Catherine Ardagh
Dublin South-Central · Fianna Fáil · Ireland
“Many Members here today know the real and lasting impact cancer has on individuals and families. It is something that touches almost every household in this country. It does not discriminate. The Bill is about fairness, dignity and giving cancer survivors the freedom to truly move on with their lives.”
“This is particularly in the case of child sexual abuse material investigations. An Garda Síochána regularly engages with its counterparts in other EU states and with international organisations, such as Interpol and Europol, in the fight against what are absolutely heinous crimes, as I think we can all agree.”
“A lot of investigations into child sexual abuse material may be referred from international partners, and it is imperative that gardaí have all the tools they require at their disposal to co-operate internationally in this field.”
“I take this opportunity to thank everyone here and acknowledge the constructive spirit in which Members have engaged with this Bill since 2022. There is a shared recognition across the Houses that this legislation will make a meaningful difference in people's lives, as described by Senator Nelson Murray.”
“The Government has now gone further than the voluntary code that is currently in place, reducing the relevant period from seven years to five years and increasing the sum-assured threshold from €500,000 to €650,000 to reflect the current housing market to support survivors to buy homes.”
“I thank Deputy Carthy for his support for this legislation. I also note the other issues he raised in relation to wider criminal justice and Garda issues. However, I will go back to discussing Deputy Kelly's amendment, tabled by Deputy Sheehan.”
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“It was imperative that the criminal justice system was robust enough to withstand the assault launched upon it through intimidation and violence. I believe most Deputies will agree that imperative remains. The House will be aware of the threat that society and the criminal justice system face from groups that will stop at nothing in pursuit of their criminal activities. There is no disputing the damage they have inflicted upon communities throughout the country. Their willingness to resort to extreme violence and their flagrant disregard for communities is apparent. Supporting the efforts of An Garda Síochána to combat organised crime and to bring to justice those involved remains a priority for the Government.”
“Section 8 of the 2009 Act makes these offences scheduled offences for the purposes of Part V of the Offences Against the State Act 1939, which is to say that trials for these offences are to be heard in the Special Criminal Court, subject to the power of the Director of Public Prosecutions to direct that the offences be tried in the ordinary courts. The purpose of this provision is to guard against the possibility of interference with jury trial by ruthless criminal groups that seek to behave as though they are beyond the law. It was enacted as a response to a number of difficulties where the justice system was considered to be under serious threat from organised crime. Organised crime groups had shown a particular ruthlessness in their activities, including attacks on witnesses and intimidation of jurors.”
“Building on ProtectEU, in February 2026, the EU published its agenda to prevent and counter terrorism and online extremism, which reinforces Europe's collective response to evolving terrorist and violent extremist threats. As I have said, the views of An Garda Síochána are clearly set out in the report. That view is that the continued operation of these provisions is required. It is my strong view, and the strong view of the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration, that the relevant sections should be continued in operation for a further 12 months. Section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 is also the subject of a motion before the House. It refers to a small number of serious organised crime offences that are set out in Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.”
“The strategy notes the changed security environment and evolving geopolitical landscape, where the links between the EU’s internal and external security require more action against the range of threats faced, including: hybrid threats by hostile foreign states and state-sponsored actors; powerful organised crime networks; the ongoing threat faced from terrorism; technological advancements and more. In response to these threats, the strategy sets out a work plan involving a stronger legal framework, better information sharing and closer co-operation. Ireland is not immune from the threats arising in this changed security environment and we must have the capability to deal with the threats arising.”
“While the 1998 Act was a response to a domestic threat arising from dissident republican terrorism, as an open democracy, it is very important that we do not lose sight of the threat from violent extremism and international terrorism. There has been a general deterioration in the international security landscape in recent times, in part due to terrible wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East. In its most recent terrorism situation and trend report, published in 2025, Europol sets out the threat situation at EU level. The report confirms that terrorism, particularly jihadist and lone actor attacks, remains a key threat to the EU’s internal security. Last year, the EU published its internal security strategy, ProtectEU.”
“I pay tribute to the gardaí and PSNI officers who continue to co-operate closely and work tirelessly together to keep their communities safe and to counter all threats from terrorism. It is our duty to ensure that those tasked with protecting us from this threat have at their disposal the appropriate measures to meet it. In that regard, I am firmly of the view that the provisions whose renewal I am seeking today are necessary to support An Garda Síochána in investigating, disrupting and dismantling the activities of terrorists. In addition to providing information on the use of the provisions in question over the past year, the report laid before this House notes the clear view of the Garda Commissioner that the Act continues to be an important tool in ongoing efforts to combat terrorism.”
“North-South co-operation in this area is crucial and co-operation between gardaí and their counterparts in Northern Ireland is strong. Indeed, it is automatic when needed most. In recent years, the benefits of that co-operation have been apparent from successful joint operations between An Garda Síochána and the PSNI. There is a long shared history between the two jurisdictions in counteracting terrorism on the island. It is essential that we continue to build on this strong co-operation in the post-Brexit period. The joint Cross Border Policing Strategy 2025-2027 provides a platform for An Garda Síochána and the PSNI to build on existing strategic and operational collaboration and to strengthen policing capacity and capability.”
“Despite the progress towards peace made over the years, they continue to seek to return to the fruitless violence of the past, as evidenced by two recent attempted attacks on police stations in Lurgan, County Armagh, and Dunmurry, just outside Belfast. We must continue to do all we can to deal with this threat. Let no one be under any illusion that these groups do not represent a threat, although we can be thankful that threat is lesser than in the past. These groups have remained resolute in their opposition to democracy, the rule of law and all that the Good Friday Agreement stands for. They remain wedded to brutality and criminality. It is also well established that these groups have links to, and operate hand in hand with, organised criminals.”
“The report laid before the House includes information provided by the Garda Commissioner on the use of the provisions in question over the past 12 months and a table setting out usage figures for each of the years since the Act came into operation. It is notable that six of the 12 provisions to be renewed, those in sections 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, and 17, have not been utilised during the reporting period. Of course, the fact that a provision is not used in a particular year does not mean that it is redundant or unnecessary as the usage of different sections can vary from year to year. It is clear that so-called dissident republicans, who have their origins in the Provisional IRA and INLA, continue to represent a threat.”
“Reports covering the 12 months up to 31 May 2026 were placed in the Oireachtas Library on 19 June. Deputies will be aware that the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 was enacted in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing in August 1998. This was a necessary and proportionate response to an atrocious and barbaric act and the murder of 29 innocent people by the Real IRA. These provisions of the criminal law provide strong legislative powers to ensure that An Garda Síochána and the courts are in a position to meet the challenge laid down by those opponents of peace. Section 18 of the 1998 Act provides that sections 2 to 4, inclusive, 6 to 12, inclusive, 14 and 17 must be renewed by the Oireachtas at least annually if they are to remain in force.”
“I move: That Dáil Éireann resolves that sections 2 to 4, 6 to 12, 14 and 17 of the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 (No. 39 of 1998) shall continue in operation for the period beginning on 30th June, 2026 and ending on 29th June, 2027. The two motions before the House seek the approval of Dáil Éireann to continue in force provisions in the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998 and the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 aimed at combating terrorism and organised crime. Given the nature of these important provisions, the Houses of the Oireachtas have decided that they should be periodically reviewed. The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs, and Migration is required to lay reports before the Oireachtas on the use of the relevant provisions in the two Acts.”
“Criminal penalties, which are proposed in the Bill, would not be enforceable without clearly understood or international agreed definitions. The Bill references prohibitions on the transport or transfer of components of an autonomous weapons system within the jurisdiction of the State. This would go well beyond existing international proposals and would likely prohibit a wide range of material and intangible systems, both hardware and software, that could be used for everyday commercial ICT purposes or legitimate military purposes under appropriate controls. I do not believe that is the intent of the Bill but it could well be the effect with far-reaching implications for industry and the defence of the State.”
“The characterisation further states that it does not exclude systems that have been developed or programmed by humans and have the ability to determine potential targets from preprogrammed profiles. Similarly, a system is not excluded if it does not result in loss of life or cause damage or destruction to objects. What is within or outside scope of a future agreed definition is for future negotiation. By contrast, this Bill on lethal autonomous weapons systems defines those very systems in a way that is narrower than that being proposed at the international level. It is, therefore, different to existing international understandings. This highlights the core of the definitional challenge, which has meaningful implications.”
“To begin with, the use of the word “lethal” to describe relevant autonomous weapons systems has been contested over the years, including by Ireland, as lethal does not suggest a system that can injure or cause damage to a civilian object - any object that is not a military objective. By way of compromise, there is now a provisional working characterisation in the current version of the UN rolling text to broaden the scope to encompass injury and damage. It states that "a lethal autonomous weapon system can be characterized as ... a combination of one or more weapons and [functionally integrated] technological components, that can identify, select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human" operating the system.”
“In Belgium, the issue has been somewhat recurring in recent years with parliamentary sessions to discuss and debate adding such systems to the country’s list of prohibited weapons through national legislation. No such effort has succeeded, although supportive parliamentary resolutions have been passed. Ultimately, states have uniformly recognised the importance of seeking an international agreement. At present, many states rely on instituting rules on the use of autonomous systems through military policies or doctrines to align with their obligations under international humanitarian law. How they interpret those rules and compliance may vary thereby highlighting the issue with individual solutions to collective problems. I will highlight some examples in the Bill to illustrate the definitional challenge.”
“The difficulty in proceeding on a stand-alone basis is illustrated by the fact that the Bill proposes to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems by reference to a definition of "autonomous weapons systems" that does not fully accord with the current working international definition or the Government’s aim of prohibiting some systems and regulating others. It is instructive to consider the experience of other jurisdictions. Elsewhere, some parliaments have agreed resolutions on the need prohibit and control autonomous weapons systems. Iceland was the first state to pass a parliamentary resolution in 2016 expressing support for a ban on the production and use of what it characterised as fully autonomous weapons systems. Notably, the resolution called on the government to monitor the issue at the UN and other international fora.”
“The Government is fully aware of the challenges and is preparing for different eventualities that we may be faced with after the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, review conference in November. Ireland is ambitious in its approach and is working to secure the best outcome in these negotiations. Enacting national legislation now without knowing the agreed approach to regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems at the international level could pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing UN process.”
“Ireland believes the elements identified through that UN process in what is called the rolling text maintained by the chair of the UN group of governmental experts provides a sufficient basis to move to negotiations on a legally binding instrument. Indeed, this Bill includes some elements of language that has been included in versions of that rolling text itself. While the Government’s focus is on trying to help secure a mandate for negotiations of an instrument, we also recognise that finding consensus will be a significant challenge at a time of low international trust and high international tensions. Some states will prefer a non-binding series of guidelines to complement existing obligations under international humanitarian law. Others may wish to keep the discussion going on definitions with no clear end.”
“This has been the case in respect, for example, with regard to the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Mines Act 2008. By contrast, this Bill seeks to prohibit autonomous weapons systems on a stand-alone basis rather than under the auspices of a dedicated international instrument. In so doing, it seeks to introduce and establish a definition of and prohibition on "autonomous weapons systems" that does not have international consensus. Furthermore, it comes at a time when Ireland is actively engaged in the dedicated international forum at the UN seeking to achieve consensus on the key elements of a potential future international instrument.”
“The breadth of both the definitions and the reference to "components" of autonomous weapons systems in the Bill would be likely to bring a broad range of commercial products within its scope such that it would be potentially un-implementable in practice as currently framed. These are the dual-use products discussed by Senator Higgins. The fact that the Bill is proposing to create criminal offences in this respect also underlines the need for precision and certainty when seeking to introduce prohibitions of this nature. When we have previously created national legislation with respect to arms control, we have done so on the basis of relevant international agreements, which contain widely agreed and understood legal concepts, terms and definitions.”
“These legal definitions are an essential basis for legislation that can successfully address the range of complex legal and regulatory issues raised by this Bill. There are a number of issues which form the basis of our position. I will set them out carefully for the House. Regulating lethal autonomous weapons systems requires comprehensive and detailed work to establish rules around the full life cycle of these systems. A large body of international experts are currently working to establish common international definitions on autonomous weapons systems, as well as broader uses of AI in the military domain. As I have mentioned, the Government is actively engaged in these efforts. Any national legislation would need to accord with international understandings when they are in place. This is important for a number of reasons.”
“Ireland has also engaged and supported research and discussions between states, international organisations, civil society and academia on addressing and mitigating bias in the use of Al, including in the context of discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Addressing these systems and the wider issue of AI in the military domain, is a cross-government issue. Officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, Enterprise, Tourism and Employment and the Defence Forces are working collaboratively to advance Ireland’s progressive stance. This is something they will continue to do as the use of relevant systems continues to grow and the need for guardrails becomes ever more clear.”
“Many states, including Ireland and its EU member state partners, are seeking a two-tiered approach of prohibitions on systems that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and regulations on others with appropriate safeguards. In addition to the process ongoing in Geneva, Ireland has been active across a range of international fora seeking to ensure ethics and human rights are respected in emerging military technologies. Along with all other member states, we supported the 2024 Political Declaration on the Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy. Ireland has participated in all responsible artificial intelligence in the military domain summits in the Netherlands in 2023, Korea in 2024 and Spain in 2026.”
“The primary forum for these efforts is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, and its group of governmental experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems in Geneva. The approach and elements for any future international instruments are still being developed and efforts are at a delicate stage. Ireland has been influential in helping to shape this process. We are actively engaged in seeking a progressive outcome to its existing mandate, which concludes in November. Its mandate is to agree a set of elements of a future international instrument governing LAWS, without prejudice to its nature.”
“The Government strongly believes that there is a need to maintain meaningful human control of all weapons systems, including any systems that may be developed. Our position is that, for such systems to comply with international humanitarian law, context-specific and value-based judgment by human beings is required and, therefore, the retention of human command and control is critical. Systems that do not incorporate such human command and control must not be developed, must not be deployed, and must not be used. A point made by Senator Stephenson was that you cannot bring a robot to court. Ireland is active, alongside like-minded partners, in seeking to establish international law in relation to lethal autonomous weapons systems.”
“In relation to what we are doing on an international and EU footing, we are again seeking to play a leading role internationally in driving agreement on the prohibition of lethal autonomous weapon systems. There is significant consensus across the House relating to the aims and goals of the Bill. Ireland regards the control of LAWS as one of the most pressing issues facing the modern arms control agenda. Their development and deployment raise serious ethical, moral and legal questions and the possibility of contravening international humanitarian and human rights law. The use of such systems to identify, select and engage targets without any or nominal human involvement is fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian law and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that underpin it.”
“I thank all the Senators who contributed to the debate. I particularly thank Senator Alice-Mary Higgins and the Civil Engagement Group. I have known the Senator for a long time. She has been at the forefront of discussions and legislation relating to peace and disarmament in this House as well as non-proliferation. Many Senators raised the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. All the legislation cited relates to international conventions and treaties that Ireland played a lead role in and are the result of years of international negotiations. Senator Higgins noted her involvement in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”
“I look forward to working with Deputy Gannon and other Members of the House in relation to early intervention to ensure that young people do not end up in the justice system and are diverted before it becomes more serious and before they are recruited by criminal gangs. I thank the Deputies for contributing today. The EU strategy to tackle organised crime and the renewed impact framework are alike in recognising firearms trafficking as a priority. The Government has no hesitation in commending to the House the motion that we opt in to this proposal. By doing so now under the Article 3 opt-in, it will ensure we are at the table with our European partners and can be involved in the detailed discussions. For all of these reasons, I commend the motion to the House.”
“As part of Ireland’s Presidency responsibilities, senior officials in my Department will be leading on the negotiation of the measure as it progresses in Brussels. It is anticipated a general approach will be reached during the Irish Presidency. Opting in now will ensure the likelihood that Ireland can take a role in these negotiations, which will be really important so as to ensure the final measure be transposed in a manner compatible with Ireland’s common law legal system. Another huge issue that is very important to me as a representative for Dublin South-Central relates to drug-related intimidation. The Department of justice on the DRIVE oversight board is hugely supportive of this programme to tackle drug-related intimidation at community level. I have delegated responsibility for youth diversion.”
“In policy and procedural terms, it is considered desirable that Ireland opt in to this measure pursuant to Article 3. In light of legal advice received from the Attorney General on 27 May that this measure provides no legal or constitutional impediments to Ireland’s participation, Ireland should opt in to this proposal. Opting in now will allow Ireland to stay in step with other European partners and strengthen our efforts to fight trafficking of illicit firearms. As part of Ireland’s Presidency responsibilities, senior officials in my Department will lead the negotiation of the measure as it progresses through the House. Deputy Gannon also raised the status of the negotiations. Negotiations are currently under way and have been ongoing since the first working party meeting took place in March 2026.”
“It is stated Government policy that Ireland participate in the justice and home affairs measures by default, opting out only where concrete and well-defined legal impediments can be identified. This issue was also mentioned by Deputy Gary Gannon. Deputies Gannon and Carthy also asked why we are now deciding to opt in. The Government is supportive of the proposal and views it as a valuable instrument in combating serious and organised crime, particularly in terms of the increased sophistication and technological advancement in the modus operandi used to commit such crimes. It should be noted that it is the Government's stated policy that Ireland participate in justice and home affairs measures by default, opting out only where concrete and well-defined national interests are at stake.”
“Under Article 3, Ireland can notify the EU institutions within three months of a proposal being published that it wishes to participate from the outset. This gives Ireland a seat at the negotiation table during the Council working groups and ministerial discussions, allowing it to influence the final wording and operation of the legislation. Under Article 4, Ireland can wait until after the EU measure has been adopted and then decide whether to opt in to the final instrument. However, at that stage Ireland has no role in shaping the legislation and must effectively accept the measure as negotiated by other member states. An opt-in under Article 3 of Protocol 21 therefore ensures that Ireland is at the table and involved in the discussions and negotiations with other European partners.”
“It does not change or affect in any way the existing EU rules on the legal acquisition, possession and cross-border movement of hunting rifles and those types of firearms. Many Deputies expressed dismay over the timelines. I assure the House that this measure was laid before the Oireachtas one month after its publication. There is some urgency in relation to it given that we have so much legislation going through the Houses and I ask them to bear with us. I note all the positive support for the proposal today. At the outset, Deputy Carthy spoke about the difference between Article 3 and Article 4 in respect of the opt-in. Under Protocol 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Ireland has two avenues in relation to opting into EU proposals.”
“I thank the House for facilitating this motion today. I thank colleagues from across the House for their contributions. I would like to address some specific questions raised. Deputies Nolan, Michael Collins, Danny Healy-Rae and Carthy raised the issue of the legal acquisition and use of firearms particularly in rural areas. Their points were well made in relation to the use of hunting rifles and rifles used to protect property from animals. However, this proposal will not redefine the rules on legal ownership of firearms. The proposal only targets intentional acts involving illicit firearms, fully preserving legitimate activities by authorised dealers, industry and citizens.”
“As part of Ireland's Presidency responsibilities, senior officials in my Department will be leading on the negotiation of the measure as it progresses in Brussels. By opting in to the measure, we will join our European colleagues to help fight this collective challenge. The Government has no hesitation in commending this motion to the House.”
“This legislation will remove the fragmentation that exists across the European Union to provide for harmonisation, thus enhancing cross-border co-operation, criminal investigations and prosecutions. The ultimate goal is to safeguard citizens and ensure that serious criminality is disrupted and punished. The views of the Office of the Attorney General have been sought on this directive. The legal advice confirmed that there are no legal or constitutional obstacles to Ireland opting in to this directive. Naturally, given the importance of this issue, officials from my Department will continue to participate actively in the negotiations at working party meetings and engage with other Departments and agencies to ensure the final text of the directive works well for Ireland and the EU as a whole.”
“This directive will also strengthen data collection on seized firearms, which will enhance the capabilities of law enforcement officers and policymakers. It will allow for better resource allocation and it will enhance threat and policy evaluation. Harmonised EU-level action will also support broader security goals, as firearms crimes are closely linked to terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking and other types of organised crimes. As firearms trafficking continues to worsen, we are committed to combating this challenge through a co-ordinated and coherent approach. To do this, we must ensure our legislative measures are fit for purpose. In Ireland, we have robust legislation safeguarding the use of firearms through the Firearms Act 1925. However, this represents the first firearms trafficking measure at EU level.”
“The proposal targets intentional acts involving illicit firearms and does not propose to change existing EU rules on the legal acquisition, possession and cross-border movement of licit firearms. The proposal will harmonise the definitions and penalties of criminal offences to include the trafficking, manufacturing or possession of illicit firearms, the falsifying or illicitly removing or altering of mandatory firearm markings, and the illicit creation, acquisition, possession and dissemination of 3D printing of firearms. Under this proposed directive, each member state will be obliged to establish a national firearms focal point to facilitate co-ordination and co-operation between the competent authorities.”
“The necessity for harmonisation of criminal standards has been highlighted in both the 2025 ProtectEU internal security strategy and the new counter-terrorism agenda. However, there are significant differences in how firearms-related crimes are defined and punished across the member states. This lack of harmonisation hinders cross-border co-operation, complicates investigations and prosecutions, and reduces the overall effectiveness of law enforcement against firearms trafficking and its related offences. I will provide more detail about the specific elements of the measure that is under discussion. The directive aims to protect EU citizens from the threat of illicit firearms by reducing the number of illegal weapons and related criminal activities, harmonising firearms offences and penalties and improving data quality and availability.”
“The issue has intensified due to geopolitical events in geographical proximity to the Union. There is a high risk that the surplus of weapons from ongoing conflict, such as the one in the Ukraine, will leak into illegal markets. Key challenges that have been identified that further the facilitation of illicit firearms trafficking are the technological shifts creating the possibility of online dissemination of 3D-printing blueprints. The large gap in data and reliable, comprehensive statistics also make it more challenging for law enforcement and policymakers to assess the scale of this threat and identify possible solutions. Firearms trafficking has been consistently identified as a major internal security threat to the EU.”
“On 26 February, the European Commission put forward this proposal with the intention to combat firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences. The aim is to introduce a EU-wide framework with common definitions of firearms offences and penalties, support stronger co-operation between member states and improve the collection and use of data. The proposal also closes the gap when it comes to the misuse of 3D printing for illicit weapons production and includes an obligation for member states to establish a national firearms focal point to better enable operational co-operation between member states. Illicit firearms pose a serious threat to the security of all EU citizens. They enable a wide range of serious and organised crimes, including drug trafficking, extortion, robbery and gang violence.”
“Ireland can accept a proposal at any time after it has been adopted but in such cases Ireland will not have been in a position to vote on the final content of the proposal. It must also be noted that Ireland made a declaration appended to the Treaty of Lisbon of its intention to opt in to measures in the area of freedom, security and justice to the maximum extent it deems possible. The EU has previously adopted several instruments regulating the legal acquisition and possession of firearms. Opting in to this measure in relation to firearms trafficking provides an important opportunity for Ireland to reiterate our commitment to tackling illicit firearms, the trafficking of which poses a serious threat to both our and our European neighbours’ security, and beyond.”
“I welcome the opportunity to address the Dáil on Ireland's opt-in to a new EU proposal for a directive on combating firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences. Ireland has an option, provided for in Article 3.1 of Protocol 21 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, to opt in to individual proposals in the area of freedom, security and justice. The protocol provides that Ireland has three months from the date a proposal is presented to the Council to notify the Presidency of the Council of its wish to take part in the negotiation, adoption and application of the measure. The three-month period for this proposal ends on 23 June 2026. The exercise of the opt-in is subject to the approval of both Houses of the Oireachtas, so it has been necessary to bring this proposal to the Houses as swiftly as possible.”
“I move: That Dáil Éireann approves the exercise by the State of the option or discretion under Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to take part in the adoption and application of the following proposed measure: Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combating firearms trafficking and other firearms-related offences and amending Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council, a copy of which was laid before Dáil Éireann on 18th March, 2026. I thank the House for facilitating this motion.”
“In summary, I agree with the sentiment underlying these amendments but I believe they are unnecessary and may be too restrictive as to means of preserving privilege. I am confident that the existing provisions and the High Court will ensure that there is no such abuse.”
“This provision is already quite sufficient to achieve the end sought by the Deputy's amendment - the preservation of privilege asserted over the record until such time as the court has ruled on the matter. An authorised officer or adjudication officer may only access material for the purpose of an investigation or adjudication and clearly cannot use material if privilege is claimed until and unless the High Court judge issues a direction or rules on the matter. Furthermore, under section 33(1), an authorised officer may not disclose any confidential information. To do so is a criminal offence under section 33(3). There are similar provisions for adjudication officers in section 33(2).”
“The intention is that in such cases, the material shall be handed over subject to its being held in safe-keeping by the authorised officer or adjudication officer, who must make an application to the High Court within 30 days. The High Court then decides what to do with it. If I understand the Deputy correctly, his concern is about what happens to the material between the handing over the material and the application to the High Court. I agree with the Deputy that the material should be kept securely but I do not believe that his amendment is required. Subsection (3) of section 32 already provides that an officer can only compel the disclosure of the record or take possession of the record provided that the privilege asserted can be maintained.”
“Regretfully, I must oppose both amendments. Section 32 is intended to deal with a situation where an investigation is under way by an authorised officer into a possible contravention by a service provider of a relevant obligation under the directive - notification of designated establishment or legal representative or failure to provide same with the necessary powers and resources. It could also apply where an adjudication is being made as to whether to impose a fine for a breach of certain provisions of the e-evidence regulation by a service provider. In the course of such an investigation or adjudication, the service provider may have to provide certain material. Section 32, which is a standard provision on the Statute Book that functions well, addresses the situation where a question of privilege arises.”
“Furthermore, there is a legal obligation on adjudication officers under section 50(2)(f) to give special consideration to small and medium-sized enterprises when considering the imposition of fines. The purpose is to ensure compliance with the legislation and the imposition of fines is very much a last resort.”
“I will not agree to an amendment that would undermine the role of the director in this regard, and neither can I agree to give service providers a free pass to breach their obligations under the e-evidence package pending the issue of guidance notes. I point out that the provisions of sections 38 and 40 are specifically designed to allow the director to remedy breaches by service providers without the need to proceed to investigations and the imposition of fines. In particular, the director can seek a compliance report to clarify what the issues are and may enter into an agreement with the service provider setting out the steps to be taken to remedy any issues.”