Teo Chee Hean
Singapore
“The second point first, Mr Speaker. Certainly, it could have been a factor. But to the Panel which reviewed the thing, it was not an acceptable excuse or reason. The agencies still have to be responsible for what they are doing, whatever season of the year it is.”
“On the balance in ACRA, I would not say it is a conflict, but you have to strike the right balance between the functions that ACRA is meant to provide, which is to have a registry which promotes corporate transparency, and you have to balance that against how you protect personal data.”
“That means, if you do find a bug or you do find a way in which you can penetrate a Government system, you let us know, and there is a bounty for it. And this is evergreen. But we also do, from time to time, have a hunting season. So, for certain of our systems, we invite white hatters to attack those systems.”
“Then, he asked when the political office holders got involved in the public communications on the Bizfile portal issue. They got involved, I think, almost as soon as it became apparent that there was public anxiety. Next question about paragraph 40 and the email to senior officers, yes, the July 2024 CM was emailed to officers.”
“In fact, we monitor the dark web for a variety of things, including this, and we have not seen any sale of NRIC numbers as such. On the question of collection and use of NRIC numbers, actually, in the communication with the Government agencies, I think it is important to know who you are communicating with.”
“So, you actually make your email address available to others. But for authentication purposes, it is quite different. You do not tell your password to others. That is something which you keep for yourself and your email service provider knows. So, there is a difference between an identifier and an authentication.”
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“On the NCMPs, we go into an election with the intention of fighting for every vote and winning every seat. But there is a floor of nine and subsequently, 12 NCMP Opposition voices in Parliament, regardless of the outcome. A floor, not a cap, Mr Perera. And this will always guarantee Opposition voices in Parliament.”
“On the issue of referendum, I think it was Mr Leon Perera who suggested a referendum. And I would not be very trigger-happy on a referendum, unless there are fundamental issues involved. In this case, I think the WP has made a mountain out of a molehill. I explained just now that, for example, on the CPA's powers, the WP has gone out and said that we have created new powers for the CPA which are even bigger than those of the Elected President and the Government. This is entirely untrue. So, if the basic structure of the system has not changed and we are making increments to it, I think it is a matter of judgement whether it is absolutely necessary to go for a referendum or not. But I would leave the WP to decide, when they have developed fully the idea of an elected senate, whether they would want to try and request for a referendum. I leave it up to you. But I suggest that there is a more straightforward way of doing it. It is to make that part of your platform for the next GE. Campaign on it. If you win, implement it. Turning to the risk of politicisation and the possible tightening of rules for the Presidential Elections, the risk of politicisation is there. I have addressed it explicitly just now in my answer. But I think what Mr Leon Perera suggests, and what the Commission suggests also, is to look at rules and the way that Presidential Elections are conducted. I think there is merit, and I agree with Mr Leon Perera there. On the staffing of the CPA, I would say that the President and the CPA, if they do need staffing and resources, the Government will certainly consider providing. Our purpose is to have these institutions operate well and to do their functions well.”
“Madam, sometimes, silence speaks louder than words.”
“Just very clearly, so do you support or not the reserved election for the next Presidential Election? I did not hear your answer, I am sorry.”
“Mdm Speaker, I seem to detect some reluctance on the part of Mr Faisal Manap to answer my question definitively. So, perhaps, I will give the Member another opportunity to answer the question and then we can assess whether he is reluctant to do so.”
“Mdm, can the Member answer my question rather than going into another speech.”
“In this context, Madam, maybe I should ask Mr Faisal Manap whether he and the WP welcome and support the reserved election for a Malay candidate in the next Presidential Election. Just a straight answer.”
“Madam, why now? The Member would recall – when did we introduce the GRC scheme? Was it in 1988? Yes. Not long before the Elected Presidency. There were some discussion and controversy after that also. But today, the GRC system is well accepted. In fact, Mr Fasial Manap is here because he is part of the GRC team, too. I think it is well-accepted, and minority MPs and NCMPs are accepted as colleagues. But it has enabled a stable system and a system which encourages racial relations to pull together, rather than to pull apart. That has helped. We had the Elected Presidency in 1991; that was when it was introduced. We could have done it then, it was considered but we decided to wait and see what the outcome would be. And you can see, after 25 years, it is not so easy to achieve such an outcome if you just leave things on their own. So, rather than wait and leave it for the future, the Prime Minister fought strongly that this is something that we ought to do now, before feelings or misunderstandings arise in the future. How many Malays are eligible? I think I answered that question. I said there are minority candidates. I do not know how many there are in the private sector. I know there are in the public sector. Because in the private sector, they do not generally declare race for their officeholders, unless Mr Faisal Manap is suggesting that this is something that they do. For the feelings and perceptions, Mdm Speaker, this is something which we do on an ongoing basis, every day. Every day, we tend to these issues of race and religion, not just once in a while or when there is a committee. We tend to it every day. And I hope that Mr Faisal Manap does as well.”
“It is our duty to make sure that the system continues to do the same for future generations. That we leave the generations to come with the Reserves that will help us survive and bounce back in a crisis; not empty coffers or a debt to repay because we have failed to put in safeguards when we could. Mdm Speaker, today, we enjoy racial harmony. Our Reserves are strong and healthy. Our Public Service is honest and able. These are not things that come about on their own. They require both good people and good systems in place. Let us, then, Members from both sides of this House, do the responsible thing today, by putting in place the safeguards that will help ensure that we continue to have good governance, and a harmonious and stable future for those who will come after us. Mdm Speaker, I beg to move and I urge all Members to give your support to the Bill. [Applause.]”
“As a Naval officer, I received my appointment as the Chief of Navy from President Wee Kim Wee in June 1991, shortly after the new provisions for Elected Presidency came into force. The Chief of Navy is one of those appointments that require the President's concurrence. And I have served in Cabinet, when Presidents Ong Teng Cheong, SR Nathan and Tony Tan carried out their Presidential duties, including the additional custodial roles of the office. They did so with dignity and grace, reaching out to all communities and doing us proud internationally. They exercised their custodial powers with integrity, circumspectly, and with independence of mind. Mdm Speaker, in my own lifetime, I have seen how our Presidents, collectively, have stood for our values as a multiracial society, as a unifying symbol of a united, harmonious Singapore. I want my children, my grandchildren and the children of every community in Singapore to see in their own lifetimes the rich ethnic diversity that is Singapore reflected in the Presidency. The changes that we are making to provide for ethnic representation will ensure that they do so. Mdm Speaker, the Pioneer Generation of Singaporeans had no Reserves to protect. They lived by the sweat of their brow, and worried about how the vagaries of life might throw them and our country on hard times. They saved, scrimped and steadily built up our Reserves, so that by the mid-1980s, we actually had Reserves and had something to protect. Before that, we did not, which is why we did not need to have a President to safeguard and protect the reserves. This is what they have bequeathed to us. The Elected Presidency has helped to safeguard these Reserves accumulated by previous generations.”
“You cannot make this proposal and disappear. You may try to retreat into rousing rhetoric, but you have to answer the questions in detail. We are looking not for rousing rhetoric, but practical policy, practical programmes, and also how one can execute these things, and where the resources are going to come from. We can do this in Parliament, engage the Opposition on these things, rather than fighting with shadows who appear and disappear in the night. Ultimately, Singapore and Singaporeans will benefit from such debate and the diversity of views. Mdm Speaker, let me conclude. There has been vigorous debate over the past three days on eligibility criteria, representation of communities in the office of President and other specific details.It is important that we stand back and end by bringing the focus back to the key principles underlying the EP. First, the President is the key symbol of our multiracial nation. The importance of this symbolism is something that has touched my life since my young days as a schoolboy. I remember, as a schoolboy in the National Cadet Corps (NCC), saluting President Yusof Ishak and marching proudly past him in the rain at the National Day Parade on the Padang. I still recall his funeral procession 46 years ago and the crowds that lined the streets to bid farewell to him. I remember receiving my commission as a Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) officer, and the President's Scholarship from the hand of President Benjamin Sheares, and then later serving as an Aide-de-Camp (ADC) to him and also attending at his funeral. After President Sheares' passing, I continued to serve proudly as an ADC to President Devan Nair. I have also experienced the additional custodial powers of the President.”
“This shows that being an NCMP offers advantages, not least of which are public exposure and Parliamentary experience. Ms Sylvia Lim herself has been a beneficiary of this and has said so. Mdm Speaker, Mr Leon Perera has said that we would not have introduced the NCMP scheme for the benefit of the Opposition alone. Surely, the PAP benefits from it, too. Well, the Government has found the presence of NCMPs in Parliament useful. All the three NCMPs have made their views heard during the debate over the past three days. But it benefits the PAP in a way that is different from what Mr Perera implies. Let me explain. It helps the PAP in two ways. First, and this point has also been made by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, it exposes PAP MPs to the types of arguments that Opposition MPs – how you take a situation, how you turn it to your political advantage and to score political points, how you twist, how you turn, how you argue. He wanted our PAP Members to have this experience in this House, not just during GEs, but every time this House sat. And I think we have had ample demonstrations of this throughout the terms of Parliament that we have had. And also, teach our PAP Members, to give them the experience of how to respond clearly and calmly. Second, and equally importantly, it allows the Government to engage the Opposition, unlike "phantoms in the night" that turn up only at GEs, make claims, not engage, and then disappear again. Here, policy alternatives have to be put up, scrutinised, examined and discussed. Just as the Opposition questions and examines the policies that the Government puts up, the Government examines the policies and the proposals that the Opposition puts up, just as we have seen over the past few days with the WP's proposal for the elected senate.”
“So, rather than legislate female representation in the office of President, we should identify, support and encourage qualified female candidates to run for presidency. Before I conclude on this segment, may I say that I was also very moved when the Prime Minister announced yesterday that the next election for the presidency would be a reserved election for Malays and I will explain to you why later on. Let me now address the questions raised by Members on the NCMP scheme. Mr Seah Kian Peng spoke about the changes to the NCMP scheme and asked how granting NCMPs full voting rights would relate to the role and responsibility of the elected Members. Madam, the NCMP scheme ensures that there will always be Opposition voices in Parliament. A floor of nine today, a floor of 12 in the future – not a cap, Mr Perera. The NCMPs secured the highest votes among the candidates who did not win the seat they contested. They have contributed their views to debates in Parliament, and we want to give more weight to these opposition voices in Parliament by giving them a vote in those additional areas where they currently do not have a vote. However, this does not diminish or detract from the vital role and responsibilities that we, as elected Members, have to serve the needs of our constituents. This is a vital, important and critical role and duty that we have. Mr Dennis Tan and Mr Leon Perera repeated the WP's contention that the scheme distracts and dissuades voters from voting in Opposition MPs. Madam, the Worker's Party has taken up its full quota of NCMP seats and it has even positioned candidates from specific constituencies to be NCMPs in preference to other candidates.”
“Ms Joan Pereira asked whether a separate, fourth category for Eurasians could be established for the safeguard mechanism. Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef spoke about mixed-race marriages. The model that the Constitutional Commission has proposed, and the mechanics we have adopted in the Bill, closely follow the framework for racial classification in the GRC system. The framework has worked well. Committees will be established to certify whether a person belongs to the Chinese community, Malay community or Indian and other minority communities. The mechanics of these will be dealt with in the amendments to the Presidential Elections Act. Any person who does not fall within one of the three racial groupings may still contest in open elections. Ms Joan Pereira asked whether we should ensure the representation of the major racial communities in the CPA. The Commission considered this but did not find this necessary. It highlighted that the primary role of the CPA is to provide expert advice to the President in the exercise of his discretionary powers. Unlike the President, the CPA is not intended to discharge a symbolic role as an expression of our national identity the way the Presidency is. This is a critical distinction between the Presidency and the CPA, which justifies the need to ensure racial diversity in the former but not the latter. The Government agrees with the Commission. Mr Louis Ng and Ms Jessica Tan spoke about the lack of representation of women in the office of President. Madam, if we look at some of the sizeable companies and key public sector offices, the pool of women who qualify is not insignificant.”
“Race is likely to have an effect in elections that are moderately close. That is why we have introduced the hiatus safeguard mechanism recommended by the Constitutional Commission. It addresses present realities, while encouraging us to strive to achieve our goals and aspirations. Is it perfect? No. Does it have some drawbacks? Yes. Does it help us to achieve our aim of having multiracial representation in the Presidency from time to time? Yes. Does it do it in a way which is self-extinguishing if we reach a point where we are race-blind? Yes. I think the Commission has applied its mind and come up with a good solution for our times. Mr Yee Chia Hsing asked whether a gap of five terms was too long for the hiatus safeguard mechanism. The Commission had proposed five terms as they felt it would strike a right balance between ensuring minority representation while not being too invasive or prescriptive. A gap that is too short, in effect, would create a rotation among races, which could impede our progress towards the ideal of a society where race is no longer a significant issue and the Government agrees. I think some of the most passionate and best speeches we have heard in the last few days have been on this subject of race and ethnicity. Several Members of Parliament – Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, on the first day, Mr Masagos Zulkifli, Ms Kuik Shiao-Yin, Ms Rahayu Mahzam, and others – spoke from the heart – and Ms Chia Yong Yong just now as well, from deep in the heart. Mr Kok Heng Leun, too. And I think this is an advance on the way that we interact with one another, the way we look at one another and at ourselves. We hope that with this process we will become a better country, a more integrated country, and a more multiracial, truly multiracial, country.”
“When we introduced the GRC scheme, there were similar concerns expressed about how we make sure that there is adequate racial representation. And, if I may add as a footnote, I think Mr Leon Perera fully understands why we have an Ethnic Integration Policy and how it has helped to avoid concentration of races and to make sure that we live together in harmony in all our housing estates, and yet he chose to raise it in a very political way in his speech just now. Mdm Speaker, as a result of these policies, we have expanded the common space, facilitated racial integration and ensured that our politics remain above race and religion. Contrast this with the approach that France has taken, which Dr Tan Wu Meng alluded to in his speech on Monday. In principle, the approach that France takes espouses a "colour-blind" approach to race relations. But, in effect, what has happened is that it has masked the stark differences in socioeconomic opportunities and outcomes between the races, which has, in turn, led to racial tension and strife. I was in France recently, about a month-and-a-half ago, and had a deep discussion with my French counterparts and interlocutors on radicalisation. Senior French officials, scholars and those who were doing community work acknowledge that there are deep fissures in their society. They are trying to grapple with it. But they run up against their long-held belief that the issue of race would go away if one simply does not acknowledge race and racial differences. But the issue has not gone away. Racial differences have been accentuated and become worse over time. Mdm Speaker, we have come a long way. But achieving a society where individuals make decisions independent of racial considerations will take time, as the recent CNA-IPS survey suggests.”
“He referred to Articles 5A, 5B and 5C. These actually reflect the broader framework set out in the new Articles 37ID, 37IE and 37IF, which deal with the disclosure of the President's and CPA's reasons in the general context of the President's veto powers. As stated in the White Paper, the proposed approach seeks to strike a suitable balance between enhancing the CPA's and the President's accountability for matters involving vetoes on the one hand and protecting potentially sensitive and confidential information on the other. The three-stage approach I have set out in my opening speech gives form to this approach. I now turn to the second issue: whether we should ensure the representation of the various racial communities in the Elected Presidency. Does race matter? Mdm Speaker, many Members have supported the need to ensure the representation of the various racial communities in the Elected Presidency. The issue is how we achieve this representation. Singapore has made significant progress in building a multiracial society. It is difficult to do. Countries have fallen apart even when they have lived in harmony for decades, even a century or two. We are only 50 years old. We are in a better situation than most countries and have managed to avoid the toxic racial debates and tensions that we see elsewhere precisely because the Government has always taken an honest, preemptive, open and active approach to fostering multiracialism. We did not leave this to chance. As Mr Edwin Tong mentioned yesterday, we see this in HDB's Ethnic Integration Policy and in the ethnic-based self-help groups, such as MENDAKI and the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA). We also see this in the GRC scheme, which has ensured multiracial representation in Parliament.”
“The Parliament – as the "most important deliberative body in the country" – has the opportunity to take a look, or a "second look", at the matter, and can decide by a two-thirds majority to proceed with the proposal. So, ultimately, whether the Government makes a decision with the President's concurrence, the President disagrees with the Government's decision, or Parliament overrules the President's disagreement, it is always an elected institution that makes the decision. At this juncture, I should address the points raised by Assoc Prof Daniel Goh on the standing and independence of the CPA. I found it very disappointing that Assoc Prof Goh repeatedly suggested yesterday that the CPA is a politicised body, while providing no substantiation for such a serious claim. Lowering the dignity of the CPA's role and standing in this manner is entirely uncalled for. Mdm Speaker, I speak on behalf of the Government when I say that the CPA members are eminent members of our society who have done much good work throughout their terms of CPA office. The CPA members are highly distinguished, competent and experienced persons who have given willingly of themselves to Public Service and their record of service and integrity speak for themselves. They have always acted independently of their appointing authorities, and advised the President based on what, in their judgment, is in the best interests of Singapore. The changes that we have proposed further strengthen the CPA and enhance its ability to play its enlarged role. We have added two members to the CPA as well so that the President can benefit from a wider range of views. Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan asked about the disclosure of the President's and the CPA's grounds in a situation where the President exercises his veto.”
“The WP has suggested that the Bill elevates the unelected CPA to an "alternative centre of power". They create a spectre of this very powerful CPA vetoing and blocking everything. It is just simply not true. If you read the White Paper, if you listen to my speech and if you look at the diagram, you will know that it is not true. Mr Pritam Singh and Assoc Prof Daniel Goh have referred to the CPA as a "third key" and questioned its moral authority. Ms Sylvia Lim and Mr Leon Perera said that the CPA can "checkmate" or "block" the President. Mr Low Thia Khiang even went so far as to suggest that the CPA's power exceeds that of the elected President, or even the Government itself, and said that, at critical moments, the CPA can block the Government from drawing on Past Reserves and making key appointments. Madam, as I have said, this is entirely untrue. The WP MPs fundamentally misunderstood the role the CPA plays under the Constitution, despite the fact that it is written down and thoroughly explained yesterday in a diagram. In fact, they are misleading this House. It is not a third centre of power. It is unable to single-handedly block a Government proposal. This has been the same for the past 25 years and remains unchanged under the Bill. When the President agrees, the CPA's view has no weight. The CPA's role is only relevant when the President vetoes a proposal from the Government. In such cases, where the President has exercised his veto, but the CPA agrees with the Government's proposal, the CPA's agreement serves to moderate the weight of the President's veto – but only by referring the issue to Parliament.”
“Mdm Speaker, I must emphasise that there are no changes to how the President's veto powers, the moderating effect of the CPA's advice or the Parliamentary overruling mechanism operate in respect of the President's custodial powers over Reserves and appointments, and I went to some trouble to prepare a slide two days ago to explain this. This was Handout 3, one of the simpler slides. The changes merely adopt a uniform approach towards the President's obligation to consult the CPA on financial and appointment-related matters, as well as extend the overruling mechanism in a uniform way to these areas. Today, the President is obliged to do this in some areas but not in others. There is some inconsistency there. So, we are making it uniform. But the President's powers and the mechanism remain the same. As I have explained, the overruling mechanism already applies in two areas, namely, Supply Bills and key appointments. The approach taken is to harmonise the approach towards Parliamentary overruling by subjecting the rest of his core custodial powers to the same overruling framework. In short, what is being proposed simply ensures uniformity in the President's obligation to consult the CPA, and the availability of Parliamentary overruling, insofar as his core custodial powers are concerned. There is no change in the way the mechanism operates. As for the weight given to the CPA's recommendations, I have already explained in my opening speech that the CPA's role is to provide its advice to the President. It is the President who decides whether to veto a Government proposal, and not the CPA. The CPA has no veto powers, neither over what the President does nor what the Government proposes. The CPA provides its advice.”
“Mr Christopher de Souza and Mr Zaqy Mohamad spoke about the financial aspects of these eligibility criteria. Madam, the criteria are to ensure that the candidates running for office have the knowledge, competence and judgement to make decisions on financial matters of significant magnitude or scale, as well as on key appointments to the Public Service. These are criteria that we are able to state in an objective way. We can codify them. However, other criteria, such as integrity and good character, are also crucial. We can write them down, but how do you measure them? They are required of a Presidential candidate, as provided for under the existing Article 19(2)(e). This is, of course, not exhaustive of all the "intangible" qualities we desire in a President, such as public-spiritedness, compassion and empathy. These are key and critical qualities. But it is very difficult to legislate for all these "intangibles". It is our people who will ultimately have to be the judge of whether a candidate has what it takes, especially where these important intangibles are concerned, to be the President when our people exercise their vote. Now, the CPA. Some Members, like Ms Sylvia Lim and Assoc Prof Daniel Goh, have asked about the CPA's functions and raised queries about an unelected body playing a role in the system of checks and balances. Others, like Mr Louis Ng, asked if the extension of the Parliamentary overruling mechanism would dilute the President's powers.”
“This took into consideration the need for a President to have the requisite experience and ability to make "large and complex financial decisions on an urgent basis" and the "diverse strategic and operational considerations" that bear upon such decisions. The Government has accepted the Commission's recommendation to increase the quantitative threshold. And as explained in the White Paper, the President may have to scrutinise huge potential drawdowns, possibly within short periods of time, and to effectively discharge responsibilities of such a scale and magnitude, the President must have the confidence that comes with familiarity with making decisions involving large sums of money. As I have already mentioned in my opening speech, there are significantly more companies today that would meet the revised threshold of $500 million shareholders' equity than the 158 companies in 1993, which would have met the $100 million paid-up capital threshold. There will continue to be qualified minority candidates, from both the public and private sectors. I do not have a precise figure. A precise figure is not available – companies do not make public the information on the racial background of their officers. But if we agree, as I think we do, that we must be uncompromising on the criteria and that we cannot lower the bar for any community, we should focus on growing the pool of eligible candidates. Every community should aspire towards producing leaders that may one day represent the nation in her highest office and to encourage those leaders to come forward to serve in that office. The pool will grow over time as our country progresses. Are the criteria too focused on financial acumen? I think Ms Kuik Shiao-Yin asked this question.”
“Madam, the WP is effectively also restricting its senate to a limited group of people. But the serious problem here lies with their proposed Senate Elections Committee (SEC), which is tasked to shortlist 16 candidates from a pool of qualified applicants. Now, the SEC is not an elected body. It is an appointed one. As Dr Janil Puthucheary pointed out, unlike the current inclusionary model where the PEC certifies the eligibility of any applicant who meets the qualifying criteria, the WP's model is exclusionary in that the SEC sets a cut-off at 16 candidates. The WP has not provided any details as to how the SEC will draw the line between the 16th and the 17th, and other candidates. So far, it has said that this line is drawn at the discretion of the SEC, and Mr Pritam Singh yesterday emphasised that the exercise of such discretion should be non-justiciable. The system, as proposed by the WP, is far from transparent. I bring up some of these issues because, if you want to criticise our present system, you need to offer something that works better. And I bring it up to show how difficult it is to design a system and make it better than the one that we have today. Mr Saktiandi Supaat and Mr Louis Ng spoke about the raised eligibility criteria and how they might impact the pool of qualified candidates. Asst Prof Mahdev Mohan and Ms Kuik Shiao-Yin asked about the differences between a chief executive of a $100 million paid-up capital company and that of a company with a $500 million shareholders' equity. Madam, the quantitative threshold of $500 million shareholders' equity for candidates from private sector companies was proposed by the Commission after studying the matter carefully.”
“Many Members have spoken on this, including Miss Cheryl Chan, Miss Cheng Li Hui, Ms Tin Pei Ling, Mr Seah Kian Peng and Ms Kuik Shiao-Yin, and agreed with the need for stringent criteria. Yet, some Members, while accepting the need for eligibility criteria, asked whether the revised criteria were aimed at limiting the pool of candidates to certain groups. The WP said in response to the Commission's report that the "real risk" is that "you have a PAP Government with an Elected President which is from the establishment – both squandering away the national Reserves". Mdm Speaker, what is the WP saying? That the past Elected Presidents have been unable to act independently or carry out their duties properly? I have seen first-hand how our Elected Presidents have carried out their roles. These are men of integrity, men who have principles and are prepared to stand by them and act on them. Has the WP itself not acknowledged, in this very House, the independence of mind of the late President Ong or the way that the late President Nathan had always treated them with courtesy, fairness and consideration? So, let us not unfairly run down the system and particularly cast aspersions on honourable men in an attempt to try to score political points. I also note that the WP, while seemingly critical of eligibility criteria, also accepts the need for eligibility criteria in its elected senate proposal. Mr Leon Perera said yesterday and confirmed today that the eligibility criteria for its elected senate proposal are the same as those for elected Presidents. Yesterday, he promised to give details in his main speech and he put his hands up several times, but we have not heard from him today on further details.”
“We acknowledge that there may be potential tension between the President's historical and custodial roles. We have always said so. It is not something that we have ducked. We have said so and acknowledged it. But as we have explained in the White Paper, and again in this House ‒ the Prime Minister and myself ‒ and as the Constitutional Commission itself noted, all our elected Presidents have been able to perform the two roles with distinction. And not a single Member from either side of this House has refuted this point. Furthermore, it is not uncommon. It is quite common in other countries, such as the US and France, for an elected Executive President to concurrently be the Head of State. While there is potential tension between an electoral process and the President's unifying role in these countries, the President continues to play this role in these countries which are long-standing democracies. In these cases, the President is an Executive President, not just a President with safeguard powers. The Executive Presidents in these countries have wide-ranging and extensive powers. In our case, our President is not an Executive President with wide-ranging powers. He is a President with symbolic and custodial roles. He is not elected on a party platform and I believe that if we have wisdom, particularly among our voters, we should be able to elect good Presidents and to handle this. Madam, with the introduction of elections for the Elected Presidency, eligibility criteria were put in place to ensure that candidates standing for elections have a certain baseline of experience and skills for the Presidential role. The Commission considered the imposition of criteria as a "necessity". These are the words of the Commission.”
“Madam, I do worry if this ad hoc-ism is symptomatic of the way they would wish to run our country and the public institutions they are responsible for. Let me now turn to the substantive matters at hand – the changes that the Government is making to improve the present system – the Bill that is before this House. These recommendations are in accord with the recommendations of the Commission, and have been arrived at after thorough consideration, through the open, consultative process over 10 months, that I had described earlier. The changes to the eligibility criteria bring the 1991 figures up to date. The changes to the CPA framework harmonise it to make it function more smoothly and uniformly. I will come to this a little more later. The changes for minority representation introduce a new mechanism to ensure multiracial representation from time to time. Mdm Speaker, as the Prime Minister has said, the Elected Presidency is not a perfect system. But what we are doing in this House is institution-building. We are trying to improve our institutions and strengthen them for the Singapore of the future. It is part of an overall effort to build stabilisers in the system so that whether you are a Town Councillor, an MP, a President or a Prime Minister, you are governed by a set of laws and are held accountable to them. Each person understands his or her role, and carries them out diligently and faithfully for the good of the country. The important point when we consider voting later this evening is that the WP has really not come up with a workable and better alternative to the system that we have, and the improvements that we are proposing. The President continues to be the foremost symbol of our national unity.”
“Instead, Mdm Speaker, the Commission's main recommendations focused squarely on enhancing and improving the existing institution of the Elected Presidency. It dealt with the revision of the eligibility criteria, the strengthening of the CPA, and the hiatus-triggered mechanism to ensure multiracial representation. The Government, in most part, has accepted these recommendations. Where we have not done so, we have stated quite clearly, in the White Paper, where and why. If the WP wants to advocate and campaign for the idea of an elected Senate, they can and should do so. But they should do so in an open, transparent and fully consultative way. Do not spring it on people. They can start by putting out a proper proposal. It is not a novel idea – a bicameral system. Some countries have a bicameral system. And one should examine its merits and pitfalls objectively – a pity that it was not submitted to the Constitutional Commission. We should study its merits and pitfalls, for example, the very issues that Assoc Prof Daniel Goh had so eloquently put forth less than a year ago. It is very well-written. The WP can then campaign on that proposal at the next GE, and, if they succeed, they can see to it that it comes to pass. In fact, if it is a good proposal, we will be prepared to consider it, too. Why would we want to consider something that is good for Singapore and not accept it just because it comes from somewhere else? If it is better than the Elected Presidency that we have constructed today, we will be prepared to accept it. But I do not think it is. What they cannot do is to pull a half-formed proposal out of a hat and press for a referendum on the issue.”
“Also unresolved are innumerable operational issues with the proposal. For example, how is gridlock in the Senate resolved? Mdm Speaker, what is troubling also is that Members of the WP have, during this debate, attempted to draw support for their proposal by representing that the Commission recommended such a structure. This paints an incorrect picture of the Commission's report and its actual recommendations. Let us go to the Commission's report itself. In paragraph 7.47 of the report, the Commission stated, with regard to the proposal to unbundle the custodial and symbolic functions, and I quote, "The Commission considers that this is a proposal that the Government may wish to consider if and when it is appropriate and timely to undertake a more fundamental change to the Presidency". And again, at paragraph 7.53, I quote, "The Commission has set out its thoughts on this issue only for the Government's consideration and, if the Government deems it fit and profitable, further debate. The Commission does so only as a group of citizens". Mdm Speaker, this was certainly not a recommendation made by the Commission, much less a main or major recommendation. It was a suggestion that the Commission made for the Government's consideration based on some of the submissions it had received. Furthermore, what the members of the Commission had actually described for consideration was an appointed council of experts with no veto powers. This is fundamentally different from the WP's proposal, which is an Upper House of elected senators, something which, I think, in the words of one of the WP's Members, was apparently a minor difference. It is a fundamental and major difference.”
“We saw WP Members go back and forth on whether the Senate's power was limited only to delay, or whether it actually held a veto; we saw them flip-flop on what eligibility criteria the Senators must satisfy; and we saw them hem and haw over how those Senators are to be elected into office. Mdm Speaker, governing is a complex and serious issue, and no responsible party should deal with an important issue, such as changes to key national institutions, in a cavalier manner. It is not something you can just be brazen about and dismiss by saying, "Oh, do not be bogged down by the details". However, the lack of a well-thought through proposal with a clear plan has not stopped the WP from going even further, calling for a referendum – in fact, almost insisting on one – on their proposal. They even put forward a draft referendum question for the House to consider, when they are not even clear what exactly it is that they are proposing. Mdm Speaker, we do not need to repeat the post-Brexit referendum confusion, where the British were left with no clear plan and lacked the execution ability to carry out what they had persuaded the voters to vote for. The WP has also failed to articulate clear or consistent reasons for why they say their proposal is better than the EP. Just 11 months ago, one of the key Members arguing for it these two days in this very Chamber had publicly argued the opposite. Their proposal gives an unelected Senate Elections Committee the ability to bar eligible candidates from even participating in the Senate elections. This exclusion is done in an entirely non-transparent, unaccountable and potentially arbitrary manner. It multiplies the difficulties associated with finding a suitable candidate for the Presidency by eight.”
“He takes quite a different interpretation on that today. This was also just barely two months before the Constitutional Commission was formed. The WP was invited to present their views publicly, and make their case before the Constitutional Commission. Unfortunately, they chose not to do so. The WP was the only one of the 20 invited contributors that declined the invitation. I was speaking to MP Mr Christopher de Souza, and he said that the Eurasian Association had many views and concerns, and they found that it was a very useful process to discuss with the Constitutional Commission. They went away not completely agreeing with everything, but understanding what the concerns and considerations were, much, much better. The Commission, nevertheless, considered all the 107 written submissions it had received, including that of the WP. The problem is, of course, that the WP's current proposal is very different from what they had submitted to the Commission. The WP has now, less than 36 hours ago, in fact, about 30 hours ago, put their proposal before this House – I must say – in a non-transparent, non-consultative way, literally keeping things close to their chests, and asked this House to consider it. Even so, we endeavoured very hard to find out more of this proposal. Unfortunately, it is apparent from the tentative way that the WP Members have attempted to respond to questions about the most basic and important features of their proposal that this proposal has not been well-thought through. The proposal has the benefit of brevity but, unfortunately, not of clarity.”
“There was wide consultation by the independent Commission, which conducted its review in a non-partisan, inclusive, transparent, open and comprehensive manner. Why did I emphasise "independent" Commission and why did the Prime Minister decide to set up an independent Commission? Because he did not want this review to end up being embroiled in partisan to-ing and fro-ing, as we have seen in the last few days. We wanted an objective look at the issues so that we could have the most comprehensive report and to do it openly and transparently. After the Government received the Commission's recommendations, the Government held dialogues as well. This entire process has taken 10 months. We know from our collective experience and knowledge built up over the past 25 years that the Elected Presidency is an important and complex institution, and that we should only move after having carefully considered the options. Mdm Speaker, in contrast, the second day into the debate, the WP sprung a new proposal upon the Members of the House. Their proposal for an Upper House – composed of elected Senators – is a fundamental change to our institutions of government. It is also a marked departure from what the WP has advocated in the past since the inception of the Elected Presidency – different from their manifesto at the recent GE in September last year, and different again from their submission to the Constitutional Commission in March this year. No mention of a Senate, let alone an elected one. What is most extraordinary is that Assoc Prof Daniel Goh, one of the WP's NCMPs, who had spoken at length in this debate yesterday supporting an elected Upper House, just in December last year, had argued strongly – and I must say, quite persuasively – against just such a bicameral system.”
“I will try to be briefer than two days ago. First, I would like to thank the 38 Members for speaking on the Bill. This is an important debate about improvements to a key national institution – the Elected Presidency. The Prime Minister has spoken extensively about the broad principles that underlie the need for the Elected Presidency, the provisions to ensure multiracial representation in the Presidency, and why the Elected Presidency remains the most workable and effective solution for Singapore. Let me address the specific matters raised by Members, which can be grouped into two main sets of issues. First, the two core custodial functions of the Elected Presidency: first, safeguarding of past Reserves and the integrity of the Public Service; and second, representation of the various racial communities in the Elected Presidency. Let me begin with the first issue. Mdm Speaker, I am heartened that all the speakers have expressed the need for safeguards to our Reserves and the integrity of the Public Service, as a legacy for our future generations. Let us lay to rest the notion that these safeguards are meant to stymie a new government coming into power. The safeguards will only do so if that government, indeed any government, even the current one, intends to use the Reserves irresponsibly or erode the integrity of the Public Service. This agreement on the need for safeguards allows us, then, to focus on framing the most appropriate way of providing these safeguards. There is no perfect solution. I think the Prime Minister said so yesterday. What we are trying to do is to find the best way of doing so. The changes proposed in the Bill flow from the recommendations of an independent Constitutional Commission appointed by the Prime Minister in January this year.”
“An average of 1,200 Singaporeans renounced their Singapore Citizenship (SC) each year from 2005 to 2015. The annual SC renunciation rate remains low at under 0.1%. Singaporeans renouncing their citizenship will be asked to indicate their reasons in a non-mandatory questionnaire. The most frequent reasons given include (a) family-related reasons, such as marriage to a foreigner or to join their family members overseas, (b) preference for a different lifestyle or environment, or (c) career or business-related reasons. Our focus is to ensure that Singapore continues to be the best home for all Singaporeans. We will continue to develop an attractive living environment and a thriving economy which creates good jobs and opportunities for Singaporeans. We also want to strengthen Singaporeans' bonds with one another and build a strong sense of identity and belonging to the nation. We actively engage our Singaporeans who are studying or working overseas. Through efforts such as the Overseas Singaporeans Unit's programmes and initiatives, Singapore Day in selected cities overseas being one example, we seek to ensure that our overseas Singaporeans maintain a strong identity and remain connected and committed to Singapore's future even while they are overseas.”
“We could not control the environment around us, but we sailed with confidence in the knowledge that – even in the face of a challenging environment where the unexpected might occur – we had built into our vessels various systems to maintain their stability and integrity. One of these is to provide sufficient ballast. In rough seas, this helps to prevent the ship from pitching and rolling uncontrollably and capsizing. Yet, if there is too much ballast, the vessel's speed, agility and responsiveness will suffer. Our nation, like a ship, needs an optimal amount of ballast – enough to keep us stable, but not so much as to render us sluggish and unresponsive to change. Our Presidency has always served as our flag – our maritime flag – a symbol of our identity at sea. We want to make sure that the Presidency remains a symbol Singaporeans from all communities will continue to identify with. But since 1991, it has also become an important part of our ballast system, stabilising our ship by safeguarding the two key areas – our Reserves and key appointments. The proposed amendments seek to enhance the ability of the Presidency to play both these important roles, to help keep our people united and our country stable. Madam, I beg to move. [(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]”
“Today, it is no longer this House that balances all the considerations when appointing a President to perform the President's unifying and symbolic role. We, therefore, need another framework to achieve and maintain this fine balance. The proposed five-term hiatus mechanism helps, where necessary, to facilitate the periodic election of members of different racial groups to the Presidency. This ensures that even though Presidents are now directly elected, they will, over time, continue to collectively embody the multiracialism that symbolises us as a people and as a country. We must also ensure that the eligibility criteria stay updated, to maintain a measure of assurance that Presidential candidates have the necessary experience and expertise for the custodial role. These add to our continuing efforts to improve the Elected Presidency so that the President's custodial powers are exercised in a timely manner, and with sufficient weight given to the collective advice of the CPA. This will provide stability to our system and also help to avoid gridlock in situations where the President and the Government do not agree. Mdm Speaker, in January this year, the Prime Minister spoke of the need to ensure that our country does not get "swept off course by a transient public mood, or an erratic government". The Government needs to be able to respond to the mood, but not go too far and "capsize the boat". I identify with this analogy at a very personal level. I devoted many years of my life serving in our Navy. In that time, I experienced navigating through both calm waters and rough seas. We learnt never to underestimate the power of the seas.”
“The revised entrenchment framework seeks to achieve a more workable balance between preserving the adaptability of the entrenched provisions, and preventing easy removal or amendments to the Elected Presidency. We will consider bringing the framework into force after observing how the wide-ranging amendments in this Bill operate in practice. Mdm Speaker, before concluding, I will just mention the amendments relating to Non-Constituency Members of Parliament (NCMPs). The reasons for and the extent of these amendments have been explained by the Prime Minister in the debate on the President's Address at the Opening of Parliament earlier this year. Clause 25 of the Bill, therefore, amends Article 39 to increase the maximum number of NCMPs from nine to 12, and to give them the same voting rights as Members of Parliament. Other amendments consequential upon these changes are made as well. Mdm Speaker, let me draw to a conclusion. Prior to the establishment of the Elected Presidency, the system for appointing the President by this House allowed Parliament to take into account a fine balance of considerations in appointing a President to office. It allowed for consideration of qualities, such as profound learning, good character, high reputation and strong moral fibre. The ethnicity of a candidate was also important, given our multiracial composition. The outcome was that the Presidency was appointed from among the major racial groups, providing for them to be represented in the Presidency from time to time. The inception of the Elected Presidency in 1991 did not change the President's foremost symbolic and unifying role. However, it overlaid onto the office an additional custodial role and transformed it into an elected office.”
“Article 5B does not catch this amendment because the power-conferring provision – Article 142(1A)(a) – is not textually amended. However, the President's custodial power over the ELTRROR and the Government's spending limit is diminished by such a change. This may, therefore, amount to a circumvention or curtailment that will be caught by Article 5C. I should emphasise that this is only a hypothetical illustration. Whether there is any circumvention or curtailment is, ultimately, a question of law on the facts of every case. Article 5C(4) stipulates the circumstances under which the President's withholding of assent may be overruled. Where he withholds assent with CPA's support, he may be overruled if the Bill is supported by a simple majority at a referendum, or a three-quarter Parliamentary majority affirms the Bill. Where he withholds assent contrary to the CPA's recommendation, a two-third Parliamentary majority may affirm the Bill. Under Article 5C(2), on Cabinet's advice, a Bill may be referred to a constitutional tribunal for a decision on whether Article 5C applies to it. If the tribunal rules that Article 5C does not apply to the Bill, the President will be deemed to have assented to the Bill. But if the tribunal rules that Article 5C applies, then the President has basis to withhold assent. In this situation, the same Article 5C(4) overruling mechanism applies. In all situations under Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, where the President has refused to concur or assent, the Government must make public the President's reasons and the CPA's recommendations before it can submit the Bill to a referendum or move a resolution to affirm a Bill. This is stipulated in Articles 5A(3) and (4), 5B(3), (4) and (8), and 5C(5) and (6).”
“The Explanatory Statement in the Bill gives a clear example. Article 142 falls within Article 17(3). However, only Article 142(1A)(a) – the discretion-conferring provision – is entrenched in Tier 2. The other provisions, for instance, Article 142(1A)(b), are not similarly entrenched. Tier 2 includes other provisions relating to the Presidency and the Election Judge. Article 5B(9) also falls within Tier 2, as explained earlier. There are three routes for introducing a Bill to which Article 5B applies. That is in the handout. The first two routes mirror those available under Article 5A. These are set out in Article 5B(1), (2) and (5). The third route is set out in Article 5B(7). A Bill to which Article 5B applies may be introduced in the ordinary way like other constitutional amendment Bills. However, it can subsequently be passed only by a three-quarter Parliamentary majority. The new Article 5C applies to a constitutional amendment Bill that circumvents or curtails any discretionary power of the President that is conferred by a Tier 2 provision. Under Article 5C(1), the President may withhold assent to such a Bill. The Article 5C mechanism is necessary because circumvention or curtailment of powers can occur without textual amendments being made to the power-conferring provision. Let me illustrate this with an example. The Government's spending limit depends on the expected long-term real rates of return (ELTRROR) on the "relevant assets" pool. Under Article 142(1A)(a), the President's concurrence must be obtained for the ELTRROR proposed by the Finance Minister. In this way, the President has a say over the Government's spending limit. Assume that a Bill purports to remove certain assets from the definition of "relevant assets".”
“These include Article 17(1) and (2), which establish the President's function as the Head of State and the principle of his custodial function, as well as other provisions establishing the Presidential office. The entire entrenchment framework, comprising Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, is also protected under Tier 1. This is with the exception of Article 5B(9), which sets out the Tier 2 provisions and, therefore, is protected under Tier 2. A Bill to which Article 5A applies can only be introduced in Parliament under the routes set out in Article 5A(1) and (2). First, where the President concurs with the introduction of the Bill, or the President withholds concurrence contrary to the CPA's recommendation; or second, where the Bill is supported by a simple majority at a national referendum. Of course, the Government can submit the Bill to a referendum at any time, regardless of whether the President's concurrence has been sought. Under Article 5A(5), regardless of how the Bill is introduced, the Bill must still subsequently be passed by a two-third Parliamentary majority. Article 5A(6) provides that a Bill introduced under the referendum route can be amended if the Speaker takes the view that the amendment is of a minor or purely drafting character, or that it does not affect the substance of the Bill. The new Article 5B applies to a Bill seeking to make textual amendments to Tier 2 provisions. Tier 2 provisions are listed in Article 5B(9). The new Article 17(3), which sets out the discretionary powers relating to the President's custodial role over our Reserves and key appointments, is protected in Tier 2. Only the specific discretion-conferring provisions of the Articles listed in Article 17(3), and not the entire Articles, are protected.”
“This is so particularly since the entrenched provisions concerned areas where disagreements between the President and the Government might be sharp and intractable. I turn now to the precise changes being made. Please refer to the handout. I will first explain the changes being made to Article 17, which contains several key entrenched provisions. Clause 4 of the Bill amends Article 17 to set out the key functions and certain discretionary powers of the Elected President, and their relation to each other. The principal Head of State function remains in Article 17(1). The new Article 17(2) is a statement of principle of the President's non-executive custodial function of safeguarding our Reserves and the integrity of our Public Service. The actual custodial powers arising from the functions mentioned in Article 17(2) are defined in the new Article 17(3). The new Article 17(4) provides that the President may exercise other powers and perform other functions according to the Constitution and any other written law. The existing Article 17(3) and (4), which relate to the election of the President and the timing of polls, are deleted and re-enacted by clause 5 of the Bill as the new Article 17A. I will now touch on the revised entrenchment framework itself. Clause 3 of the Bill introduces the new Articles 5A, 5B and 5C, which establish the revised two-tiered framework. Clauses 2, 30 and 35 of the Bill introduce consequential amendments and remove the existing entrenchment framework. The new Article 5A applies to a Bill seeking to make textual amendments to Tier 1 provisions. Tier 1 provisions are listed in Article 5A(7).”
“Currently, the existing entrenchment framework applies the same referendum requirement bluntly to all entrenched provisions. The Bill replaces this framework with one that categorises the entrenched provisions into two tiers. The first tier contains provisions fundamental to the existence of the Elected Presidency and the entrenchment framework itself. The electorate should have a direct say should the Government want to proceed with amendments to these provisions when the President, with the CPA's support, disagrees with the Government. The second tier comprises provisions relating to more operational aspects of the Elected Presidency and its custodial powers. It may not be necessary to put such issues to a national referendum. The required referendum threshold will also be revised from a two-third majority to a simple majority. The referendum threshold should be commensurate with the gravity of the decision in question. A two-third referendum majority requirement should thus be reserved only for provisions relating to the surrender of Singapore's sovereignty and relinquishment of our Police and Armed Forces, or amendments to those provisions, as currently already provided under our Constitution. These are the only circumstances under which a two-third referendum majority requirement applies other than those which were for the Elected Presidency. The third consideration is whether the CPA's views should be given legal weight within the entrenchment framework. Under the existing framework, there is no legal difference whether the President acts with the CPA's support or against its advice. The CPA's recommendations should be given weight so that it can serve as a counterbalance, as it already does in other areas relating to Presidential vetoes.”
“More recently, in Colombia, the President signed a peace deal with the country's largest rebel group to end a 52-year-old war that cost the lives of 220,000 people and displaced another five million. For this he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the deal had to be ratified at a national referendum. Early polls suggested that it would be comfortably ratified, but a vocal anti-ratification campaign, led by a former Colombian President, engendered a shock result: 50.2% of voters voted against the deal. Referendums should, therefore, be used in a circumspect way. Perhaps at this point, we should distribute the next handout.”
“This was the initial rationale for entrenchment: to protect the Elected Presidency and its core custodial powers against easy removal. By contrast, it would be much more difficult to remove well-established institutions, such as this Parliament or the Judiciary. We will, therefore, streamline the entrenchment framework to cover only the provisions establishing the Elected Presidency and its core custodial powers. This approach will also make the framework conceptually more coherent, since it is founded on the unique need to protect the Elected Presidency and its powers from easy removal. Other provisions which do not relate to these areas will remain protected in the same way as the rest of the Constitution, that is, through the need for a two-third majority in Parliament to amend these provisions. So, they are not unprotected, but continue to be protected by a two-third majority requirement in this Parliament. The second consideration is whether the referendum requirement should be revised. Referendums serve a purpose on clear-cut strategic decisions, which are so important that it is best that the people decide them directly in a national vote. However, referendums do have inherent limitations. They generally lead to binary outcomes, even though the issues that underlie the vote may be complex. Communicating these complexities to voters to make an informed decision is often not easy. Emotions and misinformation can have a big influence. For example, studies on the Brexit referendum show that a significant percentage of people who voted to "leave", subsequently regretted their vote.”
“This may explain the greater role that the US courts play in "interpreting" the constitutional text so that it keeps up with the times. This approach has been criticised for being anti-democratic. It results in constitutional law-making by unelected and politically unaccountable judges, and politicises the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the US example illustrates an important point: the Constitution must, in one way or another, continue to evolve over time. In our context, this means that we must seek a suitable balance in entrenchment, between rigidity and flexibility. Finding this balance is, ultimately, a matter of judgement. In the White Paper, we approached this by considering three questions. First, which provisions should be entrenched? Second, should the referendum requirement be revised? Third, should the CPA's views be given legal weight in the entrenchment context? On the first consideration, I mentioned earlier that most of the entrenched provisions relate to the Elected Presidency, but some are entirely unrelated to it. At the same time, provisions relating to other critically important institutions, like the Judiciary and this Parliament, are not specifically entrenched in the same way. The Commission observed that since these other important institutions are not similarly entrenched, this may support the contention that entrenchment of the Elected Presidency should also be severely done away with. We think that it remains critical to have an entrenchment framework for the Elected Presidency. The Elected Presidency serves as an additional check on a government in the two key areas. There is a risk that a government bent on raiding the Reserves or compromising the Public Services could remove the Elected Presidency to get rid of that check.”
“The entrenchment framework was not brought into operation because the Government felt that it needed more time and experience to refine and adjust the provisions governing the Elected Presidency, which is a unique institution. Over the years, several revisions have had to be made to improve the working mechanisms for the new powers of the Presidency. Had the provisions been entrenched, it would have been very difficult to improve the system. As the Constitutional Commission observed, the entrenchment framework – if brought into force – renders it "virtually impossible" to amend any aspect of the entrenched provisions. The fact that today – 25 years on – the Constitutional Commission has had to examine certain fundamental aspects of the Elected Presidency, culminating in this Bill, demonstrates the need for the institution to evolve over time. As the system continues to evolve, we must revise the entrenchment framework to seek a better balance between rigidity and adaptability. A case study of the US presents a striking example of the need for such a balance. Numerous US Presidents have emphasised the need for a constitution to be a living document. Yet, scholars have observed that it is "almost impossible" to amend the US Constitution. Amendments must receive a two-third vote in both Houses of Congress – the House of Representatives and the Senate – and be ratified by 38 of the 50 states. If just 13 states reject a constitutional amendment, the amendment fails. In other words, an amendment supported by more than 95% of Americans can still fail. Historically, of nearly 12,000 proposals introduced to amend the US Constitution, only 27 had been successful.”
“Third, clause 19 of the Bill inserts a new Article 37D(2) that requires appointing authorities to consider whether a potential appointee (a) is of integrity, good character and reputation; and (b) has expertise and experience relevant to the matters on which the CPA may have to advise the President on. Clauses 10, 12, 13(a), 14(a), 15, 18, 20, 23(a) and (b), 24, 27, 28, 29 and 31 of the Bill make consequential amendments in light of the changes to the framework governing the Elected President's custodial powers. I come lastly to entrenchment. The entrenchment framework introduces additional safeguards, over and above the existing requirement of a two-third Parliamentary majority for constitutional amendments, to further entrench certain specific constitutional provisions. The concept of entrenchment surfaced in the 1988 and 1990 White Papers. When first mooted, entrenchment covered only the Elected Presidency and the core custodial powers of the office. The rationale was to protect the office and powers from easy removal or circumvention by an irresponsible government. The 1990 Select Committee subsequently recommended extending the entrenchment framework to other provisions, including some that were unrelated to the Elected Presidency. The entrenched provisions were protected by a national referendum requirement. If the President disagreed with a proposed amendment to an entrenched provision, the amendment – however minor or process-related – may be made only with the support of a two-third national referendum majority. In making his decision, the President was not required to consult the CPA.”
“CPA members act independently in advising the President and not at the behest of their appointing authorities. However, a careful balance has been built into the CPA's composition and processes as a safeguard. Let us assume that the President appoints one of his three appointees as the CPA Chairman. If the President's three appointees are unanimous on a particular recommendation, they will only need the agreement of one other CPA member in order for their recommendation to prevail by virtue of the Chairman's casting vote. Conversely, their recommendation may not prevail if they do not have a unanimous view or do not have the support of any other CPA member. Second, Article 37B(2) staggers the terms of CPA members to ensure continuity and to enhance the CPA's independence. CPA membership is drawn into three divisions. Each division has one member appointed by the President in his discretion and one member appointed on the Prime Minister's advice. In addition, the first division has a member appointed on the Chief Justice's advice, and the second division has a member appointed on the PSC Chairman's advice. Each member's appointment expires every sixth year. The three divisions are staggered so that every two years, all seats in a division will expire together. If a seat is prematurely vacated, Article 37B(3) provides that the term of the replacement member is subject to the expiry date of the member he replaces, so as to preserve the staggering. Clause 33 of the Bill inserts a new Article 165 to make transitional arrangements.”
“The three-stage approach applies generally to all Presidential vetoes that are subject to Parliamentary overruling. A slightly different approach is taken for Supply Bills. A Presidential veto of a Supply Bill has considerable public signature, whether or not the Government seeks to overrule the President's veto. The Government either has to return with a fresh Supply Bill, or have its spending confined to the Budget approved for the previous year. In such cases, Article 37IE(2)(b) provides that, should the President exercise his veto, he must additionally publish his grounds in the Gazette and send the CPA's recommendation to the Speaker for presentation to Parliament. Fifth, the CPA will be strengthened in three ways. This is necessary because of the enlarged role it now plays. First, clause 17 of the Bill amends Article 37B to introduce two additional CPA members, one appointed by the President and another appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister. The CPA will, therefore, have eight members in all: three appointed by the President in his own discretion; three appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister; and one each appointed on the advice of the Chief Justice and the PSC Chairman. The President appoints one member to be the CPA Chairman. The new Article 37IG introduces rules relating to the CPA's internal processes. The CPA has a quorum of five members, including the Chairman. The CPA's recommendation must be made by a majority of members present and voting. The CPA Chairman has a casting vote in the event of a tie. Clause 23(c) of the Bill amends Article 37J(3) to give the CPA autonomy over its internal procedure, subject to any constitutional provisions.”
“We agree with the Constitutional Commission that the framework for disclosure ought to be refined. However, as explained in the White Paper, we have adopted a different approach on some points. The revised framework, as set out by the new Articles 37ID, 37IE and 37IF, seeks to permit disclosure where necessary, while still protecting sensitive or confidential information. For simplicity, it may be thought of as a three-stage process. Members may want to refer to the handout. The first stage applies in all situations where the President is required to refer his decision to the CPA. Under Article 37ID, the CPA's recommendation will be provided only to the President and will include the number of votes for and against the recommendation; and the grounds for the recommendation. The President must then decide whether to exercise his veto. The second stage applies if the President exercises his veto. Under Article 37IE(2)(a) and (c), he must disclose his grounds and the CPA's recommendation to the Prime Minister. For vetoes relating to the Budget or proposed transaction of a Fifth Schedule entity, the President must additionally make these disclosures to the Chairman of the entity. This will allow the Government and the Fifth Schedule entity to learn of the reasons for the veto and, where overruling is possible, to make an informed decision on whether to initiate the overruling mechanism. The third stage applies if the Government wishes to initiate the overruling mechanism. Under Article 37IF(2)(b), the Government must, before moving an overruling resolution, cause the President's grounds to be published in the Gazette and send the CPA's recommendation to the Speaker, for presentation to Parliament.”
“For all other matters, Article 21A(2)(b) imposes a six-week time limit. Article 21A(3)(a) provides that where the Prime Minister certifies that a matter is urgent, the default time limit can be reduced to a minimum of 15 days. Article 21A(3)(b) provides that the President and Cabinet may extend time limits by mutual agreement. Article 21A(4) applies where a Bill is referred to a constitutional tribunal for determination. The time from the reference to when the tribunal pronounces its opinion is not counted towards the President's time limit. Corresponding time limits will be set for the CPA to provide recommendations to the President. This facilitates a good working understanding and also ensures that the President has sufficient time to study the CPA's recommendation. The new Article 37IB requires the President to immediately refer to the CPA any fiscal or appointment-related matter over which the President may exercise a veto power. This is when the CPA's time starts running under the new Article 37IC(1). If the President has a 30-day time limit, the CPA must make its recommendation within 15 days. If the President has a six-week time limit, the CPA must make its recommendation within three weeks. Article 37IC(2) allows abridgment of time limits where a certificate of urgency has been issued. The President may extend the CPA's time limit under Article 37IC(3). In all cases, notwithstanding any extensions granted, the CPA must give its recommendation at least five days before the President's time limit for signifying his decision. If the CPA fails to give its recommendation within the stipulated time limit, it is deemed by Article 37IC(4) to have recommended against the exercise of a Presidential veto. Fourth, disclosure of President's and CPA's reasons.”