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DÁIL ÉIREANN · FORMER

Jim O'Callaghan

Dublin Bay South · Fianna Fáil · Ireland

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

This relates to section 69 of the Bill as passed by Dáil Éireann, which amends Schedule 5 to the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 to add the Courts Service to the Schedule.

SITTING OF 2026-07-15 · READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT

The first four amendments in this group are minor drafting corrections. They corrected the wording in four places so that the Bill reads consistently. It is changing the word "references" to "a reference". They make no change to the substance or effect of the Bill.

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The ARP scheme was introduced in July 2022 to recognise the generosity of members of the public who opened their houses, whether in their entirety or through the provision of a room, at their own expense to provide shelter to people displaced by the Ukraine war. The Department of Social Protection administers the scheme on my behalf.

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I have no doubt it will be challenged, and I have to be able to convince a court, if it is being challenged, that this legislation weighs up conflicting interests and recognises there is a mechanism for somebody who has reformed himself to get off the register.

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The scheme has been a lifeline for people from Ukraine displaced by the conflict, given high rental market rates and scarcity of rental accommodation.

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I thank the Leas-Cheann Comhairle in the first instance for presiding over these Stages of the legislation. I am very pleased that this legislation has been enacted. I want to thank a few people very briefly. I thank Deputy McAuliffe for introducing me to Jason Poole. I thank Senator O'Loughlin for her work on this issue in the Seanad.

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  1. I advise Senators that I plan to put forward two minor technical amendments to section 8 of the Bill on Committee Stage. These include a minor amendment to the wording in the definition of "biometric analysis" at section 43A, and an amendment to section 43B as it relates to international co-operation. It is of the utmost importance that effective international co-operation can proceed and the Bill does not impede such co-operation. This is particularly in the case of child sexual abuse material investigations. As Senators will be aware, the Garda regularly engages with its counterparts internationally. Finally, it must be recognised that this Bill falls within the wider framework of EU law on the use of Al systems.

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  2. The main change being made by this section is the inclusion of provisions to allow for minor amendments to the code of practice without the need for a full consultation process under that section. Section 10 will insert Part 8A into the principal Act. It provides that the Garda Commissioner will have to draft a code of practice for Part 6A - the carrying out of biometric analysis. This follows on from the principal Act whereby the code will set out the procedures by which gardaí may carry out biometric analysis. The code will also outline requirements in relation to storage, access, retention, deletion of data and confidentiality. Finally, section 11 will ensure that the carrying out of biometric analysis will be overseen by a designated judge of the High Court who will report to the Taoiseach annually.

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  3. In all cases, it must be necessary and proportionate. Section 43C also lists the data subjects that may be searched utilising biometric analysis. This is to ensure transparency as to who the Garda may look for using these tools. As biometric analysis will only be utilised as a decision-support tool, the section also ensures that human review of any results is required. Section 43D is a standard processing provision, which aligns with the principal Act. It is to make clear that gardaí may further process the results of any analysis conducted. A range of offences is then set out in section 43E. Section 9 of the Bill makes amendments to the code of practice provisions in section 47 of the principal Act.

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  4. Section 43A sets out the definitions for the new Part. These include the definition of biometric analysis. The definition will cover searching for general characteristics such as height and hair colour, as well the searching of biometrics of unknown and known individuals. Section 43B sets out that the Bill will not apply to certain enactments to ensure that any co-operation internationally where gardaí have access to or utilise biometrics will not be impacted by the provisions of the Bill. Section 43C sets out the substantive provisions for the carrying out of biometric analysis. There are only three purposes for which it can be used, namely, the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of arrestable offences; the protection of the security of the State; and looking for missing persons.

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  5. Section 5 amends section 7 of the principal Act. This is to ensure that CCTV applications currently in train may continue to be assessed under section 38 of the 2005 Act upon commencement of the relevant CCTV provisions in the principal Act. Section 7 currently sets out transitional arrangements for existing CCTV authorisations. Section 6 amends section 13 by removing the definition of an arrestable offence. Section 7 amends section 20 of the principal Act. It will delete subparagraph 20(2)(a)(iv), one of purposes specified for the use of automatic number plate recognition, ANPR. The provision was deemed unnecessary as the occasions for which it was included are adequately covered by subparagraph 20(2)(a)(ii). Section 8 will insert Part 6A into the principal Act. This comprises five sections, namely, sections 43A to 43E, inclusive.

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  6. There will also be the opportunity for members of the public to provide feedback on the code, alongside the bodies set out in the Bill during the drafting process. Any use of biometric analysis will also be subject to judicial oversight by way of an annual review of the operation of this technology by a judge of the High Court. I will now take Senators through the Bill. It is divided into 11 sections. Sections 1 and 2 are standard provisions providing for commencement orders and definitions. Section 3 amends section 2 of the principal Act. It inserts the definition of an arrestable offence and amends the definition of a code of practice to take account of the new provisions being inserted by section 10. Section 4 amends section 3 of the principal Act, as it relates to orders and regulations.

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  7. Biometric analysis is solely a tool to be used to assist with the sorting of information and provide gardaí with a starting point or leads within their investigation. Any use of biometric analysis will be governed by a code of practice, which will set out the procedures that apply to the use of the technology. This will be drafted by the Garda Commissioner and will be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas. Approval of the code is dependent on positive resolutions being passed by both Houses. This will give Senators the opportunity to consider the code prior to its signing. As part of the process of developing a code, human rights and data protection impact assessments will be required, the results of which will be provided to the bodies listed in section 10 of this Bill.

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  8. Gardaí will only be able to search for certain data subjects, including persons reasonably suspected of having committed an arrestable offence or being a threat to the security of the State, victims of arrestable offences or missing persons. This technology will be used to support Garda decision-making only. Human review and intervention to assess the reliability of any matches produced is built into the Bill. That means a trained garda will be responsible for its use and any decisions arising from the processing of biometric data. Gardaí finding a match utilising biometric analysis with no further interrogation of the footage or images will not be the basis for an arrest in itself.

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  9. Rather, this technology will aid gardaí in their work by allowing them to categorise, sort and filter documents gathered in the course of an investigation utilising biometrics for further review. This is not to say that use of these tools should be without safeguards, however. Senators will note that several safeguards are detailed in the text of the Bill, which I will summarise. Biometric analysis will not be used in every investigation. Rather, it may only be utilised where it is necessary and proportionate in respect of a specific Garda investigation into an arrestable offence, a matter relating to State security or in the context of a missing person investigation.

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  10. Biometric analysis will be a crucial tool to aid this important work. To take the example of an investigation into child sexual abuse material, the Garda may find hundreds of thousands of images and videos on a seized device. If it has access to biometric analysis, it could utilise these tools to sort instances of a particular physical feature of a known or unknown person, such as the victims of these crimes, in that cache of images or video. This work is concerned simply with the organisation of information and will ensure that victims of these crimes are removed from harm at the earliest opportunity. By giving the Garda the power to use biometric analysis, I am not seeking to replace traditional policing methods.

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  11. The need to provide An Garda Síochána with technology such as biometric analysis is well established. We live in an age where the proliferation of data in society has an impact on Garda investigations. In any one investigation, gardaí could be examining enormous quantities of images or video footage that may contain vital information or evidence. Where computers, mobile phones or other devices are seized by gardaí on foot of warrants issued by a court - this could be for crimes relating to terrorism, organised crime or child abuse material - the array of documents that form part of an investigation can number in the hundreds of thousands, or even millions. An Garda Síochána will not be able to reliably process large-scale data without the relevant tools to aid this process.

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  12. I am very pleased to be back in the Seanad for the second time today. I cannot, however, guarantee the same level of excitement that took place before my arrival. I am pleased to introduce the Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) (Amendment) Bill 2025 and I look forward to hearing the contributions from Senators. The Bill before the House amends the Garda Síochána (Recording Devices) Act 2023 and will provide the ability to utilise biometric analysis on a retrospective basis only. This technology is sometimes referred to more generically as facial recognition technology. There are a variety of types of facial recognition technology. One is biometric analysis, while another is biometric identification. Both can be carried out on a retrospective or live basis. What we are dealing with here is biometric analysis on a retrospective basis only.

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  13. Nonetheless, a lot of good work is done by the Garda National Vetting Bureau on a daily basis. We do not hear of the successes but only when there are issues in respect of it. Those issues can arise because many people have lived abroad for many years, and vetting sometimes requires gardaí to engage with authorities abroad, which can take time. I again thank the Senator for his question.

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  14. I am always loath to set a timeline because, inevitably, the whole focus centres on whether it is done by that time or not. As the Senator knows, it will take time to implement the necessary technical and legislative changes that I have mentioned. I assure him that work is ongoing to achieve the aim of a more streamlined vetting system. It has to go through the Department and we have to produce proposals in respect of a general scheme. It then has to go to the Attorney General's office for advice and, ultimately, there will be drafting by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel. All of that takes time. The important thing to point out is that a decision has been made that it is an area that requires reform, and I am committed to starting the pathway for that reform.

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  15. My Department is engaging closely with An Garda Síochána to ensure these reforms deliver a process that is efficient and secure, while ensuring the high standards of safeguarding that the public expects. I am pleased to communicate to Senator Crowe that issues are being developed within my Department to respond to the important matter that he has highlighted.

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  16. An example is with registered teachers, who are vetted through the Teaching Council. Teachers can move between schools without undergoing full revetting unless the scheduled renewal requirements are needed. There is merit in examining how a comparable model to that used by the council could be applied more broadly. The Government also recognises the importance of an efficient and responsive system, and that it remains so. In fairness to the Garda National Vetting Bureau, it processes a huge number of applications for vetting each year. In one recent year, it processed in the region of 630,000 applications. Most are dealt with and completed within the short period of seven to nine working days. The changes being developed will require legislative amendments and updating technical systems.

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  17. For that reason, following the work of the Garda vetting review group, steps are being progressed to modernise and streamline the current system, while fully maintaining the robust safeguarding standards that are essential. In practice, and subject to the general requirement that vetting be renewed every three years, it is envisaged that where a person has already been vetted for work within a particular risk category, that individual would not need to undergo a completely new vetting process if moving to another role within the same category. This approach strikes the correct balance. It maintains a strong protection, while also reducing duplication and unnecessary administrative burdens for volunteers and organisations. I note that similar practices operate successfully in other areas.

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  18. Concerns have included the need for repeated vetting applications where an individual volunteer is across multiple organisations or roles. As the Senator indicated, his concern is that if somebody is given vetting to coach the local hurling team, why would they need vetting to coach the local soccer team at the same time? I recognise that we need to make the system more efficient for those sporting organisations, youth services, childcare providers and community groups that rely heavily on volunteers. I have listened to the Senator's concerns and those of other representatives, as has the Government. I am conscious that volunteers are the backbone of communities across the country. Safeguarding and their participation in it are extremely important.

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  19. I thank Senator Crowe for raising this important matter. As he knows and as has stated, the primary purpose of the Garda vetting system is and always must be the protection of children and vulnerable adults. It is essential that parents, families, sporting organisations and charities can have confidence that appropriate safeguards are in place for those who undertake these positions in trust, whether it is coaching a children's sports team, working in a care home or working with people with disabilities. At the same time, I recognise from what the Senator and other representatives have said that concerns have been raised by volunteers, particularly sporting bodies and community organisations, regarding aspects of the current vetting process.

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  20. If I were mandated by legislation to draft and sign regulations that would set out the circumstances the Garda can use covert investigative activities and covert human information sources and if I were to come to the Seanad or the Dail to get approval for them, the Garda would come to a standstill in investigating serious crime. For that reason, I cannot accept the amendment.

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  21. Any unethical behaviour or behaviour seen to be in breach of constitutional or convention rights will not be tolerated and as well as that, the Garda Commissioner, Fiosrú, the Policing and Community Safety Authority and I would not permit covert activities that were unethical or in breach of convention or constitutional rights. However, we need to recognise that when it comes to investigating and trying to stop serious criminals, it is a difficult and tough business and sometimes it does require members of An Garda Síochána to engage in undercover work. Sometimes it does require them to send human resources into a dangerous situation to find out information about serious criminal activity.

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  22. The 2023 revised general scheme explicitly narrowed the scope of this legislation to address urgent specific gaps regarding stop and search, digital access and custody safeguards following Supreme Court rulings in Quirke and Corcoran, expanding the Long Title to include general governance guidelines goes beyond this expedited mandate and introduces requirements that do not align with the focused statutory fixes now being advanced. I assure the Senator that when it comes to covert human information sources and activities that there are strict policies in place within An Garda Síochána as to how those sources and activities can operate. Any time they go before the courts, they are subject to the supervisory conduct of the courts.

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  23. For those reasons, it is not appropriate to create a new statutory, regulatory regime for such matters in this Bill. In fact, it would be damaging to the public interest and to the work being done by An Garda Síochána seeking to investigate and ensure those involved in serious criminality are prosecuted. I will also speak briefly to amendment No. 5, which is in this group. This amendment is out of scope because it establishes an exclusionary rule of evidence tied to the proposed section 6 guidelines, which are not relevant to this legislation. Therefore I cannot support amendments Nos. 4 or 5. Finally, in respect of amendment No. 54, I believe this amendment is also out of scope.

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  24. The management and use of covert human intelligence sources is already governed within An Garda Síochána by detailed policy and operational procedures, which provide that operations involving such covert human intelligence sources must be conducted in accordance with law and in compliance with constitutional and ECHR obligations. The policy framework also provides for internal Garda oversight and external independent oversight. The admissibility of evidence obtained during covert operations is ultimately a matter for the courts, including in circumstances where issues relating to entrapment, proportionality or fair procedures are raised. Operational policies in this area must remain capable of being updated quickly in response to court judgments, operational learning and evolving criminal activity.

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  25. We have a very stringent oversight system for review of the behaviour of An Garda Síochána in terms of the Policing and Community Safety Authority, Fiosrú and I as Minister, as the Senator will know as well, having oversight over the activities and methods of An Garda Síochána. The Bill seeks to codify the Garda powers of stop, search and seizure as well as search warrants, and the remaining Garda powers will be codified at a later stage. Legal issues in relation to covert human intelligence sources, or controlled deliveries, are addressed regularly in the courts. Operations that involve the use and conduct of a covert human intelligence source must be conducted in accordance with law and must be carried out in compliance with human rights obligations under the Constitution and the principles of the ECHR.

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  26. It is an essential part of Garda work that members have access to and use covert human information sources. If we try to restrict An Garda Síochána in gaining access to covert human information sources we are undermining the protection that all of us in this House want to have the people protected by. That also applies in respect of covert investigative activities. It is the case, however, and I fully agree with the Senator McDowell, that there must be ethical standards operated by An Garda Síochána. However, ethical standards do not require regulations made by a Minister and then approved by politicians in both Houses of the Oireachtas.

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  27. I thank the Senator for tabling the amendment. I will not support it. The main reason I will not support it is the guidelines he asks that the legislation should implement should also be published and only approved if the Houses of the Oireachtas agree to them. We need to recognise that policing is a complicated and professional task. It requires expertise. There are many people out there, whether they want to threaten the security of the State, are organised criminals, drug dealers, who want to import weapons to Ireland or are involved in child sexual abuse and human trafficking. There are dangerous people out there and we need to make sure the public are protected from them. The people we use to protect us from them are An Garda Síochána; the only lawful entity in the State that can investigate the commission of criminal offences.

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  28. There has to be an assessment of it and the way we assess it is that the High Court objectively looks at it. Obviously, it is taken into account whether somebody is a registered lawyer, for example, and has communications with the client. That clearly will get the benefit of legal professional privilege. Whether somebody is a journalist, a recognised journalist involved in investigative journalism or whatever type of journalism, is where it gets difficult in terms of defining what a journalist is because it can be very vague. People like those Senator McDowell was talking about would then seek to avail of it, but the courts know what journalistic privilege is when they see it and there is a mechanism here for the first time in statute to recognise that privilege.

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  29. Again, I have to emphasise that we live in a society where people assert their rights. As was the case of Emmett Corcoran, the strong likelihood is that if the Garda seek to effect a search warrant on a person who claims that the material it is seizing has the benefit of journalistic privilege, then he or she will assert that and it will be asserted promptly before the court. This will then invoke section 24, which is the most important part in the determination of privilege because it sets out the very detailed procedure by which the High Court will determine claims to privilege. Just because a lawyer says, "That is legally privileged" or just because a person says, "I am a journalist and that is journalistic privilege" does not mean we all have to genuflect before it.

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  30. The review is strictly confined to identifying the presence of such material. Beyond this no further examination is permitted. It is not looking at the content of the material. We talk about journalistic privilege here all the time. Legal professional privilege is also a form of privilege we should be appraising and considering. If there is a warrant to search a solicitor's premises, or a solicitor's mobile phone or email, and you are able to look to see whether there is correspondence between the solicitor and his or her client, that is the type of screening that would be done. You would not read the letter but if it is apparent there are communications between the solicitor and his client, which are clearly or probably protected by legal professional privilege, that is the purpose of the screening process.

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  31. It is not just journalistic privilege; all privilege is protected and can be determined. That is my response to Senator McDowell. I will not go into detail in respect of what Senator Flaherty said. I will respond to him personally in due course because the issues he raised would take up too much time here. I will just say that morale in An Garda Síochána is very high at present and the Commissioner is doing an excellent job. To Senator Ruane's point, privilege screening is not an examination of each of the documents. Privilege screening is the limited examination of captured material for the sole purpose of identifying potentially privileged material without permitting a general analysis of the data for evidential purposes. This process is typically authorised by a judge when privileged material is likely to exist.

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  32. Even if that fanciful scenario did arise, the journalist still has appropriate constitutional protections because the journalist, much the same way as Senator McDowell successfully brought the case on behalf of Emmett Corcoran, would be able to say that this is an abuse of the statutory procedure, and that journalistic privilege is a right recognised under the European Convention and under the Constitution, which deserves to be and has been recognised by our courts. If the highly unlikely scenario that Senator McDowell suggests arose, there is still constitutional protection there for the journalist. Any invocation of such powers by a member of An Garda Síochána would clearly be an abuse of the statutory scheme, since it is apparent from Part 3 of the statutory scheme that journalistic privilege is protected.

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  33. It is about gardaí stopping a vehicle because they believe somebody has committed an offence or is in the process of committing an offence and that the car has relevant evidence, whether it be a weapon or a stolen item. It is not for the purpose of gardaí stopping a journalist's car a number of days or weeks after an event and saying, "We believe you have information in respect of the commission of an offence that has been committed or is about to be committed and we are going to seize your notebook".

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  34. The section also provides for enabling them to ascertain whether "evidence relating to the commission or intended commission of the offence by any person is in or on the vehicle or on any person in or accompanying it." Again, this is seeking evidence in respect of the commission or intended commission of the offence. I always listen very carefully to Senator McDowell but it is very adventurous of him to suggest that this could be availed of by a garda to stop a car on the basis that there is an offence being committed, but in fact that garda wants to get the notebook in the back seat because it belongs to a journalist. That is not what this statutory provision is about.

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  35. Section 10(2) states that where this section applies, the member concerned may require a person to stop a vehicle for the purposes of enabling the member to ascertain whether any person in or accompanying the vehicle has committed, is committing or is about to commit the offence. Let us remember the offence is what is set out in Schedule 1. Senator McDowell is correct. There are a lot of serious offences but he is right that there is a theft offence there as well. I think it is appropriate that the Garda should have the power to require a person to stop a vehicle for the purpose of enabling it to ascertain whether the person in the vehicle, or somebody with them in the vehicle, has committed theft or is committing theft. That is a perfectly legitimate statutory provision the Oireachtas can absolutely stand over.

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  36. The Senator will be aware that when gardaí suspect a person is involved in the commission of a serious offence or there is an offence and they want to search their premises, they have to apply under Part 3. This arises when they are in a public place, there is a vehicle and there are persons in vehicles. It can arise in practical terms where an offence has been committed and the gardaí want to apprehend somebody who they think has been involved in the commission of the offence or the gardaí lawfully stop a car because they believe it is associated with the commission of an offence.

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  37. I thank Senators for their contributions. Senator McDowell referenced section 10, which is in Part 2 dealing with stop and search. Part 3 deals with search of a premises. Regarding the type of scenario that stop and search deals with, I am trying to give statutory powers and statutory limits to gardaí when they find themselves encountering the commission of an offence. The Senator referred specifically to section 10. It is about a power to search persons and vehicles for evidence of an offence. The section applies when a member of An Garda Síochána is in the public place or any other place authorised by law and has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been, is being or is about to be committed.

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  38. There is a mechanism put in place to determine that. This is not a good defence of it but, obviously, it is far better than what is contained in section 10 at present. As regards the point I just made, when we look at section 10 there is no statutory duty imposed upon the Garda, whereas now there is a statutory mechanism put in place that recognises and allows for the determination of claims of privilege.

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  39. Similarly, it puts a greater obligation on An Garda Síochána. There was a criticism of the gardaí involved in the Corcoran case. If a garda knows or suspects they are searching the house of a solicitor, a barrister or a journalist, they suspect that there is going to be privileged material there. Under section 17, as I just showed the Senator, there is now a statutory obligation on a garda to tell the District Court that the warrant is for the purpose of, for example, searching a solicitor's house who the garda thinks is involved in the commission of criminal offences and that, because it is a solicitor's house, there may be privileged material there, and the garda wants to search the solicitor's computer, seize their phone on which there is probably privileged material and therefore the garda wants to inform the court about it.

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  40. The same warrant is issued to search, say, my house or the house of an editor of The Irish Times . It is the same warrant but the circumstances will be different and the provisions will be different. The order of the District Court may be different because in a certain instance there may be journalistic privilege and the court may set out in those circumstances what is or is not appropriate to be done in terms of the ultimate determination of it. We are dependent to a large extent on people asserting their rights. If somebody knows they are going to be the subject of a search warrant, their premises is being searched and they have been informed about it, they have to assert their rights. If they assert their rights, there is a mechanism here for their assertion to be determined.

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  41. If Senator McDowell reads section 17, he will see "application for a search warrant" and in section 17(5) it states: Where an applicant [the garda] suspects that privileged material may be present at the proposed place of search, or contained in, or accessible from, any electronic device or information system that may be present at that place, his or her application shall [meaning it is a mandatory requirement] include such information as is known to him or her relating to— (a) the nature of the privileged material concerned, and (b) any other matter relating to the privileged material that the applicant considers relevant to the issuing of the search warrant. There is, therefore, a procedure set out in Part 3 in respect of a search warrant. Obviously, a search warrant is a warrant.

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  42. I should have referred the Senator earlier to section 19(1)(d), on the search of an electronic device, which includes a is specific reference to conducting "a privilege screening of the data (whether captured or not) contained in or accessible from an electronic device or information system ... found at the place of search". At the beginning of section 19, it states: a search warrant may be expressed, and operate, to authorise the authorised member [the garda], in addition to exercising any power specified in sections 18 or 20 , to do such of the following as the issuing judge considers necessary and proportionate having regard to the information provided to him or her by the applicant under section 17 Section 17 also provides a requirement in terms of identifying where there may be information which is privileged. That is correct.

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  43. Section 24(1) states: This subsection applies where— (a) material has been the subject of a privilege screening analysis or an examination ... (b) it is considered that the material concerned may be privileged material, and (c) the authorised member wishes to have access to the material on the grounds that he or she considers that the material is evidence of or relating to the commission of an offence. It sets out in section 24 what happens in terms of the determination as to privilege. There can also be, as provided for in section 25, agreement between the parties. This is where gardaí and the person being searched agree that one part is privileged, while the other sections are not, and that they are the ones dealing with search privilege.

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  44. It is an exceptional provision but I think it is necessary and it is not one, I would have thought, that is regularly going to be used. Section 21 deals with the right to be informed of search pursuant to the search warrant. Obviously when the guards go to the house they are obliged to tell the person that they have an authorised warrant to search the premises. Section 22 deals with the exercise of powers under a search warrant and details what it is permitted to do in terms of exercising the powers under the search warrant. Section 23 deals with the treatment of material seized under a search warrant. Section 23(1) states "An authorised member who ... seizes material, shall ensure that following its removal", the material is recorded and stored appropriately. Section 24 deals with the issue as the determination as to privilege.

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  45. Justice Charleton said that an electronic or computer system, a phone or a computer is a separate space for which you require a separate search warrant. At present we do not have that. Section 19 deals with that effect. Section 20 provides that the "Search warrant may authorise examination of material subject to section 2(2)(b) privilege in certain circumstances". We know what section 2(2)(b) privilege is because it is already defined. I suppose that allows for a warrant to examine material where it is necessary for the purpose of protecting the life or personal safety of people. If somebody is sort of saying there is journalistic privilege, then this section gets around that if there are circumstances where the life or safety of people is threatened.

    SITTING OF 2026-05-26 · READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT

  46. I suggest that the Senator looks at Part 3, which deals with the search of premises. Section 16 deals with the definitions. Section 17 deals with an application for a search warrant to the District Court and sets out the offences specified in respect of it. Section 18 then deals with the issue of a search warrant. Section 18(1) states: "A judge of the District Court ... may, on an application, issue a search warrant ... if satisfied by information provided by ... the application that— (a) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting ... and (b) the issuing of the search warrant is necessary ... They are the general provisions. Section 19 then deals with the search of electronic device or information system under a search warrant. That section is specifically included because of another Supreme Court Decision, called Quirke, where Mr.

    SITTING OF 2026-05-26 · READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT

  47. The warrant remains. There is only one warrant. In terms of the procedures set out here, a warrant is being applied for but what is contained within the legislation is a statutory mechanism to deal with an instance where the guards suspect that there may be privilege or where somebody, subsequently, asserts that there is privilege.

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  48. I suggest that the Senator looks at the provisions contained in section 24. The ultimate determiner, or the person who will assess whether or not material contains journalistic privilege, will be the High Court. That is provided for. If somebody makes a valid claim that this is journalistic material, it cannot be searched. There is a statutory procedure for that to be assessed by the High Court.

    SITTING OF 2026-05-26 · READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT

  49. No. The guards are aware, if they are searching a journalist's house, they have to notify the district judge. If they get a search warrant they have no idea that there may be any journalistic privilege involved and the person who is searched says, "Hold on, I am a journalist and I assert journalistic privilege over this." If a person does that then there will be a procedure exercise, for the purpose of the court, looking at it.

    SITTING OF 2026-05-26 · READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT

  50. From the moment a guard appears in the District Court seeking a search warrant on an ex parte basis, the court will be aware if it is a journalist or a lawyer or if there may be other privilege attaching to it. If somebody subsequently says, "Listen, you might not know me but actually I am a journalist" then that person has a statutory mechanism to challenge the Garda search of the material and ultimately that can be appraised by the High Court. What I cannot allow to happen is people simply stating - in order to avoid a Garda investigation - that there is journalistic material on that, it is privileged and you cannot look at it, and us having to go, okay, that is the end of it.

    SITTING OF 2026-05-26 · READ THE OFFICIAL REPORT