S. Rajaratnam
Singapore
“There are two already there! BG Lee Hsien Loong: Well, we see the future before us. The proposal to have a 4% interest rate on HDB loans without a corresponding drop in CPF interest paid on the deposits is the first step to raiding the reserves.”
“This concern for the 15-20% was taken up in the President's Address by the new Cabinet. Many of the new and older MPs who preceded the Member for Queenstown have spoken eloquently and constructively on this subject. Quite a few had come forward with suggestions on how this goal could be achieved and it is constructive criticism.”
“Just two minutes. So the Member for Queenstown ended his vision of the future in what I thought was an apocalyptic note, and I would like to quote, I hope he does not deny this: 'Water [he said] can carry a boat but it can also sink a boat. Respect the people and attend to their needs at all times and the people will carry you far.”
“You will have time. You will be here for four years, five years. Do not worry. If you are serious about alleviating the lot of the less fortunate, then the politics of envy and hypocrisy is the surest way of ensuring that this goal is not reached.”
“It is incredible. He wants us to set the example that he wants to follow, to prove that he is a man who is prepared to render service. He can put us to shame (i do not think he will) by just voluntarily, one-sidedly, unilaterally, as a man of principle, sacrificing $3,000. That is nothing. it's peanuts to him.”
“May I finish my speech? - and which has the distinction of being the first political party in this country or in any other country which has been brought to a state of bankruptcy by a politician.”
The complete record
Every one of 375 lines we hold for S. Rajaratnam, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 8 of 8.
“There must he changes, of course, as the international landscape changes. The fact that the Barisan Sosialis had to amend their motion within a period of a few months only underlines my point that the world, and particularly our part of the world, is changing rapidly, and a foreign policy must be flexible enough to meet these changes. The tragic weakness of the Barisan Sosialis - that is, tragic for them but good for us - is that the more the world changes the more they remain the same old hunch of tenderfoot Marxists. 3.52 p.m.”
“So since 9th August we have had the opportunity and the freedom to show in Singapore that such a society for which we struggled in Malaysia can be made to work in Singapore; that a multi-racial society founded on the concepts of democracy, social equality and socialist concepts of economic and social justice is the only safe and practical way of building a united nation, of building a nation out of many races, and of solving the economic and social problems of peoples of all races. But for the time being, all we ask of our neighbour in Malaysia is that having insisted that we should be a sovereign State, they should treat us as a sovereign State and allow us the rights and privileges that go with sovereignty, because we concede to them the right to behave like a sovereign State. We are resentful when they behave towards us as though Singapore is still a State within Malaysia. And Malaysia can be assured that we will not use our sovereignty in such a way as to jeopardise their interests - their genuine and ultimate interests - because we are well aware that we have a vital stake in the well-being and security of Malaysia. We cannot do them in because eventually we would he doing ourselves in. Malaysia is for us a sovereign State but not a foreign country. We shall always bear this in mind in our relations with them. All we ask is that they should reciprocate this attitude. Sir, I shall have more to say about the particular aspects of our foreign policy when we come to debate the Barisan Sosialis' amended motion on foreign policy. I do not wish to anticipate the motion or their return to this Chamber. All I wish to point out now is that the course of a foreign policy is never smooth. It is never a straight line between two points.”
“We have chosen our route towards this ultimate destiny even if we have to do so, now, as an independent and sovereign State. In one way, Sir, this may not be a bad thing because we have the freedom now to choose our route towards this ultimate and inevitable goal. We live the way we want to live, the most effective way. I believe, Sir, victory goes to the one who chooses the route and successfully reaches the goal set for it by destiny. When we were in Malaysia, we chose the route of a Malaysian Malaysia as our objective, and that resulted in many difficulties and ultimately in our receiving a quit order or else. We were told never to darken Malaysia's door, and they exhorted us to set up house on our own elsewhere. Well, so be it. We are now an independent State. True it is no longer within our power to help in the building of a Malaysian Malaysia. But it is within our power and within our rights to build what I would call a Malaysian Singapore - not a Singaporean Singapore but a Malaysian Singapore. The essence of a Malaysian Malaysia was that it was possible to build a just, prosperous and progressive nation in a multi-racial society only on the basis of a non-communal and a non-racial approach in policies and in economics. When we were in Malaysia, this thesis was rejected as not only impractical but also dangerous.”
“So one cannot talk of a foreign policy towards Malaysia in the same sense as we would in regard to other countries. It must be a foreign policy of a special kind, a foreign policy towards a country which, though constitutionally foreign, is essentially one with us and which, when logic and sanity reassert themselves, must once more become one. It must be a foreign policy based on the realisation that Singapore and Malaysia are really two arms of one politically organic whole, each of which has, through a constitutional proclamation, been declared separate and independent. True a Minister in Malaysia not so long ago did say that on 9th August a diseased arm was cut off. I do not think that anything was cut off, in fact, fortunately for us. I say, fortunately, because if one of the arms is really cut off, it must result in the whole organism bleeding to death. Our foreign policy is based on an awareness of not so much the constitutional fact as the fact of what is real - the reality of the thing. The survival and well-being of Malaysia is essential to Singapore's survival. Conversely, the survival and well-being of Singapore is essential to Malaysia's survival. We should not, however, confuse the survival of the peoples in the two territories with the survival of governments and political parties, because political parties and governments come and go, as the mood and aspirations of peoples change and as the political environment changes. With this broader background in mind, we in Singapore have to accept the fact that we and Malaysia are two sovereign States compelled to move, by different routes, towards the ultimate destiny of one people and one country.”
“I confess, Mr Speaker, that I find it difficult to keep a straight face in talking about a foreign policy towards Malaysia. There is something unreal and odd about lumping our relations with Malaysia under foreign relations. But then some rather odd things do happen in the history of peoples and countries. All that we can then do is to accept the oddity as something not of our making and try to make the best of an odd situation. Because the situation is odd., we should be more than usually careful to devise rational and intelligent policies in regard to Malaysia. In theory, i.e., in regard to the Constitution, the relationship between us and Malaysia comes under the category of foreign relations. So we set up a High Commission as part of the necessary formalities between two foreign countries, and the machinery functioned efficiently when on occasions the two Commissions had to exchange formal diplomatic protest notes. However, constitutional forms are one thing and the hard facts of history, geography, economics and demography are another. All these latter factors underline not the separateness or foreignness of the two territories, but the oneness of the people in the two countries. People on both sides of the Causeway have not since 9th August even begun to treat one another as foreigners. And I do not think they ever will. This is a hard fact. Sir, if I may be permitted a personal note. I have my parents and a brother in Malaysia. Though I have tried very hard to keep up with the appropriate spirit demanded by the Constitution, I could not bring myself to regard them as foreigners. I am quite sure this goes for hundreds of thousands like me on both sides of the Causeway.”
“They will of necessity be initially on an austerity basis. There may be some countries where there will he just the Ambassador and nobody else. But whatever it is, we have to make a start, and this is a start. With some of these countries, we have very substantial and close trade relations. With others, identity of political interest and aims counts for more than trade interests. And with the rest, trade and political interests happen to be equally important. These are, as I said, Sir, the first of our overseas missions. We shall set up others when we can find the personnel and the money or when political and trade considerations justify their being set up earlier. The promotion of trade with as many countries as possible will he a major objective of foreign policy I should like to state here that ideological differences will not be made barriers to trade between us and other countries. The only criterion for trade is whether trade with another country is in our economic interest, because promotion of our economic interest is promotion of our national interest. There may, of course, be occasions when economic interests may have to be sacrificed to safeguard some important political interests the total ban on trade with Rhodesia recently is a case in point. But, generally speaking, ideological differences will not he made obstacles to trade, i.e., legitimate trade. We shall take care to see that trade does not become a cover for political manipulations, interference or attempts to control us. Talking of trade brings us to the most important aspect of our foreign policy, our relations with Malaysia. I have kept this to the last because our relationship with Malaysia is of a special kind.”
“There are people, Communists and non-Communists, who thought that Singapore, by the manner in which it achieved independence, by openly proclaiming its intentions that the base would remain, would never be accepted by the Afro-Asian countries as a truly sovereign and independent country. Sir, though we are new to foreign policy, it is the measure of the effectiveness of our foreign policy that we have been accepted as a sovereign independent country despite the British bases by nonaligned countries, and even by Communist countries. Therefore, it is not a bad beginning for our foreign policy. It only underlines the effectiveness of our foreign policy. We have made a good start. We have made a start in the right direction by adhering to a non-aligned policy. The process of consolidating the friendly relations we have established with foreign countries will take time and money. It may not be feasible to establish missions in every friendly country because we cannot mobilise the personnel and the money to do this. So friendly contacts with foreign countries will have to be maintaned and consolidated, in some cases, by establishing overseas missions. In others, by official visits and, for the most part, because there are 116 nations, by working together with all countries in the United Nations to help build a more peaceful and more prosperous world. Therefore, it is our intention first to establish missions in some ten countries. These are in alphabetical order: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand, the U.A.R., the United States and the United Kingdom. These will be, as I said, the first of our overseas missions and we hope to set up most, if not all, of them during the course of the coming year.”
“However, now that Singapore is a sovereign and independent country, we can take steps to make it clear to those who genuinely fear that the base is an imperialist base and that it is a base for aggression against them, that their fears are unfounded. We have no intention of allowing the base to be used for aggressive or so-called neo-colonialist ends, simply because it is not in our national interest to encourage aggression or neo-colonialism. This assurance is a firm one and it can be an effective one. Because, as you know, Sir, the base cannot in a sovereign country be effectively used for purposes which the Singapore Government believes to be against the national interest. We all know that without the goodwill and support of the government of the country in which the base is, a modern base cannot be operated effectively, if at all it can be operated. Of course, those who have designs of their own on Singapore will persist in believing that the base is a neo-colonialist threat. There is nothing we can do to persuade them otherwise except not to be needled by such charges into abandoning such arrangement as we think necessary for our defence for our national interest. Our responsibility is not to any outside country but to the two million people who have entrusted their welfare and safety to us, and we will ensure their safety by the most practical and most effective means we think is necessary to secure their defence. Sir, we have been independent for just under five months and our foreign policy, though still rough about the edges, has won regard as well as friends for us. The essential thing is that we have not been isolated as the local Communists and others who are not Communists had hoped we would be.”
“That goes even for the United States. So it is sheer madness for certain people in Singapore, like the Barisan Sosialis, to advocate that Singapore should be self-sufficient in regard to defence. But the Barisan Sosialis know that self-sufficiency in defence is merely another way of leaving Singapore defenceless, and that is what they really want. They know that their prospects of capturing power by constitutional and even by unconstitutional means are pretty dim in Singapore. Therefore, their only hope of seizing power is by the arrival of rescue parties from outside Singapore. A defenceless Singapore is therefore their dream and hope and the objective of their foreign policy. Getting rid of British bases, they well know, does not mean no bases at all in Singapore. Even if the British were to quit the base, the strategic value of Singapore still remains. Many countries outside of Singapore know this. What is likely to happen if the British were to pull out is that there will be a scramble by other militarily more powerful countries to get control over the base in Singapore. In such a scramble of elephants, it is Singapore which is going to be trampled to death. Because of this, we would like the British base to be here until such time as we can find other more effective and more practical ways of ensuring our defence. For one thing, the British base is already here and it has been here for decades. So there is no question of any scramble starting for possession to control the base, which there must be if the British were to quit it.”
“We believe in peace between nations simply because we have nothing to gain by war and, in any case, we have not the capacity or the resources to make war on others We covet no people's territory. We have no desire to save other peoples by interfering in their affairs. They must save themselves. These then are the elements which constitute our national interests, out of which our national interests are compounded. These, I submit, in no way conflict with the national interests of those countries which genuinely want to live in peace with us. If other countries understand that these constitute our national interests and that the preservation of these are the only objectives of our foreign policy, then they will put a kinder construction on many of the things that we do, including the existence of a British base in Singapore, unlike the Barisan Sosialis who put a different construction on the existence of our base. In the light of what I have said so far and in the light of what are our true national objectives, the bases are here not for any aggressive or imperialist purposes but for the defence of Singapore and Singapore's national interests. We are realistic enough to recognise the limits to our capacity to be able to defend ourselves against external threats. We shall, of course, build our own defence forces to the fullest extent we are capable of. But what we are interested in is the defence of Singapore in the context of a major conflict in regard to major and more powerful neighbours. We are in no position to build or finance an army capable of defending Singapore in a conflict of this kind. Even big powers with far greater resources of money, men and material plan their defence on the basis of friends and allies. That goes for the Soviet Union.”
“The promotion of national interests is the essence of the foreign policy of all countries, big and small. Only a country aligned to a big power, whether as a colony or as an ally, may he compelled to sacrifice its national interests where these conflict with those of its major partner. However, the pursuit of national interests cannot be absolute in a world where the fact of national independence has to he balanced against the reality of interdependence between nations. Even big and powerful countries like the United States and the Soviet Union cultivate allies and friends in order to safeguard and promote what they believe to he their national interests. Interdependence implies give and take between the partners involved. Interdependence cannot therefore be on the basis of unrestrained pursuit of national interests without regard to the national interests of one's partners and friends. There will arise occasions when we may have to make some sacrifice of our national interests for the long-term interests of the nation. This need not give rise to insurmountable difficulties if there is broad coincidence of views between the partners as to their ultimate national interests. In the case of Singapore, our ultimate national interests are the preservation of the essential values on which our society is founded. We believe in democracy. We believe in the establishment of a multi-racial non-communal society. As Socialists, we believe in the eradication of poverty, ignorance, disease and other forms of economic and social injustice. We believe in "a more just and more equal society", a slogan which does not always give reassurance to some other countries.”
“We are intelligent and hard-headed enough to know that these fine slogans are merely cloaks to cover big power national interests, and these are not always identical with ours. To align ourselves with any one power bloc is to add to its potential strength. And having regard to the strategic value of Singapore, we will he adding decisive strength to one side. This, far from contributing to stability in this area, will do just the opposite. In view of all this, 1 think it is in the real interests of the big powers themselves to see that Singapore is non-aligned. If the big powers are really interested in averting a major conflict in South-East Asia, they should accept and ensure the non-aligned status of Singapore. Since Singapore is genuinely convinced that a non-aligned policy is the correct one for itself and for the peace of South-East Asia, a major power need not fear that the strategic position of Singapore would he exploited to its disadvantage by one of its rivals. Our policy will be to ensure, to the best of our ability, that Singapore remains the still centre in the power storm raging in South-East Asia. However, non-alignment does not mean indifference on our part to the real issues of peace and war in this region or even feigning blindness as to what is right and wrong. A non-aligned policy, in fact, gives us greater freedom to make pronouncements or adopt stands purely on the merits, as we see them, of specific international issues. An aligned position on the other hand obliges us automatically to take the stand that our major and more powerful ally takes on any important issue. It is inevitable that Singapore's stand in specific international issues will he coloured heavily by national interests.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, yesterday I indicated why it was necessary for us to stick to a policy of non-alignment, because to be aligned to any big country would eventually have meant the loss of our freedom of action even in domestic fields, because foreign policies are in fact an extension of domestic policies into the international field. And therefore I said that was why we refused to join any anti-Communist crusade because we are non-Communist. We are socialists at home because we believe that the non-Communist policy is the best way of dealing with our domestic problems, including the Communist problem in Singapore. We cannot be non-Communist at home and anti-Communist abroad. For the same reason we have resisted demands that we should align ourselves with the Communist bloc. This demand has in fact come from the Barisan Sosialis for, when all their verbal disguise is removed, what they really want us to do is that we should align ourselves with one of the Communist blocs. This was clearly revealed in the foreign policy motion which they originally submitted for our consideration last August when, as a test of the genuineness of our independence, they specified the countries with which we should immediately establish diplomatic relations. There were only two countries, Peking and Jakarta. Since then they have amended this motion, but I do not wish to anticipate the debate to which we are looking forward in the coming days. For us then, non-alignment means avoiding entanglements in what are essentially power conflicts even though these conflicts may be wrapped up in such highly moral terms as the struggle for a free world, for the liberation of oppressed people as a struggle against Communism, capitalism, neo-colonialism and what have you.”
“Maybe to keep up the illusion of independence, the major power may permit or tolerate disagreements in minor matters of foreign policy, but in fundamental matters, we would have to stand smartly to attention when the roll call is made on any issue. Once a country has put itself in a position of having to follow the foreign policy of another country, there must eventually be loss of freedom of action in regard to basic domestic policies. If, as it is generally accepted, foreign policy is promotion and protection of national interests through appropriate international actions, a policy of alignment with a big power means promotion not of our national interests but those of the big power. That is why we are loath to join in any international anti-Communist crusade, because we are non-Communist Socialists at home; because we believe - 6.30 p.m.”
“Because we are aware of this, our foreign policy and our defence policy must ensure that we do not become, or even appear to become, the pawn of any outside power. If this were to happen, then we would be that much nearer to a real military conflict in this area. Therefore, the contribution that Singapore can make towards peace in South-East Asia is not to side with this or that contending power bloc, or become the pawn of any one of them. So long as Singapore does not fall into the hands of any one contending power bloc, we are ensuring that they are not panicked into taking desperate and dangerous counter measures. This was the reason, Sir, why immediately on independence we declared ourselves non-aligned. It was not, as some people believed, simply a case of Singapore following a current Afro-Asian fad! For an independent Singapore, which is also important strategically, to have aligned itself with this or that power bloc was to have invited counter reaction from its rivals. It would have meant Singapore, an independent Singapore, being drawn willy-nilly into the big power conflicts already raging in South-East Asia, and thus enlarging the arena of active conflict. More important, it would have also meant jeopardising our recently won independence. Alignment with one of the power blocs means aligning oneself completely with its major military and foreign policy objectives. And when a small country like Singapore aligns itself with a big power, there is no doubt as to who keeps in step with whose policies. In other words, Singapore's foreign policy, if it is aligned, becomes a copy reproduction of the foreign policy of its more powerful partner.”
“Though the Barisan Sosialis may prattle about phoney independence, this Government and our people accept the reality of our independence, and our foreign policy will be directed towards the safeguarding of this independence. It does not matter if some countries do not believe in the reality of our independence. It is sufficient for the purposes of our foreign policy that we believe in the genuineness of our independence, that the overwhelming majority of the people of Singapore believe in our independence, and that the vast majority of the nations of the world accept our independence. This being so, genuine respect for our political integrity and independence must be an essential element in relationships between us and foreign countries. The primary task of our foreign policy will always be to safeguard our independence from external threats. We shall try to do this by establishing friendly relations with all countries, particularly those nearest to us. Another way of establishing friendly international relations is to support any measure, whether on a regional basis or through concerted international action via the United Nations, which will enhance prospects for peace in this region by reducing tensions and fears. Because Singapore is regarded by the world and by our neighbours as a strategic key in this area, we shall ensure that our foreign policy and our defence policy do not increase tensions and fears among our neighbours. We are well aware that South-East Asia is in fact a battle-ground of great power politics and that Singapore could, as a pawn of some other countries, decide the outcome of the military game the big powers are playing in this region.”
“If knowing the law and the Constitution in regard to the remuneration of Assemblymen, the Barisan Sosialis representatives return to do their duty by their electors, then they would still be acting constitutionally and no harm will befall them. But insofar as our foreign policy is concerned, what is important is that the local Communists and the Barisan Sosialis should not be treated by outside countries as their special responsibility, when in fact it is a domestic problem for us to solve. We do not care if foreign countries sympathise with the Barisan Sosialis or anybody else or even wish the local Communists were a little more intelligent than they have been. But what we ask in the conduct of foreign relations is that these private sympathies and regrets should not be allowed to obtrude into the relations of foreign countries with us. The fate and fortunes of the local Communists should not be made an active concern in the relationships foreign countries establish with us. Equally, the fate and fortunes of anti-Communists or racialists should not be made the active concern of countries which seek to establish relations with us. In a democratic country like ours, there have been and will be contending political Parties striving for power on the basis of different ideologies consistent with our Constitution. It is natural for outside countries to feel sympathy for this or that Party or even to pray for the victory of a particular Party. But friendly relations between us and other countries become difficult and even impossible when the sympathy of an interested observer is transformed into active interference in our national affairs.”
“In fact, I am convinced they do not. But the countries to which they are making these frantic appeals to adopt a hostile foreign policy of words as well as of deeds must surely be aware of this. In listening to pronouncements of the local Communists, such countries should be aware that they are listening to people who are inept because of a chronic inability to distinguish between fact and fantasy, to political leaders and a political movement which has been discredited in the eyes of our people. It may well be that there is a clear grasp in certain Afro-Asian countries that a Party like the Barisan Sosialis is an expendable coterie of ineffectual clowns to play around with for lack of something better. It may be convenient, from the point of view of these countries, to humour them into believing that they are advancing the cause of socialist revolution. If that is all, then we are content, because we for our part can deal effectively with the Barisan Sosialis and the local Communists. In fact, we can well afford to allow the Barisan Sosialis to play at revolution. Should they or their Communist mentors exceed the hounds set by the law and the Constitution, we are equally capable of checking them there too. For example, it is all right with us and the country if the Barisan Sosialis choose to conduct their revolutionary struggle by the simple process of absenting themselves from this Chamber. They have not broken the law or the Constitution by doing this. And at the end of the month, they will be paid their $500, and for so long as the law and the Constitution prescribe they should be paid.”
“These countries would not have officially received a country whose independence they doubted. So the Barisan Sosialis leaders evade the truth about the reality of Singapore's independence by pronouncing the United Nations a tool of the American imperialists and the countries which received us as stooges of the Anglo-American imperialists. In other words, the 116 nations which voted for the admission of Singapore are, according to the Barisan Sosialis, the tools of the Americans. That goes, I presume, for Albania, too, because it too voted for the admission of Singapore into the United Nations. If the Barisan Sosialis thesis is correct, then President Kenyatta, President Nyerere, President Nkrumah, President Nasser and many other Heads of State who extended personal messages recognising Singapore's independence must be Anglo-American imperialist stooges. This kind of political lunacy is carried to astonishing lengths when the Barisan Sosialis move an amended foreign policy motion for the consideration of this House demanding that we adopt a foreign policy "friendly to Afro-Asian countries". This is illogical. They argue that Singapore's independence is phoney. On the one hand, the Barisan Sosialis leaders are busy asking the Afro-Asian countries to have nothing to do with Singapore because they claim Singapore's independence is phoney. On the other hand, they move an amended motion demanding that we should establish friendly relations with Afro-Asian countries, which the Afro-Asian countries cannot do if they believe the Barisan Sosialis thesis that Singapore's independence is phoney. All this, I humbly submit, Mr Speaker, is incontrovertible evidence of a fairly advanced state of political lunacy within the Barisan Sosialis fold. The Barisan Sosialis may not know it.”
“Neither these self-exiled comrades-on-the-run nor their less adventurous cheer leaders who elected to stay in Singapore contributed anything towards the emergence of an independent Singapore. Even as terrorists from Indonesia slipped into Singapore with bombs and hand grenades, Singapore, despite the scheming and obstruction by anti-national elements, found itself independent without bloodshed, without turmoil, and without any damage to the social and economic life of the people. The so-called revolutionary methods of struggle advocated by the Communists and the Barisan Sosialis, it is clear to the people, achieved nothing. Revolutionary methods of struggle, as interpreted and practised by local Communists and apprentice Communists, have been barren of results in Malaya, in Malaysia and in Singapore. Independence has come to Singapore not because of the so-called revolutionary struggles or methods of struggle of the local Communists, but in spite of them. The Barisan Sosialis therefore now try to cover up their bitter failures by pretending that Singapore's independence is phoney. In order to sustain this fantasy of phoney independence, they are compelled to create other and new fantasies. For example, in their Party journal, The Plebeian, they claim that Singapore's independence and sovereignty has been acknowledged only by Anglo-American imperialists and their stooges. In fact, some 116 countries represented in the United Nations voted for the admission of Singapore into the world body. There has, in addition, been formal recognition by individual countries. The recent Goodwill Mission, led by the Deputy Prime Minister, was officially received by Afro-Asian and Communist countries it visited.”
“Fortunately for us, no country has so far officially elected to put itself in this category vis-a-vis an independent Singapore. True, there are elements in Singapore, like the Barisan Sosialis, who are exhorting other countries to place themselves in this category vis-a-vis Singapore. Under the hilarious leadership of Dr Lee Siew Choh, for example, the Barisan Sosialis are trying to convince certain countries that Singapore's independence is phoney, that Singapore is a tool of Anglo-American imperialism. Of course, the Barisan Sosialis leaders think that in doing this they are acting like good Marxists. My view - and this may also be the view of the countries to which their appeals are made - is that the Barisan Sosialis brand of Marxism has more in common with the lunacy of the Marx brothers than with the thoughts of the author of the Communist Manifesto. The Barisan Sosialis leaders - if you will permit this euphemism - would be well advised to re-read the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto which goes "A septre is haunting Europe...". A septre is certainly haunting the Barisan Sosialis and also their friends who not so long ago fled to Indonesia to help do in the people of Singapore. These comrades absconded to Indonesia on the pretext that they wanted to liberate Singapore, to free it from the fetters of British colonialism and Malayan feudalism. But all we know is that they sent terrorists from Indonesia who killed and maimed not British colonial soldiers but a number of innocent and decent Singaporeans, including two women bank employees. They make no distinction of the sexes in these matters.”
“For example, during World War II, the Americans and Russians were the best of friends, so much so that they combined forces to bring to heel Germany and Japan - by mutual agreement then their No. 1 enemies. But since World War II, Germany and Japan have become America's No. 1 friends - more so than their wartime ally, the Soviet Union. So the friends of today or the enemies of today need not be the enemies of tomorrow. Therefore, in international politics, it is not wise to formulate foreign policies on the basis of permanent enemies, especially in the twentieth century world of convulsive changes and rapid shifts in the balance of political forces within countries. Singapore's foreign policy, based on a realistic appraisal of the position we occupy in South-East Asia, will therefore not be postulated on the basis of permanent enemies. Ours will be the more positive approach of cultivating as many permanent friends as we are capable of. We shall therefore strive to convert this second category of friendship in so far as we can into the first category of friendship, of permanent friends. There will he no fixed and inflexible attitudes in regard to these countries. We shall not take wild and angry postures if from time to time in their foreign policy of words they say something which is not pleasing to us, so long as their foreign policy of deeds remains correct and reassuring. Here patience backed with some understanding of why they have to say the things that they say, might pay dividends and it could prevent their drifting into the third category of nations. The third category of nations are the nations whose foreign policy of words are as hostile and dangerous to our national interests as their foreign policy of deeds.”
“While, generally speaking, we are sincere in our wish to be friendly with all countries which want to be friends with us, in the hard world of international realities there are bound to he degrees of friendship between countries. Those closest to us will naturally he those countries whose foreign policy principles and deeds coincide with our national interests and our basic aspirations. We may from time to time have disagreements with them on specific issues, hut so long as the fundamentals of their foreign policy and the deeds with which they hack them coincide with our basic national interests and objectives, they will continue to remain our closest friends and allies. We should not allow temporary irritations and minor disagreements between us and them to cause us to abandon them as our permanent and secure friends. The second category of countries are those which may have to be unfriendly with us in theory (for ideological reasons or because of the exigencies of domestic politics) while developing friendly and normal relations with us in practice. So long as the practice is friendly, we are equally prepared to be friendly with them, though this friendliness will have to be qualified by the realisation that the friendliness is not as complete as we would like it to be. In a relationship of this kind - the second category - there is always the hope that the friendly relations, however tentative and however cautious, could in course of time and with good sense on both sides, mature into friendship of the first category. These things can happen and do happen in international relations.”
“They denote what a country would like to do, though in the world of hard realities it may be forced to do things which do not quite harmonise with its proclaimed principles. It is therefore necessary for Singapore, which is venturing for the first time into the jungle of international politics, to bear in mind always these two kinds of foreign policy. We should be on the look-out for possible discrepancies between deeds and words in the foreign policy of a country. Only then can we devise our own foreign policy which is sound and realistic. For example, we should not be lulled into a false sense of security just because a country professes undying friendship and high regard for us or proclaims peace and goodwill to all men. We should satisfy ourselves first that these proclamations accord with what it does. Similarly, the fact that a country does not like us as a matter of principle (maybe because they do not approve of the system of government we have, or because they do not approve some of the actions that we have chosen to do), this should not preclude normal relations between us and them. So long as they do not translate their theoretical disapproval of us into deeds, we are prepared to enter into relations with them. Of course, it would be better if they say friendly things about us even as they enter into peaceful and workable relations with us. But if that cannot be done, then we would be satisfied with a friendly foreign policy of deeds. So in shaping our foreign policy we should have a clear idea of which category a country comes under, for upon this will depend the measure of friendship and closeness with it.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, it is a little bit difficult to conduct debates in this Parliament because of the situation where you do not have an Opposition! For a good debate there must be stimulus and response. We have not got the stimulus because the Barisan Sosialis, for reasons best known to themselves, have decided to stay away from the Assembly - but I have enough imagination to visualise them in front of me to provide the necessary stimulus especially on the question of foreign policy, which is a matter dear to their hearts. So I would first like to state that when we come to talk about the foreign policy of a country, there are two senses in which we can do so. We can identify its foreign policy by the statements of principles and objectives propounded by the leaders of a country. These are generally very reassuring and infused with high moral purposes, but these do not necessarily constitute the foreign policy of the country involved. Then there is another sense in which we can talk of a foreign policy, in that we can abstract it from the concrete decisions and actions taken by a country on specific international issues. From these we can abstract what the country's foreign policy is. In other words, there is a foreign policy of words, of principles, and there is a foreign policy of deeds. For practical purposes, the foreign policy of deeds is a more reliable guide to the intentions of a country than its declared and invariably reassuring principles. I am not saying that the enunciated foreign policy principles of a country are irrelevant or that they do not have any bearing on its foreign policy. They can and very often do.”