Sun Xueling
Singapore
“We are deploying electric vehicle (EV) chargers in tandem with growing demand, within the constraints of space and electricity. As EV technology is continuously improving, we are also mindful not to overbuild as chargers can become obsolete quickly.”
“I thank Member Dr Choo Pei Ling for raising feedback from her Tengah residents. Currently, two multi-storey car parks in Tengah have EV chargers, and LTA subsidiary, EV-Electric (EVe) Charging Pte Ltd, is in the process of deploying EV chargers in another eight multi-storey car parks in Tengah.”
“The Government targets to deploy 60,000 electric vehicle (EV) charging points by 2030, which comprise 40,000 in public car parks, and 20,000 in private premises. As of March 2026, there are 30,500 EV charging points deployed in Singapore. We are on track to achieving our 2030 target in tandem with the growing demand for EVs.”
“In 2025, about 30% of Build-To-Order (BTO) blocks were completed earlier than their estimated completion dates at the point of flat booking. On average, these blocks were completed about two months earlier.”
“Yes, thank you. We agree with Dr Neo that it is important to bring together the wider ecosystem and we will consult all stakeholders. The Ministry of Transport's immediate focus is to drive the usage of drones more extensively, especially by the public sector and this is because we already have many potential use cases.”
“I thank the Member for her question. Earlier, I mentioned in my reply that the HDB notifies buyers at three junctures. This is to give buyers adequate time to plan. And that is why it is at the one year before, six months before and three months before.”
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“Indeed, preschools now play a key role in meeting families' caregiving needs and complement parents in supporting our children's development. We have invested significantly in early childhood care and education in recent years. The Government's annual expenditure on the early childhood sector has more than doubled, from $1 billion in 2018, to over $2 billion today. Much of this funding is channelled towards building more infant care and childcare places and improving their affordability. We note Mr Xie Yao Quan's suggestion to increase the basic subsidy, which we provide to all Singaporean children attending preschools. Basic subsidy is only one of several avenues ensuring preschool affordability. In recent years, the Government has enhanced preschool affordability via other means to effectively lower families' preschool expenses. In 2020, we raised the household income ceiling for means-tested subsidies from $7,500 to $12,000 and increased the subsidy quantum across all eligible income tiers, so that more families could benefit. For children attending Government-supported preschools, infant and childcare fees are capped. For the past decade, parents have seen their out-of-pocket payment for fees decrease as there is significant funding provided by ECDA to these Government-supported preschools to lower fee caps. A middle-income household with a monthly income of $8,000 currently pays around $500 per month for full-day infant care in an Anchor Operator preschool, which is around two-thirds of what they would have paid 10 years ago. For full-day childcare in an Anchor Operator preschool, a middle-income household pays around $200 today, less than half of what they would have paid 10 years ago.”
“Mr Yip Hon Weng suggested to enhance training for caregivers and Ms Nadia Samdin mentioned community circles for new parents. Assoc Prof Razwana Begum proposed establishing a Family Ambassadors Programme to guide and provide resources to families. Under FFL@Community, families can conveniently access parenting and grandparenting programmes, as well as parent peer support groups formed and led by volunteers, to equip themselves to step into their roles more confidently. As Mr Melvin Yong has highlighted, FFL@Community has been expanded to 18 towns today and we are on target to roll out nationwide to all towns by the end of this year. The Government has also launched Grow Well SG recently, a new national health promotion strategy which aims to inculcate healthier lifestyles in children. Miss Rachel Ong and Assoc Prof Razwana Begum mentioned concerns around screen time and social media use among children. Under Grow Well SG, ECDA has incorporated explicit guidelines on screen time into the Early Childhood Development Centres Code of Practice. To help educators internalise these guidelines, ECDA will provide guidance on screen use within the upcoming Educators' Guide for the Early Years Development Framework. We are also collaborating with partners to develop accessible resources, so that parent and caregivers can be equipped to reinforce these habits at home. Besides strengthening marriage relationships, we have also enhanced our support for parents, especially for those with young children and who need to balance caregiving and work responsibilities. Mr Gan Thiam Poh suggested supporting families by providing more places and lowering fees at Government-supported preschools.”
“I thank Members for affirming the importance of supporting families. Families are the bedrock of our society. I agree with Mr Yip Hon Weng that when families are strong, our society will be strong. Building on this strong foundation, the Government is committed to supporting all families as they journey through key stages of life, from couples seeking to get married and raise families, to parents with young children. Let me elaborate on them in turn. Marriage aspirations among young Singaporeans remain strong and the Government will continue to work with our partners to support young Singaporeans to build their own future families. Ms Ng Ling Ling suggested piloting an initiative to allow young couples to hold their wedding in an iconic, historical and beautiful public institution. Since 2022, couples have had the option of holding their solemnisation ceremony at the picturesque Family Zone @ Gardens by the Bay. The Registry of Marriages (ROM) and Registry of Muslim Marriages (ROMM) at Canning Rise has also been a cherished venue for couples embarking on their marital journeys for over four decades. To better meet the needs of couples, the current ROM/ROMM site will be undergoing redevelopment. Assoc Prof Razwana Begum suggested providing Marriage Preparation Courses to assist newlyweds in developing skills and mindset for a strong and lasting marriage. The Families for Life (FFL) movement, led by the FFL Council, brings together various partners to offer marriage programmes to provide pre-marital education through the FFL@Community initiative. The goal is to equip soon-to-weds and newlyweds with the necessary family skills to strengthen their marriage.”
“I thank the Member for her two supplementary questions. The Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) had initiated the development of the Practitioners' Resource Guide on the Guidelines on Healthy Family Boundaries. And the background to this is that in the course of child protection work, MSF and professionals have come across parenting practices that, while not illegal, can place children in uncomfortable situations. That said, MSF recognises that every family is unique and some may face special circumstances and therefore, the guidelines are thus not intended to be rules to be enforced or prescriptive in nature across all parenting contexts, but rather to serve as general principles to help professionals working with diverse family situations. On the second question that she had, the guidelines currently do not include physical discipline elements. There have been various surveys that show that many parents in Singapore still use certain methods of physical discipline on their children. MSF recognises this and acknowledges that, ultimately, at the end of the day, parents have the right to decide on how they would want to discipline their children. But that said, if the behaviour crosses the line and goes into child abuse – and we have professionals who will look into case-specific details to be able to come to a conclusion on that. And if that is the case, then Child Protective Services will not hesitate to step in to protect the child.”
“Yes, indeed. I apologise, Mr Speaker, Sir, for not asking for your permission earlier. Indeed, my answer will correspond to Question Nos 10, 11 and 12 in the Order Paper today.”
“I thank the Member for his suggestion. Indeed, the Government is open to conversations and engagements, because this is an evolving threat landscape and we would desire to hear from academics, as well as social media companies, as to the trends they are seeing. I would like to cite two examples that have happened and which we can also take reference from, which is that there was British Broadcasting Corporation study, which claimed that young voters in key electoral constituencies during the 2024 United Kingdom elections have been recommended false and satirical artificial intelligence generated videos depicting party leaders making comments that they actually did not make. And also, in recent years, there have also been allegations of foreign interference in elections through social media platforms, most notably during the 2024 United States (US) elections, where it was alleged that a social media bot farm, comprising over 900 social media accounts, had spread disinformation in the US and abroad. So, indeed, I think there are examples in the real world and my Ministry will be open to these engagements to understand further as to what other steps can be taken.”
“I thank the Member his supplementary question. In and of itself, algorithms are not illegal. Many social media companies have algorithms for the purposes of pushing out their information. They may use it because, first and foremost, the algorithms are proprietary and they use the algorithms because they want to be able to catch the eyeballs of consumers. So, I would just like to make this point that algorithms, in and of itself, used by social media companies are not illegal. But what the FICA aims to do is that if the Minister is satisfied that the algorithms are being used by foreign entities, with a political end in mind, to influence domestic politics in Singapore, then he is empowered to issue pre-emptive measures.”
“I thank the Member for his supplementary questions. He has obviously given the matter much thought. I would like to come back to my main response, where I mentioned that the Government is aware that social media platforms' algorithms may potentially be manipulated to skew the consumption of information and that if algorithms are deliberately manipulated by foreign persons or entities, including social media companies, to affect our domestic politics, that will constitute foreign interference. These two paragraphs that I have just shared do not rely on the information being falsehoods. What instead FICA is interested in is that there are activities conducted by foreign actors typically through covert or deceptive means that affect our domestic politics, in order to advance the foreign actors' own interests. I would like to share an example. In 2024, the Government had issued FICA account restriction directions against a network of 95 social media accounts and also blocked 10 inauthentic websites that could potentially be used to mount hostile information campaigns against Singapore. Beyond this, the Government also has in place several initiatives to help Singaporeans improve their information literacy skills. We will continue to study the evolving online landscape and review if additional regulations for social media services are needed as part of ongoing efforts to enhance online safety in Singapore and strengthen our defences against foreign interference.”
“The Government is aware that social media platforms' algorithms may potentially be manipulated to skew the consumption of information by its user. If algorithms are deliberately manipulated by foreign persons or entities, including social media companies, to affect our domestic politics, that would constitute foreign interference. Various provisions under the Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act 2021 (FICA) may be used to act against algorithmically driven online foreign interference, particularly hostile information campaigns driven by foreign actors to influence our elections. If falsehoods against the public interest are communicated online during an election period, the Government may issue directions under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 (POFMA), requiring the correct facts to be published. Additionally, all online election advertising during that period must abide by the relevant rules in the Parliamentary Elections Act 1954, for transparency and accountability. The Returning Officer can direct social media platforms to disable access to or remove any online election advertising that violates these rules. The Government will engage social media companies ahead of the upcoming General Elections to remind them of the need to comply with applicable laws, especially those concerning foreign interference.”
“Now, Sir, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Third time."”
“Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Home Affairs, I move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time." The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill is linked to the previous Bill on the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill. In the Second Reading speeches for that Bill and the debate we just had, the Minister for Home Affairs and I have explained the main amendments proposed in both Bills. Although Members have already raised their questions and expressed their views on both Bills during the earlier debate, I welcome Members to raise any additional questions they may have on the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill. Mr Speaker, I seek to move. 7.20 pm”
“Designated entities will need to disclose foreign donations and anonymous donations, foreign affiliations and their leadership compositions. They will also need to comply with certain leadership requirements, such as the requirement for their top office-bearers to be Singapore Citizens or PRs. All entities will be informed of MHA's intention to designate them and will be given 14 days to make representations or seek clarifications before the designation takes place. The Government is also prepared to grant exemptions to specific baseline measures on a case-by-case basis. To be clear, the baseline measures for designated race-based entities are meant to be a preventive measure. Being designated does not mean the entity is being targeted or has been compromised by a foreign actor. We are also not instructing designated race-based entities to stop receiving foreign donations or to end any foreign affiliations. They just need to disclose these matters on an annual basis to MHA. When subsequently operationalising the Bill, MHA will provide an information kit to designated entities to guide them in complying with the requirements. (In English): Mr Speaker, Sir, racial harmony will always remain a work-in-progress in Singapore. We build on efforts and learn from the lessons of the past. It is also our responsibility to plant new seeds in accordance with new circumstances and realities. This Bill does that. The Government will continue to do our part, but it will take a whole-of-society effort to sustain the progress we have made so that future generations of Singaporeans too will enjoy the peace and harmony that we enjoy today.”
“We recognise that there is a wide range of entities that engage with race-related issues. As a policy stance, we will start off in a practical and measured manner by only designating race-based entities assessed to have a higher potential of being vectors for malicious foreign influence, rather than subjecting all race-based entities to the measures. In the first instance, we will designate clan associations and business associations linked to the Chinese, Malay and Indian races. We will need time to assess these entities in these categories before we can inform them whether they will be designated. Clans and business associations, including those focused on trade promotion, that are assessed to be not linked to the Chinese, Malay and Indian races will not be designated at this juncture. However, we do not preclude designating such entities in the future as the foreign influence landscape evolves. I understand that there may be some anxiety amongst business associations as to whether they will be designated. Here, I would like to make two points. First, business associations and organisations whose objects, purposes or activities do not relate to any race will not be designated. Second, designation is not a reflection of any wrongdoing by the entity and should not be perceived as such. Each designation decision will be made holistically and based on its own merits. The list of the designated entities will be made public to promote transparency. Our estimate is that the designations will cover more than 300 race-based entities in the first instance. The baseline measures for designated race-based entities are similar to those that all religious groups are currently required to comply with under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act.”
“The Restraining Order regime allows us to take action pre-emptively against conduct that has the potential to inflame tensions between racial groups before it goes viral and causes irreparable damage to our social cohesion. This will complement existing levers, such as the Broadcasting Act and Online Criminal Harms Act, which provide ex-post powers against egregious race-related content on platforms such as social media services. I wish to assure Members that the Government will be very careful when exercising its power to issue Restraining Orders. The fact that no Restraining Orders have been issued to date since the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act was introduced in 1990 is reflective of this. Restraining Orders are also subject to a variety of safeguards. For instance, they must be reviewed by the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony. The introduction of the Restraining Order regime is in line with the public's views that racially offensive content should be removed quickly to prevent the erosion of racial harmony. The Restraining Order is intended to provide more levers to preserve our social cohesion, not to silence legitimate opinions on race even if the Government may disagree with them. The last proposal in this Bill will introduce safeguards against malicious foreign influence. As we know, Singapore is vulnerable to external actors exerting malicious foreign influence to achieve their own agenda. They may do so in many ways, for instance, by seeding ideas that are incompatible with our multiracial society. Entities that promote the interests of a racial group or discuss issues relating to race are therefore potential entry points for such malicious foreign influence.”
“] Today, we are introducing the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill. This Bill was announced by then-Prime Minister Lee in his 2021 National Day Rally Speech. At that time, we were in the thick of the COVID-19 pandemic and you might recall that several racist incidents were widely publicised on social media. It reminds us that although Singapore has come a long way in our race relations since our early years, racial harmony is not the natural order of things. We have to continue to work at it. This Bill is the latest in our suite of measures to strengthen social cohesion and safeguard racial harmony in Singapore. This is a new Bill but, in fact, much of what is in the Bill is not new. Similar provisions already exist in the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, which was enacted in 1990 and amended in 2019. This Bill aligns what we have for both race and religion, since the objectives of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act also apply in the context of racial harmony. This Bill has five key proposals: (a) port over existing race-related offences in the Penal Code; (b) introduce the CRI; (c) establish the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony; (d) establish the Restraining Order regime; and (e) introduce safeguards against foreign influence for race-based entities. I will further elaborate on the proposals dealing with the Restraining Order regime and safeguards against foreign influence for race-based entities. The Bill will enable the Minister for Home Affairs to make Restraining Orders against persons involved in the communication, production and distribution of content that prejudices the maintenance of racial harmony in Singapore.”
“The intent is to pre-empt, prevent or reduce any malicious foreign influence affecting the entity which may undermine racial harmony and present a threat to public peace and public order. This is the same threshold for a foreign influence Restraining Order to be issued under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. These stepped-up measures against a designated entity may do one or more of the following: (a) Prohibit the entity from accepting any donation from a specified foreign principal or any anonymous donation; (b) Require the entity to return or dispose of any donation from a specified foreign principal or any anonymous donation; (c) Prohibit the entity from forming or maintaining a specified foreign affiliation; and/or (d) Prohibit the entity from appointing, admitting or retaining a specified individual – whether or not the individual is a Singapore Citizen – as a member of its governing body, or require the entity to remove any individual who is not or who ceases to be a Singapore Citizen as a member of its governing body. These powers will, amongst others, mitigate the risk of Singapore Citizens becoming proxies for a foreign principal to exert influence over the race-based entity. Of note, while this policy intent is also relevant for religious groups, such a lever is not currently present in the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. Therefore, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act will be amended to introduce a similar provision. Foreign influence Restraining Orders will also be reviewed by the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony, and must be confirmed by the President, similar to the racial content Restraining Orders I spoke about earlier. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin, please. (In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.”
“This refers to arrangements or agreements where foreign persons or organisations have a position of control or power over the race-based entity. Third, designated entities will need to disclose the leadership composition of their governing body. Fourth, designated entities will need to comply with the following leadership requirements: one, their responsible officers must be Singapore Citizens or Singapore Permanent Residents (PRs). Responsible officers include the chairperson of the board of directors, the chief executive officer or the company secretary of a company; or the president, secretary and treasurer of a society; and two, the majority of the governing body, or anyone exercising functions analogous to a governing body member, are required to be Singapore Citizens. For the first three measures, I wish to highlight that the focus is on disclosure. There will not be a blanket prohibition for designated entities to stop accepting foreign donations or to end foreign affiliations. They just need to disclose these matters on an annual basis to MHA. The Government is prepared to grant exemptions to specific baseline measures on a case-by-case basis. Clause 32 provides an avenue for designated entities to apply to the Minister for exemption from some or all of the baseline measures. There is a similar process for religious groups under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. All entities will be notified ahead of being designated and will be provided time to submit their representations. Clause 27 empowers the Minister to issue foreign influence Restraining Orders to impose stepped-up measures on a specific race-based entity.”
“In the first instance, we will designate clan associations and business associations linked to the Chinese, Malay and Indian races. We will need time to assess the entities in these categories before we can inform them whether they will be designated. Clans and business associations, including those focused on trade promotion that are assessed not to be linked to the Chinese, Malay and Indian races, will not be designated at this juncture. However, we do not preclude designating such entities in the future, as the foreign influence landscape evolves. I understand that there may be some anxiety amongst business associations as to whether they will be designated. I will make two points: first, designation is not a reflection of any wrongdoing by the entity and should not be perceived as such; second, business associations and organisations whose objects, purposes or activities do not relate to any race, will not be designated. Each designation decision will be made holistically and on its own merits. The list of designated entities will be made public to promote transparency. Clauses 18, 19, 20, 23 and 24 of the Bill will introduce baseline measures against malicious foreign influence that designated race-based entities will have to comply with. These baseline measures are similar to those that all religious groups under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act have to comply with. First, designated entities will need to disclose donations accepted from foreign or anonymous sources. The disclosure requirements will be set out in the subsidiary legislation and will take reference from the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act as much as possible. Second, designated entities will need to disclose foreign affiliations.”
“Our starting point is this: as a small, open and digitally inclusive society, Singapore is vulnerable to external actors exerting malicious foreign influence to achieve their own agenda. We had thus introduced safeguards against malicious foreign influence for religious groups under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 2019. Similarly, entities that promote the interests of a racial group or discuss issues relating to race are potential entry points for malicious foreign influence, which may seek to exploit race for their own agenda and undermine our racial harmony. Singaporeans understand the foreign influence risks. The same MDDI poll I mentioned earlier provided the following insights: one, nearly seven in 10 respondents agreed that Singapore’s racial harmony could be threatened by malicious foreign influence; two, more than seven in 10 respondents agreed that there should be laws to protect race-based entities from malicious foreign actors. Clause 15 empowers a competent authority to designate a race-based entity if considered necessary or expedient to pre-empt, prevent or reduce any foreign influence that may undermine racial harmony in Singapore. An entity may be designated by the competent authority if it: one, represents or promotes the social, economic, political, educational, linguistic, cultural or other interests of any race; or two, discusses any issue relating to any race. We recognise that there is a wide range of entities that engage with race-related issues. As a policy stance, we will start off in a practical and measured manner by only designating race-based entities assessed to have a higher potential of being vectors for malicious foreign influence, rather than subjecting all race-based entities to the measures.”
“Therefore, having a single council would facilitate consultation by the Minister or Parliament on issues given the close relationship between race and religion in Singapore. To this end, the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony will have the following functions: one, to consider and report to the Minister or Parliament on matters affecting the maintenance of racial and religious harmony in Singapore which are referred to the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony by the Minister or by Parliament; and two, to consider and make recommendations to the President on Restraining Orders. In the context of this proposal, we will be introducing the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill. The Bill comprises amendments to the Constitution to enable the President to act in his discretion: (a) in deciding whether to act on the Presidential Council for Minority Rights’ advice on Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony appointments; and (b) in confirming, cancelling or varying a Restraining Order in cases where the Cabinet’s advice is different from the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony’s recommendation. These are the same powers that the President has today in relation to the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony and we are extending it to the new Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony. We have consulted the President on these amendments as they pertain to his discretionary powers. The President supports the amendments. Moving to the last proposal, we want to safeguard our racial harmony from malicious foreign influence.”
“The issuance of Restraining Orders will be subject to stringent safeguards. All Restraining Orders will be reviewed by a Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony, which I will elaborate on in the next proposal. The person who is issued a racial content Restraining Order will be able to make representations to the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony. The Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony’s independent recommendation on the Restraining Order will thereafter be sent to the President, followed by the Cabinet’s advice to the President. If the Cabinet’s advice is different from the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony’s recommendation, the President will be able to act in his discretion to confirm, cancel or vary the Restraining Order. Moving to the next proposal, clause 3 in this Bill will establish the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony, which will replace the existing Presidential Council for Religious Harmony. The Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony will comprise representatives from the major racial and religious communities in Singapore and those who have distinguished themselves in public service or community relations in Singapore. As with the existing Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, our intent is to ensure that the new Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony adequately represents the racial and religious diversity in our society. The proposal to replace the existing Presidential Council for Religious Harmony with the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony recognises that issues of race may have religious dimensions and vice versa.”
“But given our multiracial community, race features in some of our political structures. For example, we have the GRCs. We also have constitutional provisions to ensure that a President from a minority race will be elected periodically. Good faith discussions about race have always been an important part of our political discourse and will continue to be so. It would therefore not be right or possible to completely disallow racial discourse in politics. Thus, this will not be one of the grounds for the issuance of a racial content Restraining Order in this Bill. However, any behaviour that creates enmity between races, such as whipping up of communal feelings, denigration of a person’s race or encouragement of violence, have been and will continue to be prohibited by the law. The Restraining Order takes immediate effect once issued and this mirrors the amended Restraining Order process when the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act was amended in 2019. There is no need to first establish that the person is engaging in criminal conduct, as the intent is to quickly stop the spread of content that could potentially undermine social cohesion. Failure to comply with the Restraining Order will be an offence. The Government will be very careful when exercising its powers to issue Restraining Orders. The fact that no Restraining Orders have been issued to date, since the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act was introduced in 1990, is reflective of this. But neither is this an indication that the Restraining Order regime is not necessary. On the contrary, the mere existence of the regime is a deterrent against conduct that disrupts religious harmony. The same logic applies to the Restraining Order regime under this Bill.”
“Therefore, clause 8 of the Bill will enable the Minister for Home Affairs to make Restraining Orders against persons involved in the communication, production or distribution of content that prejudices the maintenance of racial harmony in Singapore. This will complement existing levers, such as the Broadcasting Act and Online Criminal Harms Act, which provide ex-post powers against egregious race-related content on platforms, such as social media services. Specifically, a racial content Restraining Order under the Bill may do one or more of the following: (a) prohibit a person from communicating or distributing specified information or material; (b) prohibit a person from addressing a specified audience on a specified subject; (c) require a person to take all reasonably practicable steps to ensure that any specified information or materials are no longer available to the general public in Singapore; (d) prohibit a person from printing, editing, assisting, or contributing to, any publication or a specified publication; and (e) prohibit a person from holding office in an editorial board or committee of any publication. There is one area where race is in a slightly different position as compared with religion, with regard to their respective roles in politics in Singapore. That difference is reflected in the difference between the Restraining Order regime under the Bill, and that in the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. Religion is a deeply personal issue. We have, as a society, emphasised that as a multi-religious but secular state, religion should not be mixed with politics. This is a foundational principle of our society. In the context of race, we have laws which deal with communal politics.”
“Mr Speaker, the Minister for Home Affairs has provided the context and set out the broad rationale for the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Bill. He also explained two of the five proposals on race-related offences and the Community Remedial Initiative (CRI). In my speech, I will provide details on the remaining three proposals: first, establishing a Restraining Order regime to enable the Government to act quickly and pre-emptively against content that threatens racial harmony; second, establishing the Presidential Council for Racial and Religious Harmony to advise on matters relating to the maintenance of racial and religious harmony in Singapore; and third, introducing safeguards against malicious foreign influence for race-based entities. I will start with the Restraining Order regime. This lever is not new in our statutes. The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act already has a Restraining Order regime against content that threatens religious harmony. This was deemed necessary because the Internet, social media and smartphones can enable offensive content to go viral very quickly. A 2024 poll conducted by MDDI, involving more than 1,000 Singapore residents, provided three insights: first, one in two respondents have encountered content in the online space that might be considered racist or racially insensitive; second, two in three agreed that allowing racially offensive content to spread could threaten racial harmony; and third, seven in 10 agreed with the need for racially offensive content to be removed as quickly as possible. The Government shares the view that there should be levers to quickly remove content that could undermine our racial harmony and prevent such content from being further disseminated.”
“I thank the Member for that question. There have been instances in the past where there have been questions raised in this House about manpower issues that the SPF faces. So, many of our NPPs have gone towards a "man-less" operation model. But what will happen is, if there are individuals who walk into our NPPs and ask for help to change their address, they will be guided to ICA for them to change their addresses at ICA. 2.00 pm”
“I thank the Member for her supplementary questions. Currently, the mailers are sent to the new address but, like I had shared in my response earlier, ICA is reviewing how this service is conducted and has instituted the use of facial verification under the "Myself" module. So, for the other modules, like "Myself and family members" as well as "Others", ICA is still reviewing what would be the best way forward in order to safeguard our electronic services. I am sorry. Could I ask about the second question again, please?”
“I thank the Member for her supplementary question. ICA had started investigating cases of unauthorised changes of address in September 2024. Initially, the cases appeared unconnected. Time was needed to investigate and triangulate information from various reports made. By December 2024, ICA had uncovered how the unauthorised changes of addresses were effected and what they were used for. In parallel, ICA was also reviewing the technical aspects of improving the security of the eCOA system. Following an internal assessment, ICA decided to suspend the eCOA service and did so on 11 January 2025. In hindsight, ICA could have taken steps to cease the service earlier in December 2024 when the modus operandi was established. But these are judgement calls that public officers have to make every day. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is reviewing with ICA what lessons we can draw from this incident.”
“If there have been monetary losses arising from the compromised Singpass accounts, Police will work with agencies and financial institutions to remediate the losses wherever possible. Third, Ms Joan Pereira asked what punishment would be meted out. Thirteen suspects have been arrested by the Police and investigations are ongoing. Four men have already been charged in court for offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1993. These offences carry penalties of imprisonment of up to three years, a fine of up to $10,000, or both, for first-time offenders. Details of the arrests and the offences for which the suspects have been charged are contained in SPF’s news releases. SPF will be making known other details in due course as its investigations progress further. Finally, regarding the photocopying of NRICs, under the Personal Data Protection Commission’s Advisory Guidelines, organisations are generally not allowed to collect, use or disclose copies of NRIC, as they contain personal data. Exceptions apply only where required under the law, or when it is necessary to accurately identify an individual. Organisations that fail to comply with these Guidelines may be in breach of their obligations under the Personal Data Protection Act.”
“ICA and the Singapore Police Force (SPF) have been working with the Government Technology Agency of Singapore (GovTech) and other Government agencies to mitigate the impact on these affected individuals. ICA has reached out to all 99 individuals to verify and restore the correct addresses. ICA is also assisting them to replace their physical NRIC, which will have a new date of issue. ICA is also working with other Government agencies to comprehensively assess the impact of the fraudulent change of address for the 71 individuals, in particular those whose address registered in ICA’s system had been used by other agencies to administer their schemes since the fraud began. These checks are ongoing. Agencies will provide the appropriate assistance and restoration if there has been any adverse impact on the calculation or disbursement of Government benefits, including Community Development Council (CDC) Vouchers, to these individuals. Of the 71 individuals whose addresses were successfully changed, the suspects went on to take over the Singpass accounts of 16 of the individuals. They did so by performing a password reset for the Singpass account and requesting for a physical PIN mailer to be sent to the newly registered address. Out of an abundance of caution, GovTech has suspended the Singpass accounts of all 99 affected individuals to prevent unauthorised activity, and has been in contact with them to reset and secure their Singpass accounts. SPF is also coordinating with Government agencies and private entities to stop or reverse any fraudulent activity originating from the 16 compromised Singpass accounts.”
“A key problem is that there was criminal action: people gave up their Singpass account to be misused. This criminal action, which was not anticipated, was the key reason why malicious actors were able to exploit the “Others” module in the eCOA service. They had first used Singpass accounts which had been relinquished, as proxies to initiate the change of address for another individual. Using the date of issue of NRIC as one of the three safeguards was reasonable, but proved not adequate, as malicious actors managed to get hold of the information. ICA has since introduced an additional security feature which is face verification when individuals use their Singpass account to log into the “Myself” module of the eCOA service to change their own residential address. This module has been resumed since 14 January 2025. The “Others” module and the “Myself and my family” module will remain suspended until additional safeguards can be put in place. The Government places high priority on the security of our digital services from illegal and malicious actors. This is both to maintain public confidence and to protect the public from harm. We constantly test and improve the security of our systems and will continue to do so. Second, let me address questions about the impact of the unauthorised changes of addresses and what assistance has been provided to the victims. ICA has reviewed all eCOA applications made through the “Others” module since October 2020, when the eCOA service was launched. ICA has ascertained that unauthorised changes took place only in the recent months, from August 2024 onwards. ICA has found that the suspects tried to change the registered addresses of 99 individuals. They succeeded in changing the addresses of 71 of the individuals.”
“The Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) has related questions in this Sitting and will address Mr Fahmi’s question on Singpass in its reply. First, let me explain the procedure for changing one’s registered address with the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA). The fraudulent changes of address had occurred through the “Others” module in ICA’s system for electronic change of address (eCOA). The “Others” module had been introduced for the benefit of non-digitally savvy residents, such as the elderly or disabled. It enables them to change their address online without having to make an in-person trip to ICA, by getting a proxy to help them. The proxy would log into the system using his or her own Singpass account and apply for a change of address for the individual by keying in the individual’s National Registration Identity Card (NRIC) number and date of issue of the NRIC. A physical personal identification number (PIN) mailer would then be sent to the individual at his new address. The proxy would log into the eCOA system a second time and with the PIN, complete the change of address for the individual. In designing and building our digital services, we have to make practical trade-offs between absolute security and useability. In the case of the eCOA service, there were safeguards in place, including the need to authenticate the proxy via Singpass log-in, the use of NRIC number and date of issue of the NRIC of the person whose address was to be changed, and the use of a physical PIN mailer. At that time, these were assessed to represent an acceptable balance between absolute security and useability. However, we now recognise that this service could be and was exploited by malicious actors.”
“Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to address Question Nos 8 to 12 raised by Ms Joan Pereira, Mr Leong Mun Wai and Ms Hazel Poa in today's Order Paper, and Mr Mohd Fahmi bin Aliman’s question scheduled for a future Sitting.”
“On 7 January 2025 at about 2.00 pm, the Police were alerted to an alleged assault involving two male students, which occurred at Admiralty Secondary School. One of the students sustained injuries and was conveyed to the hospital. The persons involved are known to one another and are assisting with investigations. It would not be appropriate for me to comment further at this point.”
“I thank the Member for her question. In line with established case law, the fact that an offender has committed an offence, whether it is out of financial need or in the hope of recouping his losses due to being a scam victim, in and of itself does not have any mitigating value, save in the most exceptional or extreme circumstances. But I would say that there might be other cases which may contain mitigating factors. For example, if it is a government official impersonation scam victim, and he went and he did money mule-related work, thinking that he was truly authorised by a government official, and he was deceived as to the nature of the money mule work that he was doing, then this would be taken into consideration by the courts.”
“Our assessment is that the existing penalties are currently adequate. Depending on the facts of the case, scammers and money mules, including those involved in scams that impersonate government officials may face charges which carry imprisonment terms of up to 10 years. However, many scammers are based overseas, making it difficult to identify and prosecute them. We have hence focused on punishing and deterring those in Singapore who facilitate scams. For example, in 2023, we amended the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act to allow the Police to take firmer enforcement action against money mules, whose bank accounts are used to perpetrate scams and other crimes. We have also worked with the Inter-agency Sentencing Advisory Panel to publish sentencing guidelines for certain scams related offences last year. The guidelines recommend that significant imprisonment terms should be the norm for scam related offences. For example, the recommended starting sentence is six months' imprisonment for negligently handing over control of one's bank account to another person; and 18 months' imprisonment for handing over control of his bank account to another person, knowing or having reason to believe that this would assist the person in retaining criminal proceeds. The Ministry of Home Affairs regularly reviews the adequacy of our criminal penalties and will likewise do so for scams-related offences.”
“Mr Speaker, I move the amendment* to the Long Title as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. [(proc text) *The amendment read as follows: (proc text)] [(proc text) In page 3: to leave out "conducted remotely". (proc text)] [(proc text) Amendment agreed to. (proc text)] [(proc text) Bill reported with amendments; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]”
“Mr Speaker, I move the amendment* to clause 2 as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement. [(proc text) *The amendment read as follows: (proc text)] [(proc text) In page 4, line 5: to leave out "substantially". (proc text)] [(proc text) Amendment agreed to. (proc text)] [(proc text) Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)] [(proc text) Clauses 3 to 11 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)] [(proc text) The Schedule ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)] Long Title –”
“I thank the Member for the two points that he raised. When we looked at the cases, in particular, when we looked at government official impersonation scams, we looked at investment scams, we looked at love scams, we are looking at losses per case of between, on average, $150,000 and $1 million. We have also had a couple of outliers when we are talking about a couple of million dollars. So, it is very hard for me to be able to pinpoint a number to say that because we now have this RO regime in place that "X" amount of scam losses will be prevented every month. All I can say is that when we looked at the cases that the Police have encountered, when we looked at the cases that the Police have to be activated, where they have gone down, to their best efforts, together with family members and friends and try and convince scam victims that they are scam victims and still, unfortunately, the victims continued to believe that they are not scam victims – when we look at those cases, in particular, because it happens over a period of time, the losses are pretty substantial. On the second point that the Member raised, I mentioned in my speech that the RO could be expanded to include other entities, such as cryptocurrency exchanges, remittance companies and e-wallet providers, should scammers shift their tactics to exploit these platforms. So, we recognise that there is a risk that such entities can also serve as intermediaries in a scam chain, but for a start, we are imposing restrictions only on bank accounts and credit facilities. But we will continue to work with MAS to monitor the scam situations and we will consider expanding the scope of the RO in future if necessary. 3.06 pm”
“Thank you. There is a mechanism whereby different stakeholders share trends that they observe. The only thing I would say is that for some of the social media companies, they have certain data protection laws. So, while they have not disagreed with the sharing of information and data that they see and observe, sometimes, there is a certain lag time, because they need to process the information on their end, make sure that the information is in the form that can be shared with external parties. Therefore, we see that there could be a lapse in terms of timing when it comes to the sharing of information. But definitely, the key principle of sharing information and data between platforms, between stakeholders to tackle the scourge of scams, that principle is something that we all collectively agree with.”
“I thank the Member for his two points. Firstly, in my opening speech, I had shared that the Bill alone will not significantly dent the total number of scams. I also mentioned that we require a whole-of-society effort and we will have to work with stakeholders collectively to fight the scourge of scams. That said, when we look at the cases we have encountered, because the cases we are targeting right now are those that involve social engineering. And the cases I had cited – government official impersonation scams, love scams, investment scams – we have observed that the losses from these categories of scams, especially if they are over a long period of time, can lead to quite large amount of losses. So, while in terms of the number of scams that could be deterred through this Bill which we approximate to be between five and 10 cases a month, I think we should not neglect the fact that actually, the absolute amounts arising from these losses could be substantial. And definitely, when we look at it on an individual basis, we could be talking about the loss of lifetime savings. But that said, this is but one of many other methods and many other initiatives we are undertaking to fight the scourge of scams. We should not downplay the importance of public education because at the end of the day, when it comes to socially-engineered scams, the best defence really is a discerning public. Sorry, could I ask the Member to repeat the second question?”
“These are outside the scope of the Bill and Members may wish to file Parliamentary Questions on these. Ms Usha Chandradas also suggested for MHA to consider including art as a tool to address the root causes behind the perpetration of scams by victims. We note Ms Ng's and Ms Chandradas' suggestions and will take them into account, as we review our overall approach to tackle scams. Mr Yip Hon Weng suggested for the Government to strengthen cross-border enforcement against scams and do more to educate the public on scams. Cross-border enforcement is indeed a priority, given the transnational nature of scams. The Police have strong operational ties with their counterparts in key jurisdictions and work with international organisations, such as the INTERPOL, to exchange information and conduct joint investigations. But, importantly, it would be even better to prevent such scams from materialising in the first place and this is why we fully agree with Mr Yip Hon Weng that public education is a critical area of work. We recently launched the ScamShield Suite to make scam resources easily accessible to the public. The new 1799 helpline, which operates 24/7, offers the public an easy option to check with whenever they are unsure if a situation they are facing is a scam. MHA will share more on our public education initiatives at the upcoming Committee of Supply debate. Mr Speaker, Sir, fighting scams is a whole-of-society effort. The threat will keep evolving and we must ensure that we have the appropriate tools to deal with this threat, as this Bill aims to do. We will continue to evolve our methods, evolve our laws, to continue our fight against scams. I thank the Members for their support for the Bill. I seek to move.”
“Mr Yip Hon Weng and Assoc Prof Razwana Begum asked if the Government could provide banks with the necessary guidelines, training or support to ensure that banks are able to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction. Members had also asked if MHA would consider having periodic reviews of bank processes or to facilitate sharing of best practices among banks, to ensure implementation effectiveness across the board. Mr Neil Parekh also asked if it would be useful to establish a single regulatory body to coordinate the processes among the banks, the regulatory authorities and the officers. Mr Gerald Giam also suggested for real-time coordination between the Police, MAS, the banks and other platforms to enhance enforcement against scams. There are ongoing efforts to do so. Since 2022, the ASCom and MAS have worked with the major retail banks in Singapore to co-locate the banks' staff with ASCom. This has greatly enhanced the banks' real-time coordination with the Police to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction, trace fund flows and freeze bank accounts suspected to be involved in scammers' operations. We welcome other stakeholders, including social media platforms, to co-locate within ASCom, to improve real-time coordination. The Police also regularly share observations with banks to improve their fraud detection capabilities. This model has worked well and we will continue to build upon it to strengthen enforcement against scammers and recovery of scam proceeds. We agree with the suggestion to facilitate the sharing of best practices amongst banks and we are considering how to do so efficiently and effectively. Ms Ng Ling Ling and Mr Gerald Giam raised a number of suggestions to tackle scams, including on SRF, Money Lock and Kill Switch.”
“That said, however, as pointed out by Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, the Police have, indeed, observed cases where scammers introduced elements of physical interaction to strengthen the deception and, hence, we have amended the Bill to ensure that the ROs can be applied in such cases. The offences in the law include, cheating and offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 and the Computer Misuse Act 1993. These offences cover the full range of acts that constitute or facilitate scams. And to send a stronger deterrent signal, guidelines issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel have recommended higher sentences for acts that facilitate scams. I will now cover other issues and suggestions from Members and as these matters fall outside the scope of this Bill, I will address them very briefly. Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked if MHA would consider getting the banks to increase the number of checks required before a fund transfer can be allowed, to buy the authorities more time to engage and convince the individual. Banks have improved their real-time fraud surveillance in detecting possible fraudulent transactions. Today, bank staff may call up their customers to verify their transactions, if suspicious activity is detected. Cooling periods, such as those for the activation of digital tokens and other high-risk activities, will help to slow down selected transactions and give individuals more time to think about the transfers. Ultimately, banks will have to balance between fraud prevention and customer experience, as they consider ways to enhance their anti-scam measures.”
“Thus, it is a close approximate to the current order to freeze the bank account of the suspected scam victim. Mr Sharael Taha suggested for banks to be held liable for losses incurred resulting from their failure to comply with an RO, in addition to a heftier maximum fine quantum. He also asked if banks could, additionally, be mandated to stop transactions, if informed by a victim that the transactions were fraudulent. I would like to say that there is a strong level of cooperation between the Police and the banks at the ASCom and this partnership has helped to stop many scams, even without the RO regime. As I have mentioned, MHA shares the desire to minimise inconveniences for the affected individual. However, to guard against the risk of abuse, any request for funds will have to be assessed based on facts and circumstances of each case. Upon application by an individual to the Police, he will be allowed to withdraw a fixed sum of money, which will be reasonable and sufficient for basic sustenance, including their bill payments, which I had mentioned earlier. Should the individual request for more money, thereafter, the Police will require him to show proof of the need to access the money. This is to avoid the risk of scammers exploiting this mechanism to obtain monies from the individual. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked if the definition of scams covered by the Bill is sufficient, given that it may be difficult to distinguish between scams and traditional cheating cases. The Police regard scams as cheating offences that are conducted remotely, online or over telecommunications. Traditional cheating, on the other hand, involves mostly physical interactions, where the other party is known to the individual in real time.”
“These would include, but are not limited to: one, any evidence that the individual has taken up additional safeguards willingly and, therefore, the Restriction Order is no longer required for his protection; and two, any evidence that the individual is not a target of scams, such as proof that the other party is legitimate. On Assoc Prof Razwana's suggestion for individuals subject to an RO to be automatically referred for independent legal advice, individuals are free to seek their own legal advice and avail themselves of the appeal mechanism. In operationalising the Bill, we will ensure that victims are adequately supported and appeals are fairly assessed. I would also like to remind Members that the Police will always try to engage the victim before deciding whether to proceed with an RO, since the RO is intended to be a lever of last resort. So, we will not have a situation where the Police decides to proceed with the RO without trying to find out the perspective of the victim first. Mr Neil Parekh asked about the limits of immunity granted to banks and their staff, particularly, in cases of unintentional errors. A bank and its officer, employee or agent will be protected from criminal and civil liability for any act or omission in complying with an RO. The immunity applies only if the act was done or the omission was made with reasonable care and in good faith. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked if imposing a fine of up to $3,000 on banks for contravening an RO without reasonable excuse is sufficient. This is in line with section 35(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is in relation to banks being ordered by the Police to seize property held in their account or safe deposit box.”
“Ms Usha Chandradas and Mr Sharael Taha as well as Assoc Prof Razwana Begum had asked who the Specified Officers engaging the individuals would be, including their seniority and qualification, and how MHA would ensure that these powers are not subject to abuse. Mr Neil Parekh, Mr Yip Hon Weng and Ms Usha Chandradas asked about the documentation requirements for an appeal, how long it would take for the Commissioner of Police to review an appeal and whether hearings should be allowed for appeals. Mr Yip also asked if the Government would conduct regular reviews on the decisions regarding appeals or publish anonymised outcomes of such appeals. I trust that Members will agree with me that our officers can be expected to perform their duties professionally and impartially. The Police will institute internal controls such that the initial approving authority for ROs will reside with the Director of the Commercial Affairs Department or, in his absence, a Deputy Director of the Commercial Affairs Department. To ensure no conflict of interest in the appeals process, appeals will be decided by the Commissioner of Police, whose decision is final. The appeal process has been designed with speed in mind to ensure that an appeal can be decided expeditiously, issued judiciously and officers are held accountable for the exercise of this power. MHA will prescribe in subsidiary legislation, the documents and information an individual will need to provide when submitting an appeal.”
“Ms Poa also asked what proof an individual would need to show for withdrawals, how will the Police determine the quantum of the withdrawals and whether the amount withdrawn would be subjected to further restrictions or monitoring. If the individual requires additional amounts of money, the individual can apply to the Police to vary the RO to allow a specific transfer or withdrawal by showing proof of the need to access these amounts. This could include, for example, bill statements, such as for medical expenses, utility and rental payments, or any documentation as requested by the Police. Every request will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, based on the needs of each individual. This amount will not be subjected to further restriction or monitoring, since it has been assessed to be necessary for the individual. MHA agrees with Ms Poa's suggestion and has, in fact, considered exempting individuals from certain legitimate facilities, such as GIRO bill payments. However, the banks have informed us that it is not feasible to exempt selected transactions from the RO without significant system changes. Again, this is not ideal but we have decided to go ahead with the Bill at this juncture, given the importance of providing victims with the necessary protection at the soonest. But we hear your feedback and we will continue to work with banks towards allowing for these exemptions. On the question of lead time required before an individual can access his funds, once the Police have assessed if the individual should be allowed access to funds, the Police will work with the banks to arrange for the individual to make the withdrawal at a bank branch. We are working with the banks on the operational details and our intent is to ensure that this is done as quickly as possible.”
“" that directs victims to support from victim care officers and to community support in the form of mental well-being and counselling support. Mr Neil Parekh asked about the process for individuals to apply to lift or modify an RO. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how quickly a restriction on an account can be lifted, especially if a wrong account gets blocked. Ms Ng Ling Ling asked if there would be mechanisms to allow an individual who is subjected to an RO to access limited funds for his daily expenses while investigations are underway. Mr Sharael Taha and Ms Hazel Poa suggested for an individual subjected to an RO to have immediate access to sufficient funds, instead of having to apply for it. We understand the need to minimise inconvenience to the affected individual. However, we are also mindful that the scammer may exploit any channel through which the individual can gain access to money. We will therefore take a risk-calibrated approach, by allowing an individual who is the subject of an RO to apply to the Police for access to a fixed amount of monies for living expenses. MHA and MAS are working with the banks on the operational details, including the amount of time required to impose or lift an RO. Our intent is to ensure that this is done as quickly as possible – we are talking about hours, not days. Notwithstanding, if the bank makes a mistake in complying with the RO and blocks a wrong account, the bank should rectify the mistake immediately. Ms Hazel Poa asked if an individual can be exempted from certain legitimate facilities, such as GIRO bill payments, or have any financial penalties arising from late bill payments waived, during the period where the RO is in effect.”
“The Police do not currently track the number of cases where Police officers have been activated to engage potential victims, as well as the number of successful and unsuccessful interventions. Notwithstanding, based on the Police’s experience, we expect to issue five to 10 ROs per month, mainly for scam victims. The actual number will depend on the cases that are brought to the Police’s attention and their assessment of each case. Ms Hazel Poa and Assoc Prof Razwana noted that some victims may be emotionally affected when being prevented from sending money to the scammer and asked how the Police intend to support such individuals in course of them being subject to an RO. She also suggested for MHA to require the Police to take into account the views of a social worker before issuing an RO. As I have mentioned, speed is of the essence in order to protect these individuals and minimise losses, which in some cases might involve all of the victim's life savings. Hence, an RO will be issued once the Police have assessed that the conditions for an issuance is satisfied. Notwithstanding, victims who require emotional support during the process may inform the investigation officer, who will arrange for them to speak to a victim care officer. MHA will work with the Police on the operational details to ensure that victims are adequately supported. I have made available copies of a pamphlet with frequently asked questions for victims of scams and avenues for them to consult mental well-being counselling and other financial assistance channels. This copy, a resource guide, is available for Members at the entrance and exit for the Parliamentary Chamber. Members can see that there is a section called "Where can I seek support?”
“Family members may also bring in social workers and counsellors to help convince the victim. That said, the issuance of an RO is not contingent on a police report by a family member or other third parties, as this may not be necessary and may even delay our efforts to protect our victim. For example, the Police may uncover potential scam victims in the course of investigating mule accounts, or the Police may be alerted by bank staff of an individual who is suspected to be a scam victim. For such cases, it is not necessary and may be less efficient to require a family member or other third party to file a police report. The Police are required to perform due diligence checks and will issue an RO if the threshold for issuance is met. Assoc Prof Jamus Lim asked if a trusted friend or relative could be empowered to freeze transactions, in lieu of the Police. Earlier in my opening speech, I had provided an example where if the victim and the sibling agree on an arrangement where the sibling will monitor the victim's transactions via a joint account and can advise the victim against making further transfers to the scammer, the Specified Officer may not issue an RO. That said, I would like to reiterate that the decision to issue an RO will be made by the Police. The Police would have been engaging with the individual and his family members for some time, and the Police will be in the best position to make an objective and informed decision. Mr Gerald Giam asked about the estimated number of ROs that would be issued in a year and the potential losses that could have been avoided if we had implemented this earlier.”