Goh Chok Tong
Singapore
“This is what your father said during the debate on the Nassim Jade episode: "The proudest thing (for your mother) are her three children − upright, well-behaved and honourable... They are brought up straight, they are likely to stay straight. It is like, as I have said, a code of honour. If you break that code, you have brought shame...”
“They are not just the headaches of the Prime Minister and his team. They are not just the headaches of the PAP. They are also the headaches of the Workers' Party and every Singaporean. On their own, the Prime Minister and his team cannot resolve them. They require us, the Members of Parliament, and the people, to work with them.”
“The national financial education programme, MoneySENSE, continues to work with partners such as the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS) and the media to educate consumers on the responsible use of credit facilities and the factors consumers should consider before taking on debt. PROPERTY AGENTS' COMMISSION RATES 2.”
“Mdm Halimah Yacob asked the Minister for National Development (a) in 2008, what is the takeup rate for the interim rental housing scheme that is provided to those without homes; (b) what are the reasons given for rejections under this scheme; (c) whether the rental rates were affordable; and (d) how many applicants had rejected the rental…”
“MAS is working with relevant government agencies and stakeholders to study the issue carefully, and to consider the various proposals that have been raised, including the feasibility of introducing a no-fault regime.”
“Mdm Cynthia Phua asked the Minister for National Development (a) if he will provide an update on (i) the use of sustainable alternative materials in the construction industry and (ii) the cost of construction materials in view of increasing inflation rates and rising oil prices; and (b) how will the high material and labour cost impact on…”
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“I am more in favour of the current situation where there is a theoretical minimum but each party that wants to win the hearts and minds of the people must be able to appeal to all communities. I think that is more important. The PAP will continue to field more than the minimum of six. We are going to field the same number of MPs that we have from the Indian, Malay and Eurasian communities in the coming election. There will be therefore no reduction in representation as far as the PAP is concerned when we change the scheme. In the future, for some perhaps strange reasons, we have a change of government, the government of the day wants to change the law back to single member constituencies or to reduce the number of representation for the minorities in Parliament, it can do so, provided it has won more than two-thirds of the number of seats contested in an election. But for that party to do so and win the coming election, that party must be able to win the support of the minority communities. I do not think it will be so easy for a party that swings to single community contest will be able to win the support from the minorities. So the political exercise is more important. And from our point of view, we think it is wise for parties which contest in the elections to exercise this political judgment that we have a minimum. In fact, I would advise the opposition, if it wants to ever form the government, to begin to build up a multi-racial slate. If you do not have this multi-racial slate, you would have no chance ever of forming the government, because I do not think you will get the support of the minority communities. The third category of comments refers to the fact that the scheme is designed to benefit the PAP. That is wrong entirely. The scheme is neutral.”
“Would a referendum be required for this? This is not such a major change. It is an expansion of the current scheme that we have. I do not think that we require to go to the people for this, because the Constitution provides that the changes have to be made with a two-thirds majority in Parliament. So we have that mandate from the people in the last election to make changes to the Constitution, provided we are able to carry them with a two-thirds majority. How will this affect the minority representation? Actually, the change does not affect the minority representation in any way. Under current law, the theoretical minimum for the minority communities is six, as provided for under the Parliamentary Elections Act. This change does not alter that at all. The minimum number of six GRCs or a minimum number of six candidates from the minority communities remains unchanged. So it does not affect them in any way. I think the fear perhaps stems from the fact that the larger size GRCs may lead them to conclude that there will be fewer GRCs. But no matter how few it is, it will not go below the current minimum as provided for by law. This is actually more a political exercise than a legal exercise. I am not in favour of fixing a quota for representation in Parliament. I think it does Singapore no good. It does nobody any good because if we fix a quota, you have got to fill the quota. And you are not going to have candidates competing on the basis of their strengths. It will be perhaps on the basis of filling in numbers. And also having a fixed number, a quota to reflect this adequate representation, we will tie our hands. It becomes too rigid.”
“Could I finish before you raise your clarification? Otherwise, you are upsetting my trend of thought. Mr Low Thia Khiang resumed his seat.”
“So I want to move into this concept of a larger GRC so that in time to come, you will find that the people whom the voters elect will be in charge together with the grassroots leaders of each enlarged constituency. That way, over time, I believe that they can evolve a sense of working together between the people and the Members of Parliament. The important point is you must have the right people for the scheme to work. And we are trying to force the system to produce the right people. The PAP has no problem in identifying people, screening them, putting them through two or three hurdles of interview before we select them for the choice by the people. But this is completely absent in the case of opposition parties. They do not screen their candidates very well. They catch hold of anybody who they could do so or they allow anybody to walk into the party and field them. And they capitalise on the sentiments and the mood of a particular time, agitating the ground on cost of living and other issues and touting the by-election strategy. There is a danger that in some seats, we will lose them to people whom the voters do not actually want to be in charge of their lives, but in that mood, they elect as opposition MPs. And as I explained in my speech, if we do not pre-empt this and we allow this by-election effect to take place, you are going to end up one day with a very weak government, because the party that is elected to form the government may be deprived of some key digits for the Cabinet, and in the extreme you may end up with a freak election result.”
“No. It is one vote for six. It is not one-sixth of the vote. Each voter has one vote. It is not one vote divided by six. It is one vote for a team of six. Basically, what we want to achieve is to move towards a new form of selecting representatives and to build cohesion within each community. As you would have noticed, we have gone into town councils. Our experience tells us that town councils work very well. There is much more autonomy to the town councillors, much more authority and responsibility to the Members elected by the people. And from the experience gained from town councils, we therefore thought we should have this new concept of Community Development Councils to complement the town councils. It is our intention to give more responsibilities, more authority, more power, to the CDCs, so that they will actually bring Government closer to the people. The people will then be able to have a team whom they want to look after their interest, town councils and CDCs. Mr Chiam made a point that we could actually do all this without expanding the GRC from four to six. The answer is yes, we can actually do so. We can actually have a GRC of four combining with two singles to form six, for the CDCs and also for the town councils. But what happens if, as in the case of Toa Payoh, a single member constituency belongs to the opposition? You cannot group it under Toa Payoh even though it is perhaps ideal for Toa Payoh to have a larger town council to look after its interests. Likewise, Dr John Chen made a point that he actually thought the residents of Bukit Gombak are using the services of Hong Kah and it could be part of Hong Kah. I think under the present rule, we cannot just get the town council from the opposition camp into the PAP camp.”
“I am a little confused by that. I do not quite follow the point. In our case, you have a vote and you vote in a party of six. In the Luxembourg case, each voter has 23 votes. You can give all 23 votes to one party and the party will decide to whom the votes go to. Or you can select the candidates you want, or you can give a maximum of two votes to each candidate. In our case, it is one vote for six. So it is not really one-sixth.”
“Basically, it is to encourage team concept, to encourage cohesion in our communities and to encourage team work in governing and in constituencies. You may also wish to know, and this is what we have learnt from Luxembourg, that you can actually give two votes to one candidate, although each voter would have the number of votes which is similar to the number of seats for the zone. For example, if the zone is required to return 23 candidates, each voter will have 23 votes. But the voter can decide to give a maximum of two votes to one candidate, that means, you do not have to give all 23 votes to 23 people, but you can give two votes each to several candidates. So what we are doing over here is therefore not really unusual in the democratic processes of the world.”
“So voters do not have the right to choose a particular candidate they want. In New Zealand, they have a mixed system where some candidates are returned on a single-member constituency basis and others on a proportional basis. Likewise, for Japan. So it is not right to say that when we change the system, we therefore do not allow voters this fundamental right of choosing the candidates they want. In our case, we are moving from the concept of a single-member constituency to a mixed concept of single-member constituencies and GRCs. In Luxembourg, they divide the country into four zones - North Zone, South Zone, East Zone, West Zone, that means, North, South, East, West. Each zone will be required to return a certain number of candidates. The largest zone will return 23 candidates. So each contesting party will field a maximum of 23 candidates, and voters will decide which party they want to represent them in Parliament. And the voters can vote either on a party list basis or to choose the candidates they want. So this is a variation of the proportional system in other countries where you have no choice of the candidates. And if they give a vote to a party, all 23 candidates will be considered, in accordance with the votes received by the parties when all the votes are tallied. The point I am making is that there are different systems of electing people into Parliament, and ours is different from the others. Ours is evolved from the basis of our experience that we want to have a multi-racial slate of representation in Parliament and also we want to encourage team work which is why we have moved into Town Councils and also CDCs.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, there are two groups of amendments to the Constitution. The first group refers to changes relating to the Elected President's power, the second to our proposal to expand the GRCs from a maximum of four to six. On the first group of changes to the Constitution, I take it that the House supports the changes unanimously. There were no criticisms and no clarifications required of me, so I would not have to go into that particular category of changes. On the second group of changes, I could divide the comments into three categories. The first category is whether the proposed expansion of the GRCs from a maximum of four to six deprives the basic right of voters to choose the individual candidate they want. The second group of comments from Members refers to whether it affects the minority representation, ie, whether the minimum will be reduced, and there were suggestions as to how we could ensure an adequate representation of minority candidates in Parliament. The third category of comments refers to the fact that the changes will benefit the PAP. Let me deal first with the first group of comments. It is not correct to say that by changing the system, we are depriving the voters of a basic right to vote for the candidate they want. Mr Ling may not be aware that most European countries have proportional representation in Parliament. They run a system where the parties field a slate of candidates and parties contest on the basis of a slate of candidates. The voters have no right to choose who they want to be in Parliament. The people who are returned to Parliament will be decided by the number of votes received by each party and their position on the party list as the name of the candidates at the top will be the first to be returned.”
“Finally, the Bill also makes a minor and technical amendment to Article 113 to reflect the authority of the Education Service Commission and the Police and Civil Defence Services Commission with respect to pension rights of officers under their respective jurisdiction. Sir, I beg to move. Question proposed.”
“They serve for fixed terms, and once appointed cannot be removed at will. When the legislation creating the Elected President was first passed, the Government had envisaged that as the institution of the Elected President evolved, the Council of Presidential Advisers would in time come to play a larger role. The experience gained with the Council over the last five years shows that the mechanism is workable. It is timely now to consider expanding the Council to further build up its stature. A larger Council will also enable us to tap a wider spread of expertise, so that the Council can better advise the President on the broad range of issues on which he must exercise his custodial functions. An enlarged Council will complement the new mechanism to override the President's veto of appointments. The override mechanism places a heavier responsibility on the Council. Their recommendation will determine whether the President's veto is final, or whether it can be overridden by Parliament. A larger Council is better placed to make a balanced and objective assessment of the suitability of the nominee. And if the President vetoes the candidate against the Council's advice, and the Executive seeks to override the President's veto, the Executive will have a stronger basis to do so. The Bill therefore amends Articles 37B and 37C to enlarge the Council from five to six members. Article 37J provides that in case the votes are tied, the Chairman of the Council will have the casting vote. The additional member will be nominated by the Chief Justice, and appointed by the President. Having the new member nominated by the Chief Justice, instead of by the Prime Minister or President, will build up the Council as an independent body.”
“Invoking it will mean bringing into Parliament matters which do not come under Parliament's direct purview. We will have to discuss the merits of the candidate publicly. The experience of countries like the United States, which hold public confirmation hearings, shows the risks of this approach. Proceedings become politicised and sensationalised, private lives are publicised, and good men are put off from standing for office. But we do not expect such divergence in views between the President and the Executive over appointments to happen often. Most candidates for key appointments will still be considered and appointed outside the glare of publicity. And when the Executive decides to go to Parliament to override the President's veto, it can consciously weigh the disadvantages of the move against the importance of getting the particular candidate appointed. On balance, a Parliamentary override mechanism, although not perfect, is a workable solution. These amendments are part of the continuing process of fine-tuning the Elected Presidency provisions. There has been no impasse between the incumbent President and the Executive over any key appointment. The President has told me that he agrees with the amendments. Council of Presidential Advisers Let me now deal with the third category of amendments. At present the Council of Presidential Advisers consists of five members. Two are appointed by the President in his own discretion, two are appointed on the Prime Minister's advice, and one on the advice of Chairman PSC. The President, in his discretion, appoints one of the members as Chairman. Although the Presidential Advisers are appointed on the nomination of the President, the Prime Minister or the PSC Chairman, they have their own standing.”
“56, columns 465 and 466, dated 4th October 1990: "The overriding mechanism by Parliament is confined only to Supply Bills and Supplementary Supply Bills because these Bills originate from Parliament. It does not apply to the budget of a Government company or statutory board, or to appointments in the public services, because these matters do not come under the direct purview of Parliament. If there is a dispute here, the executive and the President will have to resolve it through fresh submissions of budgets and nominees for appointments." However, there will be occasions when the difference in views between the Executive and the President is one of judgement, rather than a black and white case of an unfit candidate. This will be so when the Council of Presidential Advisers actually supports the Government's nomination, but the President disagrees with the Council's advice. If this happens, the present arrangements unfortunately provide no means for the President and the Executive to resolve the impasse, other than the Executive putting up a fresh nomination. Given our limited talent pool, we may well end up with an inferior candidate. In such circumstances, it is better to have a mechanism to resolve the impasse, rather than force the Executive to nominate another candidate. Articles 22, 22A and 22C of the Constitution will therefore be amended so that where the President vetoes an appointment against the recommendation of the Council of Presidential Advisers, the Executive can take the matter to Parliament, and override the President's veto by a two-thirds majority. This is the same override mechanism provided in Article 148D with regard to the Government's Budget. This mechanism has one disadvantage.”
“No such problem has in practice arisen between the incumbent Executive and the incumbent President since the legislation was brought into effect. However, to prevent a problem from arising in future, we are taking the opportunity to insert this provision as a precaution. Consequential upon these changes, the master entrenchment provision in Article 5(2A) and Articles 21(2) and 150(5) have also to be amended. The amended Article 22H will be brought into effect once this Constitutional Bill is passed and assented to. This is to prevent non-Constitutional legislation from circumventing or curtailing the Elected President's discretionary powers. The new Article 5A will be brought into effect together with Article 5(2A) when we are ready to entrench the Elected President provisions. This is unlikely to be the final set of amendments before we can entrench the elected presidency provisions. We will probably need one or more rounds of amendments before bringing the new master entrenchment provision and new Article 5A into force. Veto Powers over Appointments I now turn to the amendments relating to the President's power of veto over appointments. Presently, the President's veto over appointments to key public officers and to the boards of the key statutory boards and Government companies in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution is final. It is final even if the President exercises his veto against the advice of the Council of Presidential Advisers. I explained during the Second Reading of the Elected Presidency amendments on 4th October 1990 the reason why we did not provide an override mechanism for appointments. I quote from Hansard, Vol.”
“A second part is a separate mechanism to deal with non-core Constitutional Bills. A new Article 5A deals with Constitutional amendments which do not affect the core provisions listed in the master entrenchment provision, Article 5(2A), but nonetheless have the effect of circumventing or curtailing the President's discretionary powers. Again, the President may, on the advice of the Cabinet, obtain an opinion from the Tribunal. However, unlike Article 22H, the President's veto under the new Article 5A is not final. If the Tribunal upholds the President's view that the Bill does have the effect of circumventing or curtailing its discretionary powers, the Prime Minister may refer the Bill to a national referendum. If two-thirds of the electorate support the Bill, the President's veto will be overruled. The President will be required under both the new Articles 5A and 22H to expressly state whether he intends to withhold his assent to the proposed legislation. If the President has not exercised his veto within 30 days of the proposed legislation being presented to him, he is deemed to have assented to the Bill. This is the same provision as the existing Article 148A(5) of the Constitution, which applies to Supply and Supplementary Bills. The Select Committee adopted this Article from a Malaysian provision. Its purpose was to deal with a difficult President. This was the reason given in the Committee Report: "... the Committee recognizes that a problem can arise if a President deliberately or otherwise delays conveying his decision on assent ... Such delay or failure to decide will prevent Parliament from trying to override the President's veto ...".”
“The Courts must answer a narrow question whether the amendment does in fact circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. If the Courts agree with the President that it does, then the President's veto is upheld. The final test of the Constitutional amendment is a judicial one of law: whether it does or does not circumvent or curtail the President's powers. The Courts do not, and correctly cannot, decide the wider political question whether it is desirable to modify the President's powers as proposed. Article 22H, therefore, is inadequate because it provides no mechanism, such as a referendum, to decide this wider question. That is the first problem. The second problem is that Article 22H would prematurely confer upon the President the power to veto non-core Constitutional amendments. The Government has not brought Article 5(2A) into effect in order to preserve full flexibility to amend the Constitution and modify the Elected President provisions in the light of practical experience. This leads to an anomaly: amendments to non-core Constitutional provisions are subject to Presidential veto, if they circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers, whereas the core provisions setting out these powers have, correctly, not yet been entrenched. The solution is to separate Article 22H into two parts, which can be brought into effect separately: One part is an amended Article 22H, confined to legislation other than Constitutional amendments, where the President's veto, once upheld by the Courts, is final. Before or after exercising his veto, the President may, on the advice of the Cabinet, seek the opinion of the Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges as to whether the legislation has the effect of circumventing or curtailing his discretionary powers.”
“If such legislation circumvents or curtails the President's discretionary powers, the President can refuse assent, and if the Courts uphold the President, the matter is final. Article 22H does not cause any problem when it is applied to non-Constitutional legislation. Such legislation should never circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. These powers are spelt out in the Constitution. If a Constitutional provision is unsatisfactory, the remedy is to amend the Constitution, not to pass other legislation which contradicts it. The question is whether Article 22H also covers Constitutional amendments. The Attorney-General argued before the Tribunal that it did not. But the Tribunal did not rule on this wider issue. It confined itself to answering the precise question posed to it, that is, whether the President could veto an amendment to Article 22H, which is a core provision. Its answer was no, the President could not veto an amendment to Article 22H. There is therefore still a doubt whether Article 22H applies to Constitutional amendments. If it does, this would give rise to two problems. First, the non-core provisions of the Constitution would be protected by an inappropriate criterion. Let me explain. Under Article 5(2A), if the Government wants to amend core provisions of the Constitution, it can either persuade the President to waive the requirement for a national referendum, or put the question to a referendum and win a two-thirds majority. The final test is a political one of policy, whether we should or should not circumvent or curtail the President's discretionary powers. Under Article 22H, on the other hand, if the President refuses to assent to an amendment to a non-core Constitutional provision, the question is put to the Courts.”
“On 20th April 1995, the Tribunal gave its opinion that: "Although Article 5(2A) of the Constitution has not been brought into operation, the President has no power under Article 22H(1) of the Constitution to withhold his assent to any Bill seeking to amend the provisions referred to in Article 5(2A), and specifically to any Bill seeking to amend Article 22H to restrict the powers of the President thereunder to any non-constitutional Bill which provides directly or indirectly for the circumvention or curtailment of the President's discretionary powers conferred upon him by the Constitution." In view of this opinion, the Government is proceeding with the amendments to 22H as it originally intended. These amendments are set out in clauses 2, 3 and 8 of the Bill. Let me explain the problem with Article 22H. When the Elected President amendments were passed in January 1991, the legislative intent was, firstly, that Constitutional amendments which circumvent or curtail the Elected President's discretionary powers should be subject to a referendum and, secondly, that the Elected President's veto over Constitutional changes which affect his powers should not be brought into effect immediately, but only after we have had several years of experience operating and refining the system. This was to have been achieved by placing the master entrenching mechanism clause in one Article - Article 5(2A), and then delaying bringing Article 5(2A) into effect until we were ready. This was done. Unfortunately, we overlooked another Article - Article 22H, which has been brought into effect. Article 22H was intended to cover non-Constitutional legislation.”
“We should first gain some experience with the system which allows GRCs to have between three to six members. Only then may we consider writing such a provision into the law. The Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Bill 1996 will make consequential changes to the Parliamentary Elections Act. The detailed changes will be dealt with later when the Bill comes up for Second Reading. Elected President's Powers The second group of amendments in the Constitution (Amendment) Bill is to fine-tune the provisions concerning the President's veto powers. They affect the President's powers in two areas: (1) Bills which circumvent or curtail his discretionary powers; and (2) Key appointments. I will deal with the President's veto powers as regards Bills first. Veto Powers over Bills On 25th August 1994, DPM Lee Hsien Loong explained to this House a problem with the drafting of the mechanism by which the elected President provisions were entrenched in the Constitution, particularly Article 22H. DPM Lee said that the Government intended to amend Article 22H to remedy the problem, but the question had arisen whether the President already had under the existing Article 22H the right to veto such an amendment. The President had stated that in the interest of testing out the system, he would like this question to be referred to the Courts for a ruling, and that he would accept whatever interpretation of Article 22H the Courts ruled to be correct. The Government therefore put this question to a 3-man Tribunal of Supreme Court Judges headed by the Chief Justice.”
“The purpose of the GRC scheme has never been to prescribe a fixed number of MPs from minority communities. It is to guarantee a minimum representation of minority community in Parliament, so that minorities are never excluded from Parliament, by some chance election result in which no minority candidates at all are elected from the single-member constituencies. The Constitution sets out the framework of the GRC scheme, including the maximum number of candidates per GRC, presently four. The Parliamentary Elections Act specifies that at least one quarter of the total number of elected MPs should come from GRCs. With 81 MPs, this means the Parliamentary Elections Act requires a theoretical minimum of six minority candidates. However, we presently have far more than six GRCs. In fact, we have 15 GRCs, as recommended by the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee before the previous general elections. And there are 17 non-Chinese elected MPs in Parliament today, more than the number of GRCs. All are PAP MPs. There are more PAP minority MPs than GRCs, because Bedok and Toa Payoh GRCs have each two minority members. There is therefore no reason to worry that as a result of increasing the maximum size of GRCs to six, minority representation in Parliament will be compromised. Some people have suggested that if we increase the maximum size of GRCs, we could require the larger GRCs to have two candidates belonging to two different minority communities, instead of one as at present. We may also guarantee a higher minimum proportion of minority MPs in other ways, for example, by requiring a larger proportion of MPs to be returned from GRCs. This is worth considering. But I do not think we are ready to implement it now.”
“At the national level, this means voting for a government which will make sound policies and lead the country into the future. At the GRC level, it means voting for a team who will make life better for the residents of the GRC. Democracy can only work when voters support the candidates whom they really have faith in: able and honest people to whom they want to entrust the country and their future. A system which encourages voters to do this is more likely to promote long term political stability in Singapore and the well being of voters themselves. The opposition have been urging voters to do the exact opposite. When they tout their "by-election strategy", what they all mean is that people should vote for opposition candidates, even though they do not trust these candidates to govern Singapore. If this happens in one or two constituencies, the governing Party loses a few seats, but the harm done is not serious, provided the opposition MPs voted in are honest men, who are not out to destroy the system. But if voters do this across the board, they will deprive the party which they in fact support, of the mandate, or the full team of Ministers, that it needs to govern Singapore. This will destabilise the political system, and lead to week governments or even a freak election result. Some people have expressed concern that this change to the GRC rules will compromise minority representation in Parliament. I have said that this will not happen: the PAP will not field fewer minority MPs as a result of this change. If necessary, it will field more than one minority candidate in some GRCs, especially the larger ones, or field minority candidates in single member constituencies.”
“Increasing the maximum number of MPs in a GRC from four to six will give more flexibility to the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee to configure a GRC which is the right size for this purpose. Not all GRCs need to have six members. But where it will be more convenient to create a 6-member GRC, the Committee will be able to do so. Devolving more powers to MPs in Town Councils and CDCs, and enlarging the maximum size of GRCs, is electorally neutral. It gives no unfair advantage either to the PAP or the opposition parties. But it gives voters a bigger stake in the result of their choice, because team MPs will manage more matters, including some duties of the Government now carried out by MCD, Ministry of Education and the hospitals. As a result, their voting will affect them in many more matters within the constituency. So voters are more likely to scrutinise the candidates, their characters and programmes carefully. Bigger GRCs also put a premium on a strong anchor-man for the team of candidates standing there. Then whichever party wins, the GRC is better off with a strong anchor-man heading a strong team, and not just a glib talker supported by a group of straw men. Therefore, the party which wins the largest number of GRCs is more likely to be able to put together a team of competent Ministers to govern the country. In other words, each constituency election in a larger GRC will become more like a national election. Voters will not only be voting for a team of MPs to manage their constituency, but also for part of the core leadership team of the winning party. This will strengthen the political system. Democracy is about exercising the choice of voting for, rather than voting against, something.”
“After an election three MPs, although they are voted in separately, can get together to form a town council. Also, after an election, a group of MPs, three in this case, in a Group Representation Constituency, can also form a town council. Thus, though the two concepts are different, they can be worked together. That was how Group Representation Constituencies, each about the size of three single-member Constituencies and each to be served by a team of three MPs, came to replace twin constituencies." Both the Town Council and the GRC schemes have been successful. As we gained confidence in the schemes, we adapted and extended them in the light of our experience. Thus in 1990, we changed the maximum number of GRC candidates from three to four, to provide flexibility in dealing with a GRC whose population was expanding rapidly. I now propose to take the ideas of Town Councils and GRCs another step further. Town Councils were set up to give more authority and responsibility to residents to manage their own estates. I intend to devolve still more authority to the local communities, by setting up Community Development Councils (CDCs). CDCs will bring government closer to the people and encourage communities to manage their own affairs. They will take over some work hitherto undertaken by Ministries and Government agencies. CDCs will be given more responsibility and resources to carry out self-help projects and dispense help to the needy, for example, through Edusave scholarships and bursaries and Medifund grants. This will strengthen social cohesion and bonding among Singaporeans. For CDCs to be effective, they need to have responsibility for a critical mass of residents.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill 1996 contains amendments relating to three issues: (a) Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs); (b) The Elected President's powers; and (c) The Council of Presidential Advisers. GRC Amendments The first set of amendments is set out in clause 14 of the Bill. The amendments increase the maximum number of MPs representing a GRC from four to six. Members may recall that there were two reasons for creating GRCs. The first reason was to guarantee multi-racial representation in Parliament. This was what started us thinking about changing the single member constituency system, and studying schemes like twinning candidates, with one Chinese and another minority candidate in an enlarged two-member constituency. The second reason for GRCs was to fit in with the proposal to set up Town Councils. Our original idea was just to twin two single constituencies. But because of Town Councils, we decided to create GRCs with three members instead. I explained this to Parliament in January 1988, when I moved the amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Constitution to create GRCs. I said that although Town Councils and multi-racial MPs were tWo different ideas, they were compatible with each other, and the GRC proposal was designed to achieve both. I quote from Hansard, Vol. 50, Col. 184, of 11th January 1988: "The town council proposal and the team MP proposal are two different concepts. One is to give residents more authority, more responsibility, to manage their own housing estates; the other is to ensure that Parliament would always be multi-racial. But though the two concepts are different, they are compatible.”
“The electoral boundaries of Rochore and Telok Ayer had to be changed in 1988 to reflect population shifts and the creation of Group Representation Constituencies. Dr Toh Chin Chye and Mr Ong Pang Boon have made significant contributions to Singapore. But we need not recognise their contributions by reinstating the Rochore and Telok Ayer Constituencies. They can be remembered in other ways. GURKHA CONTINGENT 2. Mr Low Thia Khiang asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) what are the functions of the Gurkha guards; (b) how many of them are employed by the Government; and (c) what is the annual expenditure needed to maintain the Gurkha contingent.”
“I would not know. As I said, the CPIB is in the process of investigation and I cannot go beyond what I have told him at this moment. When the investigation has been completed, further questions can be asked and the details can be given. CIVIL SERVANTS' DENTAL CLAIMS (Reimbursement) 3. Encik Harun bin A. Ghani asked the Prime Minister whether the Public Service Division will revise the reimbursement of dental claims by civil servants.”
“I do not know the exact answer because the CPIB is in the process of doing it and it has not given me an indication as to when the investigation will be completed.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, the CPIB's investigation is actually an extension of an earlier investigation by the Fraud Squad of the Hampshire Constabulary of the United Kingdom. Through the cooperative efforts of both CPIB and the Hampshire Constabulary, Van der Horst, the Repair and Technical Manager of Exxon Corporation's Southampton-based subsidiary, Petroleum Shipping Ltd, has already been charged in the UK for accepting bribes totalling £1.6 million (S$3.4 million) from Keppel Shipyard. Van der Horst pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment which he is currently serving. The CPIB, however, has not completed its own investigation into the matter. It will only be able to make a recommendation on what action to take against the involved parties after completion of the investigation.”
“Yes, I can tell him that it will be after August and maybe a few weeks before April next year. CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU (Investigation into bribe scandal involving Keppel Shipyard and an employee of Exxon) 2. Mr Ling How Doong asked the Prime Minister whether the investigation by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau into the bribe scandal involving Keppel Shipyard and an employee of Exxon has been completed.”
“I will follow what we have been doing all these years, ie, appoint the Committee with a certain set of terms of reference. When the Committee's report is out, it will be tabled before Parliament and made available to Members of Parliament. I will not do anything different from previous practices.”
“I have not yet decided on the terms of reference for the Committee. I suppose we will follow the usual terms of reference as in the past. If the voter population has increased, we will certainly ask the Committee to look into the possibility of increasing the number of seats. But nothing has been decided yet. Mr Low Thia Khiang: Would the Prime Minister agree, when he appoints the Committee and sets down the terms of reference, to make public the terms of reference for the Committee?”
“In that case, I would not give him an answer then.”
“I would not know. If you go by previous experience, it could take one to two months or two to three months. I think what the Member is actually fishing for is when the election will be held. Am I right?”
“If we go by precedents, I think it may take two to three months for the Committee to finish its work. Of course, if the Committee works overtime, I suppose it could do it within one or two months.”
“I did not say that. What I meant was the Committee would be appointed after the National Day Rally and before April next year.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, some time after my National Day Rally. And it will be done before April next year.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, the answer is No. Mr Low Thia Khiang (Hougang): Sir, when is the Committee expected to be appointed?”
“If there is any problem, it is our style to bring it out into the open. There was some misperception over the purchases of Senior Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, we looked into it. We are quite open about it. If we hear of Ministers buying 10 properties, any allegation, make it in Parliament or outside, we will investigate.”
“The answer is that Ministers can buy as many properties as they can afford, provided the purchase is all done in a transparent and above board manner. Yes, Ministers, by virtue of their position, may have certain privileges as seen by some people. But as I have said very clearly, they should never use their position to seize opportunities for their own benefit. If a Minister goes to soft launches and he thinks that because he is a Minister he would be given some special position, I want to know the relationship and the nature of that particular purchase, and I would exercise my discretion to ensure that there is no abuse and, more importantly, to deal with the perception problem that Ministers use their position for their own personal advantages. The onus is on the Minister but I am also sharing the responsibility with the Minister to make sure that they are not in any way abusing their position, and they would not. Because the Ministers that I have, I have seen their accounts and their books and I have had a hand in selecting them, I know that they would not abuse their position and I would not have any problem. But the answer to Mr Chiam's question is, they can buy as many as they want. How many Ministers do we have? Let us say 20. 10 properties each. 20 times 10 is 200. How many do we have in Singapore? Would that raise the property prices? Is that the reason behind the frenzy? Leave us to worry about the social implications. If we mishandle this, he should be very happy at the coming election. But we are not going to mishandle this particular situation.”
“But as I have said in my speech, we have enough land in the land bank for us to meet the needs of the younger Singaporeans. If we do a simulation and find that the problem of younger Singaporeans being unable to own private properties is a real one, we will then consider the suggestion by Senior Minister to find a way to redistribute. But this is a long term problem and this has got to be carefully considered. It is not something which you want to rush into. So you got to understand the problem in a bigger picture, and not zoom in on Ministers for political purposes. I am glad that Mr Chiam owns a small flat and a small office space. He should buy more.”
“I think he has got the point. When one buys properties, it is not just to live in. We buy property for investment. And I do not think he should be embarrassed about the size of his flat. I told him that I would declare what I have. I own two bungalows, one to live in and one for investment. And there is nothing I feel embarrassed about, because I bought with the earnings which I made from my days in the civil service, when I worked in a shipping line, as office holder, as a Prime Minister. The point is: where does one invest his money? I have liquid assets in the CPF and also in my bank accounts. I could have actually bought more properties, and I should have bought more properties, because my assets are collecting dust in the CPF, and I gave a small sum of money to a bank to buy shares. You know the returns for the last one year. I think they were just about the rate of interest on your funds in the bank. I knew it was wrong, because as a private individual I know that properties are the right thing to invest in Singapore. I did not do so, not because I fear that there would be any perception of wrongdoing, I could go through a housing agent, but I have not got the time to be looking around for properties to invest in. So the point is how many should a person own, and it does not apply only to Ministers. This is an issue which the Senior Minister addressed us yesterday. It is not the Ministers we are worried about. It is people who are far richer than the Ministers who are in a position to own several landed properties, and at the end of which, after maybe one or two more generations, you worry about the future generation not being able to own homes.”
“I am prepared to tell him how many I own.”
“May I respond to the Member, Mr Speaker, Sir? We heard from Mr Chiam the other day that when he was a young teacher, he applied for a house in the Singapore Teachers' Union's development. At that point of time, he already owned two flats and he applied to buy a third property. I think, normally, for such a cooperative development, I would expect the builders to ask the person to declare whether or not he owns other properties. If they did not, I was surprised that Mr Chiam thought of applying in the first place. If that is his thinking, he should not have applied in the first place but, of course, he opted out. Since then, has Mr Chiam gone on to own more properties? I do not believe he only owns two properties. I do not know how many properties he has, but I am sure he owns more than one, surely. Can he confirm? One to live in. How many has he invested in? Sir, I give the floor to Mr Chiam.”
“But ultimately, whatever the rules, it is the quality of leaders whom the people elect into public office, their integrity and incorruptibility which are the true safeguards. [Applause].”
“Integrity is the cornerstone of the PAP Government. Senior Minister laid this cornerstone. It will survive the Senior Minister. My inquiry has put Senior Minister and DPM Lee in a difficult position. But they have chosen to let their conduct in the purchases of units in Nassim Jade and Scotts 28 be publicly debated and scrutinised. This shows clearly the transparent and clean system of Government that we have. It is difficult to increase one's respect for Senior Minister, because the respect for him is already so very high. But from this episode, my esteem for him has gone up several more rungs. Far from saying, "How dare you investigate me", he was proud that I dared to investigate him. DPM behaved in a similar manner. He understood why I had to investigate and supported what I had done. Singaporeans better wish him good health and a long life. Singapore will need his services in the 21st century. I am satisfied with the outcome of the debate in the House. It reaffirmed my conclusion that there was no impropriety in SM's and DPM's purchases of units in Nassim Jade and Scotts 28. There is no reason why Senior Minister who has dedicated his life to the country should want to sully his reputation in semi-retirement. Nor is there any reason why DPM Lee should risk tarnishing his. This Government has an enviable record of incorruptibility. This has been a great plus in the quality of life of Singaporeans and an enormous competitive advantage for our economy. It enables Singaporeans to hold their heads high. The new rules on the purchase of properties will further safeguard the integrity of the Government.”
“Because if more people prefer private property to HDB flats, we will just scale back the HDB building programme, and change our land allocation, to give more land to private housing and less for HDB. Many HDB upgraders and professionals should be able to own private property. I will speak on this subject again at the National Day Rally. For the Singapore Dream to continue, the Government must and will maintain the highest standard of integrity and competence. Ministers and MPs must not only be honest and conduct their personal affairs and investments with propriety and prudence, but they must always be seen to be above reproach. On the other hand, the people must have the confidence and patience that the Government will find rational and fair solutions to their higher aspirations. The Government needs time to think through and work out sound and fair long-term solutions. The Singapore Dream will not fade away as long as Government and people are working hard, saving more and investing more to improve our infrastructure and our homes. With regard to the purchases of SM and DPM Lee, I initiated the investigation. I did not do it lightly. I turned it over in my head for several days before deciding on how to tackle the Senior Minister. Prof. Jayakumar can testify to that. I knew the risk my investigation entailed for my relations with the Senior Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, the potential damage to their reputation and the Government, even if no impropriety was found, the political cost in the coming elections, and the danger that this might split the PAP. But as the Prime Minister, I have to safeguard the integrity of the Government. No personal or political cost can be higher than the loss of confidence in the integrity of the Government.”
“Once they begin to drop, you try and get the Opposition Members of Parliament to raise confidence and raise the property prices. I do not think that is possible. But the reactions of the younger Singaporeans about their inability to own a home is a serious one which we take into account. But they have got to understand that we cannot perform miracles. We just cannot, with a wave of a wand, produce private properties for you, but it is a desire which we are studying and we will ensure that the Singapore Dream will be realised by them. But please be patient and be realistic. That is also very important. Singapore is small, but the Government's land bank is quite large. The Bukit Timah Turf Club is being relocated to Kranji. That will free up a large parcel of prime residential land at the old site. The Government also owns another big parcel of prime land at the old MINDEF at Dempsey Road, opposite Botanic Gardens. I used to work there as a Minister. Mr Bernard Chen was also there. I know personally the value of that piece of land, and which was why I argued that the old MINDEF had to be relocated to Bukit Gombak, so that that piece of land could be released for development. We intend to reclaim more land. For example, we have plans to reclaim a long island, all along the East Coast, from Marina North to Changi Airport. This will be very suitable for high quality housing. This is not something new. It is actually published in our book, The Next Lap. Look it up. There is a beautiful picture there of this long island and the homes you can begin to dream to own on that long island. Over the longer term, there cannot be any real shortage of private property.”
“Senior Minister's suggestions are ideas that he has sketched out in broad outlines, to spark off the discussion, and in due course to be fleshed out and modified. They are not ready to be implemented immediately. The detailed conditions will be crucial. I will be happy to receive other suggestions from the public for us to consider. DPM has just passed me a letter which he received from a friend of his who is an architect, helping him in his branch and a fellow officer in the SAF. The writer gave feedback on this question of the fading Singapore Dream, the desire of younger Singaporeans to own properties. He wrote, and this is what he got from other people: A Vice-Principal at a junior college was telling me that some of his junior college boys were asking why they should defend their country when they would never have a chance to own a house or a car. Our answer is: get through your junior college first, go to university and then prove yourself. If you can prove yourself, you would have the chance to own a house. And if you are amongst the top earners, and you are prepared to pay for a COE, you could also own a car. There are a few other complaints about how people are so angry with the Government for allowing property prices to rise. He wrote: `In fact, I heard of some people who are angry with the Government for policies that appear to encourage the rise in property prices and for not taking sufficiently drastic action to cool the market, that they have decided to vote in the opposition, as a last resort, to try to bring down property prices.' I think that is the surest way to bring down property prices. You return a substantial number of Opposition candidates in the coming election, you rock confidence, you will see that the property prices would drop.”
“We are not asking officers to seek the approval of their Permanent Secretary for their property purchase, but only to make a declaration, for two reasons: (a) The onus to ensure propriety of the transaction would then pass to the Permanent Secretary, whereas the officer must remain fully accountable if any wrongdoing should surface later on; (b) So unlike the Prime Minister, the Permanent Secretary does not want to take on the responsibility of having to clear the purchases of the civil servants working under him. And he cannot, because the Permanent Secretary is not well placed to decide whether the price or conditions are exceptional. To decide that the officer has not obtained a better discount off the list price or better terms than anyone else, the Permanent Secretary will have to do a full investigation, and obtain the information from the developer or vendor, rather than from the officer, who as purchaser, is not in a position to know what all the other buyers were getting. Conclusion To sum up, once it became clear that there was nothing improper in SM's and DPM's purchases of properties, this debate has shifted to perceived privileges of Ministers, MPs and senior civil servants buying properties on the inside track and to the fading Singapore Dream. Dr Lee Tsao Yuan spoke of the concern of young graduates and professionals, as they see their dream of owning a private home fade. I had already been discussing this problem with Senior Minister and my other colleagues. I told Senior Minister that Tsao Yuan had given him an opening, and suggested to him to spell out his ideas to this House, which he did yesterday. We have not yet decided on any steps, because this is a long-term problem which needs very careful study.”
“Town Councils handle several million dollars of transactions every year. While the PAP MPs are supervised, the non-PAP MPs may not be. Also, the set of Rules of Prudence for MPs is the PAP's, not the Government's. I am considering whether we should not require all candidates to elected office to make declarations to a neutral person before an election. This matter has to be looked into. It has to be considered. Rules on Purchase of Property by Civil Servants The Public Service Division has also worked out rules to govern purchase of property by senior civil servants. It has sent me its proposal. I have approved the paper and PSD will release the paper to the media later this week. The new rules will come into effect upon release. In brief, civil servants will be asked to declare to their Permanent Secretary, on a standard form, any non-HDB property purchase they, their spouse or dependent children are making, at the point they commit to the purchase. The Civil Service has always required officers to declare the investments of their spouse and dependent children, and the Public Service Division wants to keep it that way. The new rules will be based on a clear, comprehensive restatement of the spirit and code of behaviour by which civil servants are to conduct themselves. It is the spirit, rather than the letter, of the rules which will maintain a high sense of ethical conduct and propriety in the civil service.”