOI Act review conducted by Allan Hawke back in 2013, over a decade ago.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. It is not hard to imagine that this would allow a greater scope for the provision of frank and fearless advice. Next, this bill reintroduces application fields that were abolished in 2010 as part of the opening up of government and removes the ability to make anonymous requests. The government argues that these changes are needed to deal with the volume of requests—in particular, vexatious or AI generated requests—but, again, the evidence is minimal. If the government is asking the parliament to restrict democratic rights, at the very least it needs to produce evidence that would justify this.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. The Auditor-General, Caralee McLiesh, also recently highlighted the costs associated with lack of transparency in the public sector, stating: A lack of transparency means it is harder for people to understand government activity, obtain information to make decisions, and participate more fully in public life. It weakens accountability in a system that lacks other accountability mechanisms … Such accountability mechanisms include market competition. A proactive approach to publishing much more information would reduce a lot of the administrative burden of FOI requests. Additionally, former commissioner Podger has recommended that firm limits on political involvement would ensure a more appropriate system of rewards and penalties for senior public servants.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. Andrew Podger, the former commissioner for the Public Service, has said: … other factors than FOI are contributing to failures to provide frank and fearless advice. One clearly accepted by the royal commission is the process for appointing (and terminating) departmental secretaries and the role and appointment process of the APS Commissioner. He went on to say: The FOI Act may be contributing … but the evidence is far from clear. More likely is pressure from ministers and ministerial advisers exaggerating the political dangers, and a public service overly responsive to the government and failing to meet their obligations to serve the Parliament and the Australian public.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. This list of factors against giving access to a document in the public interest includes whether 'giving access to the document would or could reasonably be expected to have' any of the following effects, including prejudicing the 'orderly and effective conduct of a government decision-making process.' In the words of former Public Service Commissioner Andrew Podger, this 'could be used to refuse access to almost any document'. In expanding the deliberative process exemption, the government is relying on the 2015 Shergold review and the 2019 Thodey review, which including anecdotes from public servants that their advice is chilled by the possibility of disclosure under the FOI regime and recommended the widening of the deliberative process exemption. However, the chilling effect is far from conclusive.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. She continued: The mere fact that a document is a Cabinet document should not, by itself, be regarded as justifying maintenance of its secrecy. But what we have here, under the cover of the robodebt royal commission, is the government extending the cabinet document exemption and extending it to briefing documents, summaries or any reference to the contents of a document to which an exemption applies—a massive expansion of this exemption. Next, the bill expands the conditional exemption for documents that would reveal the deliberative processes of government. It does this by adding a new list of 'factors against giving access' in addition to the current 'factors favouring access' and 'irrelevant factors'.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. Specifically, the commission found that, while the minister failed to meet his responsibility to properly inform cabinet, it was senior public servants who provided advice to cabinet that did not contain a reference to the concerns regarding income averaging and the need for legislative change. In relation to the cabinet exemption, Commissioner the Hon. Catherine Holmes AC did not merely recommend tinkering with the exemption; she recommended its complete repeal: … the Government should end the blanket approach to confidentiality of Cabinet documents. To give effect to this, section 34 of the FOI Act should be repealed. The wide range of class and conditional exemptions in the FOI Act is sufficient to protect the public interest in relation to Cabinet documents.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. Recently, I had my own FOI request for the final report from the review of public sector board appointments processes denied on the basis of cabinet confidentiality. The bill will broaden that exemption. It proposes that a document will be exempt if 'a substantial purpose for its preparation was submission for consideration by the cabinet.' This will effectively broaden the amount of material able to be denied. The government is expanding this exemption, despite the royal commission into robodebt finding that cabinet secrecy enabled the abuse of power to continue.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. Among the bill's most concerning features are these: the expansion of the 'cabinet document' exemption; the expansion of the 'deliberative processes' exemption, through the addition of a list of 'factors against giving access'; the reintroduction of application fees for FOI requests; and the removal of the ability for an FOI applicant to remain anonymous or use a pseudonym. First, I want to turn to the expansion of the absolute exemption for cabinet confidentiality. This is an existing exemption that we know governments rely on to resist applications. Indeed, the government relied on cabinet confidentiality to refuse to deliver to the Senate the documents that provide evidence of the vexatious and AI-generated applications that it claims it is responding to in the bill.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. Requests for the government's evidence for these proposed freedom of information request restrictions have repeatedly gone unanswered. During Senate estimates, the Attorney-General's Department was unable to produce any material evidence of malicious actors or automated requests, and in response to an order for the production of documents in the Senate, requesting evidence of claims that vexatious requests under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 are being generated by artificial intelligence or other non-human actors, the Attorney-General provided two US media reports and a list of talking points. This is hardly conclusive evidence.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. And the Australia Institute has found that only 21 per cent of FOI requests in financial year 2023 were granted in full compared to 81 per cent in 2006. Where the average request took 13 hours to determine in 2006-7, it took 51 hours in 2023-24. In other words, the government employs four public servants to do what only took one public servant under the Howard government. Clearly, the system needs fixing, but the government's bill takes the system in the wrong direction. Under the guise of responding to alleged abuse of the system by technology, the government is attempting to fundamentally shift the FOI culture away from disclosure, undermining many of the important reforms introduced in 2010. The government has framed this bill as a crackdown on 'abusive and frivolous' FOIs, but where is the evidence of this abuse by technology?

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. Here we are, with the bill having been relegated to the Federation Chamber by a government who clearly wants to ram these changes through without adequate time for scrutiny and consideration and without the level of debate they deserve. Certainly, Australia's FOI system needs an overhaul. You'd be hard pressed to find someone who disagrees with that. Indeed, in December 2023, the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee described the system as broken and unfit for purpose. In July this year, the Centre for Public Integrity released analysis of the operation of the FOI system. It revealed a system that is underresourced, riddled with delays and concerning indications of the abuse of exemptions.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. Freedom of information is one of the key pillars of a democracy. It should ensure that people have access to the information they need to understand the decisions and actions of their government. Australia has a proud history as a world leader in freedom of information, having introduced a comprehensive federal FOI scheme in 1982, as part of the new administrative law reforms, and then undertaken a major overhaul of the scheme in 2010, under the leadership of Senator John Faulkner, to promote a greater culture of disclosure. Unfortunately, the Freedom of Information Amendment Bill 2025 does not continue this leadership. This bill reduces government transparency and takes our public services in a more secretive direction. Both of these outcomes would undermine our democracy.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. This reform is an opportunity, a once-in-a-generation chance to fix our broken system, restore trust and put nature at the heart of decision-making, while providing a more efficient process for business and investment. As it stands, the bill does not do that. It risks repeating the very mistakes that the Samuel review warned us about—too much discretion, too little accountability and too many loopholes. I urge the government to work with the crossbench, to listen to the experts and to strengthen this legislation so it genuinely delivers for our environment, our economy and future generations.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. The International Court of Justice's recent advisory opinion confirmed that countries like Australia are bound by international law to assess and limit greenhouse gas emissions, including those from exported coal and gas. While the government argues that the safeguard mechanism already regulates emissions, this only applies after a project is operating. It doesn't stop new, high-polluting projects from being approved in the first place. In the last term alone, the government approved 27 new coal, oil and gas projects, with four new approvals this term. Their combined lifetime emissions are expected to exceed 6.5 billion tonnes of CO2. A reformed EPBC Act that ignores climate is a reform that fails to meet the moment.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. In Western Australia, the EPA was forced to withdraw its 2019 emissions offset guidelines after intense pressure from the gas industry and the state government. When regulators appear to be bending to political or industry pressure, whether that bending is real or perceived, public confidence evaporates. If we want to rebuild trust, this regulator must be genuinely independent, properly resourced and protected from political meddling. Finally, we cannot talk about environmental protection in 2025 without talking about climate change. Yet these reforms studiously avoid it. Unsurprisingly, the government has again refused to include a climate trigger, a mechanism that would require assessment of a project's greenhouse gas emissions as part of environmental approvals.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. This is exactly the kind of political appointment risk I tried to address through my own 'ending jobs for mates' private member's bill, to ensure independent and transparent selection processes for key public roles. Without those safeguards, NEPA risks being just another arm of government rather than a truly independent watchdog. We've seen state based environmental regulators marred with this type of controversy. In New South Wales, the EPA was recently accused of bearing a report on lead contamination in children's blood to placate mining companies. In the Northern Territory, the EPA chair was involved in decisions on a major gas leak scandal without disclosing his paid role with an industry lobbying firm.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. However, concerningly, this can be satisfied through the payment of a restoration contribution charge to the restoration contributions holder. This allows for habitat-destroying developments to be deemed to have a net gain on a protected matter despite the impact being irreversible. The proponent can simply pay into the fund and thereby bypass the true net gain test, and there are no provisions requiring adequate accounting for delivery of the net gain. The reform package also establishes a national environmental protection authority, NEPA, which is welcome in principle. But there is a glaring flaw. The government has chosen not to create a governing board, and there is no independent appointment process for the CEO.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. While this could improve efficiency, it comes with an enormous risk. Of particular concern, the water trigger will be available for devolution despite being specifically excluded from bilateral approval agreements and regional plans in the current laws. Next, I'm deeply concerned regarding the approach to offsetting. There is no requirement for developers to avoid or reduce damage before moving to offsets under the mitigation hierarchy, only that the minister must consider the hierarchy. This will likely entrench offsetting as the default option rather than the last resort. The net gain test is designed to ensure that actions cannot be approved unless impacts on protected matters are offset through actions that result in a net gain.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. In a judgement in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court last year, Justice Rachel Pepper noted the Forestry Corporation's lengthy record of prior convictions for environmental offences, including polluting a forest waterway, inadequate threatened species surveys, unlawful harvesting of hollow-bearing trees and harvesting in koala and rainforest habitat exclusion zones. That's why I'll be moving amendments to these bills—to repeal the exemption for the regional forestry agreements and the continuous-use exemption. Another concern is the devolution of federal powers to state and territory governments, particularly in relation to the water trigger. The bill empowers the minister to accredit state processes and enter into bilateral agreements so that states can assess and approve projects on behalf of the Commonwealth.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. While the government has said that the national standards will apply to forestry activities it's difficult to see how this will work in practice, given the proposed standards do not yet exist and given forestry activities are exempt from the act. I simply do not accept that native forest logging should be exempt from our national environment laws on the basis that state laws can be relied upon instead. You need look no further than my home state of New South Wales to see why. In New South Wales, environmental requirements have been repeatedly breached by the Forestry Corporation of NSW.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. For decades, exemptions in the EPBC Act have allowed destructive activities to continue without federal assessment or approval, even when they impact threatened species or critical habitats. The most glaring examples are the regional forestry agreements, which exempt native forest logging from EPBC Act oversight and the continuous-use, or prior-authorisation, exemptions relied upon by proponents of agricultural land-clearing. Since the EPBC Act was introduced more than two decades ago, our environment has only declined further. Australia is now the only developed nation on the list of global deforestation hotspots. Our forests are being bulldozed at pace, pushing species like the koala, the greater glider and the grey-headed flying fox to the brink of extinction.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. The provision requiring approvals to pass the net-gain test, which is an important guardrail on the offset provisions, is subject to the satisfaction of the minister. There is also a high level of discretion available to the minister in providing for declarations or bilateral agreements to devolve powers to the states and territories, along with many other crucial checks and safeguards. Indeed, earlier this year, when there was a threat that the EPBC Act might actually be used to protect a species—the Maugean skate—the government stepped in and amended the bills. This is not the strong objective framework the Samuel review recommended. Next is the carve-outs and blanket exemptions.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. Yet these reforms expand and entrench ministerial discretion rather than curtail it. Key decisions and tests throughout the bills depend on whether the minister is 'satisfied' that something is the case or whether an action is 'not inconsistent with' national environment standards. That kind of subjective language weakens the law. The new environmental standards, which are meant to be the centrepiece of this reform, are riddled with this type of language and subjectivity. For example, an approval must not be inconsistent with a standard but only if the minister is satisfied that's the case. The no-regression principle, which is meant to ensure standards don't go backwards, applies only to the satisfaction of the minister.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. In fact, earlier this year, then opposition leader Peter Dutton said he would use the existing national interest test to fast-track the North West Shelf gas extension—a project that the Australia Institute estimates would release around 90 million tonnes of emissions every year, equivalent to building 12 new coal-fired power stations. This isn't about whether you trust the current minister; it's about what a future government, perhaps one less committed to protecting our environment, could do with such sweeping discretion. That brings me to the next serious flaw—the bills' overreliance on ministerial discretion throughout. The Samuel review found that the existing EPBC Act insufficiently constrains decision-maker discretion, leading to uncertainty and poor environmental outcomes.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Ken Henry has warned that the national interest test in these reforms is likely to incentivise significant lobbying from developers, as they are all absolutely convinced that their project is in the national interest. The legislation cites projects relating to defence, security and national emergencies as the types of projects that might attract the exemption, and the environment minister has confirmed it could be used for something like a rare earth mine or a gas project if that was what the minister of the day decided. But at the end of the day the minister only needs to be satisfied that the action is in Australia's national interest. It doesn't take much imagination to think about how this could be exploited.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. I have a number of concerns about these reforms that I'll go through in detail. Let me turn to the first major concern: the new national interest exemption. Under this provision, the environment minister could approve a project even if it includes what are deemed to be unacceptable impacts to the environment, so long as the minister deems that it is in the national interest. That's an enormous power. It effectively lets the minister override the law and to do so without having to explain why. While the minister must generally publish a copy of the decision, together with the reasons, this accountability mechanism can itself be avoided when the minister believes it is in Australia's national interest to not provide these details.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. Once ecosystems are destroyed, once species are extinct, no amount of economic activity or offsetting can bring them back. The people of Mackellar understand deeply the need to protect nature. They want their children and grandchildren to have the same connection to the coast, the creeks and the wild beauty that we've been lucky enough to grow up with. That's why they've asked me, as their representative, time and time again, to push for strong reforms to our national environment laws and to stop the destruction of our unique ecosystems, plants and animals that has occurred relentlessly in this country over the past few decades. They want a system that protects our environment and provides predictable, efficient decision-making for business. This is entirely possible, but these reforms are not it.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. Communities, investors and industry are all calling for the same thing: an approval process that is efficient, transparent and fair. Businesses need clarity on how decisions are made and they need to know that if they put forward a strong, environmentally sound proposal they'll get a fast 'yes' and if a project isn't up to scratch they'll get a fast 'no', so they can move on and refine their plans—not waste money—and invest with confidence elsewhere. That's what a well-functioning system delivers: speed, certainty and integrity. But this cannot come at the expense of nature. A healthy environment underpins a healthy economy. The two work hand in hand. So it is critical that this time around our nature protection laws do actually protect nature and that we don't see another 25 years of environmental neglect.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. It should be our nation's safeguard for the environment—the framework that ensures that our forests, rivers, oceans and wildlife are not irretrievably polluted and destroyed but protected for future generations. This package of reforms was intended to fix our national environment laws, but instead it risks entrenching the very weaknesses of the current EPBC Act that have allowed Australia's environment to decline so sharply. It is well understood that business needs greater certainty when it comes to project approvals. For Australia to meet our climate goals and unlock the enormous potential of renewable energy, we need clear, consistent and trusted environment laws. But right now many projects, including renewable energy projects, are being delayed or bogged down in confusion.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. I rise to speak on the Environment Protection Reform Bill 2025. There is broad agreement that the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, or EPBC Act, has utterly failed to protect our environment for the past 25 years. We now have 19 ecosystems on the brink of collapse, and we are a global deforestation hotspot, along with Bolivia and Brazil. I want to begin by saying, sadly, that I cannot support the environmental reforms in these bills in their current form, because, quite simply, they do not guarantee protection for our nature. The EPBC Act is the one piece of national legislation that we have to protect our environment.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-04 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. Australian taxpayers will be investing billions into the creation of critical mineral mining and refining and processing in this country. As we embark on the next big resources opportunity, we must not repeat the poor policy decisions that have allowed multinational companies to profit off Australian gas with little return to the everyday Australian.

    SITTING OF 2025-11-03 · READ IN HANSARD