He Ting Ru
Singapore
“When our researchers develop AI system that work across Southeast Asian languages, we create tools that can be deployed in our own service sectors, our hospitals, our schools. When our companies lead in AI adoption, we generate demand for new skills, new roles and new industries that our workers can be trained into.”
“Thank you, Sir. I would like to ask the Minister for further colour about the longitudinal tracking of bullying incidents, as in my Parliamentary Question, both in terms of perpetrators and how does the Ministry actually track that.”
“Mr Speaker, while I am supportive of the Government's zero tolerance approach towards stamping out vapes, we should also be holistic and mindful of the socio-economic and even possibly psychological undercurrents that give rise to vaping.”
“With decisions like periodic increases to tobacco duties, I hope we are seeking to maximise the sin tax impact instead of considering its revenue impact. Similarly, we should be doing more to curb the health impacts of public smoking, for instance, by tackling smoking while walking.”
“Sir, I would like to once again thank our Parliamentary staff for their work in ensuring the smooth running of the various functions of our Parliament. And with that I beg leave to withdraw my amendment. [(proc text) Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.”
“For instance, during a debate on the Online Safety Bill, we proposed that OSC submit annual reports detailing the number and categories of reports received, directions issued and findings of online harms trends.”
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“Having worked on a number of highly complex multi-billion-dollar mergers and acquisitions, and structured finance transactions across multiple jurisdictions spanning the globe, I know how invaluable it is to have certainty. In such deals, there are many moving parts and a number of complicated regulatory regimes ranging from takeover codes, listing rules, merger control, catch all laws governing natural and national interests, and also financial rules for lawyers and other financial advisors to consider. It is also why it is also standard practice for parties to engage with regulators early on in the preparatory process long before any public announcements are made so that parties can understand potential impediments to their transactions, assess the risk of a regulator blocking the transaction and to address these through their structuring of the transaction, including on occasion giving irrevocable and legally binding undertakings to do or not do certain things for a fixed time period post-completion. This is also the case here in Singapore. It is fair that we ask whether the amendments proposed in this Bill, especially under a Certificate of Urgency, which was last used during COVID-19, are in fact strictly necessary to provide the Government through MAS the legal power to block the Allianz’s acquisition of Income. After all, according to the offering circular, the long stop date was actually nine months after the announcement date, which would actually have taken us until sometime next year. MAS' powers are contained in sections 26 and 27 of the Insurance Act 1966.”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, passing legislation which has or is seen to have retrospective effect must not be taken lightly. This is especially so when it adversely affects the rights and interests of persons and has the potential to hurt Singapore's reputation for certainty, stability and predictability of our commercial laws. It should not be taken lightly and the WP's position when the Constitution was amended a year ago as a precautionary measure, reflects our general concern over retrospective amendments. In this case, while it is true that MAS’ approval of Allianz's proposed acquisition of 51% of Income remains pending, we note that the transaction had previously been signed and announced, albeit conditional upon receiving regulatory approval amongst others. It can thus be seen to be a live transaction. Thus, I believe that there is a risk that the amendments proposed in this Bill, along with their urgent nature, would be seen to be retrospective by players in our corporate finance landscape. For this, I specifically refer to clause 2 of the Bill which contains the proposed section 33A subsection 9 of the Act which states that, quote, this section also applies to a relevant application received by the authority before the commencement of the Insurance (Amendment) Act 2024 that is still pending as of that date. Even if some were to argue that this Bill's acts do not fall within the realm of having retrospective effect, there is a second principle of legal and regulatory certainty in the context of Singapore's corporate finance landscape to consider. This was also alluded to by Members Liang Eng Hwa and Joan Pereira in their speeches.”
“I thank the Minister of State Rahayu for the reply. I just wanted to ask some supplementary questions on this. First is, whether or not, in the Code for Fun, have there been any attention paid to certain groups which might be found to be generally more reluctant or a little bit more afraid to engage with the topics? And also, some of the schemes that she mentioned earlier, such as the NLB schemes, whether or not these schemes have user data or participant data tracked, not just in terms of gender, but age group and also socioeconomic background? The thinking behind this is just to find out whether or not we need to target these groups that are generally under-represented in technology and AI.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. I just have one clarification on the confusion that the Minister mentioned about my concerns raised about exemption for authorised new agencies and her linking it to one of the suggestions that I made in relation to public education efforts. In fact, I think I mentioned in my speech when I talked about the use of pre-bunking in a sort of inoculative approach, I talked about exposing people to weakened forms of misinformation, so, not necessarily real deepfakes. Also, I think when I talked about using short-form content, I was actually referring to generic short-form videos, for example, but not during the election period.”
“We can also use short-form content on social media and interactive online experiences to reach a wide audience, teaching them to recognise common manipulation techniques used in deepfakes and other types of misinformation campaigns. To conclude, we support the addition of measures to tackle the harm that deepfakes and such manipulated content can cause during the especially vulnerable period of an election campaign. However, I believe that there are a number of concerns and clarifications that I hope the Minister can address, as we work together to ensure that our democratic process does not come under threat by sophisticated manipulated media.”
“Finally, while we have focused a lot today about the potential harms and dangers that deepfakes may pose to democratic processes, some researchers have also warned against being overtly alarmist. In a 2020 paper, Orben warns against what he terms as "technology panics", arguing that these can sometimes encourage quick fixes that "centralise control over truth". I believe that Member Mr Yip also raised similar concerns about overreach earlier. Instead, I think it would be more helpful to invest in nuanced and effective proactive public education strategies. A technique that appears promising is "pre-bunking", the process of debunking lies, tactics or sources before they strike, because prevention is more impactful than cure. It works like inoculation and aims to build mental resilience against misinformation before being exposed to its full force. Much like Ministry of Defence's Exercise SG Ready earlier this year involving a simulated phishing exercise run by organisations. Pre-bunking works by exposing people to weakened forms of misinformation and uses this to teach them to spot manipulative techniques used by fake news peddlers. This approach seems to work across different cultures and across those with differing political views and should be integrated into our wider strategy tackling the effects of misinformation on our population. Specific proposals could include enhancing media literacy education in schools and other touchpoints, where our citizens hone their critical thinking skills necessary to navigate the increasingly complex information landscape.”
“Also, what happens after an offence is reported and the decision is made to issue a corrective order? Would the Returning Officer then simultaneously ask both the poster and platform to take it down? What then happens if there is a refusal to comply with the order? After all, for platforms, the maximum fine of $1 million dollars might be questioned about whether it was sufficient to compel trillion-dollar companies, such as Meta and TikTok to comply. Would the Minister also be able to elaborate on any appeals process, if one were to disagree with the corrective order? This is particularly important too, as information has now gotten to the stage where experts sometimes even disagree about whether a piece of content is real or doctored. Finally, moving to abuse of this process, particularly given the very short nature of our official elections period, and given that members of the public can also make reports. While we often view deepfakes as malignant and harmful, recent elections such as the recently concluded Indian national elections have seen instances where generative AI and deepfake technology has been used to manipulate videos of candidates in a way to benefit them. A classic example would be using deepfake technology to show candidates speaking in languages or dialects that they do not themselves speak, in a misleading effort to endear themselves to certain segments of the electorate. Would these cases of "positive deepfakes" fall under the scope of the prohibition? Also, given that anyone can make a report, what is the penalty if a member of the public makes a false report? And how will this be communicated so that members of the public do not spam reports as an act of mischief during the election campaign?”
“After all, foreign disinformation groups are known to wage persistent year-round disinformation campaigns to influence political outcomes. For example, the government of Canada detected a Chinese spamouflage campaign, where various Canadian members of parliament, including its' prime minister, leader of the opposition and members of the cabinet were targeted. The rapid response mechanism alerted the affected members of parliament who were provided with advice and support on how to protect themselves from the campaign. The aim? To discredit and denigrate targeted members of parliament, by questioning the political and ethical standards, using deepfake videos and fake social media profiles. While the punishments outlined in this Bill are meant to act as strong deterrence, they do not fully address threats from those operating outside of Singapore's jurisdiction. How then will we effectively combat the risks associated with a foreign coordinated campaign using prohibited content like deepfakes? Next, moving to an investigation of alleged offences. Given that members of the public can report alleged prohibited content, where and what is the investigative capacity to investigate claims made in this regard? Who undertakes the investigation, and how long would it take for these to be completed, before any further action is taken? What resources, both in terms of manpower and otherwise, would be available to the Returning Officer and ELD to make relevant decisions and take enforcement action? After all, in Singapore, we are somewhat unique in having a very short campaign period and added together with the quick spread of digital information, it makes it even more imperative that decisions about claims have to be made rapidly.”
“It is important to have clarity on this as academics have found that there is emerging evidence that propagandists increasingly exploit applications such as WhatsApp and Telegram, preying on their popularity, loose moderation policies and trust within private networks. In Slovakia, the example I raised earlier, Telegram has become a haven for pro-Russian propaganda and a deepfake of Simecka was spread widely on Pro-Fico Telegram channels ahead of the election. In view of this, can the Minister clarify how the exemption for private messages will address the risks associated with widespread disinformation spreading through these channels? What are the criteria to be used to determine whether or not a specific communication is private and therefore exempt from the prohibitions contained in the Bill? Aside from these, I have some clarifications around three broad areas: first, the scoping of the prohibitions; second, questions about the reporting and investigation of alleged offences; and third, the potential misuse of the regime. On the scoping of the prohibitions, I note that the prohibitions and offences only apply during election periods and it is confined to Singapore. While it is necessarily the way it is scoped because the acts being amended are acts governing our two types of elections in Singapore, what is the treatment regulating prohibited content aimed at influencing political sentiment when we are not in an official election period? Deceptive information may begin swaying public opinion well before an election is formally announced and this is especially the case as the potential window for calling a general election narrows over time.”
“What mechanisms will be in place to hold these outlets accountable if they do publish or propagate prohibited content, intentionally or unintentionally? More specifically, does the Minister believe that the existing codes of practice governing authorised news agencies are sufficient to address the concerns raised above, or would further updates be needed to combat the unique risks associated with digitally manipulated content and deepfakes? Would there thus also be new codes or updates to the existing codes of practice, such as the promised new code of conduct which the Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) states will be published to ensure social media companies do more to moderate content and when is the expected publication date? Second, the Bill also states that private or domestic communications are exempted. The new section 61M(4) exempts private or domestic electronic communications between two or more individuals from the regulations. While we acknowledge the intent to protect personal privacy, we hope that this exemption does not become a Trojan horse used to overcome the Bill's defences combating disinformation. This is because disinformation often spreads rapidly through private channels. It is also not a secret that modern communication platforms have blurred the lines between private and public spaces. What would be the standing of spaces such as private Facebook groups, private Telegram channels, locked Facebook profiles or messaging group chats? Would whether a channel is private hinge on whether having people in the group not knowing each other, for example?”
“While political scientists on the whole concluded that the deepfake alone did not cost Simecka to lose, the very speculation caused by its going viral laid bare how dangerous it is for a democracy to exist in an environment of low trust in public institutions and a population with a propensity to believe in conspiracy theories. The Workers' Party (WP) therefore supports the introduction of legislation to combat the threat of digitally manipulated media contained in this amendment Bill, although I wish to raise two main areas of concern and seek further clarifications from the Minister on other further technical points. First, the new section 42L(4) contains a number of carve-outs from the band of manipulated content during the election period for OEA, including for authorised news agencies. The reason given for this is to allow factual reporting. However, this is not enough reason to exempt these actors as factual reporting should not require reproduction of prohibited material. In fact, we should consider a concerning scenario – authorised news agencies, when reporting on prohibited content, might inadvertently spread misinformation. In our attention deficit world, many readers skim headlines and images without carefully reading the full article or captions. This creates a risk where such content, even when presented as part of factual reporting, could be mistaken for genuine content and go viral as real news. Thus, the very act of reporting by reproducing these prohibited materials might unintentionally amplify their reach and impact. Our disquiet over creating such a two-tier media landscape leads to questions about how we can ensure that media entities exempt from the prohibitions of the Act do not publish such content without consequences.”
“Mr Speaker, deepfakes, particularly malicious ones, pose a serious threat to our democratic processes, particularly during elections. While exciting, technological advances in the field of generative AI bring new challenges in maintaining the integrity of our political and electoral system. The proliferation of highly realistic yet fabricated content, particularly in the digital realm, poses a risk to our electoral system and, if we are not careful, will shake the trust citizens have in the democratic process here in Singapore. It bears reiterating that deepfakes and digitally altered content are a very real and present danger to democracy. As mentioned by the Minister and also Member Yip Hon Weng earlier, in the 2023 Slovak parliamentary elections, we witnessed the potential impact on elections of the malicious use of deepfakes to sway the results of an election. Just two days before the elections there, during the equivalent of our cooling-off day, a fake audio clip surfaced, which was set to have been a recording of pro-European candidate, Michal Simecka, discussing electoral fraud with a prominent journalist. Both quickly denied its authenticity but the clip went viral. The impact was also amplified by the deepfake being released during the election's "silence period", when media is prohibited from discussing election-related developments. In that election, the pro-Russia candidate Robert Fico ultimately won, which naturally led to speculation about whether the deepfake contributed towards Simecka's loss, given that he was polling stronger than the ultimate victor.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker, and I thank the Minister for his Ministerial Statement. I have two clarifications. The first relates to a part of the PQ that I filed for yesterday, where I asked, what was the total capacity of bridging bus services put into effect, compared to the average ridership of the stations that were closed as part of this disruption. The Minister mentioned that bridging bus services cannot match the train in terms of speed and capacity, even with 80 buses deployed. We all agree with that. But I am wondering whether he has figures on what was the capacity of the actual bridging bus services that were deployed? That is my first clarification. The second one relates to safety, which we just talked about. As with other Members of the House, I would like to extend my gratitude to the workers and everyone on the ground who worked hard to get our rail system up and running again. But I wanted to come back to this and ask the Minister, what specific measures were taken during this incident to ensure that the workers working around the clock to effect repairs, including those workers who were working for contractors, were working safely, including not working double or additional shifts beyond what is safe? Were there, for example, advisories or directives that the Ministry or LTA actually issued to the workers and contractors to tell them what the avenues and measures that are available to them? For example, if they felt that there were some concerns around the working environment for their safety, whether there were any spot checks undertaken to ensure that all rules and safety guidelines were adhered to during the repair process?”
“And I think you do actually find it in some restaurants and some chains – they do have common allergens clearly labelled on menus. So, I think that is something that we could also look at. And again, the Senior Minister of State earlier mentioned MOE and ECDA. I think if I am not wrong, ECDA has training for preschool teachers, where they train the use of the EpiPen. That is great because that by extension, that means that early childhood educators are aware of how to spot food allergies and how to handle that. But I think, again, from my understanding of the situation, certain schools are probably a bit more advanced in terms of the public education and the initiatives that they have taken, especially in the primary school level, to educate, both students and teachers, and also the food handlers within the canteens, about their importance; because even though the numbers might be small, each one incident can be potentially life threatening. So, I hope that the Senior Minister of State can also let us know about when they are expecting to roll out more of these national initiatives.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Senior Minister of State for the reply. I would like to declare that I have a family member who is affected by severe food allergies. The thrust of my question is to understand whether, for example – I understand that in the last five years, there has been found to be a worldwide increase in prevalence of food allergies, especially in children. So, I am just wondering whether we have similar data in Singapore, because I note that a Straits Times article that was published recently, also stated that, for example, in 2014, I think there were 300 cases seen by one of the hospitals, and by 2020, it has gone up to 10,000. So, again, trying to understand how much of that is due to, I guess, actual increase or how much of it is just increased public awareness? It will be helpful for us to know. The second question really relates to the food handling industry and people who handle food in general. It has just been my experience that sometimes, even when we make it known in advance that we do have food allergies among one of the diners, there are times when, on occasion, we have actually been served with the allergen in question, when we specifically said that one of us is severely allergic to it. That is obviously far from ideal when it was a very near miss on one occasion when the food was literally almost put into the mouth. So, I hope that more awareness can be raised around this issue. On other occasions, we have also been met with incomprehension from either from food waitresses or food handlers who literally do not understand what we are trying to tell them. So, I think that more work needs to be done from this perspective. Other countries have taken the route of, such as food labelling where common allergens are displayed.”
“Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I would like to ask the Minister, as part of its discussions with NE, did MCCY ask NE why they agreed to the deal knowing that there will be a capital extraction post-acquisition? I believe some of the concerns raised in Parliament in August were about financial sustainability and capital structure of the business going forward. So, I struggle to understand how withdrawing capital in the future can strengthen any entity's capital structure. Given that there is public interest and social mission involved here, I think it is important that these reasons are articulated properly to help the public understand why there was this structure put in place, and I think it is also relevant because NE is still after all going to be a shareholder, albeit a minority one going forward, under the original proposed structure.”
“Mr Speaker, I refer to parts (b) and (c) of my original PQ. I do not think I heard the Minister answering them. The first being for a breakdown between the offline and online bullying incidents that are reported to schools. And part (c), relating to whether there are any special guidelines, given our approaches taken for cases of bullying involving students with neurodiverse conditions or disabilities, and if there are such guidelines, what are they? And it is important, especially for this last point, because different measured strategies need to be behind how these students are handled, because they need to be sensitive or also effective, and not all teachers or counsellors might feel that they are able to handle some of the more complex issues.”
“And in terms of domestic consumption, unlike electricity generated overseas, we have some control over our electricity consumption. Ultimately, the drive for successfully transitioning our energy sources and decarbonisation will require us to not just pay attention to supply, but also demand. We cannot neglect to continue to raise awareness of energy conservation and wider sustainability concerns, and both industry and households have to continue to work together, keeping our energy use in check. For this, we would like to repeat our calls made since 2016 for Singapore to work towards solar panels being mandatory on commercial and residential buildings except in special cases. This would not only cut emissions and electricity costs but will also provide some options in our energy security.”
“Our industrial sector currently contributes 55% of total energy demand. With industrial usage set for significant growth, especially from energy-intensive use cases, such as data centres, necessitated by the growth of artificial intelligence (AI) applications, it is likely that total energy demand will grow more. While we may be able to achieve our target of 30% renewables, the wider challenge remains. We are already seeing power-hungry AI applications drive outsized demand for energy just to keep data centres running. Given our AI ambitions, we have been looking for “clean” sources in the region to meet demand, including solar farms in Australia and wind or hydropower sources from our ASEAN neighbours – Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, for instance. However, what happens when our ASEAN neighbours start requiring a significant amount of renewables to power their own transition and development? What, too, do we do if geopolitical conflict results in energy supply lines being cut, such as was the case with the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines? Our regulations and policies are also important in boosting Singapore’s energy security which, in turn, will affect our geopolitical risk tolerance with electricity imports. For instance, EMA introduced rules requiring all new and repowered natural gas power plants to be at least 30% hydrogen-compatible from this year and the few power plants coming up in the next few years are hydrogen-compatible. But with an economic lifespan of around 25 years, is there a timeline for these power plants to run on green zero-emission hydrogen? If these fossil fuel plants are unable to meet net-zero power, will they be retired early to make way for low-carbon imports?”
“In this example, the failure of capital deployed can be attributed to the lack of financial viability of a range of carbon capture technologies, a risk that cannot be overlooked when dealing with nascent technologies. In view of this, I have some clarifications for the Minister. Funds typically appoint a designated fund manager or have a general partner responsible for evaluating projects, investment decisions and the overall management of fund operations. Which agency will be the fund manager for the FEF? On a broader level, which Ministry or agency holds ultimate accountability for our target energy mix and transition to 30% renewable sources by 2035? On an explicit strategic approach and fund objectives, what does success for the fund look like? How will its efficacy be measured? Given that our country’s energy security and transition are fundamentally critical to our survival, how will this translate into the fund balancing between the need for financial returns versus the long-term strategic costs necessary for such a transition? Can the Minister clarify what are our key performance indicators (KPIs) for the fund? Aside from supporting the 2035 target for six gigawatts target for low-carbon imports which will provide 30% of Singapore’s electricity supply, will the impact on the grid emission factor, which calculates the actual climate impact of the changes, be a KPI? Moving on to more general points about our energy environment and maximising the climate impact of the fund. As we ramp up towards transitioning our energy mix, our energy demand has been growing consistently. Electricity consumption increased by 2.6% between 2021 and 2022, part of a long-term trend of consumption, having increased by nearly 25% over a 10-year period between 2012 and 2022.”
“Would the Minister confirm that the fund will not be used to rely on fossil fuels as a crutch, especially if it means that we are stuck with using this crutch in the long term? A query I have is, what happens if projects are terminated early? In the case of the 100-megawatt Lao DPR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore Power Integration Project (LTMS-PIP), it was reported that the deal is currently on pause over government-level disagreements. What happens if assets supported by the fund are stranded due to project failures or pauses? Next, on accountability. As we work towards these national energy goals, accountability allows us to equip accountable stakeholders with commensurate mandates and authority to see through the successful implementation of these targets. We fall short of targets when lines of accountability are unclear or if our strategic approach is flawed. We need to learn from our experiences in the arena of food insecurity, specifically, the difficulties faced in achieving our "30 by 30" goal, in working to achieve our goal for energy security in the coming decade and beyond. We can also learn from the failures of investing in unproven technologies, as was the case in the US. The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act offered US$3.4 billion for the research and development of carbon capture and sequestration projects. A case study of 11 demonstration projects selected by the US Department of Energy, resulted in only two continuing to remain operational. A further five commercial projects saw only one reaching operational implementation, which eventually closed within four years.”
“As with most capital-intensive infrastructure projects, particularly for energy projects, commissioning times before such projects even begin yielding outcomes play a critical role. In a 2024 study on renewable energy project, globally-funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under the European Research Council, commissioning times across renewable technologies and regions have increased on average between 2015 and 2022. The same paper called for more policy interventions to address this increase in times, ranging from insulating projects from fiscal shocks to standardising legal processes surrounding projects. Given also, that target projects supported by the fund can include nascent technologies, these being one of the factors that increases commissioning time, how does the Government plan to use the fund to address potentially lengthy commissioning times and how does it see the efficacy of using the fund to meet our 2035 targets? Also on the mechanics of the fund, I note that the proposed new section 19A(1)(a) uses the wording "any low-carbon energy project or energy supply security project". Does this mean that the fund could, hypothetically, support a new built fossil fuel project in the name of energy security? Would any project qualify, as long as it meets the criteria of being necessitated by any low-carbon energy project as described in 19A(6)? I note that power back-up is explicitly given as an example in 19A(6)(b), but could this also mean support for fossil fuel power stations providing baseload power? What are the scenarios where the fund would support fossil fuel power for non-back-up use?”
“Mr Speaker, I will focus my speech today on the FEF. The fund is a key piece of our strategy in securing our energy future and meeting our 2050 Net Zero Objective and we support its creation. The fund is meant to catalyse the development of clean energy infrastructure in the region, through the development of infrastructure necessary for low-carbon projects that typically face high upfront capital expenditures and commercial or geopolitical risks. My speech today would cover three areas: the mechanics of the fund, accountability and the energy environment. Implementation refers to details about fund management, investment criteria and how the fund's mandate links to our broader energy and climate goals. Accountability refers to clarity on stakeholders who are responsible for the fund's performance and how to benchmark the effectiveness of the fund. Lastly, our energy environment refers to wider trends that affect the decarbonisation of our energy mix. The fund will be established at the end of this year, with an initial injection of $5 billion. After taking into account due diligence time frames, the first investments through the fund should be made next year. This gives a 10-year time frame to achieve our 2035 goal for renewable energy to contribute 30% of our energy mix. Thirty percent is a significant ramp-up and will be predominantly driven by our target to add six gigawatts of low carbon imports, given that the current proportion stands at approximately 1.3%. Therefore, we would need an exponential increase in renewables between just 2030 and 2035 alone. I have some clarifications relating to the implementation of the fund.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. During Question Time last month on 6 August 2024, I quoted a December 2023 Zero One report which stated that Income Insurance's reported capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 193% was in excess of the 120% required under the Insurance Act and other applicable regulations. [Please refer to "Regulatory Assessment of Allianz Insurance's Planned Acquisition of Income Insurance", Official Report, 6 August 2024, Vol 95, Issue 138, Oral Answers to Questions section.] I would like to clarify that while the report mentioned a value of 120%, I understand that the baseline CAR level currently required by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is 100%, plus any additional amounts imposed upon MAS upon individual insurers. I further note that from 1 January 2024, Income is required to maintain higher capital requirements due to it being designated by MAS as a domestic systematically important insurer.”
“No, I wanted to make the clarification before adjournment. Oh, sorry.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. Just a quick clarification. During yesterday's Question Time, I quoted a December 2023 Zero One report, which stated that incomes reported —”
“Discretionary awards are rarely paid and have proven ineffective in incentivising whistle-blowers. Confidentiality and anonymity protections allowing whistle-blowers to file complaints anonymously and maintain their anonymity encourage higher participation rates. Compensation for related actions where whistle-blowers are rewarded for enforcement actions by all relevant agencies resulting from their tip promotes comprehensive reporting to all relevant authorities. For us in Singapore, the $3 billion money laundering case has indicated that there is somewhat of a culture of viewing self-reported checks as administrative hurdles to be avoided in the pursuit of profits. This cultural issue needs addressing in any regulatory framework. I believe that a whistle-blower fund, properly implemented, offers us the best shot of changing the game and mindset around suspicious transaction reporting. In the fight against money laundering, we will need both carrots and sticks. While the US already has a strong AML framework, as evidenced by its prosecution of the 1MDB case, it still saw the need to enhance the whistle-blower system. Singapore should follow suit, recognising that motivating individuals to come forward is essential to maintaining a clean and transparent financial system. By implementing these measures, we can turn the current AML lapses into a catalyst for positive change, fostering a culture of integrity and vigilance within our financial sector. A whistle-blower fund, seeded from the ill-gotten gains of the Fujian money launderers, could be the cornerstone of a cleaner, more transparent financial future for Singapore.”
“This approach allows us to target the core issue of financial opacity, adapting to new financial instruments and practices as they emerge. It positions Singapore as a leader in combating global money laundering while maintaining our attractiveness as a financial hub. Finally, Mr Speaker, in response to the clear need to shift the culture among our financial gatekeepers, we can approach it from a different angle. Rather than viewing AML measures as mere administrative burdens, we must foster an environment where vigilance is valued and rewarded. In our fight against money laundering, we must recognise the crucial role of whistle-blowers and create a system that incentivises proactive reporting and cooperation. I propose that we allocate a portion of the assets confiscated from money launderers to establish a whistle-blowing fund. This fund would serve to reward those who come forward with valuable information, with the size of the awards proportional to the value of the assets seized as a result of their disclosures. The US offers an instructive model. In 2023, the US enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Whistleblower Improvement Act as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2023. This legislation, passed unanimously by the Senate, significantly enhances incentives for whistle-blowers. Key provisions include: first, guaranteed awards of 10% to 30% of the financial fines collected for qualified whistle-blowers; second, establishment of a $300 million financial integrity fund funded by criminal forfeitures, fines and victim restitution; and third, expansion of eligibility to include non-US citizens, corporate auditors and compliance professionals. The US experience offers valuable lessons for crafting an effective whistle-blower campaign. Mandatory awards are crucial.”
“Next, I will move on from individual markets to overarching considerations. Mr Speaker, given the evolving nature of money laundering techniques, we should consider creating a single dedicated omnibus AML legislation. This would consolidate the various amendments currently scattered across different acts, including the CFT, CDSA and the numerous MAS guidelines. Such consolidation would encompass regulations for financial institutions, professionals, trustees and dealers in precious metals. This omnibus approach serves two purposes. It simplifies compliance for industry professionals and makes our AML laws more accessible to the general public. Secondly, and more importantly, we should future-proof our legislation by introducing the unifying legal principle and being affirmative in the duty of financial transparency. Currently, our laws require reporting of suspicious transactions when there are reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity. I propose we go further. Financial institutions and gatekeepers should have an affirmative duty to ensure the transparency of all the transactions they facilitate. This new standard of care would require reasonable efforts to ensure transparency, which is more proactive than our current suspicion-based reporting. It would involve comprehensive origin and destination checks for funds, verification of the economic rationale for complex transaction structures and enhanced ongoing monitoring for high-risk clients or transactions. The advantage of this approach is that it does not require suspicion of a predicate offence. Instead, it ensures that Singapore does not become a place that facilitates the obfuscation of funds, which some call "Singapore-washing". We can protect private wealth without enabling financial opacity.”
“The 1MDB scandal provides a stark example of how the art market can be exploited. From May to September 2013, approximately $137 million from an account controlled by Jho Low's associates was used to purchase art at Christie's auctions. This includes, Jean-Michel Basquiat's Dust Hits for $48.8 million, along with significant works by Alexander Calder and Mark Rothko. Low further leveraged these assets, using 17 artworks to collateralise loans worth $107 million from Sotheby's. Effectively creating additional layers of transactions to obscure the origins of the stolen funds. The scale of this issue is significant and growing with the depth of the market. In early 2023, China saw a 14% year-on-year increase in art auction sales to $7.9 billion, with the Old Masters' segment alone rising 15% to $1.1 billion. Globally, the art-secured lending market has expanded rapidly, with Sotheby's financial services alone originating more than $10 billion in loans since its inception. The entire global art secured lending space was valued at up to $34 billion in 2023. This growth in art-related financial services presents new challenges for anti-money laundering efforts. Collateralised portfolios of art can more easily obscure the origin of funds and complicate scrutiny of wealth sources. The US Treasury, recognising these risks, recommended in a 2022 report that certain art market participants be subject to AML requirements, including suspicious activity reporting and KYC requirements. Given these developments, what steps is Singapore taking to address the risks of money laundering through the art market and other alternative assets? Are we considering implementing AML requirements for auction houses, galleries and art-secured lenders operating in Singapore?”
“6 billion to pick butchering and other crypto fraud, with the true scale of losses unknown, as victims are often too embarrassed to report crimes to authorities. There is great technical complexity involved. While blockchains offer transparency, sophisticated laundering techniques involving multiple transactions and intermediaries pose tracing challenges. Both centralised exchanges with consolidated wallets and decentralised protocols enable the co-mingling of illicit and legitimate funds. This can take the form of consolidated exchange hot wallets for exchanges, such as Binance; but also decentralise co-minglement protocols through crypto tumblers, such as Tornado Cash; or core protocol features, such as Privacy Coins or Monero's ring signatures. There is a fundamental tension between crypto's desire for instant, irreversible transactions and the need for financial safeguards. While instant transaction finality is desirable in crypto for censorship resistance, it poses risks when it butts up against traditional finance. Our priority must be preserving Singapore's reputation for clean finance over accommodating crypto's preference for irreversibility. To address these concerns, we should consider methods like increasing off-ramp fiction. Solutions, could include enhancing scrutiny on crypto-to-fiat conversions, including one-to-three-day escrow periods for large transactions, with the time bought to perform on-chain analysis through providers, like Chainalysis, to check for co-mingled funds or suspicious sources both on centralised exchanges and decentralised protocols. Finally, I will move on to art. The art market, with its high value transactions and potential for anonymity, has recently become an attractive avenue for those seeking to launder illicit funds.”
“Can we get more clarity on this statement? Is this an operationalisation of the July 2023 public consultation? To close the current regulatory gap, I suggest requiring all SFOs, regardless of tax incentive status, to register with and be licenced by MAS. Mr Speaker, there is a related issue of remittance companies working with SFOs. Currently, SFOs are exempt from many due diligence requirements, allowing their transactions with remittance companies to go largely unscrutinised. Since 2019, MAS regulations have not required remittance houses to seek prior approval for new customers without face-to-face meetings. Are remittance houses now included in the April 2024 MAS Notice PSN01 (Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism - Specified Payment Services)? If not, what strengthening of remittance house diligence can we expect? I propose two immediate measures for remittance companies. First, to introduce cumulative transaction limits for SFOs receiving funds through remittance houses, with an automated system to flag transactions exceeding those limits. Second, reinstate mandatory face-to-face verification for new customers, especially for high-value or frequent transactions involving SFOs. I will move on to cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies and other digital assets present unique challenges to our AML efforts. Recent data indicates rising illicit fund flows. Chainalysis reports nearly $100 billion has been sent from known illicit wallets to conversion services since 2019, peaking at $30 billion in 2022. Crypto is increasingly used to launder proceeds from off-chain crimes, like drug trafficking and fraud, not just crypto-specific crimes. In 2022 alone, the FBI reported that US victims lost $2.”
“This approach would not only bolster our AML defences, but also curb potential market abuses by SFOs. We can hit two targets with a single type of policy instrument. For SFOs, recent events have demonstrated that SFOs can be a significant conduit for illicit funds entering Singapore. In July 2024, Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong revealed that six SFOs awarded tax incentives were linked to individuals convicted in the recent money laundering case. The number of family offices in Singapore has grown by nearly 200%. From 400 in 2020 to about 1,100 by the end of 2022. This rapid expansion increases the risk of importing financial crimes from jurisdictions with weaker AML controls. This is a live vulnerability in our AML framework. The current regulatory landscape presents a glaring gap. SFOs are exempt from MAS legislation or licencing requirements under the SFA, as they do not handle third-party funds. While this is an MHA Bill, cooperation with MAS is key to addressing the risks. What, then, is the current status of the MAS Public Consultation on Strengthening Defences Against Money Laundering Risk in SFOs, launched on 31 July 2023? The consultation proposed that all SFOs maintain a relationship with an MAS-regulated financial institution for AML checks. We have not seen any public updates on actions taken. If this public consultation has not been operationalised, then, as stated by the Minister of State Alvin Tan in Parliament on 3 October 2023, only SFOs applying for MAS tax incentives are subject to DDCs. This means, SFOs not seeking tax incentives remain outside our AML framework. How do we justify this discrepancy? MAS Managing Director, Mr Chia Der Jiun, stated on 18 July 2024, that Singapore had already issued a set of enhancements for SFOs last year.”
“Third, to effect real change, we must alter the incentive structures to foster a culture of vigilance throughout the financial industry and we should act decisively to establish a whistleblowing fund. First, individual verticals. Mr Speaker, money laundering is an issue that can only be effectively combated by addressing multiple potential entry points to maintain the integrity of our overall financial system. Given the rapid pace of financial innovation and the increasing complexity of corporate structures, we cannot, realistically, stay ahead of all asset classes unless we legislate proactively. I will focus on three areas not covered by the Bill: SFOs, cryptocurrencies and fine art. I hope that there can be discussion about the Government's assessment of the risks in these sectors. It will be insufficient to merely state that these areas are not covered by the Bill. We must understand how the Government intends to address these areas and ensure that any gaps are effectively closed. Mr Speaker, the 2021 collapse of Archegos Capital Management, a US$20 billion SFO, highlights a critical regulatory overlap between AML concerns and systemic risk. Archegos used equity total return swaps to build US$100 billion of portfolio exposure while avoiding disclosure requirements, exposing a significant gap in financial oversight. In response, the US is contemplating significant regulatory changes. These include bringing family offices under the Investment Advisors Act, mandating ownership and business structure disclosures and enhancing trade reporting under the Securities Exchange Act. Such measures could compel SFOs to provide detailed information about their trades and portfolios. I strongly advocate for similar advanced disclosure requirements for SFOs in Singapore.”
“Mr Speaker, while the strengthening of our anti-money laundering laws is welcome, the recent $3 billion money laundering case is a good reminder that we have to tackle money laundering comprehensively and I will speak on this today. Like my Aljunied Group Representation Constituency (GRC) colleague, Ms Sylvia Lim, I support the Bill's objectives. However, we cannot just react to the immediate circumstances of money laundering cases, but need to more holistically address structural problems at their root to prevent ourselves from being caught out on the back foot. It would also prevent a situation where our legislation and regulations, which take time, end up having to constantly play catch-up to outlaw new ways in which criminals evolve to launder illicit funds. The challenge of money laundering that we face has several key facets. First, money laundering can originate from any area within financialised assets, including Single Family Offices (SFOs), cryptocurrencies, fine art and real estate. Second, we would be best served by a comprehensive omnibus AML Bill that consolidates and streamlines the various existing regulations including CFT, CDSA and MAS guidelines. This unified approach should cover all relevant sectors, including financial institutions to dealers in precious metals. These laws should also be easily understood by all Singaporeans, not just specialised legal and compliance experts. An omnibus Bill would present an opportunity to future-proof our legislation by introducing a unifying principle of a duty of financial transparency for our intermediaries, which does not require suspicion of a predicate offence and ensures that Singapore does not become a place that facilitates obfuscation of funds.”
“However, it is natural that existing staff, especially those who are more junior, would be concerned and wonder whether and how they would be supported through this. Given the above, is the Government or MAS aware of any discussions being made about possible job losses or will MAS consider if any guarantees should be made and sought from Allianz about existing employees, about their employment situation and would this form part of the MAS regulatory assessment and ultimately, decision whether or not to approve the transaction? And finally, if I may, on the point about the financial sustainability of Income, I note a report that was published in December 2023 by Zero One Research, where it notes that the capital adequacy ratio of Income Insurance was roughly as 193% under the Risk-based Capital framework, called the RBC 2 framework, and this was based on reported data. This exceeds, by a wide margin, the minimum required level of 120% under Singapore's Insurance Act. [Please refer to "Personal Explanation", Official Report, 9 September 2024, Vol 95, Issue 140, Personal Explanation section.] So, my question is, could I get some clarity about why are there concerns about Income's unsustainability as a business, given this healthy buffer?”
“Thank you, Madam. I have three supplementary questions on this. The first would be in relation to governance and controls. First, I know that Allianz settled a criminal case in the United States (US) two years ago for around US$6 billion over allegations that it defrauded investors, and its US subsidiary pleaded guilty to criminal securities fraud and agreed to pay fines and make restitution to investors. Did MAS look into this and also is MAS then therefore satisfied that corporate governance and controls have been strengthened and that there are no residual concerns? Because after all Income serves 1.7 million Singaporeans with a significant market share in areas such as motor insurance, about 20%, in property and also health, roughly around 15% for each of those. My second supplementary question relates to a point made in the Allianz announcement. In the announcement, it said, and I quote, "Allianz and the offeror intend to undertake a strategic and operational review of the company and its subsidiaries with a view to enhancing the value of existing businesses, operating the company in a more capital-efficient manner." And then, further on, it states, "Pending the outcome of such a review, Allianz may make changes to the operations and businesses of the company and its subsidiaries". I note that there are approximately 1,900 employees of Income at the moment and, having worked on a number of acquisitions, I note the standard for discussions to be had between parties about streamlining operations, possible redundancies and sometimes certain undertakings are made about continued employment for a certain amount of time, particularly for key officers.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. In response to part of my PQ on what recourse workers have should they have or are suspected to be suffering from ill effects due to exposure, while I acknowledge the Minister's earlier points about no anomalies being detected during air quality monitoring, can the Minister clarify whether there were any reports received about health concerns from our workers and now our volunteers given that they have started to be deployed and what recourse do they have should they suffer from or are suspected to be suffering from ill effects due to both dermal and inhalation exposure? Secondly, how many who were involved in the main coastal clean-up were foreign workers and to what extent have they been trained for this sort of work, especially as the 1,500 volunteers who signed up to volunteer were deemed to be lacking the special skills in the initial phases? I have a couple of clarifications for the Minister for National Development. First, I do not think I heard the answer to part of my question about whether the oil spill has affected plans for a second marine park in the Southern Islands. Secondly, how much are the various studies and research projects to study the impact on the biodiversity implications on our various natural ecosystems? How much is the total cost expected to be for these studies and research projects?”
“The second question is if there is a significant projected impact on the transition framework on Singapore's climate targets.”
“I thank the Minister for his reply. I have two supplementary questions. The first is, the Minister said earlier that EDB has been engaging affected companies. I was just wondering how many companies have been reached by EDB and does he have an estimate about how many companies have not yet been engaged by EDB; and how many more to go, basically? The second question is, is there any significant projected impact from the transition framework on Singapore's climate targets that arise from this, from the framework?”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. I just wanted to seek clarification about the point made about the procedural difference as well between the apprehension and the arrest, which I think the Minister has clarified. Upon apprehension, can I just confirm that the person being apprehended does not actually get taken in a police cell, or into a lock-up, and instead, is directly taken down to seek medical attention?”
“I thank the Minister for her reply. I just have one quick clarification. This relates to the High Court judgment in Mah. At paragraph 30 in the High Court judgment, it states that the Attorney-General submits that there is no practical difference between the terms "apprehend" and "arrest", and a person is apprehended under section 7 of the MHCTA when he is compelled to accompany a Police officer to be examined by a medical practitioner. So, given that the Minister stressed earlier that there is a difference between apprehension and arrest, I would like to understand and seek clarification about the Attorney-General's submissions during the High Court case, and how that squares with what was said earlier.”
“Volunteers with the People's Association Community Emergency Response Team should also attend such training so that they are able to respond to persons experiencing mental health crises. With their knowledge, these trained volunteers can also serve as ambassadors to educate their communities and persons living with mental health conditions.”
“We have to balance our current police and public safety approach to persons experiencing mental health crises and discuss how we may adopt a more person-centric approach that focuses on providing care and support in these situations. I thus conclude my speech with two suggestions. First, I hope that more work will be done across the Government to educate and help more citizens better understand the complex issues that lie behind the occasional intersection between public law enforcement and those experiencing mental health crises. For this, the National Council of Social Service (NCSS) launched the Beyond the Label Collective in 2022. At the launch of the Collective, former President Halimah Yaacob noted in her speech that we should not erroneously associate criminality or violence with mental health conditions, as this is rarely the case. We therefore need more public education campaigns to help Singaporeans better appreciate the difficulties involved in achieving the tricky balance between public safety and the needs and dignity of those living with mental health conditions, which may end up being infringed when they are unable to get appropriate support and treatment that is needed to get them and their loved ones when they may be experiencing a mental health crisis. Second, interested members of the public can be trained as community first responders to support persons experiencing mental health crises. Currently, the Community Life-Saving Programme, offered jointly by the People's Association and MHA, offers the standard First Aid plus AED Awareness Course, SFAA and the CPR AED certification. This can be expanded to include the Singapore Emergency Responder Academy's First Aid and Mental Health Training Programme.”
“For example, in 2017, Sweden introduced a psychiatric emergency response team which would send an ambulance comprising two mental health nurses and one paramedic to attend to persons experiencing a mental health crisis. Another approach is the United Kingdom (UK) Street triage model, a partnership scheme between the police and approved mental health professionals to provide advice and support for people experiencing mental health crises. We have taken encouraging steps in this direction here in Singapore. In March 2021, IMH partnered SPF to pilot the Crisis Response Team, a mental health crisis response team in Singapore dedicated to providing timely care and support to persons with suicidal tendencies in the community. A 2023 journal article published in European Psychiatry found that CRT intervention could mitigate suicide risk and pressure on the mental health system, that is, reduce unnecessary emergency room visits and hospital admissions, create greater mental health awareness and facilitate individuals' connection to mental health care services, that is, in hospitals or the community. Given the positive impact of the CRT, has the Government considered expanding the programme to respond not only to cases involving the risk of suicide but also persons experiencing mental health crises more generally? Such a move can also help reduce the strain on our police. In response to a PQ in March 2022, the Minister for Home Affairs had stated that the Police and other investigative agencies' primary task is to deter crime, investigate and deal with crime, and they are not deeply trained in mental health issues.”
“The safeguards and guidelines I asked about are thus extremely important if an occasion arises where the conduct of the arrest or apprehension and subsequent procedures are problematic. Taking a step back to look at a bigger picture and in light of the Second Minister's acknowledgement of Deputy Prime Minister's declaration to this House that mental health is a key national priority, in February 2024 and the large number of Members who spoke to express their concern and even alarm over the situation facing us, I am worried about the amendments to the MHTCTA unnecessarily perpetuating stigma against persons living with mental health conditions. This entrenchment of discrimination against those living with mental health conditions was also a concern that was highlighted in an op-ed published in The Straits Times last week. The authors pointed out quite rightly that this is a major concern and identified the balance between three main prongs. First, upholding public safety; second, respect for the dignity of the person in crisis; and third, the proportionate use of force. For sure, this is a tricky balance to get right and I hope that my concerns raised above can help us better appreciate the various segments contained of each of these prongs when discussing whether these amendments help or hinder our stated aims to reduce and ultimately eliminate stigma for those living with mental illness or mental health conditions. A related point then is also whether the police are best placed to respond to persons experiencing mental health crises. In recent years, many countries have taken steps to implement alternative strategies to provide support and de-escalate the situation.”
“However, it is unclear to me also what the records refer to and what kind of history would be applicable here. If there is no history, does this mean that no intervention is possible? Fourth, given the concerns above, what safeguards, guidelines or training and support would police officers be given in applying the new threshold to situations on the ground, especially after they have made a decision to detain the suspect? After all, we are drawing a delicate balance between public safety on the one hand and the proper treatment and approach to those living with mental illness and conditions. In an article published in JOM last week, Chan Lee Shan, drawing on her own experiences of being arrested while suffering from her first and only episode of psychosis, raised concerns about a person living with mental illness and crises ending up being traumatised by the experience, particularly if they are then treated no differently from a conventional arrest and held in police cells while checks are being made and next steps are being decided as to what would be the most appropriate step for treatment, release or otherwise. Finally, on the new thresholds, what options are available to those who believe that they were erroneously detained, subject to what they believe to be excessive force or trauma? These are not theoretical concerns, as after all, the Mah case was one where the officer was found to have made certain statements which were later withdrawn after being contradicted by body-worn camera footage and the judge also expressed concerns about the discrepancies between the medical report produced by the examining doctor and the evidence later submitted.”
“At paragraph 30A of the concluding observations in respect of Article 14 of the CRPD on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Liberty, the CRPD Committee urged Singapore to repeal all legislative provisions allowing for the involuntary deprivation of liberty of persons with intellectual disabilities and persons with psychosocial disabilities on the grounds of their impairment or their perceived dangerousness to themselves or others. As noted above, this refers specifically to the MHCTA. I note that the Minister for Health had stated in a response to a Parliamentary Question (PQ) in 2021 that the MHCTA is already in compliance with the requirements of Article 14 of the CRPD. Can the Government confirm if this position on the MHCTA remains the same, notwithstanding the CRPD Committee's recommendation for this House to reform this law? If not, will the Government consider the necessary steps to be taken to ensure that the MHCTA complies with our obligations under the CRPD? Second, the High Court Judge in Mah also noted that he considered that a time frame for imminence under the new old threshold would be a matter of hours rather than days. With the introduction of the new threshold of reasonable risk to safety, can the Minister confirm if there would be any time frames that are applied to the assessment of whether to detain? If so, what are they? Third, paragraph 23 of MHA's press release on this Bill gives an example of a situation where police records show that the person making the threat has a history of mental disorder. Would the Minister be able to confirm that all persons suspected to be suffering from mental crises and falling under this new threshold would be subject to a background check for a history of mental disorder?”
“I have five main points and clarifications about the new threshold. First, I have a concern that the lowering of the threshold from the Court's clarification of a reasonably imminent risk being lowered to a reasonable likelihood that danger to life or personal safety may occur under the MHCTA would lead to different standards applying to those who may be living with mental health conditions or illness. In fact, according to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee), such a distinction is discriminatory. In September 2015, in Guidelines on the Right to Liberty and Security of Persons with Disabilities issued by the CRPD Committee, legislations like the MHCTA, which allow the detention of persons on the ground of their actual or perceived impairment on the basis that they are deemed dangerous to themselves or to others, are discriminatory in nature and amount to arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Can the Minister clarify if the Government has considered its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which the Government ratified in 2013, in tabling this amendment? If so, how do the proposed amendments square with our CRPD commitments? In October 2022, the CRPD Committee issued its concluding observations for its first periodic review of Singapore's record on disability rights.”
“While I appreciate that the Minister for Home Affairs had previously stated in this House that law should not inadvertently result in defensive policing, I believe that it is important to make it clear that the amendments reducing the threshold to apprehend a person is subject to safeguards and for the public to know and understand what those safeguards are. As our law currently stands, the Police's general power of arrest is subject to various safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code. The distinction between arrestable and non-arrestable offences make clear the situations where a police officer may arrest someone without a warrant. For example, while the police may arrest without a warrant someone on suspicion that they have caused or may voluntarily cause grievous hurt to another person, the police cannot arrest without a warrant in a situation where the offence is that of voluntarily causing hurt. With the proposed amendments, I would like to seek clarification from the Minister of my understanding that these changes are in response to the High Court's ruling in Mah. Additionally and specifically, can the Minister detail what specific challenges our law enforcement officers have had while carrying out their policing duties with suspects who are persons suffering from mental health crises or illnesses that warrant these amendments? I have concerns that the threshold being lowered has to be very carefully weighed up against the expressed aims of Singaporean society to do more to properly support and address mental health challenges facing some of our fellow Singaporeans, especially when law enforcement officers do not necessarily have the training and resources to fully understand the challenging and complex issues surrounding mental health conditions.”