Kenneth Tiong Boon Kiat
Singapore
“(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Thank you, Mr Speaker. Last month, I spoke with Teochew residents in my constituency and they asked me, (In Teochew): "Zuo-ni buay sai toi teochew hee?" (做呢唔使睇潮州戏?") Which means: why can we not watch Teochew movies? Mr Speaker, I have three questions.”
“Thank you, Speaker. Residential rooftop solar generates clean energy and reduces household dependence on imported natural gas and provides a hedge against energy price shocks – benefits that EVs, which add demand to the same gas-dependent grid, do not provide. I note that the Minister of State has mentioned the Green Mark scheme.”
“To the extent that there is a court jurisdiction as was the case in Hangzhou in China, I think that there can be made a point to determine whether something is substantively AI-driven redundancy or not.”
“But more than that: no growth where the gains are captured disproportionately by capital and the burden of adjustment falls on labour. Universal access, so intelligence is not rationed by wealth. Strategic engagement, so we are not price-takers in our own future.”
“I would like to ask two clarifications of the Minister. First, why does he believe that the SkillsFuture course enrolment is a reliable proxy for seriousness? I have some of my residents who have gone for some of these AI courses; they are not very complimentary on the content of these courses.”
“The deepest lesson of the last decade of skills policy, here and abroad, is this: the state cannot substitute for the firm as the principal in a worker's training. We have spent 10 years and considerable public money trying.”
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“Thank you, Speaker. The deposit rate is fully refundable at 10 cents, but I believe media reports have put the projected price increase at 25 to 60 cents. So, the difference is about 15 to 50 cents of permanent compliance costs, which the vending machine will not return. So, what assessment has been made of this non-refundable portion as a share of income for lower-income households? The second supplementary question: the only current confirmed refund method is EZ-Link. So, can the Senior Minister of State confirm that the cash refund or cash voucher refund option will be available at all return points from Day 1. The third supplementary question: a lot of parallel importers face $40,000 a month of fees under the scheme. With the transition grant at $2,500, that is quite disproportionate. So, these parallel importers are the companies that bring the cheapest drinks onto the market. Has the Ministry assessed the risk that this scheme eliminates the discount beverage segment entirely? And final supplementary question: I note that the Senior Minister of State has said that they will monitor to see if the price increases will go beyond three to four cents. But as we all know, price increases are sticky. So, what will the Government do if the price increases go beyond three to four cents?”
“The question is about fitness for Parliamentary office and that is what this Motion is about. So, I believe in – let me just read the Motion again – in the third limb, you express regret that "the conduct of Mr Pritam Singh, which was dishonourable and unbecoming of a Member of Parliament". So, what conditions of this situation do not obtain for Mr Tan Chuan-Jin?”
“Both Speaker and the Leader of the Opposition are Parliamentary leadership positions. Both situations raise questions about fitness for office. Arguably, the Speaker is more important than the Leader of Opposition since the Speaker is in the line of succession for President. Yet, Parliament was never asked to judge Mr Tan Chuan-Jin. No Motion. Not in 2020, not in 2021, not in 2022, not before his resignation, not after. Nearly three years of silence and then a quiet exit, but not before calling my hon colleague an "f–ing populist". Mr Pritam Singh faced the Courts. He was convicted. He paid his fine. The legal process is complete. Now, Parliament wants its turn. Mr Tan faced nothing. No Court, no conviction, no fine, and certainly, no Motion. So, the Member who faced nothing gets a quiet exit and the Member who already faced the Courts must now face Parliament as well. So, if this Motion represents the proper standard for addressing misconduct by Parliamentary leaders, why was Parliament never asked in those three years to judge Mr Tan Chuan-Jin? Which is the higher standard of accountability? What justifies a Motion for Mr Pritam Singh of the WP, but not Mr Tan Chuan-Jin of the PAP?”
“It will be relevant, Speaker, if I can just finish.”
“Thank you, Speaker. Mr Speaker, a question for the Leader of the House since she has brought up the matter of Mr Tan Chuan-Jin. In July 2023, Mr Tan Chuan-Jin resigned as Speaker over an affair with a sitting MP. The Prime Minister had known since late 2020 – nearly three years. For nearly three years, the Speaker presided over this House, ruling on Members' conduct, maintaining order, while in an affair with a Member they presided over.”
“The Leader of the House characterised it as a cover-up, which was not found in the legal judgment. So, I do not believe this is permissible under Standing Order 50(6), which involves imputing improper motives.”
“The Leader of the House characterised it as a cover-up. That was not found in the Court filings. So, under Standing Order 50(6), I do not believe that is permissible.”
“Mr Speaker, I rise on the Point of Order under Standing Order 50(6). The Leader has stated that Mr Singh has lied to the Courts and lied to Singaporeans. The Court conviction was specifically for lying to the COP under oath, no perjury charge was brought. These characterisations impute improper motives beyond the Court's actual findings. I ask that the Leader confine her remarks to what the Court actually found.”
“Thank you, Speaker. Eleven days ago, the United States (US) conducted "Operation Absolute Resolve" in Venezuela. In two-and-a-half hours, the US forces struck four air bases with Kamikaze drones, destroyed Venezuela's Russian-supplied Buk-M2E air defences and eliminated aircraft on the ground. By 2030, I believe these sorts of capabilities will become more widely distributed. So, what is the Ministry's assessment of our post-2030 posture's survivability against this type of strike? And does the Ministry believe that there are concentration risks to be mitigated?”
“Thank you, Speaker. The Senior Minister of State spoke about enhancing demand offtake. Given that our local farms face structural disadvantages against cheaper imports, has the Ministry considered any form of minimum local sourcing requirements for major retailers and food service operators, even a modest starting quota, so as to create guaranteed demand and help farms achieve commercial viability? This could be a 1% quota for major food importers and supermarkets like NTUC Fairprice and Sheng Siong. You can call it "1 by 30", if you would like.”
“Data breaches. If there is a data breach.”
“" And if I may, that is a significant part of why I posed the Parliamentary Question to Minister Ong Ye Kung earlier today about needing a dual regulation framework by MAS and MOH for insurers, so that someone is cleanly accountable for insurer behaviour as a health system actor.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker, for the clarifications. I also thank the Senior Minister of State. So, I mentioned the possibility of insurance. The Senior Minister of State mentioned that there will be cost support. But is there a reason why insurance is not offered, rather than general cost support? That is the first clarification. Two, I thank the Senior Minister of State for saying there will be flexibility for IT-incapable practices, such as the senior GPs who are my constituents. Can the Senior Minister of State just double click and explain a bit what this flexibility for IT-incapable practices might entail? Three, I think I did not hear an answer to what if there is a data breach. Can the insurers now use the now-public information in the data breach? And I thank him for his response to my concerns about the inspection and right to audit clauses. The Senior Minister of State's response is that doctors should carefully assess what is relevant. I think that this may not be a great solution because I think the doctor is caught in the middle between the insurer and the patient, and they have to bear liability for the judgement calls as to what they put in the notes. So, I think what is probably going to happen is that there is going to be a chilling effect, where doctors will start avoiding documenting any sensitive data, both in their own medical records but also perhaps in NEHR as well. And so, if it percolates up to the NEHR, would the NEHR utility not be undermined if they cannot trust what to input? So, I mentioned in my speech that it might be better to just go downstream and just say that we "work with MAS to prohibit insurers from requiring NEHR-derived information as a condition of coverage, claim processing and policy renewal.”
“Since access controls do not exclude data from NEHR, a breach potentially exposes everything, regardless of restrictions. Possible loopholes must be closed. Today, insurers cannot access NEHR, but perhaps through transcription and audit clauses, they can access NEHR-derived information sitting in clinical notes. In locking the front door, we must also lock the back door. If we are to build a national data asset, we must ensure that it is governed by contestable principles, not captured by a monopoly provider. The original vision for IHiS was discipline through competition. We should return to it. I look forward to the Ministry's reply. Thank you, Speaker.”
“Third, we should legislate interoperability standards and open API requirements for all health data intermediaries, including any entity that emerges from Synapxe. The goal is to ensure that the application layer – the layer where innovation happens – is open and contestable. I happen to think all this can be done within four to five years. Mr Speaker, with such contestability and with an opening for opt-in mechanisms where citizens can choose to share their data for specific purposes and receive compensation, I believe the NEHR can be a means of production for three outcomes: (a) better population scale outcomes. This is the primary purpose and I support it fully; (b) a fair stake in data monetisation for every citizen. If value is going to be extracted from the data, we should create conditions where citizens can likely share in it, not just bear the risk; and (c) an ecosystem catalyst for health-based startups. With open APIs and interoperability, Singapore can become a place for health tech innovation. Startups can build on the NEHR platform, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can compete for contracts. We can export health tech capabilities regionally. The NEHR can become a flywheel for a more dynamic health tech ecosystem, one that benefits the Government, citizens and entrepreneurs alike, not merely a Government-only benefit and asset. Mr Speaker, in conclusion, I support this principle of a unified national health record. It can improve care, reduce waste and enable the precision medicine of tomorrow. But a Bill that compels contribution must also come with robust ecosystem safeguards. Those compelled to contribute must be protected from disproportionate burden or liability. Privacy controls must be real.”
“Today, MOH relies almost exclusively on Synapxe to implement its technology integrations. There is capture and cost inflation. An engineer is hired at $5,000 a month. That engineer's services are sold to public healthcare clusters at significantly higher rates. If the mark-ups are excessive – and they can become excessive in the absence of competition – it can crowd out innovation and make the ecosystem weaker than it should be. I believe a different model is possible and necessary. My vision for Synapxe is different. It would return to the original contestable principles surrounding IHiS' creation. First, I would seek to separate Synapxe into two entities. The first entity would be a core infrastructure company. It would handle standard setting, data exchange protocols, security baselines and the NEHR plumbing. This stays Government-owned and lean – perhaps a few hundred people. It runs the pipes and sets the protocols but does not compete at the application layer. The second entity would be a commercial services company. It would handle system integration, consulting and vendor management. This gets spun off – maybe privatised, maybe converted to a Government-linked company that must compete commercially, both domestically and internationally. Second, MOH must reacquire the in-house capacity to be an intelligent buyer of technology services. Before or concurrent with any Synapxe structuring, MOH needs a technical unit of about 50 to 100 people – not administrators but engineers, data architects, security specialists – people who can evaluate bids, write specifications and challenge cost claims. Without this capacity, the Ministry will find it hard to escape capture.”
“I believe a monopoly, such as Synapxe, may not experiment with such models. But a contestable market will. Some players may try patient-centric approaches and the best models will emerge. To create the conditions for competition to discover it, that requires open APIs, interoperability standards like the opt-in mechanisms of the sort that my hon colleague Mr Fadli Fawzi mentioned, and a contestable application layer. Mr Speaker, let me turn to the system operator. Section 8 provides that the Minister may designate a system operator to operate, administer and maintain the national electronic record system. In practice, that will be Synapxe. Synapxe, formerly known as IHiS, today employs about 3,500 people. It serves as a technology backbone for our entire public healthcare system. When IHiS was set up in 2008, I believe the original vision was that it will operate on contestable principles. MOH will issue tenders, IHiS will compete, win some, lose some, it would have enough work to survive, but will need to compete elsewhere to thrive. In doing so, it will face enough competition to stay efficient. This model was the original plan for the Ministry of Defence and ST Engineering. Dr Goh Keng Swee, speaking in 1977, said, "We do not own or run enterprises on ideological grounds. We expect Government-owned enterprises to be efficient, to make money and to expand whenever feasible. If a Government-owned enterprise loses money, it is allowed to go bankrupt, and this has happened, fortunately, in very few instances." This was and is the discipline of contestability. Government-owned enterprises were to be subject to market forces. But the current model for Synapxe has drifted from this vision.”
“The existence of NEHR with its comprehensive longitudinal record makes non-disclosure almost impossible to sustain. So, I ask: one, does MOH agree that a transcription pathway where NEHR-derived information entering clinical notes and becomes accessible to insurers through audit clauses defeats the legislative intent of section 6? Two, what if there is a data breach? Can insurers use the now public information? Three, will the Government work with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to prohibit insurers from requiring NEHR payouts or NEHR-derived information as a condition of coverage, claim processing or policy renewal? Four, will the Government review the inspection and right to audit clauses in Integrated Plan contracts to ensure that they did not circumvent the excluded purposes provisions? And five, if an insurer is found to utilise either pathway, what enforcement mechanisms will exist? Will this be a matter for MAS, MOH or both? Deputy Speaker, I now wish to speak to a broader question. This Bill will create, for the first time, a comprehensive national database. Social determinants, such as postal code, education, marital status; clinical outcomes, such as blood pressure readings over decades, medications prescribed; and soon, perhaps, genomic data from the SG100K project. It is a formidable dataset. It is a "means of production"; not just of population health outcomes, but of significant economic value. So, how do we ensure that value from this national health data infrastructure, and its possible monetisation of any form, flows to citizens? Globally, startups are experimenting with patient-centric data models, where individuals can choose to share their data for research and receive compensation.”
“2 of the Draft Guidelines on Appropriate Use and Access to NEHR, released by MOH in 2023: "In the event that such information was previously transcribed from NEHR into the patient's clinical notes, it would be treated as part and parcel of the medical record belonging to the healthcare institution." Meanwhile, Integrated Plan insurers are increasingly requiring doctors to sign contracts containing "Inspection and Right to Audit" clauses. These clauses grant insurers the right to inspect full medical records to verify claims. The result is that doctors check NEHR for relevant history – past abortions, in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment, mental health conditions, sexually transmitted infections – and note it in their files for clinical safety. Because of these audit clauses, insurers then gain access to this sensitive, transcribed NEHR data, even if it is irrelevant to the current claim. A patient going in for gallbladder surgery may find their insurer reviewing their psychiatric history. Scenario two. Section 17(1) provides that an individual may access and collect their own accessible health information. A Singaporean applies for insurance. The insurer's application form may include a new requirement: "Please attach a complete printout of your National Electronic Health Record." No printout, no policy. Once the data leaves the system through legitimate patient access, it seems beyond the Bill's reach. Even if insurers do not require a NEHR printout directly, they already have a right to refuse payouts if a pre-existing condition was not previously disclosed. If an applicant fails to disclose a condition, one that now sits permanently in NEHR, the insurers can void the policy at claim time when they discover the non-disclosure through other means.”
“Two, if such unauthorised access occurs, does proactive monitoring exist or will the system rely solely on whistle-blowers and complaints? Three, what is the technical architecture for access-restricted data? Is it encrypted separately? Is it stored in a segregated environment? Or is it simply flagged in the same database, such that a breach would expose it alongside unrestricted records? Four, what is the access model for NEHR data? In Taiwan, the National Health Insurance system uses a dual-card approach – the patient must present their Health IC smart card, the doctor uses their professional IC card, and both are required for access, with written patient consent. This dual authorisation prevents rogue access because no single party can retrieve records alone. Will Singapore's NEHR access model include such safeguards? And five, what is MOH’s position on specific carve-outs for defined sensitive conditions, where patients can opt out of contribution entirely? Moving on to insurance. Mr Speaker, I commend the drafters of this Bill for their attention to the concern regarding the use of medical information for insurance underwriting. Section 6 defines "excluded purposes" to include deciding whether to insure an individual, continuing or renewing insurance, or processing insurance claims. So, section 19(2) prohibits specified users from accessing NEHR for any excluded purpose and section 38(5) imposes enhanced penalties for accessing records for excluded purposes. Insurers cannot access NEHR directly. Healthcare providers cannot access NEHR on behalf of insurers, and a patient's consent cannot be used to circumvent these protections. Is it watertight? Let me offer two possible scenarios. Scenario one. According to section 3.1.2.”
“There is a group of patients today who pay cash, wanting to keep their records, perhaps with sexually transmitted infections, mental health conditions or abortion records, off the system. Many foreigners also do not want to be on NEHR. Under this Bill, that option will no longer exist. The Bill provides for "access restrictions" – Class 1 that prevents all access and Class 2 that restricts access for specific purposes or persons. But as section 30(7) states: "To avoid doubt, an access restriction does not prevent or restrict the contribution of health information." So, the data is uploaded and stored centrally. Any access restriction is a viewing control. It masks who can see the data. It does not exclude the data from NEHR. If the burden of proof is on the custodian of NEHR to have a robust privacy model, let us examine the custodian. Synapxe, the custodian of NEHR, was rebranded from IHIS, which was responsible for allowing the 2018 compromise of 1.5 million SingHealth patient records. The Committee of Inquiry found that IHiS staff lacked adequate cybersecurity awareness, that key staff failed to take appropriate action even when there were clear signs of an ongoing attack, and that the Chief Information Security Officer's response was, and I quote, "clearly lacking and displayed an alarming lack of concern”. This has led many doctors to mistrust Synapxe in these matters. Given the history here, I believe our health authorities also need to take steps towards rebuilding that trust. So, I ask: one, how is MOH going to police unjustified access of NEHR, where rogue elements read medical histories of unrelated people? What assurance can MOH give us that our health data is safe with Synapxe?”
“But I have spoken with doctors who run small operations. They worry that when a breach occurs – and breaches are a matter of "when" and not "if" – the enforcement spotlight will fall on them. Did they have sufficient firewalls? Was their anti-virus updated? Were their staff trained adequately? They fear being "hung out to dry”. [Mr Speaker in the Chair] I also wish to speak for some of my constituents who are senior GPs still practising in the heartlands. Many are approaching retirement and are not tech-savvy. They will struggle with the digitalisation requirements that this Bill will impose. If the transition is too abrupt, many of these senior GPs may feel forced to retire early or sell their independent clinics to large corporate chains, accelerating consolidation in the primary care sector. The end state of a modern, integrated health information system is desirable. But the transition must be managed carefully. So, I ask: one, would the Ministry issue clear, tiered guidance on what constitutes "reasonable" safeguards for practices of different sizes? A safe harbour framework, if you will. Two, will the Ministry consider providing or subsidising cybersecurity insurance for small providers so that they need not fear shouldering the entire financial risk of a breach? Three, will there be a transition period with educational enforcement, rather than immediate punitive action, to allow smaller providers to build up cybersecurity capabilities? Four, could the Ministry offer transitional support for senior practitioners nearing retirement, perhaps something as simple as sending personnel to help digitalise their records monthly? Second, to the question of sensitive medical conditions that patients wish to keep private.”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the principles underlying this Bill. A population-scale set of longitudinal medical records is the "means of production" for more timely interventions, accurate diagnoses and preventive health at large. The contribution of data to the NEHR will create a valuable dataset and that value should flow to all Singaporeans. But before I move on to the question of value, my belief is that a Bill that compels contribution must also come with robust ecosystem safeguards. From my conversations with practitioners and from my reading of the Bill, I have three sets of concerns: (a) the disproportionate cybersecurity burden on small providers; (b) the uploading of sensitive medical information despite patient objections; and (c) possible insurance loopholes that may render our privacy protections ineffective. I will then speak to a broader question: if we are building a national health asset, who benefits and how do we continue to ensure it catalyses a dynamic ecosystem rather than becoming captured by a single monopoly provider? First, to the cybersecurity obligations imposed on healthcare providers. The Bill designates all Healthcare Services Act licensees – from tertiary hospitals employing thousands to single-doctor GP clinics in HDB heartlands – as "relevant persons" under section 64. All face the same statutory obligations: to implement reasonable controls for secure processing, reasonable safeguards against unauthorised access and cybersecurity protections under sections 66 and 68. The penalties for non-compliance are severe; fines up to $200,000 or two years' imprisonment for individuals, and up to $1 million for other entities. The Bill does use the word "reasonable", which implies proportionality.”
“Sorry, not to belabour the point. Is it contractual liability or statutory liability? And second of all, could the Minister of State respond on my five-year review period point, please. Thank you.”
“I thank the Minister of State for her clarifications and her response. I just want to clarify, because I think she may have misunderstood what was my fifth question. I was saying that there is no organisational statutory liability for those handling non-personal data, and I think she made some references to contractual obligations as well as something about personal — so, I just want to clarify that it is organisational statutory liability for non-personal data, does it exist or not? Another thing I would like to bring up, which I do not think she has answered, is my request for a public register of all these Ministerial directions. Australia does it. I do not see why it would be very difficult to do it. It will certainly not be operationally difficult to, because it is just publicising the type of data that is going to be shared. As well, I think, the five-year review period – I do not see why not. Australia does it, and I think it is quite a sound legislative principle. so, these are my supplementary questions for now.”
“So, we will continue to ask for three commitments: a public register, a mechanism to track and report citizen benefit, and a formal review within five years. And I have flagged two gaps in organisational accountability that should be addressed. I trust that the points collectively raised today will spare us a future blindsiding. Thank you, Mr Speaker.”
“Individual criminal liability for employees who misuse data. What does the Bill not deliver? Any organisational requirements. No security certification, no audit trails, no breach notification duties. So, question four: where are the data governance requirements promised in the consultation? And if they are to come by regulation or procurement contract terms, will the Ministry commit to that today? Secondly, a liability gap for non-personal data. Under PDPA, for data breaches involving personal data, organisations face financial penalties of up to 10% of their annual turnover. Individuals also face liability. Under this Bill, for non-personal data shared with private entities, only individual employees can be prosecuted. If an organisation systematically exploits non-personal Government data beyond its authorised purpose, the entity that designed the business model and profited, faces no direct liability. Accountability must reach the benefiting entity. If organisations can profit from misuse while only individuals bear risk, the incentive structure is incorrect. So, question five: will the Government commit to organisational accountability mechanisms, especially for non-personal data which is not covered by PDPA? And why has it not chosen to hold organisations accountable here? Mr Speaker, I am on the whole supportive of the Bills enabling data sharing with private sector actors. In any case, deeper public-private collaboration is inevitable. Data will flow to where it creates value. But we should learn the lessons of TraceTogether. TraceTogether taught us that non-transparency about data sharing has costs. This Bill should learn that lesson. Transparency is what makes data sharing sustainable in the long term.”
“What is the mechanism ensuring citizens share in that value? I mean concrete improvements: service quality guarantees, cost reductions passed to users, transparency about outcomes and also something I believe in, which is benefit sharing from any future possible monetisation of their data. So, question two: what benefits will Singaporean citizens see from this framework? How would these be tracked and reported? And will there be any part of the Government that advocates directly for citizens gaining a share of these data benefits? Thirdly, public review. The original PSGA allowed sharing between Government agencies. This amendment opens the door to the private sector powers of a different order. Australia's framework includes a review that "must start by and be completed within 12 months or a longer period agreed by the Minister of the third anniversary of the commencement of this Act". This is a sound legislative principle. The grant of novel powers should have built-in moments for reassessment. The backlash to TraceTogether led to emergency legislation limiting Police access. Would it not be better to commit to a review now, than to legislate in the possible crisis of confidence later? So, question three: would the Minister commit to a formal public review within five years, including the directions issued, the data shared and whether the safeguards have been adequate? Mr Speaker, beyond these three asks, I wish to flag two concerns about organisational accountability. Firstly, a data governance gap. The public consultation promised robust safeguards through data governance requirements on external partners – I quote, "requirements similar to what public sector agencies have to meet". What does the Bill deliver?”
“The Government gains the capability to share any data with any private entity. Private entities gain access to Government health data. And what do citizens gain? Under this Bill, a citizen has no right to know when their data is shared with a private company, no mechanism to find out which companies hold their data and no way to ensure they benefit from the value that data creates. TraceTogether failed on transparency. Citizens did not know Police could access their data. Why risk the same failure mode again with this Bill on a larger scale, with more actors, including those outside the Government, and less visibility? If this Bill expands what the Government can do with citizen data, should it not also expand what citizens can do to track, to benefit from and to govern that sharing? Mr Speaker, I ask for three commitments that would complete this framework. One, a public register. All data sharing directions issued to private entities should be published – the categories of data shared, the recipient, the purpose, the duration. This is not a per transaction notification. It is the disclosure of Ministerial directions made in small numbers. Australia's Data Availability and Transparency Act 2022 includes such a register. It creates accountability without undue operational burden. TraceTogether's problem was that citizens could not know how their data was used – and a register solves this. So, question one: would the Government commit to publishing a register of all data sharing directions issued to private entities? Secondly, citizen benefits. When data flows from the Government to the private sector, it creates value for those two players. Agencies gain efficiency. Private entities gain data access and improve their services.”
“Mr Speaker, I support the PSGA. But I would like to place some significant concerns on the record. Let me begin with a story this House knows well. In January 2021, Singaporeans learned that Police had access to TraceTogether data under the Criminal Procedure Code. This contradicted earlier assurances that the data was "purely for contact tracing, period". The then-Minister in-charge of the Smart Nation acknowledged he had been blindsided. He had not considered existing laws when making those assurances. The backlash was significant not because Singaporeans opposed law enforcement but because they felt misled about how their data would be used. The backlash led to the expedited passage in February 2021 of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) (Amendment) Bill restricting access to seven serious offence categories. The lesson is that trust must be built through demonstrably robust processes. Once faith in a data sharing framework is broken, it is expensive to rebuild. I raise this because the Bill before us creates a new framework for sharing citizen data, this time, with private entities. The question is whether we have learnt from the TraceTogether episode. The original PSGA passed in 2018 allowed Government agencies to share data with one another under Ministerial direction. This amendment expands that framework significantly. Data can now flow to private companies, contractors and vendors, and introduces a power to re-identify anonymised information. Mr Speaker, of course, data sharing creates value. Examples abound, like the Social Service Net. When MSF shares client data with family service centres and voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs), we see coordinated assistance and faster assessments. But this Bill creates a fundamental asymmetry.”
“Thank you, Speaker. MOH itself notes a trend of escalating cost and premiums alongside tightening claims practices. MAS can act on unfair claims handling, but MAS is primarily a financial regulator. MOH's direct levers seem strongest when policies are MediSave-linked. So, my question is, what enforceable levers does MOH have to ensure that insurer conduct advances healthcare affordability and access? And where does MOH remain dependent on MAS? Also, it appears to me that no one is cleanly accountable for insurer behaviour as a health system actor. Does the Minister believe that this is a gap that requires filling?”
“: I thank Minister Chee for his clarification and I appreciate it. So, could I just ask him to please formally withdraw those comments so that it is clear for the record?”
“But I did manage to find this exchange while digging in the Hansard, a Parliamentary Question from 2 July 2024, "Asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance whether the Government will review its investment mandates with GIC to consider the suggestion from some industry players for GIC to allocate part of its investments to securities listed on the Singapore Exchange to revitalise our local stock exchange." The source of that "pump-priming" question was Member of Parliament Liang Eng Hwa, who is not a WP Member of Parliament. So, respectfully, I would like to ask the Minister to please clarify and source his comments. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I support the Bill.”
“Earlier stage listings would build local investor familiarity with science-based companies and allow incremental capital raising as milestones are met, and would perhaps have improved the odds for some of the first generation Biopolis companies which failed. That is why I support SGX RegCo's amending of admission requirements for life sciences companies. With your indulgence, Sir, before I end, as this Bill touches on the stock market, I would like to correct some statements about the Workers' Party (WP) stock market proposals. Minister Chee Hong Tat, at the DBS hosted a fireside chat on 22 October 2025, said, I quote, "Over the past year, we have worked closely with the industry to come up with proposals that could enhance the liquidity and competitiveness of Singapore's equities markets. We decided not to go for quick fixes, such as asking GIC or Temasek to pump-prime the market by mandating them to invest a certain amount in local equities. I explained in Parliament previously, in response to similar calls by the Workers' Party, that I do not believe such superficial measures will be effective and sustainable. This is what the Chinese call, "治标不治本", solutions that may sound good in theory but actually do not solve the underlying problems facing our equities markets." I am not sure what calls the Minister was referring to. I have looked around and asked my colleagues, but have drawn a blank. My colleague Louis Chua did speak in this year's Committee of Supply about our stock market, but he suggested two things: letting more of Temasek's GLCs list on SGX; and strengthening corporate governance standards. He did not suggest what the Minister has called "pump-priming".”
“Not mimicking NASDAQ's high-beta growth, not remaining purely defensive, but rather a foundation of quality SMEs, profitable, well-run, the "domestic bargain" in action, complemented by selective growth engines from a robust R&D industrial policy. The local stock market is currently dominated by Government-linked Companies (GLCs). However, Singapore has a long tail of well-run profitable SMEs, which do require growth capital. They are not super growth companies, but they deserve capital and can anchor our index. We need to meet our economy where it is. SGX should become an exchange that looks out for growing SMEs and cultivates a pipeline for listing. This should include overhauling the sponsor-based Catalist board, to be replaced by a non-trading, capacity-building "incubation board" which graduates to OTC-style boards as a prelude to mainboard listing. SMEs are the companies that will benefit most from a supportive exchange ecosystem, including the long-tail of research needed to cover them. The second layer will be selective growth from R&D. Commercial offshoots from our Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) masterplans in Pharmaceuticals, Advanced Manufacturing and Deep Tech should be able to list an earlier stage, in order to access domestic capital. The collapse of Tessa Therapeutics in 2023, despite raising over US$200 million, illustrates the brittleness of relying solely on late stage venture funding without domestic capital market support. Without opining on the commercial validity of that specific decision, I believe capital intensive R&D ventures could benefit from accessible public markets.”
“Investors must be able to trust that the baskets of stocks they are purchasing represent genuine value, not a random collection of mediocre companies. By lowering listing standards and removing investor protections like the financial watch list, the risk is that the quality of the SGX and Straits Times Index (STI) is allowed to degrade precisely when global capital is demanding higher quality for passive allocation. Let us not forget that active management, to weed out mediocrity, is an expensive endeavour. You will pay an active manager above and beyond to do due diligence to separate weed from chaff, and these active management fees are a drag on any future returns. You cannot attract passive capital by diluting the quality of your index. Any slackening in market shaping and maintaining quality standards cuts directly against one of the most important structural trends in modern finance. I am bearish on any cutting of standards. Fourth, passive capital also demands coherent indexes. Without quality and coherence, we cannot articulate what our market represents. Big allocators need clarity about what each allocation represents in their portfolio. But look at the STI: Financials – 54%, Real Estate Investment Trusts or REITS – 16.4%, Industrials – 9.8%, Telecom – 7.5%, Utilities – 4.9%. Almost entirely defensive. There is also leakage. Secondary listings like Jardine Matheson and Hongkong Land, both managed from Hong Kong, comprise 5% of the Index, but represent neither Singapore operations nor "Singapore Inc's" core capital-formation interests. Defensiveness and leakages are headwinds in building a future coherent story to ultimately increase SGX's valuation premium. What would a future coherent story look like?”
“Taiwan's 54% retail participation versus our 21% shows what happens when retail investors have confidence – confidence built on quality signals like watchlists and Investor Protection Centres. I will now move on to a few remarks on the principles that should underlie our stock market. At its core, a stock market strikes a "domestic bargain": savers get high-quality asset appreciation and local enterprises get capital and exit opportunities. All other functions, such as foreign capital allocating to Singapore, or overseas companies listing in Singapore, are extensions of this core. Four structural realities constrain our equities market. First, the "ASEAN gateway" strategy is becoming obsolete. It may have worked for Singapore when other Southeast Asian countries did not have a strong local market, but today, Thailand and Vietnam have their own mature and highly liquid markets with domestic brand recognition. ASEAN companies no longer have as many compelling reasons to list on the SGX, vis-a-vis their home exchanges. Second, our regulatory reach is limited over other foreign markets. This means for foreign companies, we are exposed to information asymmetry and governance risks we cannot adequately mitigate, such as, for the fraud-accused Nio. Third, passive capital demands quality indexes. The tidal force of passive investment is a secular supertrend. Sovereign wealth funds like Norway's leading Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) have demonstrated that low-cost passive investing outperforms the active management approach. I believe passive strategies will form the basis of significant portfolio allocations going forward. But passive investment requires something fundamental, high quality indexes or baskets worth buying.”
“I understand this view, but I believe that raising the quality of listed companies is pre-conditional to building this two-sided market. Other jurisdictions are not focusing on financial incentives. Hong Kong is focused on raising corporate governance standards, enforcement and improving processing efficiency, which is, in my view, a more correct approach. Hong Kong's listing rules have historically been stricter than SGX in areas such as independence of directors, remuneration disclosures and related party transactions, and their regulators have been much more aggressive in enforcement actions, including against directors. Hong Kong recently introduced a new Corporate Governance Code with stricter requirements: limiting independent non-executive directors to six listed directorships, mandatory continuing professional training, broad skills matrices and performance reviews. They are raising standards without using financial incentives. On 29 October, SGX RegCo announced it would remove the financial watchlist and introduce more flexible listing rules under a "disclosure-based approach." This is a bit paradoxical to me. The watchlist itself was disclosure. It flagged financially distressed companies to investors. Removing it does not increase disclosure; it removes a critical warning signal. What SGX calls a more "disclosure-based approach" can actually mean more disclosure for poor companies while keeping them listed and trading, but less actionable disclosure and actionable information for the market as a whole. I therefore disagree with the removal of the watchlist. Industry players supporting its removal may of course benefit from more trading volume, even if low-quality. Their incentives may not align with retail investor protection.”
“And while this is not in the Bill, I note that MAS has the Grant for Equity Market Singapore (GEMS) Research Development Grant, which provides a top-up per research report, more if it covers pre-Initial Public Offering and newly-listed names. This will help strengthen the value proposition of a listing here in Singapore, even if we cannot offer much valuation premium. The tax rebates are also tied to the profitability of the company. If the companies are loss-making, they will not qualify for the rebates. If it were not the case, we could be attracting rebate tourism from dubious companies. Last, and most importantly, these measures are time-limited until the end of 2027. The second principle I have reservations on is this whole idea of giving listing incentives at all. I could not find much evidence that having listing incentives will improve the quality of companies or long-term performance. In fact, the converse was more likely true. The Quebec Stock Savings Plan, which offered taxpayers generous tax write-offs for investment in new public stock issues of companies, drove a short-term surge in small company primary issues. But many issuers later disappeared or posted weaker earnings. The impact on capitalisation was short-lived and overall, stimulus effects were limited. For listing incentives, from the company's perspective, it may be unsustainable once incentives end and these companies may fail or simply delist when that time comes. What we are likely to see is a short-term pop in the numbers, because without answers to permanent questions around liquidity disclosure, quality, investor depth and regulatory credibility, strong secular headwinds remain. Some say it is a chicken-and-egg problem, building liquidity and investor depth.”
“For me, the bigger philosophical questions from first principles – why would a company want to do a secondary listing in Singapore? Why would Singapore benefit overall from more secondary listings in a disclosure-based regime? – remain inadequately answered. Overall, I would rather we focus on attracting quality primary listings over extending incentives to secondary listings. But since the trial is limited in time and scope, we will support the Bill scope in toto. We hope the results will be published and guide future market development. The Bill addresses three key technical problems regarding secondary listings. Many secondary listings come by introduction, meaning no new shares sold, which leaves little local free float and tends to depress local turnover. The Hong Kong Exchange (HKEX) warns that secondary listings can suffer from failure to develop or sustain an active trading market, which is why they flag such stocks prominently with an "S" marker. SGX currently has 29 secondary listings. Multiple high-profile SGX secondary listings were by way of introductions, meaning no new shares. This includes a 2010 listing of Prudential and the 2022 SGX listing of electric vehicle company, Nio Inc, which GIC is now suing for securities fraud in the Southern District of New York. These secondaries have had thin local trading versus their primary venues, with exception of the Jardine Group. So far, secondary listings have been a mixed bag. I will return to this point about poor quality listings later. But technically, 92K insists that shares must be offered to the public, ensuring some float, so listings by introduction are excluded from rebates. This is prudent.”
“The principles on 92K which I have reservations about are: First, the extension of rebates toward secondary listings. From the company's perspective, academic research shows secondary listings work primarily when listing in the US, where companies gain from purported superior governance standards or valuation premiums. It is debatable if Singapore offers either advantage. The advantages are not of secondary listings in general but of the US in particular. I can understand why SGX might want to encourage secondary listings. They are a prelude to secondary offerings. In Financial Year (FY) 2025, SGX had six new listings, raising $25.7 million. This was dwarfed by secondary offerings, which was a hundred times larger at $4.3 billion. SGX's function as a capital raising venue for already listed companies is currently much more significant than its listings. SGX Chairman Koh Boon Hwee, has argued for the need to take calculated first-mover risks to build liquidity. Presumably anchoring more secondary listings is one of those first-mover risks. But from Singapore's perspective, I do not see much benefit in giving incentives to attract secondary listings, especially combined with a disclosure-based regime, which may result in a bigger slate of lower quality companies. At the point of entry, many may just make the number of listings and market cap look better, while not creating broad local employment since their operations are overseas. Some may disagree on the basis that these secondary listings may improve liquidity and generate turnover. But how much of this is sticky, multi-year liquidity, and how much is transient event-driven volume? I ask: what is the basis of the Government's belief that it will lead to high-quality liquidity?”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, I will speak today on section 92K of the Finance (Income Taxes) Bill which is part of the Government's emerging strategy to improve the attractiveness of Singapore's equity market. It provides time-limited tax incentives for both primary and secondary listings. Before I begin, let me preface by saying I will use the term SGX as shorthand for SGX's equities business. SGX, as a whole, is a multi-asset exchange that has great strengths in foreign exchange (FX), commodities and other derivatives. I think those parts of the business, including BidFX and Iron Ore, have been doing a good job. On section 92K, my overall view is that these measures, a time-limited experiment in tax incentives, are in themselves unlikely to move the needle on improving the SGX's competitiveness, for good or bad. Although I have some general reservations about some of the Bill's principles, on balance, since it is tightly scoped by being both limited in time and capped in subsidy, I support the Bill to give this Government latitude to experiment. Section 92K introduces a tax rebate to encourage companies to list their shares on SGX. Companies that list their ordinary shares on the SGX between 19 February 2025 and 31 December 2027, new listings or re-listings, both primary and secondary listings, will qualify. Shares must be offered to the public in conjunction with the listing. The company receives a tax rebate for five years, 20% corporate tax for periods of a primary listing; and 10% for a secondary listing. These are capped at $6 million a year, if the market cap is at or above $1 billion on listing date; and $3 million a year if below that figure. The company must remain listed throughout the entire five-year period and must apply for approval by 31 December 2027.”
“Thank you, Speaker. Given the safety concerns around small modular reactors, which are light-water reactors, under what conditions would the Ministry consider training a cadre of experts in thorium or molten salt reactors, which have better safety characteristics like running near atmospheric temperature?”
“I would like to apologise to the Minister for my comment on his question.”
“I would like to apologise to the Minister for the comment.”
“I do withdraw that comment. I will maintain that, that question is not a meaningful question. Thank you.”
“So, the answer is no. And I do not think it is the Minister's point of view that you should in fact have a zero-risk approach. Because it is impossible. So, he is asking a stupid question.”
“There is a pattern of Ministers and political officeholders asking very rhetorical zeros, like rhetorical questions, which have no meaning, which are like —”
“Thank you, Speaker. Three supplementary questions for the Minister, given that Prince Group's scam operations were publicly documented by English language investigative media as early as February 2024 and even earlier in July 2022 in Chinese court notices, did MAS conduct any mid-term reviews of DW Capital Holdings between 2018 and the US action in October 2025? And if not, why not? The second supplementary question. I thank the Minister for his metaphor. I think there are a lot of flies in the house. So, as more cases of criminality associated with family offices that have been set up in Singapore have come to light, will the Government start to work on the assumption that illicit money generated by scams and other cross-border crime has already penetrated Singapore? And therefore, will the Government mandate enhanced due diligence on existing client relationships across all regulated financial sectors, not just new client onboarding? The third supplementary question. Further to my previous question, will MAS require all existing 13O and 13U tax incentive holders, and not just new applicants, undergo mandatory rescreening?”
“Thank you, Speaker. Two supplementary questions for the Minister. Firstly, what are MOE's target operational outcomes for AI adoption? Surely, the Ministry must have a direction or goals, whether it is fewer hours, better allocation of time from administrative duties to teaching, or something else. Without that, how do we measure whether AI adoption is achieving the desired outcomes? The second supplementary question: the Minister said that the workload has been stable at 53 hours per week. Does MOE believe that this is sustainable in the long term? And if not, what is the target number of hours that MOE is working towards?”