Edwin Tong Chun Fai
Singapore
“These questions have been answered in the reply to Questions Nos 26 to 31 for Oral Answer on today's Order Paper. [Please refer to "Addressing Issues Identified in Legal Profession Sustainability Study", Official Report, 7 July 2026, Vol 96, Issue 32, Written Answers to Questions for Oral Answer not Answered by End of Question Time secti…”
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“Mr Speaker, the Minister has sketched out some of the forces that explain why online falsehoods are real and serious problems, not just to Singapore but for democracies around the world. I will take Members through the key provisions in the Bill. Members who have read the SC report will notice that the Bill tracks closely the SC's findings and recommendations. The measures in the Bill are designed to address, firstly, the impact of falsehoods; and secondly, the reasons underlying why falsehoods have had a severe impact. On the impact of falsehoods, the SC made the following findings. Falsehoods can have a one-off dramatic impact. But low-level falsehoods that have no immediate visible impact can be just as dangerous. This is found in paragraphs 105 to 107 of the SC report. The Minister has explained in detail how falsehoods harm democratic institutions and free speech. The SC goes into this in some detail at paragraphs 121 to 138 of its report. Falsehoods can also cause serious and sometimes fatal consequences for individuals and for businesses. This is covered in paragraphs 139 to 151 of the SC report. To understand why falsehoods have had such a serious impact, the SC heard extensive expert evidence on the psychology and mechanisms of how falsehoods work and operate. This can be found at paragraphs 152 to 177 of the SC report. But let me summarise. The core trick of falsehoods lies in their use to arouse anger, fear and negative emotions. This more effectively exploits cognitive biases. There is also a stark power imbalance between facts and falsehoods. It is very difficult for facts to overcome falsehoods organically. Falsehoods move and take effect quickly, long before corrections can be put in motion.”
“No, if it is not a statement of fact, then POHA does not apply. But that is not to say that should you have a statement that has affected a business entity economically or that might otherwise be defamatory of an individual, those civil remedies still apply. And parties can still avail themselves of that even if the statement does not fall under POHA. I hope that clarifies. [(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)] [(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)] [(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai]. (proc text)] [(proc text) Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]”
“For these individuals, yes. And I explained that in my earlier speeches on the Member's example on workers.”
“Well, it depends on the circumstances in which he went on to identify the actual culprit. But I would imagine that in such a scenario, Members would remember I spoke about there being a defence of reasonableness. So, if you portray someone as being the perpetrator when actually it is not, then I think I would doubt that the Court would say it is unreasonable for the person to then point in the direction of the actual perpetrator. But, as I said, it is fact-specific. Let the Court look at the facts of each case and understand the context and reasons behind the posting even by the second person.”
“I thank Mr Pritam Singh. A misleading statement is still a statement of fact and is not a comment or an opinion. The example the Member cited, "May commit violence if you attend a black metal band concert" is a view that has been formed, is a culmination of various factors which have led a person to come to that conclusion. That is not a statement of fact, nor can it be categorised as a misleading statement, which is also a statement of fact. So, that statement that the Member has cited is outside of the realm of this Bill. What this Bill seeks to do is to look at statements of fact which are directly and positively false. And I think the Courts have clear jurisprudence on this. But also indirectly through omission otherwise false or misleading in itself. In my earlier speech, I cited an example as to how if you omit certain key facts which are material to understanding, then the image or the view that is communicated is otherwise false because of the omission, and not so much because of a positive statement. So, the Bill covers both scenarios.”
“I would just like to reiterate that as important as it is to have this piece of legislation to deal with remedies for harassment online and offline, equally important is the social consciousness and, of course, public education to shape behaviour. I have taken note of Members' suggestions which may be outside of the scope of legislation but which are nonetheless helpful as we work towards a society that, not just through legislation but as a whole, frowns on harassment and frowns on what is effectively bullying, whether online or offline. We have worked and will continue to work with the media and other stakeholders to raise general public awareness of their rights and remedies under this Bill. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.”
“Mr Louis Ng asked if we could categorise and put together examples of permissible and impermissible publication of identity information, through guidelines or other informational material. As I mentioned, because it is very heavily fact-specific, it may not be meaningful to set them out into a set of compendium of guidelines to try to guide each case. Whether something is or is not an offence will have to depend on the facts and, as I said, the Court has to look at each case on its own. But as I also mentioned at the outset, putting all of these together into one body and to allow a framework within which a prosecution can take place, will, in itself, over time, develop a body of jurisprudence, and the application of the provisions will be guided by the Court which looks at each case and develops the jurisprudence in common law as the cases move along. Let me deal with a couple of other points. Mr Pritam Singh asked why POHA does not apply to the Government. The general position in law is that the Government is not bound by legislation unless it expressly provides for that to be so. In the case of POHA, that is the case, and the Government has taken a view that it will not avail itself of remedies under POHA. Likewise, it will not be subject to provisions under POHA. As to how officers of the Government can be held accountable, that can always be done in the usual forum like in Parliament, as in the usual case. I think Mr Pritam Singh is aware of that. Let me see if there are other queries I have missed out. Mr Speaker, I believe I have dealt with the queries raised by various Members.”
“To illustrate, the original publisher of the personal information might not have ill-intent but someone who reposts the same information may then have the malicious objective. The key factor is the intention behind the publication, whether original or the republication, and each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Mr Pritam Singh also asked about a hyperlinking occasion. Again, I did not quite get the specific facts. So, please correct me if I am wrong. But I understand Mr Pritam Singh's example was that if you hyperlink identity information, and in the context of the example, it was a lawyer, and the question that was posed is, "Why is a lawyer behaving in this way?" Then, on those facts, it is not a question of doxxing. It is really a question of trying to show that you might have some queries over the conduct, but there is not otherwise, from the Member's example, an intention to cause harassment to this individual. I would add that posts which merely state opinions or which are meant to encourage social debate, for example, do not fall within the ambit of offences. I will conclude my responses to the queries raised regarding the ambit of the provisions by emphasising that the nature has to be very fact-specific. We cannot be overly prescriptive in the Bill. But we want the Court to be able to look at each fact, look at each case, understand the context and circumstances in which it is done. And bear in mind that for a person to be prosecuted under this offence, it has to be established beyond any reasonable doubt that the intention of the posting or the publication was to cause the harassment.”
“But to the extent helpful and illustrative, let me set out some of these facts which could be considered in a case to determine intent or knowledge. For example, words or actions that accompany the publication of someone’s personal information. Overt acts and declarations are essential facts from which the Court may infer an intention. For example, if A publishes B's personal information and encourages others, along with the publication, to harass B or to find a way to incite or to use violence against B, then the Court could infer that there was the necessary intent in this case. Second, the Court will also look at the context in which the personal information was made available. So, in another example, if A supplies B's personal information in an online forum, and I think this is close to some of the examples that Members have cited, that is dedicated to hunting down and committing violence against "wrongdoers", the objective circumstances would point to the inference that A knew or had reasonable cause to believe that his post would facilitate the use of unlawful violence against the victim. So, the act itself may be neutral but the act of putting it in a forum which is for the self-declared purposes of trying to seek online vigilantism or to incite violence, that would then be taken together. So, the relevant context behind the act will also be considered. The provisions do not distinguish between the original publisher and someone who then reposts the publication. Rather, the law looks at the intention of the person who publishes the personal information or the knowledge that he had when he published that information.”
“But, as with all cases before our Courts, the judges will have to look at the specific facts and overall context of each case, to look at the circumstances in which it took place, to look at the holistic context of the facts and circumstances, and then make an overall assessment. Ms Rahayu Mahzam, Mr Murali Pillai and Mr Louis Ng as well as Mr Pritam Singh have also raised queries pertaining to the ambit of the offences. So, let me address that. I will outline the type of conduct that these offences target as well as conduct that will not breach the law. The offence of doxxing requires the ingredient of the publisher’s intention or knowledge based on the objective circumstances. It is fact-specific. As is the case with many other intention or knowledge-based offences today, for example, even under those which you can find in sections 3 and 7 of the existing Act, the Court must look at all the facts and circumstances before it determines if there was such intention or knowledge. So, it is not looking at an overt act like stalking. So, some examples are set out in the act on stalking, but it is looking at circumstances from which one infers or derives an understanding of the intention behind the act itself. The law provides in the Bill for a defence of reasonableness. This means that if a person can prove that his conduct was reasonable, he will not be guilty of the offences. Mr Louis Ng and Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked about the factors which a Court might consider when deciding whether there was intention or knowledge present in a case. As I mentioned earlier, and I think you have heard me say, it is fact-specific. So, you cannot quite constrain the Court to always be considering a set of facts and circumstances.”
“Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked questions about challenges involved in preserving evidence, especially online ones where the content could be posted on Instagram stories, where the material is sometimes transient. Features, such as what Ms Rahayu Mahzam has mentioned, are ephemeral and cannot be viewed once a certain period of time has elapsed. Again, that is a challenge to preserving the evidence, but that is also not unique to POHA. While evidence can be obtained through the investigation efforts of law enforcement agencies, victims and applicants can obviously also take practical steps to preserve the evidence. For example, if a victim or a victim's acquaintances come across offensive content on such platforms which disappear after a certain period of time, he or she can take a screenshot and try and preserve the nature of the content so that that can be used subsequently as evidence. I turn now to the "doxxing" provisions and, as I have heard the speeches, there has been unanimous support for these new provisions. Members, such as Er Dr Lee Bee Wah, Dr Chia Shi-Lu, Mr Gan Thiam Poh, Ms Rahayu Mahzam, Mr Christopher de Souza, Mr Pritam Singh, Mr Louis Ng, Assoc Prof Walter Theseira and Prof Lim Sun Sun have all spoken about or raised the issue of online vigilantism. Let me first deal with the question of what constitutes "identity information" which some Members have raised. Briefly, it is information which, on its own or with other information, identifies or could be used to identify an individual. Mr Louis Ng asked, in particular, as an example, if a vehicle plate number could fall under the definition of "identity information". The answer is yes, it could, since it is information that can, on its own or possibly with other information, identify an individual.”
“The problem of online anonymity is not unique to offences under POHA. Indeed, it is a serious and growing problem, not just in POHA. Law enforcement agencies worldwide have had to face challenges in tackling cybercrimes and cyber-enabled crimes, where criminals have sought to hide behind the relative anonymity of the Internet to cause harm to society. However, a person who uses a fake moniker or other means to conceal his identity, can still be identified by the investigation efforts of law enforcement agencies. The amendments to POHA are intended to provide tools to deal with the unique nature of online falsehoods. POHA currently provides that where the respondent or publisher is anonymous, they may be identified by an Internet location address, a website, a username, an account or an email address, or any other unique identifier as the Court may order. With the amendments, even if the source of the falsehood is, for example, hiding behind a virtual private network address and cannot be tracked down, is anonymous or refuses to take down the falsehood, the victim has other options aimed at stopping the falsehood, the spread of the falsehood and also making the appropriate corrections. The victim may apply for a stop publication order to require other parties to stop publishing the false statement or substantially similar statements. In addition, or in the alternative, he may apply for a disabling order or a targeted correction order, depending on what is the right correction to deal with and address the false statements. These latter orders can require Internet intermediaries to disable access to the falsehood or to ensure that corrections are distributed to those who access the falsehood.”
“Without redress, and the remedies which this Bill proposes, it would be next to impossible for individuals to protect themselves against this. Internet intermediaries have long been unable, or perhaps unwilling, to take proactive steps to remove such content. So, the issue here is not so much about cost. It is about a falsehood where it is not only the right thing to do under this Bill to get redress for the individual, but I would say, it would also be socially responsible for the Internet intermediaries to remove these falsehoods and ensure that there is proper redress. This Bill provides legislative solutions to deal with such conduct and to provide individuals with recourse and redress in an environment where the Internet intermediaries wield such power and control over the medium. Prof Lim Sun Sun has asked whether the new regulations will harm Singapore's pro-innovation environment. They will not. Ultimately, the strengthened falsehoods regime under POHA will complement the companies' interest in running a responsible and positive platform which serves to improve the quality of private discourse amongst their users and improve the quality of their experiences on the platform. We will no doubt continue to work with the Internet intermediaries to develop operationally feasible solutions that can be taken into account under the new section 16BB(3) in the Bill, which clause 20 introduces. I turn now to some questions on online harassment and the anonymity of harassers. Mr Patrick Tay, in particular, raised the issue of anonymity in cyberspace, the identification of online perpetrators not being so easily done. This issue of identifying such perpetrators was also raised during the Second Reading of POHA back in 2014.”
“The first is what the estimated volume of online falsehood cases that could be brought before the Courts after the Bill is passed; second, how significant an administrative cost this will be in the context of Internet intermediaries? On the first point, the Courts are equipped to deal with any increase in the number of cases brought. In fact, I would say the point goes beyond just numbers. If, by these amendments, we allow more victims to more quickly and more easily obtain redress, resulting in more cases being brought, then, in some measure, the purpose of these amendments would have been fulfilled. In terms of the administrative cost on Internet intermediaries, we should first bear in mind the fact that Internet intermediaries already fall within the scope of POHA today. So, it is not a new amendment to bring these intermediaries within POHA. And the starting point is that POs as well as orders under section 15 can today already be made against these intermediaries. Given this, we do not expect that the revised regime will impose significant additional administrative cost on these platforms. In any event, we should remember that this Bill deals with harassment, physical and online, and the use of falsehoods to affect and damage people’s lives and livelihoods. Apparent from the many examples I gave in my speech earlier, and certainly those cited by Members themselves, this kind of conduct has very serious consequences. People’s lives and reputations can be easily and quickly destroyed. Businesses can be ruined, causing economic damage. All of this happens in an online environment and on platforms where falsehoods travel quickly and the truth is often left behind.”
“Clause 20, which introduces the new section 16CA, allows for costs reasonably incurred by third parties in complying with a General Correction Order to be made against any of the following: the author of the false statement, provided that the author authorised or caused the statement to be published; any person or entity that intentionally published the false statement; and the applicant of the order. I think Mr Pritam Singh also asked if this was intended to apply beyond the General Correction Order. The answer is no. The reason for clause 20 is that the General Correction Order brings in third parties – third party platforms which have got nothing to do with the publication, the authoring of the statement and are not the author itself; and it is in that situation that a cost remedy and regime are provided for in this Bill. That is not to say that this, otherwise, takes away the victim's ability under civil law to seek redress and that can include the costs of any suffering incurred by the victim against the publisher or by the author of the falsehood. Mr Pritam Singh also asked about liability of third parties and let me just deal with that. It is in the context of moderators of social media groups and platforms for posts made by users. The position is that if the user made a post which falls foul of the law on doxxing, the moderator will not ipso facto be liable for doxxing since he himself has not published the information and Mr Pritam Singh's own example, as I understood his example having heard it, was that there was also no intention to harass in that case. I turn now to deal with Prof Lim Sun Sun's queries and there were two queries that came through.”
“They do not apply where a section 15 falsehood is concerned. Finally, the simplified process and quicker timelines, which I spoke about earlier, they are meant to make it less costly, and easier, for a victim to seek redress. And in answer to Mr Yee's third question, that is the purpose of the amendments – to simplify, to expedite, to make it easier. And I think to Mr Pritam Singh's point, these simplified procedures also apply to falsehoods. Mr Christopher de Souza asked further whether the word "harm" in section 16AA is limited to physical harm and the answer is no. For context, a Court must first be satisfied in such an application that there is prima facie evidence, amongst other things, that the publication of the specified material has caused or is likely to cause the subject of the false statement harm. An interim order under section 16 can be made only if it is just and equitable to do so in the circumstances. The harm need not be physical; it may be harm to the subject's reputation or business. It may also encompass emotional harm. And as we know, the nature of online falsehoods is that their effect often extends beyond the realm of physical harm, moving down to reputational or emotional harm. And, indeed, the examples that we have heard in the House today by Members illustrate that where entities in particular are involved, the harm is often to their reputation or business. Mr Christopher de Souza also asked about third party expenses in complying with and adhering to General Correction Orders.”
“Stating an opinion, without more, that black metal bands incite people to do violence – I think that was the thrust of the statement the Member mentioned – would not be a false statement of fact. Mr Yee Chia Hsing has three queries relating to entities that are the subject of falsehoods. Let me just address them quickly in turn. First, Mr Yee Chia Hsing has asked whether the PHC may award damages to a victim of a false statement without the victim bringing a civil suit. The answer is no. That is because the remedies available under POHA seek to protect individuals and entities against false statements of fact by preventing or limiting the spread of those false statements. Remedies, such as correction orders and targeted correction orders, are also available to ensure that the false statements are corrected and made known to those who had viewed the false statement. These remedies are intended to supplement and not replace the existing civil actions for defamation and malicious falsehoods. However, clause 20 of the Bill allows the victim of a falsehood to commence related civil proceedings in PHC. This will allow the subject of the falsehood to seek the remedies provided under POHA as well as for damages under civil proceedings in one Court. So, it makes the proceedings a lot more simplified and a lot more convenient. Second, Mr Yee Chia Hsing has asked if a victim of a falsehood only needs to make a Police report and, I think in his words, "piggy-back" on criminal investigations in order to obtain an order in relation to the falsehood. Again, the answer is no, and that is because the deeming provisions which allow a respondent to rely on a prior criminal conviction, apply only in relation to applications for POs or EPOs.”
“Mr Murali Pillai also raised an example of a disgruntled person who harassed the employees of a company by sending them repeated emails and also using threatening language. I think that is the case that went before the Courts some years ago. He has suggested that the company be allowed to commence an action to protect its employees from the harassing conduct of such a person. The remedy lies in section 12. The starting point is section 3 of POHA which makes it an offence to target a person, which can include a company, and cause any other person, which can also include the company’s employees, to suffer harassment, alarm or distress. So, as illustrated by Mr Murali Pillai’s example, the company and its employees are both victims for the purposes of section 3 of POHA. The company can apply for a PO under section 12. As the company is an entity, such a PO would also extend to its employees. Mr Christopher de Souza asked about the definition of the term "statement of fact" and if it is meant to be different from how the term is currently understood under section 15. The answer is no. Clause 3, which contains a definition of "statement of fact", is merely intended to make the definition of the term clearer. On this, Mr Pritam Singh also asked a question about the black metal band. I forgot the precise language that the Member had used about the phraseology. But from what I caught of the statement, it was an expression of an opinion as to the effects of attending black metal concerts. Whether you agree with that or not is a different issue. But as I have mentioned at the start, a statement of fact does not include a statement of opinion or a commentary or even a critique.”
“The Minister for Law had, in 2014, said that the precise classes of workers covered should evolve as the operating landscape of public service evolves over time. I would like to assure the Member that with these amendments, there are sufficient measures and remedies under POHA for the protection of everyone. Offenders can also be prosecuted under the Penal Code for egregious cases involving hurt, criminal intimidation or criminal force. On the issue of harassment at the workplace, Ms Anthea Ong asked whether entities now have a responsibility to exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behaviour of their employees. In general, employers already have a duty to ensure the safety and health of their employees at the workplace. The amendments that we are proposing in the Bill today do not change that. Indeed, the Tripartite Advisory on Managing Workplace Harassment which was issued in 2015 stands as a practical guide and does so till today for employers and employees to better prevent and manage harassment at the workplace. I would add to this that the Bill provides that entities can be criminally liable for all the offences under POHA. So, it applies to entities as well as to individuals. And for entities, because they are non-natural persons, the principles of attribution will apply. For example, if the officers managing a company instruct their employees to carry out acts of harassment, such as harassment in connection with moneylending activities, the company itself can be criminally liable for those acts. The amendments will, therefore, discourage entities from using or allowing their employees or several employees to harass their customers.”
“In six out of these 51 cases, there was a breach of a PO or an EPO on more than one occasion. These statistics give a snapshot, but, in themselves, cannot be considered to be an accurate barometer of the effectiveness of POs. Mr Murali Pillai has raised a query which also pertains to the effectiveness of POs. Let me just try to address that with reference to the example that he has cited. He has shared an example of a female victim who obtains a PO against her ex-boyfriend who has harassed her using intimate recordings that he possesses. He has sought clarification about whether section 12 prohibits the Court from making ancillary orders that it deems fit. The short answer is that section 12(3) provides that a PO may include any requirement necessary for or incidental to the proper carrying into effect of the order. So, it gives the Court some flexibility to consider all the facts and determine what is the appropriate remedy in the context of that case, given no two harassment cases will have similar facts. Mr Patrick Tay suggested that the scope of "public service worker" under the Act be reviewed. In particular, I think Mr Patrick Tay suggested that private security guards be accorded special protection under POHA. We had considered this point before and I think Mr Patrick Tay is aware that this issue has come up in this House previously. To explain the current position, individuals are considered "public service workers" for the purpose of enhanced protection under POHA if their jobs serve the general public, and not just the patrons of a private business or establishment. We note the points that Mr Patrick Tay has made.”
“The list mirrors that introduced by the Criminal Law Reform Bill yesterday in respect of certain Penal Code offences committed in the context of intimate relationships. This Bill seeks to enhance protection for victims who are psychologically manipulated or intimidated by their intimate partners. For some of these victims, stepping forward to seek help in the context of that relationship is very challenging. And for other victims, sometimes, seeking help is not even an option at all. On the one hand, there is a need to protect such victims. But equally, and on the other hand, we should ensure that not every offender is subject to enhanced penalties merely by reason of being in an intimate relationship. So, the Bill strikes a balance. If the accused person can prove that the victim's ability to protect himself or herself from the accused was not adversely affected by reason of their relationship, then the enhanced penalties will not apply. That provision is set out in the Bill. So, on Mr Patrick Tay's example, if there is no evidence before the Court that there was an imbalance of power in the context of the relationship with one party being coercive, the other party being submissive, and no evidence that the victim was unable, by reason of the relationship, to prevent the harm that was caused or will be caused, then if an accused person commits an offence under POHA in this kind of scenario, the enhanced penalties will not apply. Dr Chia Shi-Lu asked for some recent data on the effectiveness of POs, the number of cases of repeated breaches and subsequent injuries or deaths. Since POHA came into force on 15 November 2014, 406 POs and EPOs have been made. In the same period, 51 Magistrate's Complaints have been filed for alleged breaches of POs and EPOs.”
“We are now empowering the Court to consider, upfront, where appropriate, whether the respondent should undergo psychiatric assessment and treatment after it grants a PO in civil proceedings. So, at the juncture that the Court considers that it is appropriate to grant the Order, it also has to look at whether or not psychiatric assessments and treatments might be necessary for this accused person. In my view, this benefits the accused person, as early psychiatric intervention may help to prevent further harassment where the harassment is due to this underlying psychiatric condition. Ms Anthea Ong observed that harsher punishments are not necessarily always an effective deterrent and may not serve victims better. We agree that increased punishments alone cannot be the only solution, and indeed, they are not the only solution. POHA is not only about punishing offenders. And, as I mentioned earlier, apart from the Mandatory Treatment Orders and psychiatric assessments, it provides already for options for mediation and counselling. And these are designed to ensure that, as far as possible, the process, where possible, keeps acrimony and the aggravation to a minimum. Mr Patrick Tay asked for examples of situations where the enhanced penalties might not apply to a harasser in an intimate relationship. Let me first explain the framework within which the enhanced penalties for offences against victims in intimate relationships are meant to apply. Clause 11 sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Court may have regard to when determining whether an accused person and the victim were in an intimate relationship.”
“So, to Mr Pritam Singh's point, the remedies are gender-neutral. Dr Chia Shi-Lu asked if it is possible to introduce stronger deterrent measures to enforce POs. He has also asked if more can be done to prevent subsequent harassments or attacks. The Bill has several measures designed to deal with this. Two of them are deterrent in nature, and a third seeks to try to address the underlying cause or reason for the harassment conduct in the first place. Let me just briefly explain these three. The first deterrent measure is to make breaches of POs arrestable in prescribed circumstances. I mentioned that in my earlier speech, especially in a case where hurt is involved or where the harassing conduct persists even after the PO has been issued. In these two cases, the breach of the PO is made arrestable. Previously, they were not and that might have accounted for why some victims felt reluctant to step forward. The second deterrent measure is to have enhanced penalties for offences which involved a second or subsequent breach of the POs and EPOs. Clause 11, in this regard of the Bill, doubles the maximum penalty prescribed if a POHA offence is committed against an intimate partner or against a vulnerable person. The third measure seeks to address the underlying root cause of harassment. As Dr Chia pointed out, there may be cases where the accused could not be acting rationally or thinking straight, or behaving with restraint. We fully agree with this, as it also mirrors the feedback given to us by the various stakeholders. Currently, separate criminal proceedings have to be brought so that a Mandatory Treatment Order can be granted upon a criminal conviction.”
“We will work with the State Courts to ensure that necessary resources are deployed to expedite the hearings of these applications. That is the intention of the PHC in the first place. Having a dedicated Court to hear these applications with streamlined procedures, applying them in a way that best suits the case, will make for expedition and also efficiency in managing the cases. Mr Pritam Singh asked about a case where, on occasions, you might need to hear a case in five to six hours because of very pressing demands. No doubt, Courts will try, but I would say that it will be very difficult to do so mainly because to hear a case properly and fully, one will have to ensure that the proper evidence and the right materials are before the Courts for the Courts to make the proper assessment of the case and decide. Mr Murali Pillai asked about jurisdiction, and I would just like to deal with that, the civil jurisdiction. Mr Murali Pillai suggested that our Courts should have the jurisdiction to hear civil applications where the victim of harassment is outside Singapore at the material time and where the act of harassment by the harasser is committed outside Singapore. The basis of the Court's jurisdiction is as set out in section 17 of the existing POHA. That does not change, and we acknowledge that this limits the scope of jurisdiction in respect of acts which may take place overseas. I would like to turn to the enhanced protection for victims of harassment and related persons. There were questions relating to the measures that are available to enhance protection for victims of harassment, in particular, victims who are intimately related to the harasser. All victims, whether married or not married, of whatever gender, will be protected under POHA.”
“Separately, the amendments will also ensure that the respondent can be ordered to undergo a mental health assessment and the appropriate treatments where necessary. But nonetheless, Mr Louis Ng's suggestion is an interesting one and we will work with the relevant agencies to see how we can further consider this suggestion and also enhance the support to victims. Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked if there are plans for the PHC to employ a judge-led approach. The short answer is yes. And clause 24 of the Bill empowers the PHC precisely to adopt a judge-led approach in any civil proceedings before the Court. This will ensure that the judges can exercise greater control over proceedings, taking charge of the proceedings and managing it from the judge's perspective. The overarching objective of this is to ensure that the proceedings are dealt with as efficiently as possible, fairly, but also to ensure that acrimony is kept at as low a level as possible. Mr Christopher de Souza has asked about the timelines and asked how long the process to apply for a PO and EPO currently takes. He also asked what resources will be deployed to PHC to ensure that the proposed expedited timelines that we have in mind can be met. Currently, an application for a PO is fixed for a pretrial conference about three to four weeks after the applicant's Originating Summons and Affidavit are filed and processed. The hearing for the final PO is generally fixed within four weeks from the last pretrial conference. So, it will be several weeks or, if not, months, downstream from the original application. Applications for EPOs are fixed for a hearing before a judge within three working days from the date these documents are filed.”
“Currently, the Court already has the power to refer parties to counselling and mediation and will continue to do so in the appropriate cases. The streamlining of procedures and expedited timelines that I mentioned in my earlier speech build on this to enhance the process even more. In relation to the Police's investigations, Mr Louis Ng asked if Victim Care Officers who are specially trained in victim care management also handle the cases involving victims of harassment. The answer is yes, they do. The Victim Care Cadre Programme is available to all victims of crime who require emotional support throughout the course of investigations. This includes victims of harassment who can avail themselves of victim care services by providing their consent to such services to investigation officers. Mr Louis Ng asked if it is possible to make it mandatory for the Court to consider referring parties to mediation and counselling. I think I have addressed that. But just to underscore the point, under section 12(2B), in appropriate cases, the Courts already do so. They have the power, and they do frequently arrange for parties to attend counselling or mediation, when it is appropriate in those cases. Mr Louis Ng also asked if it is possible for social workers to be attached to applicants of POs in certain cases, so that the social worker can consistently monitor and be aware of the development of the case, and also be able to identify worrying trends or changes in the harasser's behaviour. The case which Mr Louis Ng cited is a tragic one. And I would say that there are already existing avenues of assistance for applicants for POs to onsite counsellors and also psychiatrists who will be able to assist.”
“That is why clause 24 of the Bill permits prescribed third parties, such as voluntary welfare organisations, to bring civil proceedings on behalf of a victim. The Court will consider each of these applications judiciously. These third parties, on top of being able to bring their application, can also give practical support to the victim by providing information on Court procedures and processes and also help, especially at an important time like this, on lending emotional and moral support to the victim during the process. Mr Christopher de Souza and Ms Rahayu Mahzam asked whether there are measures in place to ensure victims of harassment and abuse are given sufficient assistance when they approach the Courts. Ms Rahayu Mahzam, in particular, expressed hope that the PHC will be a "one-stop shop" to provide practical support and help with counselling. The current laws, augmented by the proposed revisions in this Bill, strive to make the process as easy as possible and as simple as possible for victims. Currently, there are already Court officers at the Harassment Cases Registry to explain the processes under POHA. There is also an assessor stationed there to look at the application, understand the nature of the application, and guide the applicant on the application. On top of that, options are also put to the applicant in the appropriate cases to consider counselling or mediation. On top of this, on a pro bono basis, law students are available to assist onsite to provide general advice to help with the form filling and also, in the case of more complicated factually involved cases, to assist in the drafting of affidavits in the application.”
“Mr Speaker, I thank all the Members who have spoken in support of the Bill. I am grateful for the strong support that has been expressed in this House. Members have shared many examples of how Singaporeans – and animals – some known personally to them, have experienced harassment, both in the physical and the online space. I will do my best to respond but I cannot reply to all the examples that have been cited, some more graphically. But the stories that Members have shared in this House illustrate just how easy it is to spread falsehoods about individuals, about businesses, and how there are serious consequences, immediate and downstream, and why we need this Bill to give redress and recourse for individuals against physical and online harassment. Assoc Prof Walter Theseira shared a very vivid, and might I say graphic, example of his personal experience of being harassed and spoke passionately about the need for each of us to treat one another with dignity offline as well as online. I cannot agree more with Assoc Prof Walter Theseira. Members have vividly described falsehoods which have serious and devastating consequences, and which can also have a deep and long-lasting impact. They underscore why we need these laws. The questions that Members have raised can be categorised into various baskets and I intend to address them as comprehensively as I can. First, let me address the Court process which various Members have touched on. Ms Anthea Ong has suggested to allow persons between 16 and 21 years of age to make applications for POs without their parents or legal guardians. We recognise that, in some cases, there are groups of victims who require assistance in seeking legal redress, and for their own reasons, may not want parents to be involved or to be aware of it.”
“Finally, I must underline the fact that the levers that we have devised under the Act are designed to be responsive in nature. They offer protection, recourse and redress. At the end of the day, harassment is a social problem which requires a concerted social response. We all bear a responsibility for ensuring that harassment is not perpetrated or escalated. This is the surest way to provide victims with protection. We should not tolerate any harassment or violence, least of all, those which occur in an intimate partner or family setting. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move. [(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]”
“Finally, non-compliance with orders will be punishable with contempt, which is similar to the current regime, and contempt only if non-compliance is intentional. For those who want to appeal against an order under section 15, they will still need to seek leave under section 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. In light of the decision by the Court of Appeal in AG v Ting Choon Meng, which ruled that only individual persons have recourse under section 15, clause 20 of the Bill states that both individuals and entities can apply for remedies under section 15. As with the other remedies under POHA, the Government will not have recourse under section 15. The Government will have to rely on the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), which is currently still a Bill. Likewise, section 15 orders can be made against both individual persons and corporate entities, but not the Government. Allowing entities to seek relief will ensure that the companies and their staff do not suffer, lose their livelihoods, as a result of falsehoods. Mr Speaker, Sir, after five years, we have introduced a significant number of amendments to keep pace with changes in technology, and to be responsive to feedback as to the ease with which applications can be brought, and relief granted. The Bill builds upon an existing ecosystem to deal with harassment, and to offer victims recourse and redress. It is equally integral to this ecosystem that there are the many volunteers, psychiatric institutions, the Police, the news agencies, schools and many others. They are all part of the ecosystem, and we are grateful for their efforts in highlighting harassment issues and broadcasting the remedies available and also assisting with the victims.”
“The prescribed third party can be required to publish a notice stating that the statement in question has been found to be false, as well as a correction of that false statement. The rationale of this? Well, the ubiquity of technology nowadays means that falsehoods may spread across several different platforms. It may start on one; it may carry through to one or several others. It might be difficult to identify who has been exposed to a falsehood. As mainstream purveyors of information, prescribed third parties have a sufficiently wide reach to help to correct viral falsehoods which are particularly serious or persistent. What are some of the safeguards? As this order imposes obligations on third parties, interim relief will not be available. The third party should be allowed to fully contest the claim if it wishes to, before an order is granted. However, a victim can still rely on other forms of interim relief to stop or stem the spread of the falsehoods, such as the disabling order or interim stop publication order. In terms of the relevant procedure for these orders, the same streamlined process I mentioned and also, expedited timelines, will apply. The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for the interim orders within 48 to 72 hours of application, and given the speed at which online publications can go viral, the PHC will aim to hear the application for an interim order within 24 hours of application if the false statement has been published online, subject to any requirements to give notice. The interim order will remain in place until it expires or has been cancelled. As with POs, the PHC will aim to hear applications for final section 15 orders within four weeks of application.”
“The respondent in such a case will be required to publish a notice online or in a printed publication, stating that the statement in question has been found to be false, and correcting the false statement. The respondent will also be required to make the notice available to persons, or specified description of persons, as determined by the Court. Next, on disabling orders which are available today. They can be made to require an Internet intermediary to disable access to a material containing a false statement on the Internet intermediary's platform, so that it is no longer available to viewers. Next, targeted correction orders which are also available today. They are in like vein to correction orders but can be made against an Internet intermediary. It requires an Internet intermediary to distribute a correction of the false statement to viewers of a false statement on the Internet intermediary's platform. So, it carries the corrections on the platforms. Again, the purpose of this is to ensure that where the false statement has been published by way of the Internet intermediary service, the truth is made accessible to viewers of the false statement. Finally, the general correction orders which are new. Let me describe them. They can be made where the Court is satisfied that serious harm to the reputation of the subject, whether professional or otherwise, has been caused or is likely to be caused. Unlike the other orders, they operate against a prescribed third party who has not been responsible for the publication of the false statement. This third party, as an example, could be a news outlet, broadcaster or Internet intermediary.”
“It is a flexible one, taking into account various factors, including but not limited to the nature of the false statement; the seriousness of the allegation made; the degree to which the statement has been publicised; whether the subject of the false statement has the means to publicise his or her own version of the truth. A stop publication order requires a person or entity not to publish a false statement or any substantially similar statement. It is already available today as I have mentioned. The orders have been amended to include substantially similar statements. This ensures that publishers cannot game the system by simply amending the statement slightly, but such that it is still false. As with the present regime, stop publication orders can be taken out against multiple individuals or entities and the applicant need not take out separate applications against multiple persons. Anyone who publishes the false statement or a substantially similar statement is bound upon service unless the Court has dispensed with service. This deals with the situation where an anonymous user may use different online accounts to publish the same false statement. This will be covered by the order, regardless of which account is used. Next, on correction orders. These are available today but fleshed out in the amendment Bill. I spoke earlier about how falsehoods travel faster, deeper and more broadly than truth; and that repeated exposure to false statements on social media make them more believable. Correction orders seek to address this problem. There may be cases where it is not enough to order a respondent to stop publishing a falsehood, and it may be necessary to go beyond that to require the respondent person or entity to put the truth out there.”
“Mr Speaker, going back to my example. The statement is also false if B was subsequently acquitted on appeal, because the statement conveys a false meaning by reason of its omission of B’s subsequent acquittal. Once a false statement about a subject is established, clause 20 sets out five orders that may be available to address it. Interim relief will be available for all orders save the General Correction Order. This was necessary, given the speed at which online falsehoods can now spread. Interim relief can be obtained ex parte in the case of interim stop publication and interim notification orders, both of which are targeted at individuals or entities which publish falsehoods. In the case of interim disabling orders and targeted interim notification orders, which are directed at Internet intermediaries, notice of the application first has to be served on the Internet intermediary. This is because the Internet intermediary is not directly responsible for the falsehood, and should be given a chance to explain its position in Court, should it wish to contest the application. Let me explain each order in turn and start by saying that all of the orders, save the General Correction Order, are already available under the Act today. As is the case under the current Act, the Court will not make any of these orders unless satisfied, amongst other things, that, one, the statement being complained of is false; and two, it is just and equitable in the circumstances to make the order being sought. The test of when it is just and equitable to grant a section 15 order has been set out by our Courts in case law.”
“For the avoidance of doubt, the falsehoods regime under sections 15 and 16 of POHA, and clause 20 of the Bill, deals with false statements of fact. This includes misleading statements but does not cover criticisms, opinions, satire or parody. Let me make this clear. First, a statement that omits material facts is misleading if the statement would have been considered by a reasonable person to be misleading by reason of such omission. If, for example, A says that B is dishonest, that is a statement of opinion and not a false statement of fact. However, if A goes on to say that B was convicted by a Court of cheating, then this is a false statement of fact if B was never convicted of such an offence. This is also false if B was subsequently acquitted on appeal.”
“As with the other victims of harassment, such as cyberbullying and intimate partner violence, a victim of doxxing will be able to avail himself of the streamlined processes and expedited timelines as well. The Court may order that the offending communication be taken down by the offender and persons who have shared the original post or substantially similar posts. Where appropriate, the Court may also order that an Internet intermediary disable access to the offending post. And finally, where an EPO involving online doxxing is involved, the Court will aim to hear the application within 24 hours. Let me now turn to online falsehoods. First, in terms of setting the context. Aside from doxxing, the Bill also enhances existing measures available to address the spread of falsehoods by repealing and re-enacting the falsehoods regime. The falsehoods regime under POHA aims to help individuals to give recourse and redress against the effects of falsehoods whilst, at the same time, striking the balance with the right of people to hold their own opinions and debate matters of interest. Broadly, POHA categorises the remedies available by types of orders which are available, split into five categories. Section 15 deals with the final orders which can be given in cases of falsehoods, and section 16 deals, amongst others, with interim orders for the same. This is similar to the approach taken in section 12, which makes a PO available against both persons, entities and Internet intermediaries. In contrast, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill has distinct parts dealing with individuals versus corporate entities, and these are found in Part III and Part IV of that Bill.”
“It does not stop them from: identifying the perpetrators of crimes, including traffic offences or POHA offences or, indeed from posting videos of public disputes to give a factual account of an incident. On the other hand, publishing someone’s contact details to netizens intending to harass or alarm that person or intending that other netizens use the information to harass or hurt the person, is unacceptable. Publishing photographs and contact details of a girl, intending that others use those details to harass her, is likewise unacceptable. There have been concerns raised that the new doxxing provisions could be too broad. These similar concerns were raised about the existing harassment provisions back in 2014. Harassment is heavily fact-specific, and doxxing is a subset of that. It is no different. The law today, in fact, with these amendments, adds clarity. Doxxing is currently prosecuted through a mix of provisions arising in different pieces of legislation. Courts will now be able to develop a body of jurisprudence on when the offence is made out and, furthermore, existing case law on when intent is made out in the circumstances can be relied upon. Other concerns have also been raised about whether the new provisions can deal with anonymous posters. Let me deal with that. Anonymity is not a new issue under the Act. Minister Shanmugam, when he spoke on this Bill in 2014, addressed this. Even if the respondent or publisher is anonymous, he may be identified by an Internet location address, website or other unique identifier as the Court may order. In addition, POs are binding, even if the person behind the account may not be identified. The POs can be served on multiple accounts as well.”
“Her former best friend, it turned out, had emailed her full name, photos, address and names of the school and tuition centres that she attended to over 60 porn blogs. With this knowledge, she retreated from her social interactions, afraid to even leave her home. This young girl was a victim of harassment. However, the email sent by her friend to the porn blogs, despite its malicious intent, may not have been caught by existing POHA provisions which require communications to be "threatening, abusive or insulting" in themselves. The doxxing amendments are an extension of the existing provisions on harassment and seek to deal with this lacuna in the law today. Clauses 4(a) and 6(d) introduce the offence of doxxing. For this offence, the intention or knowledge of the publisher is key. Doxxing will be made out if the person published identity information of another person: intending to cause harassment, alarm or distress; intending to cause the victim to fear that unlawful violence will be used against him or another person, or to facilitate unlawful violence against the victim; or knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the publication is likely to cause the victim to fear that unlawful violence will be used against him or another person, or to facilitate unlawful violence against the victim. Identity information is defined as information that on its own or with other information identifies, or purports to identify, the victim. This includes photographs, contact details, address and place of employment. The new offence will not affect most people, who continue to engage constructively on the Internet.”
“The Government has amended the Penal Code to provide for enhanced penalties for specific offences committed against intimate partners. In a similar vein, clause 11 of the Bill doubles the penalty if a POHA offence is committed against an intimate partner. We are also taking steps to ensure that a harasser who re-offends is also dealt with severely. At present, as I mentioned earlier, breach of a PO under POHA is not an arrestable offence. This is in contrast with the position under the Women’s Charter. In response to concerns that POs issued under the Act are perceived as ineffective, we propose to amend the law. Clause 22 provides that if a harasser breaches a PO, this will be arrestable in prescribed circumstances, such as where hurt is caused or where the harassing conduct persists despite the issuance of a PO. In addition, clause 9(b) provides that if a harasser breaches a PO more than once, he will be liable on subsequent conviction to twice the maximum punishment prescribed. This also brings the Act in line with the Women’s Charter. I turn now to online harassment. I spoke earlier about the scourge of technology when not handled properly. I would like to turn to amendments that have been targeted towards online behaviour and harassment. First, on doxxing. To understand the basis of the doxxing amendments, let me first highlight a case that might fall through the cracks today. A Singaporean girl, whom I shall not name, was in the middle of her GCE "O" level. She discovered edited photographs of herself on a Tumblr blog with pornographic content. She started receiving unsolicited messages on her social media platforms. One day, she noticed a man following her home.”
“This will address cases that have already been brought before our Courts, for example, where wayward companies might have crossed the threshold of lawful debt collection into criminal behavior, such as intentional harassment or violence, in the context of conducting their lawful activity. So, harassing, intentional harassing, sometimes violence, in the context of carrying out their debt collection. Companies may have sent different runners to harass a victim. Victims can now obtain a single PO against the company and they do not have to bring each runner who conducts each of these harassing acts to Court each time. Domestic exclusion orders are available under the Act. These orders, which are also available under the Women’s Charter, will allow victims to exclude a harasser from their shared residence. This is so even if the harasser has a proprietary interest in the residence. We are also taking measures to strengthen the recourse available to victims and increase the deterrence factor of the remedies available under the Act. First, clauses 4 to 10 and 13 clarify that entities can be liable for contraventions under the Act. They can be prosecuted or sued for damages, and the common law principles of attribution will apply. This will discourage entities from allowing their employees to harass customers. Second, this House heard yesterday about amendments to the Penal Code to double penalties for offences committed against vulnerable persons. Under the proposed POHA amendments, clause 10 provides that penalties for POHA offences against vulnerable persons, be they adults or children, will likewise be doubled. Third, we spoke earlier about the pressing need to protect victims of intimate partner violence.”
“In addition, clause 16(2) clarifies that Internet intermediaries can be ordered to disable access to an offending communication published on their platforms. This is to try to clamp down on harassing communications going viral or spreading even further. Second, clause 16(2) extends the scope of POs to protect related persons of the victim. This will ensure that individuals such as Mdm A, in my example, will be able to obtain POs for herself and her children, rather than have to live with the abuse and to worry about potential harassment or abuse to her children. Third, we have acted on feedback that the Courts should be empowered to proactively intervene in cases where the harasser’s conduct may not cross the threshold of criminal or dangerous conduct, but where the facts demonstrate that the harasser is mentally ill. Clause 19 empowers the Court to order the respondent to undergo a psychiatric assessment after it grants a PO and undergo psychiatric treatment if certain criteria are fulfilled. And the criteria are that (a) the respondent must have a psychiatric condition susceptible to treatment, capable of being treated; (b) the respondent must be suitable for treatment. The psychiatric condition must have contributed to the contravention that formed the basis for making a PO, having a nexus with the conduct complained of. The criteria and nature of the treatment will largely mirror the treatment regime under the Criminal Procedure Code, with appropriate safeguards. Failure to comply with the orders will be punishable as contempt of Court. Two further amendments in clause 16(1)(a) clarify the law. POs can be obtained against entities who commit contraventions under the Act. The common law principles of attribution will apply.”
“The victim will no longer have to renew the EPOs every 28 days. The hearings will also be conducted more quickly. The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for EPOs within 48 to 72 hours of application. Where there is an element of violence involved, the PHC will try to conduct hearings for EPOs within 24 hours of the application. The PHC will aim to conduct hearings for final POs within four weeks of the application. The timelines, of course, will be subject to practical constraints. For example, if an application is filed over the weekend, the Courts may only be able to hear it on the next working day. Applicants should, of course, always seek Police intervention if they are in immediate physical danger. Finally, should the Court decide to stay proceedings for a PO under the new section 13A pending a criminal investigation, it may take longer for a PO to be granted. However, in that situation, an EPO will be in place until the PO is granted. We hope that these measures will relieve some of the anxieties that an applicant faces when invoking the Court process and encourage those in need to come forward. Next, in terms of enhancing the protection for harassment victims and related persons. We will enhance the protection for these categories of persons, expand the scope of POs and the powers available to the Court when granting a PO. Let me explain. First, clause 16(1) widens the ambit of POs to deal specifically with the situation where an offender may publish a harassing communication which is then shared by others. A PO can now be made to prevent the publication of communications which are not just identical but also substantially similar to the offending communication.”
“The judges will be specially trained to deal with harassment matters. Volunteers will be on hand to help victims navigate the Court process. In egregious cases, it may not suffice to grant the victim a civil remedy in the form of a PO. The law may need to deal with the offender even if the victim has not already gone to the Police. In the Bill, there is a clause 18 which imposes a duty on a judge granting the EPO to consider whether a criminal investigation is warranted. So, the Court has a proactive duty to look at facts, circumstances in the course of granting the EPO. If it is, the judge must refer the matter to the Police. The intention is for serious cases of hurt or harassment which come to the Court to be referred to the Police. This will ensure that the state can intervene and intervene at an early stage to reduce the risk of further or greater hurt to the victim. In addition, we are taking measures to help victims to meet the burden of proof. Clauses 16(1) and 17(1) provide that if the respondent has been convicted of a hurt offence under the Penal Code, or a POHA offence, the requirement to show that the respondent has contravened POHA will be deemed satisfied. In other words, the victim will not have to prove his or her case more than once. In terms of streamlining procedures and expediting timelines, we have worked with the State Courts to do so, so that the process for applying for a PO under POHA will, as far as possible, be aligned to that under the Women's Charter. The victim will be able to file an application for a PO using a simplified form at the PHC or online. Relief will also be quicker and more permanent. Clause 17 will ensure that EPOs will be in place until the conclusion of proceedings unless they are successfully challenged.”
“It escalated to physical violence when he hit, kicked, slammed her face on the floor, threatened her with a knife. And all of this, in front of the children. He threatened to kill himself or the children and abused the children. He would follow Mdm A everywhere and track her whereabouts via calls, texts, global positioning system. When Mdm A decided to seek help, she could not apply for a PPO under the Women's Charter as she was unmarried. Her first child who did not carry the man’s name on her birth certificate was in the same position. She could only apply for PPOs for the other four children. Mdm A and her children had to go to a crisis shelter, where they are living now. The man is in a new relationship. There are other such cases, and I am sure Members themselves will be familiar with their own experiences. We need to find a way for people in intimate relationships, who are the subject of serious abuse, to get POs more easily. PAVE, in particular, highlighted this strongly to us and has advised the Government on how best to deal with the situation. As a result, we amended the Penal Code yesterday and are proposing amendments to POHA today to further strengthen the recourse. We have carefully considered the feedback, some of which I have sketched out, from stakeholders alongside the need for greater regulation. We will improve the process of obtaining relief from the Courts. Let me start with that in the Bill. The Bill has a new Part 3A, which will establish the Protection from Harassment Court (PHC). The PHC will be dedicated to dealing with harassment matters, whether online or offline, and will have oversight of all criminal and civil cases under the Act. It will be sited in the State Courts and will have the jurisdiction of a District Court.”
“The Courts should be able to order offenders to be sent for psychiatric assessment and treatments where appropriate as there are cases where mental illnesses may well be the root of the offender’s behaviour. Third, it was suggested that POs should also be given more bite. At present, a breach of a PO is not arrestable. This perceived lack of severity might be another factor which deters victims from coming forward and applying for POs. Further, our attention was also drawn to a specific group of victims, namely, victims of intimate partner violence. These are often victims in a romantic relationship. They may be dating or married. If unmarried, they do not qualify for protection under the Women’s Charter, which only protects victims of family violence. Some might assume that it might be easier for an unmarried victim to break off the abusive relationship. However, the psyche of an abused partner is sometimes the same, whether married or unmarried. The intimacy of the relationship allows the abuser to create a psychological hold over the victim and makes it difficult for the victim to break free. Research shows that romantic love can sometimes be like an addiction. A Promoting Alternatives to Violence (PAVE) study in 2012 in Singapore showed one in three unmarried persons between the ages of 15 and 34 were found to be in an abusive relationship. Of these, two-thirds had their first abusive relationship in their teens. On average, for 20% of those who were abused by their spouses or were themselves abusers, the abuse started when they were first dating. Let me highlight the case of Mdm A. She dated a man for five years, they had five children. Dating violence started in the first year of their relationship. The man began by shouting vulgarities at her.”
“First, the process of obtaining relief under this Act. It is clear to us that processes under POHA can be simplified further, made cheaper and also faster. The current process of applying for an expedited protection order (EPO) and protection order (PO) can be streamlined. The forms can be made simpler. Some victims have said, they feel that they need the assistance of a lawyer to navigate the current process. Currently, applying for a PO costs about $300 to $500. In contrast, there is a simpler and more inexpensive method to apply for a personal protection order (PPO) under the Women’s Charter. Those victims who choose instead to file a Magistrate’s Complaint face some difficulties. First, the outcome of the complaint often turns on the conclusion of Police investigations. Victims do not know when these investigations might conclude. A victim who has filed a complaint with the Magistrate, does not have the benefit of the protections afforded by a PO. If a PO is necessary, the victim has to separately apply for one in the civil Courts. We can simplify the procedure, so that a victim does not have to provide evidence of his or her harassment more than once. We can also ensure that we prevent the duplication because reliving the experience only causes further mental anguish for the victim. Second, feedback received is that the Courts should also be given more powers when making orders. In particular, the scope of the POs should be widened. It should cover related persons of the victim, as harassers often target persons close to the victim in order to get to the victim.”
“The amendments to the Protection from Harassment Act (POHA) today give power to the people so that the man on the street can take back the truth and find a way to reclaim his dignity. We seek to simplify the process to make it easier for the man on the street to get recourse, to get redress; make clear what remedies he can get; enable him to tackle falsehoods and harassment once they are published; enable him to put the truth out there, to counter falsehoods that may affect his livelihood or, in the case of a company, its business. So, first, let me take Members back to our first attempt in 2014 to deal with online harassment holistically, when this piece of legislation was first enacted. This, as Members will recall, was the first piece of legislation dedicated to protecting victims of harassment, both offline and online. It laid down clear norms as to what constitutes unacceptable social behaviour. The presence of this framework encouraged victims to come forward to seek help, to seek redress. To date, more than 3,000 Magistrate's Complaints have been filed under the Act. Over 1,700 prosecutions have been brought. About 900 convictions have been obtained. There were 500 applications for protection orders under this Act, of which over 200 such orders were granted. These numbers demonstrate how important POHA has been as an avenue of relief to victims of harassment. In introducing the revisions today, we have taken keen interest in feedback on POHA from at least three groups. First, the Courts. Second, the civil society groups. And finally, from the victims of harassment themselves. Let me sketch out the feedback that we have obtained, given to us by these three groups, which have been instrumental in shaping the amendments behind this Bill.”
“The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is de facto good." This memo leaked two weeks after the Cambridge Analytica scandal broke. There is not enough transparency in how administrative standards are derived and enforced. There are no democratic process and no court process. Facebook only made public its community standards in 2018 after the Cambridge Analytica scandal erupted, 14 years after Facebook was first founded. People have no faith in social media giants to contain harassment. Users have complained that social media companies have taken days to address their complaints about harassment, if at all. A poll in the UK this year showed that more than half the reports that women lodge about harassment on Facebook are met with either no response or response that the behaviour did not breach their own community guidelines. A Singaporean girl saw a Minister to complain that she had her picture put up on Facebook by a male acquaintance, along with derogatory remarks containing sexual innuendo. She wrote to Facebook, whose response was, that it did not violate their community standards. Last year, a US Democratic strategist received threatening tweets. He complained to Twitter, which said it did not violate rules against abusive behaviour. The man later sent pipe bombs to politicians, and then, at that stage, Twitter said its earlier assessment was wrong. The actress who accused James Franco of sexual misconduct was also repeatedly harassed on Instagram. She made a report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and said that Instagram ignored almost all her complaints. Tech companies have admitted that they are unable to deal with some of these problems. So, we need a solution.”
“And, finally, in a University of Buffalo study, 20,000 tweets during Hurricane Sandy and the Boston Marathon bombing showed that 86% to 91% of active twitter users spread falsehoods. Nearly as many did nothing to correct that. It is self-evident, partly from what I have seen and partly I am sure from Members' own experience, that the Internet is almost impossible to control, akin to a lawless jungle. As in any jungle, the weakest and most vulnerable are disproportionately affected. Recent surveys showed multiracial females have the highest risk of being harassed online. Adolescent girls are more likely to experience cyberbullying than boys. Seventy-five percent of children with autism are bullied online. Seventy percent of children with physical defects are bullied online. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) teens are five times more at risk of being abused on Facebook than non-LGBT teens. This online harassment translates into real world violence. One in three women in the US experiences domestic violence. Nearly 90% of domestic abuse shelters and programmes report that abusers have intimidated and made threats against them using electronic means. An Australian survey found that 98% of domestic violence practitioners reported clients who experienced technology-facilitated abuse. We cannot trust the Internet companies to regulate this jungle. Why? Because their primary motivation is the pursuit of profit. In an internal company memo, Facebook Vice President Andrew Bosworth in June 2016 claimed that any growth, any growth on Facebook was good. Let me quote the memo, he said, "Maybe it costs a life by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools. And still, we connect people.”
“Falsehoods about companies can cause them irreversible damage, set off a public relations nightmare and cause economic damage. Even giants like Coca-Cola are not immune. There have been stories claiming that clear, parasite worms were found in bottles of Dasani across the country. Several hundred people had been sent to hospital as a result. That the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had shut down a manufacturing plant. Coca-Cola, of course, denied this, as did FDA. The National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) FairPrice, closer to home, was affected by multiple rumours. In 2007, a photo suggesting NTUC sold halal pork circulated on the Internet. Similar rumours later affected Ya Kun Kaya Toast and a Yong Tau Foo business at Westgate shopping mall. In 2017, Members would recall that there was a post going around social media suggesting that FairPrice's house brand rice was made of plastic. All untrue. Studies paint a bleak picture of a world where the spread of falsehoods over social media is quick, wide and pervasive, whilst truth, even if it corrects the original falsehood, lags far behind. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study analysed 126,000 rumours that spread on Twitter over 12 years. The study showed that rumours travelled farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than truth in all categories of information. The study showed that tweets which perpetrated a falsehood about the Ebola virus being transmitted by air, outnumbered tweeted corrections by 2.7 to one. Another study by the Journal of Experimental Psychology indicated that repeated exposure to a false statement on social media made it more believable.”