Brad Vis
Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford, British Columbia · Conservative · Canada
“Mr. Speaker, the third petition I would like to present today is on nicotine pouches. This petition is being presented on behalf of small businesses, including convenience stores.”
“Mr. Speaker, I have a number of petitions to present today. The first is petition e-7198, which has 5,746 signatures. It calls upon the Minister of Fisheries to not remove the recreational access to chinook and coho salmon in the allotment of salmon allocation.”
“Mr. Speaker, earlier today, I asked a Liberal member a very simple question: Could he confirm or deny the rumours in British Columbia that, under the new security partnership between Canada and China and the government's desire to sell federal airport assets, Chinese companies would be able to buy those assets?”
“Mr. Speaker, the second petition I would like to present today is with regard to the elimination of the federal apprenticeship incentive. The petitioners call upon the Government of Canada to reinstate the apprenticeship incentive grant for Red Seal trades, index it to inflation, link it to the successful completion of technical training…”
“Mr. Speaker, Bill C-30 contains proposed new provisions under the Privacy Act and the Canada Transportation Act to assess the full value of our publicly owned airports. Rumours in British Columbia dictate that part of the new security agreement with China would allow Chinese companies to buy airports in Canada.”
“Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honour the life of Mel Zajac, a remarkable British Columbian whose compassion and generosity left an enduring imprint. Mel's life was marked by a profound tragedy that ultimately inspired a legacy of extraordinary philanthropy. In July 1986, he lost his son Mel Jr.”
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“To that end, the federal government should change the national code publication process such that provinces and territories have time to review a draft code for a year so they can collectively agree to a set of changes they can then adopt as fully harmonized national code at the time the code is published. Without this change, provinces will continue making their own amendments, which prevents harmonization and risks low adoption of costly changes in the 2025 codes. We are urging the federal government to take action now to avoid further fragmentation across Canada. Fragmented Interpretation—Local interpretation of building codes varies significantly from municipality to municipality—even across the same city sometimes, causing delays and extra costs for the industry.”
“If all levels of government hope to achieve building 500,000 new homes per year, they need to treat the sector as a partner, and excessive and ill‑conceived regulation is a key barrier to be addressed jointly. The more I read this, the more the concerns outlined by the Canadian Home Builders' Association contradict the community-building partnership clauses of the National Housing Strategy Act. How dare they? The letter continues: Harmonization Failure—Without addressing affordability in national codes, which is a key priority for almost every province and territory, the national codes risk being not adopted, or being modified so much provincially that there isn’t in fact harmonization.”
“A much more reasonable approach is needed. (1325) Reduced Transparency—Recent changes to the governance and committee structure have reduced transparency and sidelined industry voices. It would be interesting to see how many members of the Canadian Home Builders' Association are on any of the councils the government created in its National Housing Strategy Act. The letter continues: Decisions are increasingly made behind closed doors, with little rationale published or meaningful engagement with those most affected—Canada’s residential construction sector. The residential construction sector...can no longer be the target of poorly thought-out policies and regulations that take away from building more supply.”
“All changes should be properly revisited to look at their individual cost impacts, plus the cumulative cost impacts of the full suite of changes the 2025 code will require on each home. CHBA’s initial analysis of a typical 2500 sq. ft. home estimates increased costs from the 2025 code changes to be $56,364 (see Appendix A ) without any energy efficiency compliance cost. If provinces continue to mandate the progressive energy targets from the 2020 codes from Tier 1 to Tier 5 this would double those costs, bringing full implementation of the 2020 energy targets and 2025 codes to an estimated cost of $113,930 for each home built within the next few years. CHBA’s Housing Market Index shows material costs alone for that same house have gone up $100,000 from 2025. Canada’s housing crisis cannot handle these kinds of increases.”
“Much better approaches to achieve these goals must be found through a revamping of the 2025 code, with timelines and solutions that support affordability. Affordability Ignored—There is no formal requirement or code objective to protect housing affordability... Again, the government's approach is not aligned with its national housing strategy or the National Housing Strategy Act. The letter continues: ...not even a principle for committees developing the national codes. Economic concerns brought forward by the construction industry are being dismissed, and cumulative costs for all changes in the 2025 codes have not been calculated by those developing the code. Ultimately, it is Canadians bearing the brunt of the added cost of these changes.”
“Here are our key reasons for pausing all construction code changes and revisiting them with proper focus: Reduced Productivity—The large amount of national priorities and the pace of developing the respective code changes leave insufficient time for proper review, simplification and resolution of outstanding constructability or affordability concerns by those who are most affected—the residential construction industry...and Canadians facing affordability challenges in trying to buy a home. The amount of new code requirements is overwhelming. Changes related to energy, greenhouse gas emissions, radon, and wind/seismic loads add significant costs and delays and will reduce the productivity of the sector, while in many cases not even delivering the right outcomes.”
“With that, and before seeking adoption of the 2025 National Construction Codes by the provinces, CHBA is calling on the government to improve the 2025 codes with the proper lenses of affordability, evidenced-based decision-making, and a view to regulations that will truly lead to the optimized outcomes that must be considered in today’s world. The 2025 codes should be paused, revisited, and re-issued once these issues are addressed, so that provinces can and should actually adopt them, and harmonization can be achieved.”
“Further to that, by not addressing housing affordability in the national model codes, even though most provinces and territories call it a priority, there may in fact not be harmonization—the very reason model codes exist in the first place—because provinces may rightly reviewed and accepted by the time they are published, which negates harmonization by instead increasing the likelihood of provincial variations or non-adoption. Lack of harmonization at the provincial (and municipal) level is a key barrier to industry productivity. A serious course correction is needed, and thus CHBA is urging the Government of Canada to immediately pause all changes to the National Model Construction Codes, as Australia has done with its code system.”
“We estimate that the new 2025 code will add over $100,000 to the cost of a typical new home...this is completely untenable. To that end, we cannot support the 2025 model codes or their adoption and call for an immediate pause to redo them properly CHBA has become seriously concerned over the last few years with how Canada’s new governance system for national codes and its updated code development process is neither transparent nor evidence-based anymore. These deficiencies are having a direct and negative impact on housing affordability, construction productivity, and the ability of industry stakeholders to contribute meaningfully to effective codes development and implementation while reaching your government’s priorities of additional housing supply and more climate change effective construction.”
“(1320) At the same time, the government has not moved fast enough to improve the economic conditions required for private sector building. Developers have faced rising financing costs, regulatory delays, increased development charges and approval bottlenecks. In fact, I think it is worth reading the February 18, 2026, letter to the Prime Minister . It states: Dear Prime Minister... The Canadian Home Builders’ Association (CHBA) continues to support building code development where it follows principles of clear and convincing policy analysis, where evidence-based decision-making happens in public meetings and where committees emphasize cost-effective (ideally cost-neutral) acceptable solutions that equally solve the climate and housing affordability crises in Canada.”
“Without structural reform, faster approval, lower non-construction costs and a regulatory environment that enables builders to deliver housing at scale, any short-term easing driven by reduced demand will prove fragile and reversible. In short, the recent moderation in rents is not evidence that the government's housing strategy is succeeding. It is evidence that the imbalance between supply and demand remains unresolved and that the system responds more quickly to changes in population flows than to years of federal spending and bureaucracy. That reality only reinforces the conclusion that the core problem lies not with the funding levels but with the policy framework that has failed to deliver sufficient housing supply.”
“Claiming credit for lower rent growth under these circumstances risks confusing cause and effect. Slower rent increases caused by the arrival of fewer people does not mean housing has become more affordable. It means pressure has been temporarily relieved by constraining demand. This distinction matters. A housing system that relies on dampening demand rather than expanded supply is not resilient. It does nothing to address the underlying shortage. It does not improve access for Canadians already locked out of the housing market, and it offers no assurances that affordability will be sustained if demand rises again.”
“Fewer new entrants competing for the same limited stock of rental housing naturally does ease upward pressure on rents. That is basic economics. However, this is not a victory on housing policy, supply or affordability. It does not reflect new homes coming online at scale, faster approvals, lower construction costs or a more functional housing system. It reflects demand-side slowdown caused by changes in immigration and temporary resident policy, not the success of the national housing strategy. Indeed, if the government's housing strategy were working as intended, rent moderation would be driven by increased supply, improved affordability outcomes and lower usage of the food bank, especially for low and moderate-income households, not by reduced population inflows.”
“This is not an isolated policy failure. It is a system-level imbalance. It is therefore deeply ironic that the government is now taking credit for signs of easing in rental markets in some cities where rents have stabilized or grown more slowly. This change is far more plausibly explained by a reduction in housing demand, not by a sudden success of federal housing policy. Over the past year, the federal government has tightened and reduced inflows of temporary residents, including international students and temporary foreign workers, as it celebrated in the 2019 budget implementation act. That shift has had an immediate and measurable effect on rental demand, particularly in urban markets that absorbed a large number of the new arrivals.”
“The consequences for the government's policy failures on housing are not evenly distributed. Young Canadians are bearing the brunt. They face higher rents, delayed home ownership, delayed family formation, rising debt burdens and other postponed life decisions. Even when new units are built, the PBO cautions, the addition of these units would only partially offset the decline in overall affordability support, so even new supply is not solving the overall affordability crisis so many Canadians face today. It barely offsets worsening conditions. To add to these pressures, there is rapid population growth. Demand has surged. Supply has not kept pace, and policy failed to adjust fast enough. Over the last number of years, there have been historically low vacancy rates, rising rents and increased competition for entry-level housing.”
“That is not all bad, but the PBO warns that “this occurs within a context of declining spending and a shift away from immediate affordability supports”. I mention that in the context, because so many more Canadians are on the verge of being homeless. Homeless numbers are actually rising, while the government said they would do the opposite. The government has failed to prioritize the people who are in greatest need. The National Housing Strategy Act requires a focus on those in greatest need, but the funding structure and approach tell a different story. Funding is being shifted from programs that provide current affordability supports toward capital contributions with benefits over many decades. I hope there are some improvements there. (1315) Let us talk about generational impact.”
“The result is predictable: Housing needs continue to rise, affordability deteriorates, and the government declares success while the underlying problems worsen. In effect, the federal approach substitutes announcement and program branding for outcomes, producing numbers that are too small, too slow and too poorly targeted to reverse the crisis. According to the government's own independent budget officer's assessment, this level of supply cannot meet its stated objectives, confirming that the current strategy, as designed and funded, is failing to deliver the results Canada was promised. Let us delve a bit more into a structural problem in policy design. The issue is not just scale. It is design. The strategy has shifted toward financing tools and long-term capital programs.”
“It would be about 26,000 units over five years, a scale of delivery that underscores the failure of the government's current approach. Put plainly, this represents roughly 5,000 units per year nationwide, at a time when Canada is adding hundreds of thousands of new residents annually and facing a huge housing gap measured in hundreds of thousands of units. Even the Parliamentary Budget Officer characterized this contribution as “modest”, estimating it would increase housing completions by only about 2.1%, relative to baseline projections. That is not transformational. It is marginal change at best. When a strategy promises to cut housing need in half but delivers a supply that addresses only a tiny fraction of that projected shortfall, this amounts to an admission that the policy levers being used are inadequate.”
“If I had another couple of hours today, I would probably delve into some of the comments made by the Minister of Infrastructure and Housing on his new approach and the new bureaucracies the government is covering. I just do not have enough time to get through all that in the time I have today. I will talk about the supply strategy and Build Canada Homes for a bit. The government's response is to emphasize supply, to build more homes and to accelerate construction, but the PBO even offers a reality check where Conservatives and Liberals might agree on improving supply: “[Build Canada Homes] should be expected to make a modest contribution towards housing supply and affordability.” As I asked earlier when I read that report, what does “modest” mean in practice?”
“Rather than acknowledging that its approach has delivered neither the promised reduction in housing need nor improvements in affordability, the government is scaling back federal supports while leaving the underlying strategy largely intact, effectively retreating from its own commitments without admitting its failure. Let us be clear. Housing need continues to rise in Canada. Targets are being missed, and spending is being cut. This is not an adjustment. It is a quiet retreat from objectives the government has failed to meet under both the national housing strategy and the National Housing Strategy Act, an implicit acknowledgement that the approach has not worked, without the candour to admit failure or undertake a genuine course correction.”
“Rather than openly reassessing the strategy and admitting that its core design has failed, the government appears to be quietly pulling back, reducing funding while maintaining the same policy framework. This halfway acknowledgement, though, stops short of the full consideration the evidence supports, which is that the approach itself, not just its funding level, has failed to meet its objectives. (1310) I encourage everyone to look at the highlights on page 1 of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's outlook for housing programs under budget 2025. Federal plan spending on housing programs, as I just noted, is set to decline 56%, a decline that reflects more than a fiscal choice. It follows years in which the government failed to meet the core objectives it set for itself under both the national housing strategy and the strategy act.”
“Delayed project delivery, weak targeting and an overreliance on long-term capital programs have meant that additional funding has not produced proportional investments in affordability or a reduction in housing need. However, the PBO shows something more important: Outcomes have continued to worsen, not because funding was insufficient but because the government's approach failed to address structural constraints that determine whether homes actually get built and become affordable. Spending's falling 56% is a signal that the government itself is implicitly acknowledging that simply layering additional funding onto the existing approach has not delivered results.”
“Governments should be focused on removing barriers to construction and increasing supply. The association has warned that many regulatory responses to housing and climate objectives ultimately increase costs and reduce housing production. Let me expand on my speech on budget 2025 regarding less support, not more. One might assume that worsening outcomes could be addressed simply by expanding funding, but the evidence shows that money alone is not the binding constraint. The problem is not a lack of announcements or headline dollars. It is that the underlying policy framework has failed to translate resources into results. Structural barriers, slow approvals and misaligned incentives such as those outlined by the Canadian Home Builders' Association outline that very fact.”
“The Canadian Home Builders' Association argues that housing affordability and supply are already in crisis and that the code changes should be evidence-based, cost-effective and implementable at scale. The CHBA has criticized the 2025 codes for insufficient consideration of their cumulative cost impacts. The costs are so significant that in a February 2026 open letter to the Prime Minister , the Canadian Home Builders' Association calls for an immediate pause to that regulatory approach. The CHBA has cited federal impact analysis showing that high-energy performance tiers could increase construction costs by more than $40,000 per home. In total, the CHBA estimates that the 2025 National Building Code could add up to $100,000 in costs to a new unit. Every policy should be tested against one question: Will it build more homes?”
“Homeowners are carrying larger and larger debts. When borrowers fall behind today, they are falling behind on much larger mortgages. The average delinquent mortgage balance reached approximately $355,000 in quarter one of 2026, a 13.2% increase from a year earlier. Total consumer debt reached $2.66 trillion nationally. Mortgage delinquencies are often the final stage of household financial distress. The Bank of Canada found that households heading towards mortgage delinquency typically increase credit card utilization roughly two years beforehand, begin missing consumer credit payments one or two years beforehand and experience rapidly worsening financial conditions in the six months leading up to mortgage delinquency. Canada needs more homes, but the 2025 National Building Code risks making homes more expensive to build.”
“Rebecca Oakes, vice‑president of advanced analytics at Equifax Canada, said, “When we look kind of at the mortgage trend, it is just a really good indication of the severity of financial stress that’s happening in a region.” Ontario is experiencing record stress. The housing crisis is no longer even about affordability alone. It is becoming a mortgage payment crisis. (1305) Equifax reported that mortgage delinquencies were up 52% year over year in Ontario during quarter one of 2026. In Toronto, mortgage delinquency rates increased by approximately 58% year over year. Data from CMHC showed that around 0.21% of homeowners in Hamilton had not made a full mortgage payment in at least three months as of late 2025, representing a 425% increase in that city's mortgage delinquency rate from mid-2022.”
“Rising housing need, declining affordability and missed targets demonstrate that process has outpaced performance and that the scale of bureaucracy and spending alone has not been sufficient to meet the Liberal government's stated objectives. Let us look at some of the mortgage delinquency rates that are on the rise. Mortgage delinquencies have increased significantly after nearly a decade of Liberal housing policy. CMHC reported in May 2026 that the national 90‑plus day mortgage delinquency rate rose to 0.2% in quarter four of 2025, up from 0.21% a year earlier. According to a 2026 Equifax report, the rate of delinquencies in Ontario sat at about 0.3% in the first quarter of this year, a jump of 52% year over year. In B.C., the number jumped 36% to 0.25%.”
“This is perhaps the most damning finding in my entire analysis today, because it tells us that even after billions of dollars and years of programs, the system is not improving; it is deteriorating. Public, independent evidence makes clear that this deterioration is occurring despite the creation of a large federal housing bureaucracy and tens of billions of dollars in announced spending. The Parliamentary Budget Officer is repeatedly showing us that while administrative structures, programs and reporting requirements have expanded, the measurable outcomes that matter, such as reductions in housing need, improved affordability and faster supply delivery, have not followed. In effect, the federal government has built a complex policy and administrative architecture, but that architecture has not translated into results on the ground.”
“Let us turn to the data we reviewed in the 2019, 2021, 2024 and 2025 Parliamentary Budget Officer reports that I outlined earlier. The Parliamentary Budget Officer told us that housing need rose to 2.6 million households in 2024, yet only 78,000 households have been removed from need in that same 2024 report. This is not a small gap. This is a complete collapse in deliverology. The Liberals used to love talking about deliverology. That is a shortfall of more than 450,000 households. Barely one in seven who were promised relief will actually receive it. Critically, the PBO concludes that housing need is expected to increase over the projected period despite program spending. It is very clear. Program spending is not working. What the government campaigned on in the last election is not working.”
“Bill C-26 therefore represents not a course correction, but an institutional workaround, one that would allow the government to claim action on housing while avoiding a candid reckoning with why its flagship strategies have fallen apart. (1300) The National Housing Strategy Act establishes the right to adequate housing as a “fundamental human right”. These are not suggestions. They are regulatory obligations, which means that we must evaluate this policy not just politically but legally. Is it improving outcomes? Is it prioritizing Canadians most in need who are going to their local food bank and working two jobs? Is it moving things forward, as the principle that the Liberals outlined of progressive realization requires? No.”
“If the strategy and the act were working, new resources would logically flow through them, reinforced by tighter targets and clearer accountability. Instead, Bill C-26 would bypass that framework altogether. This is not an accident. It reflects a tacit recognition that the existing approach cannot deliver outcomes it promised. However, rather than acknowledging that failure and proposing a redesigned strategy, the government is seeking flexibility without accountability, with more money now and fewer questions later. This approach risks repeating the same mistakes at greater cost. Untied spending may move dollars, but without discipline and without parliamentary accountability, it does not guarantee homes that are affordable, nor the intended objectives of the minister.”
“New spending under that framework is supposed to advance those objectives and be evaluated against them. Bill C-26 departs from that logic. Rather than strengthening or reforming the national housing strategy to correct its glaring shortcomings and complete failure, the government is proposing a parallel track, authorizing significant new payments for housing supply without anchoring that spending to the strategy's target or the act's obligations. There is no requirement in Bill C-26 to demonstrate how funds would reduce core housing need, no binding affordability thresholds and no alignment with the act's statutory focus on households in greatest need. In effect, the bill asks Parliament to approve new money while suspending the very accountability framework that the Liberal government put in place in 2019. That choice matters.”
“As I outlined earlier today, in 2019, Parliament passed the National Housing Strategy Act, and that changed everything because it legally requires the government, in section 5, to set out national goals, timelines and desired outcomes, and “focus on improving housing outcomes for persons in greatest need”. At its core, the act establishes not only a statement of principle, but a framework for action and accountability that is directly relevant to the government's current legislative choices, including Bill C-26 . This is where the government's position becomes most revealing. The National Housing Strategy Act was designed to ensure that federal housing policy is guided by outcomes, not announcements: clear goals and timelines, a focus on those in greatest need and mechanisms to measure whether progress is actually being made.”
“(1255) When the government seeks additional funds through ad hoc legislation while simultaneously reducing support under the existing strategy, it is not because housing lacked funding in the past. It is because large-scale funding, absent structural reform and accountability, has not translated into affordability or adequate supply. Seen this way, the issue before Parliament is not whether more money should be spent, but whether spending is being governed by a framework that actually works. The National Housing Strategy Act was supposed to be that framework. The fact that the government is now bypassing it after committing tens of billions of dollars without achieving its objectives underscores the depth of the policy failure we are confronting. However, this is not just a policy story.”
“In other words, the bargain was clear: unprecedented federal investment in exchange for clear goals, timelines, accountability and a focus on those in greatest need. That is why the failure to meet outcomes is so consequential. After years and years of record spending, program expansion and administrative growth, the evidence shows worsening housing needs rather than the progressive improvement the government labelled in its original housing strategy, as I outlined. This context matters when evaluating the current policy choices before us and this programming motion today. Bill C-26 and budget 2025 do not emerge in a vacuum. They follow a decade of escalating financial commitments that have not delivered the promised results.”
“When the national housing strategy was launched, it was presented as a $40-billion plan. Over time, that figure was repeatedly increased and reframed as over $70 billion in federal commitments across grants, loans, financing tools and program spending. I believe that as of last night, it is over $80 billion in commitments. Parliament was told that this level of investment, combined with a rights-based legislative framework, as I outlined in my review of the act, would fundamentally change housing outcomes in Canada. The act was therefore never intended to operate in isolation from funding. It was meant to discipline and guide very large public expenditures toward measurable outcomes. Indeed, all of the speeches I read from concerning Bill C-97 in the 2019 debates reinforced that very point.”
“Rather than correcting course when this evidence emerged, the government largely stayed on the path, allowing a predictable gap between ambition and outcomes to widen year after year. The net reduction in core housing need is limited relative to the scale of the problem. That is what the Parliamentary Budget Officer stated in the 2021 analysis report. This was the first clue that something fundamental was not working, because when a plan is described as transformative, but its outcomes are described as limited, there is already a gap between promise and performance. My second point is on the National Housing Strategy Act and ambition in law. It is also important to situate this legal framework in the context of the scale of the federal investment that accompanied it.”
“As early as the first major PBO assessments of the national housing strategy, the evidence showed that the scale of program impacts was insufficient relative to the need, as the member from Winnipeg will note in my disposition of the 2019 report. Even before recent population pressures and interest rate shocks, by 2021, only a few years into its implementation, the PBO was already warning that the net reduction in core housing need was modest and that federal interventions were not on track to meeting stated targets. In other words, the warning signs were visible well before the current crisis we find ourselves in today. The strategy was underscaled from the outset, heavily relying on slow-moving capital programs and incapable of delivering the rapid affordability improvements the government promised.”
“As I have reiterated numerous times throughout my remarks this morning, the government promised to remove 530,000 households from housing need, cut housing need in half, create 100,000 new housing units, repair or renew 300,000 existing units, protect 385,000 community housing units and reduce chronic homelessness by 50%, a suite of commitments that the government presented as comprehensive, time‑bound and transformational under the national housing strategy in 2017. It committed to cutting housing need in half. These were not small commitments. They, in the government's own words, were meant to be transformational. (1250) However, the Parliamentary Budget Officer made very clear early on that outcomes were already falling far short.”
“However, this occurs within a context of declining spending and a shift away from immediate affordability supports such as the Canada Housing Benefit and support for existing social housing. Let us walk through this and break down all of this important information because that was a lot of data. It even got me sweating, it was so suspenseful. I want to walk through not just what the government promised on housing but what the evidence shows. This is now a question not only of policy performance but of whether the government is delivering on its own law, the national housing strategy, and ambition in policy.”
“Here is the cliffhanger: Build Canada Homes should be expected to make a modest contribution toward housing supply and affordability within the broader context of a large decline in support for housing affordability. The report continues: Build Canada Homes is presented as part of the Government’s efforts to double the pace of housing construction over the next decade. That said, the Government has not yet laid out an overall plan to achieve this goal. Ouch. We anticipate that the contribution of Build Canada Homes will likely be modest and estimate that the program will add about 26,000 units over five years, representing a 2.1 per cent increase in housing completions relative to our baseline projection. Build Canada Homes has sufficient funding to create approximately 13,000...units of housing affordable for low‑income households.”
“We project that by 2027, there will be about 926,000 more households in core housing need compared to the start of [the national housing strategy] in 2017. Let us go on to 2025. Then we are going to get to my speech. I have to do my research first. In 2025, in “Build Canada Homes and the Outlook for Housing Programs under Budget 2025”, the Parliamentary Budget Officer highlights that: Federal planned spending on housing programs is set to decline 56 per cent, from $9.8 billion in 2025‑26 to $4.3 billion in 2028‑29 due to the expiry of funding for existing programs and cuts set out in Budget 2025. Within this spending plan, Budget 2025 prioritizes...the construction of new housing through a new federal agency called Build Canada Homes. Build Canada Homes plans to spend $7.3 billion over 2025‑26 to 2029‑30.”
“After accounting for the impact of all relevant federal policies, [the Parliamentary Budget Officer projects] that 2.6 million households will be in housing need by 2027. This represents an increase of about 926,000 households in core housing need compared to the start of Canada’s [national housing strategy] in 2017. Already, in 2024, we saw that the strategy was not working. An hon. member: Oh, oh! Brad Vis: I am getting there. Do not worry. Mr. Speaker, the report goes on to say: The overall target of Canada’s NHS is to remove 530,000 households from housing need by 2027‑28. After accounting for the impact of all relevant federal policies and economic trends, we estimate that 2.4 million households are currently in core housing need and we project that, by 2027, 2.6 million households will be in core housing need.”
“In 2024, the Parliamentary Budget Officer highlights: Spending on programs to address housing affordability averages $6.1 billion...over the term of Canada’s 10‑year National Housing Strategy (NHS). This is a massive increase, we will note, from the 2021 numbers. (1245) This represents a 50% increase in the purchasing power of federal spending compared with the prior 10 years. Additional [housing] program spending has been primarily allocated to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporations’ Financing for Housing programs, which received a $1.3 billion per annum increase in funding. Total spending on housing affordability is estimated to be $17.5 billion annually, with 65% attributable to tax expenditures.”
“CMHC had made financial commitments towards the creation of 7,960 units of affordable housing committing to charge an average maximum of 72% of 30% of median household income under the Rental Construction Financing Initiative.... Finally, we project that in the absence of additional spending the number of households in housing need would have increased to approximately 1.8 million households with a $9.3 billion aggregate affordability gap by 2025‑26. Over the period of 2021 to 2025, incremental CMHC spending averages 16% of the projected affordability gap and about $63/month per household in housing need. I am going to go on to the 2024 report because I have not even gotten to my analysis yet, after I read all of these reports last night, and that is the most important part.”
“This caused a [42%] reduction in the number of low-income community housing units supported under bilateral agreements between 2015 and the baseline established by CMHC’s new bilateral agreements. These were outlined in the National Housing Strategy Act. Third, CMHC’s capital contribution programs have faced implementation delays. Over the first three years of Canada’s National Housing Strategy, CMHC spent less than half the funding allocated for two key initiatives, the National Housing Co-Investment Fund and Rental Construction Financing Initiative. As of 30 October 2020, CMHC had made financial commitments towards the creation of 4,270 units of affordable housing committing [on] average [a] maximum of 52% of median market rent under the National Housing Co-Investment Fund.”
“Of the $3.7 billion per year in average planned spending, $221 million per year...is dedicated to indigenous housing in urban, rural and northern areas. Since [the] 2019 report...Canada’s federal government has allocated $672 million per year in additional funding to address housing...and homelessness. The report continues: First, despite the increase in overall spending, funding for CMHC’s assistance for housing need programs intended to help low‑income households increased only by $192 million per year...in nominal terms, which represents a 15% decline in the real purchasing power of federal spending. Second, a significant portion of the community housing supported under CMHC’s bilateral agreements with provinces reached the end of their operating agreements.”
“On to the report “Federal Program Spending on Housing Affordability in 2021”, this is a continuation of the review of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's assessment of the national housing strategy. It reads: The Government of Canada’s current plan to address housing affordability is the 2017 National Housing Strategy (NHS), which runs from 2018‑19 to 2027‑28. This plan is primarily administered by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) and Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC). These department’s planned spending under the National Housing Strategy is $3.7 billion each year. As we have noted, it has gone up from $2.8 billion in the 2019 examination already. Average planned spending is driven up by time-limited programs implemented in response to COVID‑19, like the Rapid Housing Initiative.”
“Under “What will the [national housing strategy] achieve?”, the report states: The primary outcome target of the National Housing Strategy is “530,000 households removed from housing need” or “up to 50% reduction in the housing need of renters.” However, it is not clear that the National Housing Strategy will reduce the prevalence of housing need relative to 2017 levels. As shown above, the [national housing strategy] largely maintains current funding levels for current activities in nominal term and slightly reduces targeted funding for households in core housing need. Furthermore, CMHC’s assumptions regarding the impact of [the national housing strategy] outputs on housing need [to] reflect the likely impact of those programs on the prevalence of housing need. This is something the report aptly does.”
“(1240) As shown in Figure 2-4— This is on page 6 of the 2019 “Federal Program Spending on Housing Affordability” report by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. —the “$40 billion” headline commitment in the National Housing Strategy policy document includes...loans..., new loans..., existing planned spending...and required Provincial‑Territorial cost matching.... Together with the $16.1 billion in new planned spending, this exceeds the “$40 billion” headline commitment. A full breakdown is attached as Appendix A.... CMHC’s total planned spending from 2018‑19 to 2027‑28 is $27.9 billion. As we will note in future reports, it has gone up significantly since then, but in the interest of time, and having so many of these reports to get to, I am going to jump ahead to some of the findings they found in 2019.”