Desmond Tan
Singapore
“Here, I would like to thank MOM and our tripartite partners for their attention to maintaining workplace fairness, particularly their focus on seniors.”
“And he went on to say that, "as unionists of unions affiliated with NTUC Singapore, we have never flinched from raising our concerns and advocating for our members' rights for better wages and for better work prospects and welfare.”
“As shared by Mr Lee Kuan Yew at a mass rally in Geylang Serai in 1959 and, thereafter, repeated at the NTUC’s 50th Anniversary Dinner in 2011, and I quote, “In Government, I have never forgotten that it is in the interests of workers and their unions that we must strive for growth and development.”
“Mr Speaker, we have not detected an uptick in unlicensed moneylending, or UML, cases since October 2021. Between October and December 2021, there were 917 cases of UML and UML-related harassment cases reported. This was an 8% decrease, compared to the same period in 2020. The Police take a tough stance against UML activities.”
“There are approximately 13,000 households who have electricity accounts in arrears and 150,000 households who have water bills in arrears. Of these 150,000 households, about 1,200 have arrears of at least $250.”
“I thank the Member for the suggestion. Indeed, the Police do monitor the current trends, but I would like to, first of all, say that we think the current situation of unlicensed moneylenders is under control.”
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“Mr Faisal Manap asked whether drivers in financial difficulty can be allowed to pay their road traffic fines in instalments. MHA has been studying this since last year as we have also received feedback from several Members of this House. Regardless, already today, for genuine cases of financial difficulty, if the individual appeals to Traffic Police (TP) and the appeal is assessed to be meritorious, TP will extend their deadline to pay the traffic fine. Mr Patrick Tay spoke about the need for greater traffic safeguards. In general, road safety has improved. Road traffic fatalities have decreased in the past decade, from 195 in 2011 to 118 in 2019, and 85 last year in 2020. That said, we agree with Mr Patrick Tay that every accident is one too many. We will continue to do more to enhance road safety. For example, to better protect elderly pedestrians, we will increase the penalties for motorists who commit offences at pedestrian crossings or offences that endanger pedestrian safety in Silver Zones. We will also put in place similar measures for School Zones to protect students. We are completing our review and will announce details later in the year. In conclusion, the Home Team will continue to work in close partnership with our community to build a safer and a more secure Singapore.”
“When faced with a situation that raises suspicion, members of public can view the list of legitimate financial institutes published on the Registry of Moneylenders’ website. Members of public can also visit the App Store to download Scamshield to screen and block calls and messages suspected to be from scammers. (In English): I will now talk about engaging community on policies and legislation related to the private security industry. Mr Raj Joshua Thomas asked how the new Security Agencies Competency Evaluation or SACE framework will encourage transformation and adoption of technology by the private security industry. A key assessment area under the SACE will be on how much security agencies harness technology to augment critical areas, such as training, operations, and command, control and communications (C3). This will set new benchmarks for the industry. These competencies will be reviewed periodically to keep up with technological developments and complement efforts under the Security Industry Transformation Map (SITM). MHA takes a very serious view on the abuse of security officers and we will amend the Private Security Industry Act, or PSIA, to include new offences to address the common types of verbal and physical abuse which security officers face when carrying out their duties. These offences will also carry harsher penalties, compared to similar offences against the general public. In addition, we will continue supporting public education efforts, such as the industry-led anti-abuse campaign. MHA will also work with the industry to equip security officers with better public management skills and encourage the use of body-worn cameras to further deter abuse. I will also address two questions on road safety.”
“While efforts to disrupt scammers' operations and money transfers are key to combating scams, the best defence against scams is a discerning and vigilant public. Everyone can potentially be a victim, not just the elderly. MHA's survey found that in 2020, close to 50% of scam victims were between 20 and 39 years old. It is important for everyone to exercise vigilance, to be sceptical of incredulous promises and unverifiable requests and check with authorities whenever in doubt. I also encourage everyone to download ScamShield to filter out scam calls and messages. To date, ScamShield is actively blocking over 2,500 scam numbers and has filtered more than 280,000 scam messages. ScamShield is an application developed by GovTech, MHA as well as NCPC. But right now, it is only available in iOS version but agencies are working towards developing an Android version. Madam, I would now like to make a few remarks in Mandarin. (In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mdm Chairperson, the number of scams in Singapore is on the rise. Thus, the Home Team will step up efforts to work closely with our community partners to strengthen the public’s awareness of scams and scam prevention. There are three “Don’t”s in scam prevention: first, don’t trust strangers; second, don’t reveal your passwords; third, don’t transfer funds carelessly. Lately, loan scams have been on the rise. However, according to our laws, a licensed moneylender cannot approve or grant a loan to a borrower remotely. In other words, those who claim to be licensed moneylenders offering loans to you via the phone or through Whatsapp messages must be scammers. Everyone must remain vigilant.”
“We also took measures to help victims recover losses through Project FRONTIER, which stands for Funds Recovery Operations and Networks Team, Inspiring Effective Resolutions. This is a collaboration between Police and more than 20 financial institutions. Once the Police are notified, most bank accounts suspected to be involved in scammers' operations can be swiftly frozen within a day. This is a big step forward from the 14 to 60 working days that these tasks used to take. I have asked banks if we can work together to further compress the turnaround time for freezing of bank accounts used by scammers so that even less is lost to scams. Besides banks, we also work closely with telcos and IMDA to block spoof calls and scam websites used by overseas scammers. MCI will elaborate on efforts to tackle scam calls during its Committee of Supply debate. Finally, we are working with digital platforms to do more to combat e-commerce scams, which remain the top scam type in 2020. We are working with e-commerce platforms, such as Carousell, Lazada, Shopee, Qoo10 and Amazon to prevent scams. Areas being explored are improving the seller verification and increasing the use of more secured payment methods, such as escrow accounts. A few overseas jurisdictions have begun exploring the use of legislative levers to place clear obligations on the industry to secure e-commerce transactions. For example, in December 2020, the EU Commission proposed the Digital Services Act to better regulate the digital space, including online platforms and intermediaries. The Government is considering all options to address the scourge of e-commerce scams.”
“Mdm Chairman, community partnership is crucial to achieving the Home Team's mission. This coming year, MHA will tap on our partnership with the community in two areas. First, combatting scams. Second, in the design of our policies and legislation related to the private security industry. I will cover the first one. We are concerned with the scam situation in Singapore. In 2020, more than 15,000 cases of scams were reported, a 65% increase from 2019. We agree with Mr Derrick Goh that the Police should be sufficiently resourced to combat scams. The Police have since re-organised existing resources and set up the Anti-Scam Centre (ASC) in 2019. Through the Transnational Commercial Crime Task Force, or TCTF, the Police have also partnered foreign law enforcement agencies in Malaysia, Macau and Hong Kong to tackle cross-border scam syndicates targeting victims in Singapore. The Police will continue to conduct joint operations with like-minded jurisdictions. And MHA will continue to monitor and review the resources allocation to ensure that the Police continue to remain effective. I chair the Inter-Ministry Committee on Scams, or IMCS in short, which draws on the expertise and the resources from different Ministries. In the coming year, the IMCS will deepen our partnership with the community and private sector stakeholders to combat scams. Allow me to elaborate on a few notable initiatives. Mr Derrick Goh asked for an update on the IMCS' plans to deepen its partnership with the banks, telcos and digital platforms to combat scams. First, banks. The Association of Banks in Singapore, or ABS, and its members have worked with the Police and MAS to detect and to weed out scammers and money mules.”
“These are some of the ideas that we will be implementing and this gives us an opportunity not just to ramp up the productivity but also to ensure that environmental sustainability will be taken into account. The second part of the question is about exports. Today, most of our local produce are catered towards local markets. In the coming "30 by 30" plan, we envisage it is likely to be the same. However, we do understand that the exporting of vegetables and produce will allow our farms to gain economies of scale, lower their costs and become competitive regional players. So, we will work with ESG and the agencies to support our markets to facilitate their exports, where necessary, and to ensure that we do not just have a very vibrant agri-food hub in Singapore, but also a competitive one in the region.”
“I thank the Member for her supplementary question. There are actually two parts to the question. The first is on how, as we ramp up, we continue to ensure that environmental sustainability is taken into account. The second is on export. So, I would touch on the first part, first. First of all, the "30 by 30" goal, is precisely to give us this opportunity to relook at how we can create the agri-food hub in Lim Chu Kang as part of the master planning. Through the process of masterplanning, we can, not just increase the productivity of our produce, but also to take into account some of the environmental factors in the design of the land use as well as the methods in which the farming technology can be introduced in this new plan. To give you an example, as part of the design of the Lim Chu Kang masterplanning, we will be taking into consideration the possibility of integrating different services together, as a shared service, for example, the waste management that the Member talked about. This will allow us to ensure that the environment factors are taken into account and to pool the resources together from different farming industries and technology to be introduced to ensure that the environment is protected. Having this hub also allows us to ensure the integration of some of the services from the food waste to industry feed and food feed or vegetable feed. To give you an example, poultry waste can be recycled to produce biogas, which can then provide some energy for the farms. At the same time, the solid waste from poultry waste can also be used as fertilisers for the vegetables.”
“Yes, Sir, ISD regularly engages the religious groups. I do not have the exact frequency. And in the engagements, besides sharing with them what is the current situation, one of the things that we always share with them is to look out for the signs. I have highlighted during my speech earlier on the signs that we have to look out for – one, the propensity for violence, a misguided understanding of certain religious beliefs and, of course, some signs about the individual's attitude towards multiculturalism and multiracialism. These are the tell-tale signs that, in terms of the religious leaders' understanding of their followers, they play a very key role because I think in their interactions with their followers, they will come across different expressions of their understanding of the religion as well as the situation in Singapore. So, ISD does that very regularly, not just with the religious leaders' groups but also with educational institutions as well as community groups to spread this important message and also to allow them to understand what are the tell-tale signs to look out for.”
“I thank the Member for the supplementary question. In my earlier reply, I have mentioned this is one of the key efforts that we are putting upstream to ensure that we educate our people. And that is the best line of defence – to ensure that they understand what are the right teachings and not be swayed by radical and extremist views. So, working with MOE, working with private organisations, MCCY, we want to reach out to our youths in various platforms, through various means, even in the areas that they are very keen and very interested and are very good at, through social media as well as through online platforms. I think through these efforts we try our very best to inoculate our youths of today, to allow them to discern what are the right messages, what are the right doctrines and not be swayed by radical ideologies such as the case that has been said here. There is no easy, fool-proof solution when it comes to online access, we all know that. It is a challenge that we all face. We have to constantly look at how we can educate our youths through the school system. But I think also in terms of family, the roles of family, friends and close ones, are very important to make sure that we support our young people and also supervise, to some extent, the access they have online as well.”
“For example, in consultation with his parents and former school, ISD has made arrangements to facilitate his continuing education while in detention. This includes arranging for tutors to assist him in preparing for his national exams this year. A mentor has also been identified for him. In addition, ISD is working very closely with the National Council of Churches of Singapore, NCCS, which is keen to be involved in the youth's rehabilitation to identify a suitable Christian counsellor for him.”
“There is also support provided by the Inter-Agency Aftercare Group. Through the group's network of welfare organisations and regular interactions with ISD, case officers provide detainees with another source of social interaction and support. These regular interactions are also a platform for rehabilitation stakeholders to guide the detainees. Even after they are released, they receive continuous supervision through the RO regime, with ISD case officers providing guidance to them and to help them with a smooth re-integration into society. Specifically for youth cases, priority continues to be given to address the ideological misconceptions that underpin the radical mindsets. Additional attention is also paid and in this case, to this 16-year-old youth, to address the non-ideological factors that led to their radicalisation, such as the sense of belonging and identity, critical thinking skills to discern radical rhetoric online, mental resilience, correlated stresses; and in particular, efforts are made to enable detainees to continue with their education where it is practicable. This was assessed to be critical in keeping these youths motivated and focused. ISD works with their families, the schools and other rehabilitation stakeholders to create a conducive environment to facilitate their studies. A mentoring programme tailored to meet the rehabilitation needs of these youths was also introduced in 2016. The mentor-mentee relationship will continue after the release, to ensure that they stay focused on pro-social goals. The rehabilitation for the 16-year-old youth as mentioned earlier on, will be largely guided by the approach that I have detailed above. We will also apply some of the best practices from the rehabilitation of previous youth cases.”
“I thank the Member for the question. The rehabilitation approach adopted by ISD is a holistic, intensive and long-term one, comprising religious, psychological and social rehabilitation – these three factors together. It is also customised to the individual's context and the circumstances. So, let me elaborate on each of these factors. First, on religious rehabilitation. All detainees, those released back to the community on Restriction Orders (RO), will have to attend religious counselling sessions at least once a month. The religious counselling sessions aim to provide them with the proper religious teachings and interpretation so as to counter the radical ideology they have imbibed from online and other sources. Secondly, on psychological rehabilitation. Through their detention and even after their release on RO, detainees work closely with psychologists to address the propensity for hatred and violence, and vulnerability to radical influence. The psychologists will also help them to reframe the faulty reasoning that underlie their beliefs. As part of this process, the psychologists regularly assess behavioural and cognitive aspects of the detainees' progress in rehabilitation. And third, and just as important, on social rehabilitation. Social rehabilitation is the form of social support that is provided to enable the detainees to re-integrate smoothly into society upon release and to stay on track in the long run. Family, in this regard, play a key role and key part in this process. Detainees are granted weekly family visits to preserve their connection to the family unit as much as possible. An aftercare officer is also assigned to each detainee family to provide social and other support where relevant.”
“All schools will also establish a peer support structure by 2022, where students will learn to support each other and be taught upstanding behaviour, speaking up for their peers where necessary, including in instances of racism and hate speech. These social bonds are the strongest counter possible against the spread of exclusivist and extremist ideologies. Outside the classroom, there have also been efforts to encourage interracial and interreligious dialogue. For example, the "Regardless of Race" dialogue series organised by OnePeople.sg and supported by MCCY, provides a platform for conversations on sentiments, issues and norms pertaining to race. Since 2019, five sessions have been organised, involving a total of more than 500 participants. Another community-driven initiative to provide more safe spaces for open conversations on religious issues is the "Ask Me Anything" series facilitated by a non-governmental organisation, the WhiteHatters Ltd. MCCY organised a Hackathon for Social Cohesion in November and December 2020, where more than 200 youths were invited to pitch innovative ideas on strengthening social cohesion and implement projects that promote social, racial and religious harmony. Mr Speaker, a cohesive and united society is the best defence against terrorism and radicalisation. We will continue to strengthen our efforts to build a resilient community that is prepared for a terrorist attack in Singapore and plays an active part to safeguard Singapore's unity in the face of this threat.”
“Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the RRG has intensified its digital outreach efforts. It produced over 60 online lectures, "live" postings, online engagements and videos for the community, including for youths. The RRG has also reached out to various inter-faith and religious groups. For example, in February 2020, the RRG, together with the Geylang Serai Inter-Racial Religious Confidence Circle (IRCC) organised a forum entitled "Harmony Amidst Crisis" to show the solidarity of Singaporeans. Leaders from the various faiths came together to observe a minute of silence for those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and also to start the campaign "#outbreak_never_break_us". The forum featured speakers who touched on the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, the threat of radicalisation and how extremists have been leveraging the pandemic in their recruitment efforts. Within the classroom, topics on multiracialism and the importance of racial harmony are taught in subjects like Character and Citizenship Education (CCE), History and Social Studies. In Secondary schools' Social Studies, students examine the impact of social and racial and religious prejudice and misconceptions on people and society. They explore the roles played by individuals and groups in strengthening interactions between different races and they consider how they can play their part to promote social cohesion. As part of the refreshed CCE curriculum, Secondary school teachers will receive specialised training to facilitate discussions on contemporary issues, such as race and religion, to hone students' perspective-taking skills as well as engender a sense of empathy and respect.”
“Age-appropriate SGSecure content is incorporated into story books and card games for students, as well as assembly talks and mobile exhibitions by Home Team agencies. ISD has also been working with schools, Institutes of Higher Learning and community organisations to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation outreach activities for students, youths and educators since 2007. These include workshops, talks and seminars. With the COVID-19 pandemic, ISD has leveraged online platforms for its outreach efforts. For example, ISD conducted webinars for educators in Institutes of Higher Learning last year. Workshops for school counsellors have been conducted since 2016 to sensitise them to the terrorism and radicalisation threat. As of 2019, over 260 School Counsellors in Secondary schools, as well as a number of Student Welfare Officers, have attended the workshops. Each workshop includes a visit to the ISD Heritage Centre to sensitise them to security threats, as well as a one-day training session which provides them with a better understanding of the radicalisation process and the factors, especially among youths; the behavioural indicators to look out for; and the intervention measures they can take. Teachers are encouraged to watch out for early signs of possible radicalisation, such as the avid consumption of radical materials, or expressions of support for terrorist entities and causes. Community partners such as the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) and the Inter-Agency Aftercare Group also conduct counter-ideology outreach activities targeted at students and youths. For example, the RRG has been working with schools to organise assembly talks, workshops, as well as learning journeys to the RRG Resource and Counselling Centre.”
“Such efforts are also important in sending a clear signal that our local religious communities stand firmly against radical ideologies and that any copycat attacks will not find traction or support here. Mr Lim, Mr Choo and Mr Murali asked about our efforts on educating religious groups, youths and the general public on countering radicalisation, and deepening students’ understanding of racial and religious issues. The SGSecure movement is a call to action to Singaporeans to unite and prepare for the threat of a terrorist attack. We have been reaching out to different groups in the community, including religious organisations, to raise awareness of overseas and local threats of terrorism and radicalisation. We conduct programmes such as interfaith dialogues and activities and visits to the Harmony in Diversity Gallery to sensitise the public to cultural and religious nuances and sensitivities, as well as to deepen mutual respect and understanding among our different races and religions. We have been sharing with the public how to detect early signs of radicalisation, such as displaying a keen interest in people with extremist views, supporting the use of violence as a solution to achieve one's agenda and expressing low tolerance and resentment towards multi-racial and multi-religious living. We urge the community to stay alert and to inform the authorities of suspected cases of radicalisation, so that we can intervene early and prevent such persons from harming themselves and others. Mr Choo asked us what more we can do in schools. We have been working closely with MOE to engage younger Singaporeans on SGSecure. All schools have a framework to drive SGSecure initiatives, which is overseen by school leaders.”
“The Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Act was passed by Parliament in January this year. It replaced the Arms and Explosives Act and strengthened our regulatory and enforcement regime. We agree with Mr de Souza that it is important for Singapore to denounce terror attacks whenever they happen, to send a clear message about where we stand as a people on this. The Government has publicly condemned overseas terrorist attacks. And we are also fortunate to have the support of our religious leaders, who have been proactive in publicly condemning terror attacks and reminding their followers to stay calm and not react to expressions of extreme sentiments and acts of violence in the name of religion. For example, in the wake of the Christchurch shootings in March 2019, various faith groups issued statements to denounce the shooter’s actions and call for Singaporeans to remain united and reject extremist ideas. Various ground-up interfaith initiatives were also organised, including a youth forum and a remembrance ceremony. More recently, following the arrest of the 16-year-old youth, our local Christian and Muslim religious leaders met to reaffirm the mutual trust between both communities and condemn the teenager’s plot to attack the two mosques. The leaders of other religious communities echoed the call for Singaporeans to rally together in the fight against terrorism and extremism. Mr Lim asked how we can improve relations between different religious groups. By showing their solidarity against violence and engaging in regular interactions, joint activities and community projects, our religious groups have maintained and strengthened harmonious relations, even in the wake of incidents that threaten to undermine our social cohesion.”
“Both documents expressed his misguided hatred towards Islam, as well as support for the Christchurch attacks and far-right ideology. ISD’s investigations found that he was operating alone. There was no indication that he had tried to involve others in his plans. This case shows clearly that violent impulses are not restricted to any particular racial or religious group. People who have been exposed to hate speech can become influenced by it. The 16-year-old youth will undergo psychological and religious counselling to correct his radical ideology and address his propensity for violence. We hope that he will respond positively and will be successfully rehabilitated, so that he can carry on with his life. Mr de Souza, Mr Choo, Mr Lim and Mr Murali asked about our counter-extremism and counter-radicalisation efforts. Singapore has been strengthening our laws and building resilience against terrorism. For example, the updated Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act came into force in April 2019. Key changes included expanding the prohibition on financing terrorism activities to include terrorism training, and increasing penalties for failing to disclose information relating to terrorism financing to the authorities. The detection and arrest of the 16-year-old Singaporean underscores the continued importance of the Internal Security Act, to enable the authorities to act pre-emptively before attacks happen, thus preventing injury, loss of life and damage to our communal harmony. With regard to offensive weapons and firearms, we exercise tight controls under our laws, and these apply regardless of the modality of sales, be it through physical retail stores or online e-commerce platforms.”
“Mr Murali asked for the facts and circumstances of the case and Mr Choo asked if investigations were conclusive that he had operated as a “lone wolf”. The 16-year-old Singaporean was arrested in December 2020. He had made detailed plans and preparations to attack Muslims at two mosques using a machete. He is the first detainee to be inspired by far-right ideology and he is the youngest individual dealt with to-date under the ISA for terrorism-related activities. He was self-radicalised, motivated by a strong antipathy towards Islam and a fascination with violence. He was inspired by Brenton Tarrant, who attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in March 2019. The 16-year-old Singaporean watched the video of Tarrant’s attack against the two mosques and read Tarrant’s manifesto. He also watched propaganda videos produced by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, and came to the erroneous conclusion that ISIS represented Islam, and that Islam called on its followers to kill non-Muslims. He had planned to carry out attacks on 15 March 2021, the second anniversary of the Christchurch attacks, at Assyafaah Mosque and Yusof Ishak Mosque, near his home. To prepare for this, he conducted online reconnaissance and research on both mosques; devised a plan to procure a vehicle to use during the attack; bought a tactical vest from an online platform which he intended to adorn with right-wing extremist symbols and strap on his mobile device to livestream the attack; watched videos to learn how to wield a machete to inflict fatal wounds; and intended to purchase one from an online marketplace. He also wrote two documents which he intended to disseminate prior to his attacks.”
“Mr Speaker, please allow me to take together the eight questions on the recent arrest of the 16-year-old self-radicalised Singaporean and measures against extremism and radicalisation from Mr Christopher de Souza, Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Lim Biow Chuan.”
“Various Members asked to expand the Police's use of contact tracing data to other offences that are not covered or not included in the seven categories, such as outrage of modesty or offences against vulnerable persons. Indeed, the data would be useful and would assist the Police to solve these crimes. However, we had to make a judgement call on the balance between the two imperatives of public health and public safety that Minister Vivian Balakrishnan talked about. Outrage of modesty and offences against vulnerable persons are of grave concern to the Police and public but rank below the seven categories in seriousness. This was a very tough balancing act for MHA. Nonetheless, I would like to assure Members that the Police will continue to investigate all offences even though they are not in the seven categories of serious offences. Ms Sylvia Lim and others spoke about Australia's model. Every country is different. Singapore had to decide what model and what we value. We score exceptionally well on safety and security because of the approach that we have taken and that we have decided on. I have a graphic here and I will distribute to Members via email at the end of today to illustrate this point – that we are here today, our security situation and safety is a result of the model and decision we have taken in terms of our law enforcement policy. I am heartened that many Members expressed their support and trust in the Police. This trust and support is very precious to us, which we will guard zealously. I would like to assure Members that the Police will continue to do whatever they can to ensure public safety and to pursue all leads in our investigations.”
“If a person assisting in investigation claims that he had lost his TT token, this will also be looked into by the Police. My advice is that upon the discovery of the loss of the TT token, one should quickly get a replacement at any Community Club, so as not to compromise contact tracing efforts. My Sylvia Lim asked about my statement in Parliament last month about accessing suspect’s and witness’ contact tracing data. Under the CPC, Police are entitled to access data from anyone. What was meant was that, operationally, in order not to compromise investigations, Police are more likely to approach witnesses first for data, in order not to tip off suspects. In this Bill, Police are empowered to access data from all persons for investigating the serious crimes that are set out in the Bill. Ms Sylvia Lim also asked why the exact list of offences is not specified. Describing the categories of scheduled offences, rather than the specified offences themselves, is an approach that we have employed in other Acts. For example, the Extradition Act takes a similar approach. The seven categories of offences relating to serious offences that will be obvious prima facie. On Ms Sylvia Lim's question regarding what is included under the category of serious sexual crimes, only rape and sexual assault with penetration will be covered. It will not cover other sexual assault involving mentally challenged victims. The Police cannot use contact tracing data that fall outside of the seven categories. Should a Police officer make a request, the Smart Nation and Digital Government Office (SNDGO) and MOH would not be permitted to provide the data.”
“I will let Members of the House read at your own time. Ms Tin Pei Ling asked about the safeguards in Police’s access to the data. First, while the Criminal Procedure Code, or CPC, specifies that production orders can only be made by officers with the rank of sergeant and above, we, in fact, intend to require the rank of requesting officer for contact tracing data to be higher. All requests for contact tracing data will have to be made by an officer of Inspector rank and above. This is the same level of approving authority for bank data that we request from financial institutions. Second, within the Police, all requests for contact tracing data must be approved by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), which is the staff authority for all investigation-related matters within the SPF. Third, the receiving party will only be required to comply with the order to disclose the data to the Police, if it is in relation to a serious offence. Any public sector officer, including Police, who uses or discloses the data for a non-serious offence would have committed an offence. Lastly, all extracted data will be encrypted and kept in strict confidence. Only authorised officers will have access to the encrypted data. Mechanisms will be put in place to ensure restricted access and to maintain logs on the officers who have accessed the data. And, of course, if the data is used in Court, it will be seen whether the offence does or does not fall within the seven specified categories. Ms Jessica Tan cited a situation where an individual’s lost token was used to commit a serious crime. As part of an investigation, Police will holistically assess the leads and evidence, including TT data, in cases where this may be obtained.”
“Our current framework under the CPC has enabled the Police to do their job efficiently and effectively, and Singapore has thus been kept safe and secure. Let me give a hypothetical example, where we assume a terrorist attack has occurred and Police are trying to prevent more attacks. In such a situation, contact tracing data could be critical information that we could use to identify any other persons involved in the planned attacks and uncover any terrorist ring as quickly as possible. As you can see, when it comes to investigations, time is of the essence. If Police had intelligence and access to contact tracing data that could help stop attacks from taking place, I believe Members in this House would not say no. Ms Sylvia Lim asked if we can give more than one example that Minister Vivian Balakrishnan had given in his opening speech. With your permission, Mdm Deputy Speaker, may I ask the Clerks to distribute an Annex that I have prepared, containing examples for each of the seven categories of serious offences. Members can go through these scenarios and examples, and ask ourselves: would we really say that the information should not be used by the Police in such situations?”
“Mdm Deputy Speaker, I will take the opportunity to address some of the questions that were raised by Members of the House pertaining to contact tracing data used by Police investigations. First, Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin and Mr Louis Ng asked about using contact tracing data for cases where the initial charge for a serious offence is subsequently reduced or amended to a less or non-serious offence, or if the serious offence reveals a separate non-serious offence. The Police and Prosecution will not be able to use the contact tracing data for prosecution of a non-serious offence. This is what we are trying to say in this Bill. There could be a situation where the suspect is investigated for both serious and non-serious offences committed at the same time. In criminal proceedings for such cases, which may be dealt with in a joint trial conference covering both the serious and non-serious offences, it would not be feasible to separate the data used for investigations of these offences. But should the offences be dealt with separately in separate trials, then the prosecution will not be able to use the data in prosecution for the related non-serious offence. Mr Pritam Singh asked about Police’s use of TraceTogether data and Mr Leong Mun Wai also asked when Police first accessed the TT data. The Police have only requested for TT data once, for a murder that occurred in May 2020, in line with their powers under the CPC. As the TT app was not installed in the suspect’s phone, there was no useful data obtained. Mr Pritam Singh and Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin also asked about the usefulness of the contact tracing data for criminal investigations. It is understandable that in any investigation, every piece of information is potentially useful and helpful.”
“This Bill works alongside other laws to keep the threat of online harms at bay. That said, the threat of online influence lies outside of this scope and Members may consider filing specific parliamentary questions for this to be addressed holistically. Mr Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members’ concerns. The Bill is a crucial piece of legislation that will go a long way to continue to ensure safe, secure and responsible GEW handling in Singapore. Once again, I thank Members for their strong support for this Bill. Sir, I beg to move.”
“Using imitation guns to commit certain scheduled offences such as robbery and extortion continues to be a serious offence under the Arms Offences Act. The offender can be jailed for up to 10 years and be liable for caning of no fewer than three strokes. Ms Sylvia Lim also asked the question for the number of gun possession licences issued for self-defence that are still in force. There are currently 19 gun possession licences in force, issued to personal security officers of certain embassies, for security reasons and protection. In the past, the Police used to issue gun possession licence to private individuals, such as arms dealers, for self-protection; but this is no longer practised today. Mr Melvin Yong asked on the defences and counter measures against drone attacks. SPF will work closely with CAAS to deal with the threat of weapon-mounted drones. This is because section 7B of Air Navigation Act today makes it an offence to operate a drone with prohibited items carried on it. Weapons, guns and explosives are prohibited items. Clause 97 updates the reference in the Air Navigation Act to refer to this new Bill. We have developed some capabilities, and are testing more methods to counter drones used for illicit purposes. However, I will not be able to share more due to the sensitivity of the operations. Lastly, Mr Zhulkarnain and Mr Gan Thiam Poh raised the concern of access to harmful online content relating to GEW, terrorism and other materials. I agree these are important issues raised. However, preventing terrorism use of GEW is but one aspect of the Bill. There are more specific and focused laws like the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act and the United Nations (Anti-terrorism Measures) Regulations to address the threat of terrorism.”
“In such a scenario, issuing a security direction would be critical to mitigate the threat first, given that the matter is of such urgency and magnitude that there is not enough time for regulations to be amended or new regulations to be made, and for the due process under clause 63 or licence conditions to be modified. Secondly, Mr Zhulkarnain also asked if a security direction would apply to a "close associate" of a licensee. The answer is no. A security direction can only apply to a licensee, class licensee or person exempted from the Act. They are ultimately responsible for the regulated activity and are best placed to take necessary action to comply with the security direction. It would be ineffective and disproportionate for a security direction to apply also to a close associate. To Mr Zhulkarnain's question on whether it is possible to seek judicial review against a security direction, given that a security direction is non-appealable under the Act, the Bill does not contain a privative or ouster clause, and so yes, a person who is aggrieved by exercise of power can seek judicial review. On the need for asset preservation, the Member need not be concerned because the security direction is aimed at dealing with a particular situation and is valid only for a period of up to six months. Asset disposal or destruction will not be an appropriate response in a security direction. I will now progress to other issues raised. Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked for the statistics on crimes involving imitation guns. There are only a handful of such cases – nine cases were reported in the last 10 years, of which seven resulted in conviction for offences under the Arms Offences Act or the Penal Code.”
“Second, on whether the Licensing Officer (or LO) has discretion to still grant security clearance if a person fails one or more criteria under clause 45(1). The answer is yes. The clause does allow the LO to give such weight to the factors, as he considers appropriate, when assessing the security clearance of a person. Third, on the security clearance for foreigners, such as arms dealers for short-term trade fairs. The Police Licensing Officer performs security vetting on all licence applicants, whether foreign or local. Specifically for foreigners, the Police Licensing Officer will request for relevant documents to show proof that they have been duly licensed or authorised by the source countries to handle the GEW. To further mitigate the security risks associated with imported guns and explosives, all movement of such high-risk items in Singapore must be escorted and guarded by armed auxiliary police officers, thereby minimising the chances of the items being misused or mishandled. Mr Zhulkarnian asked about security directions under clause 64. First, on the circumstances for which security direction may be issued. As mentioned in my earlier speech, security directions issued by Minister can be used where there is imminent threat to life or property. A possible scenario is where there is an on-going suspected terrorist incident, such that for public safety reasons, licensees and even those who are exempted from holding GEW licences must immediately enhance their security posture or completely shut their premises for a specified period to prevent the terrorists from getting their hands on guns and explosives.”
“Only qualified Compliance Officers will be authorised to conduct site inspections on behalf of the Licensing Officer. In addition, they will not be allowed to exercise more intrusive enforcement powers such as seizure, search and issuance of composition. The Police Licensing Officer will also conduct audit checks on Compliance Officers to ensure that they are proficient in carrying out their duties. Given these safeguards, and in line with the minimum age for other security-related work such as security officers, MHA has assessed that the minimum age of 18 is appropriate, and there is no need to set a higher minimum age at this juncture. Ms Sylvia Lim raised several questions regarding the security clearance regime, under clauses 43 and 45 of the Bill. First, on the need to security clear close associates. While close associates may not handle GEW directly, they need to be security cleared because of the security risk associated with the indirect influence they can exert over the operation of the entity and on the regulated activities the entity conducts. The threshold of 5% equity interest or voting rights to qualify as a close associate is similar to that for determining a "substantial shareholder" under the Companies Act, and is currently used by the Police for the purpose of evaluating the fit and proper criteria. As setting a lower threshold would make it more onerous for businesses, MHA assesses that the 5% threshold is sufficient and balanced, based on the current circumstances. The threshold can be reviewed from time to time, depending on the threat environment. So, shareholders who hold 5% and above will have to be security cleared.”
“In addition, to help manage costs for operators, we will introduce a new licensing model, where if an applicant seeks to conduct related activities, he will only need to make one application to the regulator, to obtain the set of different licences for these activities. The cost of this one application will be lower than the total of having to apply individual licences for each regulated activity. Next, on class licensing, Mr Derrick Goh asked for assurance that class licensing will not apply to higher risk categories or situations. Mr Vikram also asked about the steps that Government will take to keep class licensees informed of requirements under a class licence. Relatedly, Mr Louis Ng also asked if variations to class licences will be published in forms more readily accessible to the public, than the Gazette. To Mr Derrick Goh's question, as class licensing is less stringent than individual licensing from a security standpoint, MHA’s intent is to apply class licensing only to lower-risk activities, such as air gun shooting in school settings. To Mr Vikram's question, under clause 56, class licensing conditions will be published in the Gazette, which is publicly accessible. Police will also reach out to groups that will be class licensed to make them aware of their regulatory obligations. To Mr Louis Ng's question, the short answer is yes. Variation of class licences will also be published on Police's website; and Police will reach out to affected class licensees, where feasible, to inform them of the changes. On the issue of appointment of Compliance Officers raised by Mr Melvin Yong, Mr Louis Ng and Ms Sylvia Lim, to assure this House, Compliance Officers will be required to undergo training and assessment by the Police Licensing Officer.”
“This would be a light-touch approach that mitigates the risk of misuse of such items, without being overly onerous. Moving on, I will touch on licensing of shooting range operations and costs to stakeholders. We note Mr Derrick Goh’s suggestion to manage the inconvenience and costs to stakeholders. I must reiterate that, when designing the regulations and processes, safety and security will remain our topmost priority. But within this objective, we are also mindful to minimise regulatory burden as far as possible. Specifically, prior to granting or renewing a shooting range operation licence, there are certain procedures which are fundamental to ensuring the safe conduct of activities that need to be carried out. These include inspecting the range premises to ensure the robustness of safety and security measures, and security vetting of key persons. These inevitably take some time. Where possible, Police have streamlined procedures and processes to make things easier on licensees and applicants. For example, Police have digitalised the entire licensing application and renewal process, reducing administrative burden and unnecessary waiting time. However, activities such as range time slot booking are managed by the range operators, and are not within the control of the regulator. On the issue of compliance cost, range operators have generally implemented most required measures on their own accord, even today, such as the installation of CCTV systems and setting up access controls into and out of the range premises. We therefore do not expect the introduction of shooting range licences to impose significant additional costs in the immediate term on these operators.”
“To assure this House, regardless of the quantity or duration of possession of such items, a licence will already be required for the possession of these items, setting out basic safety and security conditions that must be adhered to. If these quantity or time thresholds need to be revised subsequently due to changes in threat assessment, clause 2(2) of the Bill allows downward adjustments to be made through Regulations. Next, on the definition of "weapons", Mr Louis Ng also asked if the term is intended to cover imitation, replica or ornamental weapons. 3.00 pm Imitation or replica weapons are not regulated under the Bill, as these are unlikely to be effective in causing injuries or death, and therefore pose too little risk to warrant tight regulation. The way the Bill has been drafted places only an exhaustive list of actual weapons to be regulated in the First Schedule. Conversely, "gun" has a broad, descriptive definition in the Bill, and therefore to avoid doubt, the Bill makes clear that imitation and replica guns are excluded. Notwithstanding, the use of an imitation weapon to threaten or cause fear of injury or death to others would likely be an offence under other Acts, such as the Penal Code. Ornamental weapons, however, are covered under the Bill. These include ornamental swords and daggers. These items have potential to be misused to cause harm due to their sharp tips or blades. But we also recognise that the overall safety and security posed by these items is low, as long as they are kept safely and securely within dwelling places for the purpose of display. Therefore, possession and storage of these items will be considered for class licensing.”
“Paragraphs (c) and (d) in the definition are extensions beyond what would be the exhaustive paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of "store". They are meant to clarify the situations under which the possession of a certain number of articles or for a certain period for purposes outside of what is in paragraphs (a) and (b) will constitute storage, and not possession, for the purposes of the Bill. The thresholds of 12 for guns and major gun parts, and 24 continuous hours for explosives and explosive precursors, were determined based on MHA's operational assessment of the increased risks associated with these higher quantities or longer time of GEW being held in one's possession. The thresholds are necessary for regulatory certainty. Otherwise, there is no difference between storing and possession of these items, which has to be regulated differently because of the appreciable risk difference of these activities. To elaborate, if the thresholds are exceeded, the licensee may be required to implement more extensive storage-specific safety and security measures, such as CCTV requirements and hardened walls. These are over and above the requirements typically placed on licensees who possess a single gun, or handle explosives or explosive precursors for a very short period of time. We acknowledge that with any defined threshold, persons may seek to operate at the margins to avoid taking on additional regulatory burden. But this is a necessary trade-off between meeting our security objectives and providing stakeholders with clarity on the rules.”
“To complement the already robust measures at the checkpoints, we have a stringent enforcement and regulatory regime inland, as well as severe penalties under the Bill for unlicensed supply, storage and possession of GEW. This will be a strong deterrence against potential offenders. Mr Melvin Yong asked for the circumstances under which a person or an organisation would be authorised to possess a 3D blueprint of a gun. We recognise that there are legitimate reasons to possess digital blueprints of guns in Singapore, such as conducting scientific or law enforcement research. And the Bill is not intended to impede such activities. Parties that wish to undertake such activities can apply for the appropriate licence or seek special approval from the Minister for Home Affairs under clause 13(2)(c). They will then have to adhere to licensing or approving conditions, such as, requiring that the blueprints are securely handled and not be left easily accessible by uninvolved persons. On the questions raised by Mr Sharael Taha on the need to impose export controls on certain types of 3D printers, and by Ms Joan Pereira and Mr Melvin Yong on whether MHA intends to regulate 3D printers, these issues fall beyond the scope of this Bill, which does not deal with 3D printing in itself or 3D printers per se. I seek the Members' understanding that this will have to be studied in detail, wider, with the relevant agencies and dealt with separately. Having addressed Members' queries on 3D printing, I will now move on to Members' comments on other clauses. Mr Louis Ng asked about the definition of "store" in clause 2, which is one of the regulated activities covered by the Bill.”
“In this regard, we agree with Mr Sharael Taha that the community and family members and friends play an important role, such as flagging out potential lone wolves 3D printing guns illegally with intent to cause harm. Information can be provided to the authorities and will be treated with strict confidence. I also acknowledge at this point Assoc Prof Jamus Lim's point about addressing the underlying motivations behind criminal activity. The Government never loses sight of the need to do so and I thank the Member for his views. Members also raised questions on the import of guns: how we deal with 3D-printed guns that can escape metal detectors, and the threat of guns and weapon parts imported into Singapore via parcels which are deceptively mislabelled as something else. First, to clarify, the import of a 3D-printed gun, whether metallic or not, still requires a licence. Our postal regulations also make it unlawful for a person to send by post or to deliver by post any gun or weapon. There are robust checks at our checkpoints to detect threat objects, including gun or weapon parts and 3D-printed guns, and Mr Sharael Taha shared an example earlier on. Incoming parcels are inspected, with the help of technologies other than metal detectors, such as X-ray machines. Certain persons of interest, such as those flagged up by intelligence agencies to be of security threat, may also be subject to further checks. Enforcement officers at the checkpoints may also conduct random checks, to deter and detect any security threats. Notwithstanding, we recognise that there is no fool-proof system to fully prevent the import of gun and weapon parts.”
“For example, New South Wales also passed laws in 2015 to criminalise the unauthorised possession of 3D blueprint for the manufacturing of firearms. Licensing the possession of such blueprints will enable the authorities to know who are involved in 3D manufacturing of guns, to ensure that proper security and practices are in place for handling dangerous articles that may potentially be produced as a result. But I also want to emphasise that items which do not fit the description of a gun under clause 3 of the Bill will not require a licence to possess or 3D print. Clause 3(4)(c) also makes clear that imitation guns are not considered guns for the purpose of the Bill. Therefore, the possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of such items will not require a specific licence under clause 13. On the impact on the NERF gun community, off-the-shelf NERF guns are clearly meant for recreational purposes and present little risk, given that the projectiles are foam-based, and are unlikely to cause injury if used properly. MHA does not regulate NERF guns today, and does not plan to do so at this juncture. Correspondingly, the possession of any blueprint of NERF gun parts will not be regulated. We will continue to assess how best to apply the right regulatory tools for the various items, in a way that is calibrated to the risks involved, so as not to hamper innovation unnecessarily. Mr Sharael Taha and Mr Melvin Yong raised questions pertaining to the enforcement of this offence. Police will enforce in a practical and reasonable manner, based on information that is received, for example, from members of the public.”
“Major parts of guns are essential to the operation of a gun, such as the barrel or the trigger mechanism and which can be assembled to create a functioning gun. On the other hand, gun accessories are designed to be fitted to or attached to a gun for various purposes, such as to conceal its fire, like a silencer or flash suppressor, or it cannot work except in connection with an operative and functioning gun. They therefore pose a lower risk. As for weapons like swords and knuckledusters, they are less lethal and dangerous than guns, and therefore, we think there is no necessity at this juncture to also control the possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of these weapons. On replica guns, while we agree that they can potentially be used to cause alarm, they cannot be used to cause physical harm per se and therefore similarly pose lower risks. But if such guns are used while committing certain offences, such as robbery and extortion, an offence would be made out under the Arms Offences Act, along with the Penal Code offences for the main criminal act. To address Ms Yeo Wan Ling's point that 3D-printed guns are unlikely to function and her concern on inhibiting innovation, as I mentioned in my Second Reading speech yesterday, the threat posed by the 3D printed guns and gun parts is real. This point was echoed by other Members as well. There have been genuine cases and online videos demonstrating the use of 3D printed guns or gun parts, especially the metallic ones. In this regard, we are not alone in addressing this new phenomenon. Other jurisdictions have also passed legislation that deal with the threat of 3D printing of guns.”
“Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their views and for their strong support for this Bill. There are many questions that have been asked. I shall address them in turn, first, on the 3D printing of guns, given the strong interest among Members on this topic. Following which, I shall address issues raised by Members thematically. Many Members raised questions about clause 13 which is on the new offence of unauthorised possession of 3D blueprints for the manufacture of guns or major gun parts. The divergence of views among Members shows that there is no straightforward answer to achieving an appropriate regulatory balance on this matter. On the one hand, Mr Sharael Taha asked if the offence should be widened beyond guns and major gun parts to also cover gun modifications and attachments and offensive weapons. Mr Melvin Yong also took the view that clause 13 should cover possession of digital blueprints for gun replicas. On the other hand, Ms Yeo Wan Ling was of the view that 3D printed guns are unlikely to work in practice and that clause 13 could have a chilling effect on innovative applications of 3D printing. To be clear, under present law, if you produce a gun using a 3D printer without a licence, you are committing at least two offences: unlicensed manufacturing a gun and possession of an illegal gun. The Bill does not change this basic position. What the Bill does is to address the new phenomenon where it is increasingly easy for anyone to seek out and acquire online designs and directions on how to make a gun, and using a technology that is increasingly accessible. But we are also careful to ensure the law is not over-reaching. We have limited clause 13 to guns and major gun parts as we have assessed these to pose the highest risk, necessitating such strong controls.”
“For example, the individual’s physical or mental health and participation in criminal activity are material factors in screening. The Bill will also make clear the obligations of the licensee and the worker. In particular, clause 47 makes it an offence if a licensee allows a worker who is not security cleared to handle GEW. At the same time, a special worker of a licensee, who handles GEW knowingly, or with reckless disregard, that his or her security clearance is not valid, will be committing an offence. To guard against persons who are not licensees but may have significant influence over an entity engaged in GEW regulated activities, clause 48 makes it an offence if a licensee fails to inform the LO within seven days of a person becoming a close associate. Let me conclude. I cannot emphasise enough that the safety and security that we currently enjoy in Singapore should never be taken for granted. In this regard, the Bill seeks to ensure that our regulatory framework remains robust to deter and prevent the misuse and mishandling of GEW, which can have very serious consequences for our safety and security, while respecting the need to allow legitimate uses for some GEW. Mr Deputy Speaker, I beg to move. [(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]”
“For example, the penalty for the offence of unlicensed possession of explosives for individuals is higher than that for breach of licensing conditions involving explosives, as the former is considered more egregious. This is a fairer approach, to ensure that the penalties are proportional to the offence, while maintaining our tough stance against misuse of GEW. The Bill also streamlines the regulatory approach for dangerous fireworks. Currently, dangerous fireworks are prohibited under the Dangerous Fireworks Act, or DFA. However, fireworks are explosives as well, and ought to be regulated as such under a single law. Clause 98 therefore repeals the DFA. All activities involving fireworks including discharge, transportation and storage will be regulated as explosives under this Bill. Last but not least, the Bill contains provisions that put on firmer footing some existing practices which remain relevant in our new security environment. One of these practices is the current security clearance regime, and which the Bill will apply to licensees and their management, and certain key personnel engaging in regulated activities, called special workers. Screening requirements, which serve to mitigate the risks associated with GEW, are presently imposed through the "fit and proper" criteria for licensees, or mandated through the licensing conditions for the workers. This has shortcomings as there is no consistency and direct link between the validity of security clearances and the authorisation to engage in the regulated activities. To lend greater clarity to the industry, clauses 41 to 46 set out the security clearance process and considerations for granting, suspending or revoking the security clearance of an individual.”
“In developing this Bill, we took the opportunity to rationalise the offences and penalties across the various GEW-related laws to achieve greater coherence, consistency and clarity. There are currently some inconsistencies in penalties for offences with similar offence elements. For example, section 3 of the Arms Offences Act, or AOA, criminalises unlawful possession of arms or ammunition and the penalties include caning. Section 13 of the AEA similarly criminalises unlicensed possession of arms, but the penalties are lighter and they do not include caning. In addition, certain offences have similar penalties, even though the egregiousness of the offences differ. For example, under the AEA, the offence of conducting an activity without a licence attracts similar penalties as a breach of licensing conditions, even though the latter is considered less severe. Moving forward, regulatory breaches like non-compliance with licence conditions or unlicensed activities will be criminalised under the Bill, whereas actions with criminal intent will be offences under the other Acts and will carry heavier punishments. To this end, clauses 93 and 94 amend the AOA and the Corrosive and Explosives Substances and Offensive Weapons Act, or CESOWA, in short, to clarify that offences made out under these Acts involve criminal intent and therefore attract heavier punishments and penalties, thus distinguishing them from offences under the AEA. The Bill also repeals the Explosive Substances Act, as there are similar offences relating to explosive substances in the CESOWA, such as possession and use of explosive substances with criminal intent. Even as penalties are being raised, the penalties are also calibrated to match the egregiousness of the offence.”
“For example, the Licensing Officer may need to impose requirements for the deployment of a range safety officer or installation of robust perimeter fencing. Clause 19 therefore makes it an offence to operate a shooting range or paintball range without a licence. The Bill also confers on the Licensing Officer, or LO, greater operational flexibility, to act swiftly where necessary to deal with new dangers or where there are increased risks. First, the LO may change the licensing conditions during the tenure of the licence. Today, the LO cannot do so. If the LO needs to impose tighter conditions on the licensee, for example, to deal with changes in the operating environment, the LO must first revoke and then reissue the license. Also, the LO cannot impose tighter conditions on an errant licensee whose breach may not warrant licence suspension or revocation. Clause 54 allows the LO to add, delete or modify conditions during the tenure of a licence, subject to due process. Second, there will be a new power for the Minister for Home Affairs to issue security directions. Sometimes, a security situation requires a more expedient response than what modifying licensing conditions allows, given the need to provide for due process when licensing conditions are changed. If there is imminent threat to life or property, for instance, clause 64 allows the Minister to direct licensees, class licensees and even exempted persons to immediately put in place enhanced measures, or temporarily suspend, cease or scale down their activities for a period of time. This is called a security direction. It is non-appealable and is time-limited to six months. Non-compliance is an offence. The other key objective of this Bill is to ensure a more calibrated and coherent enforcement framework for GEW.”
“Today, "arms", as defined under the AEA, covers guns and major gun parts and five specified weapons, that is, swords, bayonets, daggers, spears and spearheads. This definition has two issues. First, the controls and penalties are not calibrated according to the risk posed by the item. The specified weapons pose lower risks than guns and major gun parts. But the way “arms” is defined now, means that these lower-risk items require the same controls, and offences involving these items carry the same penalties as offences involving guns. Second, other weapons which may pose equal or higher risk as the five specified weapons, such as machetes, are not regulated. Our policy intent is to have a regime that comprehensively controls GEW, and in a manner which is commensurate with their risk. Clauses 29 to 35 create and set out a distinct set of controls, offences and penalties for the specified weapons, to reflect the lower risk they pose vis-à-vis guns and major gun parts. The expanded list of specified weapons to be regulated is reflected in the First Schedule, and will include other dangerous weapons like throwing stars and knuckledusters, which are very unlikely to have common day-to-day uses. In addition, the Bill expands the scope of regulation to cover gun accessories, such as flash suppressors and silencers, which can be used to enhance the performance of guns. However, the penalties for gun accessories are lower than those for guns as they pose a lower risk. The Bill also allows shooting range operations to be regulated, to ensure safety at the range. Today, operating a shooting range is not an activity that needs to be licensed. However, we want to be able to ensure that safety and security measures at shooting ranges are adequate.”
“But there are certain low or moderate-risk GEW-related activities which warrant some regulatory control, just not to the extent of individual licensing. For example, students who handle air guns as part of their co-curricular activities (CCAs) in schools, generally do so in the campus, in the compound, which is a relatively secure setting, but some safety and security measures are still needed to prevent misuse or mishandling. Therefore, clauses 56 to 58 introduce a class licence system that will work in lieu of individual licences. Under these clauses, a person who meets certain criteria, which will be set out in subsidiary legislation, such as being a member of a school air gun club, is automatically treated as licensed and allowed to carry out a GEW regulated activity, subject to the conditions. With class licensing, the person need not be put through security clearance and need not apply or renew for individual licence. Conversely, under clause 66, the Licensing Officer has the power to suspend or disapply the class licence with respect to a specific class licensee if the LO is satisfied that, inter alia, the class licensee has contravened class licence conditions, is convicted of an offence in a GEW-related Act, or if it is in the public interest or national security of Singapore to do so. To elaborate, public interest grounds include considerations relating to public order as well as public security and safety. For example, if an air gun class licensee is found to be a gang member, Police can then disapply this person from continuing to handle GEW. Next, the Bill also revises our regulatory approach towards weapons and gun accessories.”
“Clause 80 therefore allows the Licensing Officer or LO in short, with the approval of the Minister for Home Affairs, to appoint Compliance Officers to exercise certain powers of the LO, such as the powers of inspection. Next, while the vast majority of the GEW industry are compliant, we continue to encounter episodes of lapse among licensees. Some happened because the licensees wanted to save costs, or wanted to make compliance more convenient for themselves. In so doing, they compromised safety and security. Any lapse or breach involving GEW can result in catastrophic consequences. MHA has identified areas where we can further improve compliance and enhance regulatory effectiveness. First, the Bill requires specific periodic reporting of GEWs by licensees and allows for inspections by regulators. There are risks to the community when guns, explosives or lethal weapons are not accounted for. Clauses 59, 60 and 61 require licensees to update the Licensing Officer on changes to their management and to periodically report on their conduct of the regulated activities. Clauses 70 to 72 grant the Licensing Officer and authorised officers additional powers, such as the powers of inspection and powers to order the production of documents, to determine whether information given to the regulators is correct or whether regulatory action needs to be taken. Second, the Bill expands the scope of regulation to cover GEW-related activities and items more comprehensively, in a calibrated manner. In particular, the Bill introduces a class licensing regime for low or moderate-risk users and activities. Currently, the AEA requires all persons conducting GEW-related activities to be either individually licensed, or to be exempted, which means they will fall outside the Act.”
“To be clear, the intent is not to target persons who genuinely have no knowledge and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she possessed the digital blueprint for making a gun. For example, a person who merely browses out of curiosity and finds on the Internet a gun blueprint, and the blueprint is only temporarily stored in the browser cache. Next, we have the threat posed by drones laden with GEW. This is a real and serious threat. In 2018, explosives-laden drones were used during an attack on Nicolas Maduro, the Venezuela President, when he was making a public speech. Several members of the Bolivarian National Guard were injured. GEW-laden drones can circumvent conventional physical security measures, such as physical fences and CCTVs. Clause 5 addresses the threat by making it clear that a person who has control over or operates a vehicle or vessel carrying GEW, even if via remote control, is treated as possessing the GEW. The Bill reinforces the 2015 amendment to the Air Navigation Act, which makes it an offence if a person operates an unmanned aircraft and the unmanned aircraft carries a prohibited item, which can be any weapon. The Bill also introduces powers for the Licensing Officers to authorise third parties to do low-risk compliance checks, to allow the regulator to focus on high-risk GEW. Currently, all licensing compliance checks are performed by Police officers regardless of the risk posed by the GEW. There is scope to use our limited Police resources more optimally. Our intent is to delegate checks on low-risk items, such as weapons and air guns, to qualified persons.”
“In addition, the Bill allows the Minister for Home Affairs to prescribe items as prohibited GEW, offences related to which will attract even higher fines of up to $100,000 for persons and $200,000 for entities. These are items which are identified as particularly dangerous or may be more readily concealed and would be particularly suited to unlawful use. For example, certain types of automatic gun commonly used by terrorists, which are highly dangerous and clearly have no legitimate use. No licence will be granted for the handling of these items. Next, the Bill criminalises the unauthorised possession of digital blueprints of guns. Today, a person could easily find on the Internet, materials for gun making and manufacture a fully workable gun using a 3D printer and a gun blueprint taken from the Internet. As a case in point, in 2019, a shooter in Germany had brought along guns with components that were manufactured using 3D printing. Those guns were eventually not used in carrying out the attacks, but were his back-up arsenal. Clause 13 provides that a person who wants to make a 3D-printed gun or major part of a gun by an additive manufacturing process using a 3D printer or electronic milling machine will need a licence. Without a licence, the mere possession of a digital blueprint of a gun or gun part will be an offence. In this context, "possession" includes the scenario where a person in Singapore physically possesses a storage device containing such a blueprint, as well as the scenario where a person in Singapore stores a blueprint outside Singapore, such as in an overseas cloud storage device.”
“Otherwise, there is a risk of lapses going undetected, potentially resulting in disastrous safety or security consequences, such as the recent explosion that happened in Beirut which killed more than 200 people. The Guns, Explosives and Weapons Control Bill before this House seeks to replace the Arms and Explosives Act, the Explosive Substances Act and the Dangerous Fireworks Act, and make consequential amendments to other GEW-related Acts. The Bill reinforces the Government's position that any handling of GEW is a privilege that is conditioned on the overriding need to ensure that we meet the objective of public safety and security, and that strict controls are required to achieve this objective. In particular, the Bill will strive to achieve two objectives. First, to strengthen our levers to promote safe and secure GEW handling and further minimise the risks posed by GEW, and second, to ensure a more calibrated and coherent enforcement framework for these items. We have, in the process, consulted industry stakeholders to explain the amendments and also obtained their feedback. Let me now explain some of the key amendments. We intend to achieve our first objective of strengthening levers to promote safe, secure and responsible GEW handling and further minimise the risks posed by GEW in two ways. First, by further tightening controls over high-risk GEW. Today, the maximum fines for unlicensed activities involving explosive precursors (EPs) are $100,000 for entities and $50,000 for individuals. However, the maximum fine for arms and explosives is only $10,000, even though the degree of harm that can be caused is comparable to that of EPs. The Bill therefore raises the maximum fines for guns and explosives to match those for EPs.”
“Many of these incidents were not carried out by military organisations or state-sponsored activists, but individuals with extremist views and sentiments, using guns or knives. Among others, the series of religiously-motivated terrorist attacks and the beheading of a school teacher in France late last year as well as the Christchurch mass shootings in 2019 by a gunman, where 51 individuals lost their lives and 40 were injured. We must not presume that these attacks cannot happen here in Singapore. Recently, 37 individuals were investigated by ISD and the Police for inciting violence, stoking communal unrest and making derogatory remarks against Muslims. One of them was eventually arrested under the Internal Security Act. He had bought foldable knives in Singapore, which he claimed he would use for attacks against Hindus in Bangladesh. Second, technology is posing an increasing challenge to effective enforcement against GEW-related crimes. The Internet has significantly facilitated the trafficking and manufacture of GEW. One can easily get online and access materials and instructions to manufacture GEW. There are lethal forms of GEW that can be purchased over the Internet. Third, we need to optimise our enforcement resources to better regulate a growing industry. The AEA was last amended in 2007 to introduce regulation for explosive precursors. Since then, the total number of GEW licences has more than doubled, from around 2,000 in 2010 to more than 4,000 in 2020. Every licence requires resources to vet the licensee and to conduct inspections. The Police, who are currently the regulators under the AEA, need to be able to regulate this growing pool of licensees effectively.”