Thio Li-ann
Singapore
“Also, it appears that the existing Act and these amendments do not require the relevant decision makers, such as the Board of Film Censors and Committee of Appeal to give reasons for their decisions. Why not include a statutory duty to give reasons for their decisions, as a matter of good governance?”
“The question is this: there is a virtue in writing down rights. Though it is clear that the right to vote is a constitutional right, my suggestion was that if you write it into Part IV, you can get to the detail.”
“Given Singapore's high standing in the legal world, such a museum would be a worthy addition to our cultural space. Culture itself embodies an intangible or spiritual value from which the soul of a nation is forged.”
“And we should be very careful when we tinker with the Constitution. The multi-racial situation in Singapore is very fragile. I lived through the riots of 1963/1964 and I remember 13th May in 1968. Just for clarification, because I may be misunderstood.”
“Nothing can be achieved without people and nothing endures without institutions: good people and good institutions complement each other in building a constitutional state where a basic value is to remind those holding political power that they are public servants, not overlords.”
“Lastly, to broaden our perspectives as global citizens in a global city with a global hinterland, the IAD could promote public outreach by providing basic international law information on its website, such as what treaties are, and how treaties serve the national interest. Community Legal Clinics”
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“I hope this ideal of service will continue to guide our Government leaders, as they lead this nation through foul storm and fair weather. Madam, I support this motion. 4.52 pm”
“In 1988, when GRCs were first introduced, there were 42 SMCs. Today, the law only requires eight SMCs. If a strong government is considered to be one in control of, say, two-thirds of the House, this would be 56 seats. Having more SMCs will enhance the prospect of having more diverse viewpoints, a closer voter-MP link and satisfy issues of democratic legitimacy. Who knows, it may reintroduce the viability of the independent parliamentary candidate which appears to have gone the way of the dinosaur since 1988. The number of SMCs could easily be doubled or tripled without affecting the strength of the political party which wins all or most of the GRCs. To enhance political pluralism, the Government may wish to increase the number of NCMPs from the current three to the permitted maximum of six, and to give them full voting rights to reflect the constitutional importance of oppositional politics. Madam, in our evolving political system, the President urged that Singapore "cannot just be a collection of different communities"; we must share common values; politics must focus on the common good and not be merely a contest between the narrow agendas of interest groups. Henrik Ibsen said, "A community is like a ship; everyone ought to be prepared to take the helm." I am confident the post-65 generation will step up to the plate and fill the leadership ranks in politics and social life. Madam, former Czech President Vaclav Havel said the only genuine and worthy politics was "a matter of serving those around us: serving the community and serving those who come after us". He said the deepest roots of politics were moral, as it was "a responsibility expressed through action, to and for the whole".”
“A lawyer recently returned from London wrote to me expressing horror in finding local papers apparently had nothing better to report than the AWARE saga, as opposed to the more interesting British papers which offered a lot more variety. This made me somewhat nostalgic for my student days in Cambridge, where I could, with chocolate croissant and Nescafe coffee in hand, survey a range of perspectives from the Times, Guardian, Independent or Telegraph. Sir, the President mentioned the need to update the political system which is "not set in stone" and securing good leadership. Aside from the guidelines Senior Minister Goh articulated, I hope that promoting electoral competition and enhancing democratic legitimacy will also receive attention in strengthening the political system. Regarding Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), I suggest capping the numerical size of a GRC team, perhaps to the original three members, to secure the constitutional rationale of ensuring minority legislative representation, while heightening prospects for a competitive system. GRCs can link up informally to ensure economies of scale or a critical mass to run Town Councils and CDCs, which are strictly beyond the constitutional design for GRCs. In addition, as there is no specific quota for the total number of minority MPs the GRC scheme should yield, increasing the GRC team size and decreasing the number of GRCs might lead to a decline in number of minority MPs. There should be a clear rule stipulating a minimum floor of minority MPs to ensure their adequate representation. In relation to issues of fairness and viewpoint diversity, diversity can be encouraged without undermining a strong, effective government by increasing the number of single member constituencies (SMCs).”
“It was hard to shake the impression that certain journalists were playing the "I don’t like your views so I will play the religionists are imposing their values' card". This was very disappointing. When is a reporter reporting, and when playing an advocate? We do not want to arrive at the place where, as Mark Twain put it: "If you don't read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed." TODAY published an insightful online letter on 5th May which fairly commented that the biased reporting not only distorted the issue but may have lent fuel to fire in inciting hatred and ill-will against a religious minority. The author wondered whether the "highly inappropriate" linking of personalities to their "personal religious beliefs" exacerbated "the tension that led to death threats and call for boycott". He called for the censure of "such lines of reporting that incite religious intolerance, by speculating one’s motive based on personal faith". Irresponsible reporting can threaten social harmony and undermine social cohesion. How is journalistic autonomy, integrity and accountability to be secured? Responsible journalism should extend to covering a diversity of views, not a journalist’s preferred view. It should include the accurate and most effective representation of differing viewpoints, and not paint the fringe as mainstream or the pathological as normal. Readers may then see all sides of an issue and decide what is true, accurate and sound, in the spirit of participatory democracy. This is important given the near monopolistic position of Singapore broadsheets.”
“However, the press may, by biased and selective reporting, misrepresent, distort or obscure an issue. We need to broaden our understanding of responsible journalism in Singapore, which, to borrow a canine metaphor, rejects the extremes of an adversarial American watchdog and a Pravda-like lapdog, or running-dog. The Singapore press is expected to promote nation-building, help forge consensus and facilitate consultative democracy. Journalists are entitled, like all citizens, to have their own opinions; however, they do a disservice if they report contentious issues in a one-sided fashion. This misinforms rather than informs. The principle must always be to hear both sides, canvass all perspectives. The feedback I received from friends and strangers on the reporting of the AWARE controversy, which was disquieting enough for the President to reference, was that much of the reporting, particularly in one paper, was biased; it largely lacked a diversity of views in singing the same chorus that religious groups should not get involved in secular organisations. Emails I received described how many perceived such reporting as being "slanted", "personal and spiteful", "too smug", "self-righteous" and "irresponsible". Some spoke of their new lists of "fair" and "unfair" journalists. The proper limits of religious activism is certainly a valid issue that arose, but there were other issues, such as whether a religious group was involved, as opposed to individuals with a religious faith. Another interesting enquiry would be whether it was really a debate about values rather than religious overstepping. Any attention given to this issue was strangely subdued.”
“Secular fundamentalists are oppressive where they seek to mute religiously informed convictions in public debate, by demonising a view as religious in attempting to make religious faith a cause for embarrassment or to distract citizens from the merits of an argument by discounting a speaker whose values are shaped by a religious rather than a secular faith. This is a strategy of avoidance, not engagement. One of my colleagues, a family law expert asked in exasperation: "When can a person simply speak up as a whole person made up of all the values that convict him and not be accused of mixing religion with politics?" All views should be heard and subject to public critique, as the price of admission to the arena of public discourse. This is what it means to take differences seriously. The best argument will most persuade. As John Milton wrote: Let Truth and Falsehood grapple: who ever knew Truth put to the worst, in a free and open encounter? Militant exclusionist secularism is thus a recipe for social disharmony; it feeds the 'culture wars' in the US and provokes those it seeks to exclude. It will not promote unity in diversity. Importing this type of kulturkampf or culture wars into Singapore would go against the President’s Call for tolerance, restraint and mutual respect, which are reciprocal civic virtues. Should this eventuate, das ist nicht gut. The President’s call for restraint is timely. The call for toleration must be framed against the bigger question: what should we tolerate? We should be intolerant of racism and anti-religious bigotry which will impair racial and religious harmony and the rule of law. When it comes to moral disagreements and public policy, the press is powerfully positioned to promote informed debate.”
“Deputy Prime Minister Wong welcomed the public service of individuals inspired by their religious convictions; they also "set" society’s "moral tone". He affirmed that religious individuals had the same right as other citizens to "express their views on issues in the public space" guided by their beliefs. Religion is thus separated from politics, but religion is not separated from public life and culture. Everyone has values, whether shaped by religious or secular ideologies; all may participate in public discourse to forge an ethical social consensus. This is democratic and cherishes viewpoint diversity. While religion is personal, it is not exclusively private and has a social dimension which is not to be trivialised. Thus, Singapore secularism is "agnostic" and "thin". The Government does not favour or disfavour any particular religion. We practise "accommodative secularism" described by the Court of Appeal as removing restrictions to one’s choice of religious belief. Religious values do have a role in public debate; when this House debated the casino project, I noted many MPs prefaced their speeches by confessing their specific faiths! Agnostic secularism of this sort is a virtue; it is a 'framework' which facilitates the peaceful co-existence of religions; it celebrates free conscience, consonant with classic liberalism which accepts intellectual variety as integral to a free society. Conversely, militant secularism is an illiberal and undemocratic vice in seeking to gag religious views in the public square and so to privilege its atheistic values, as in Communist states. Secularism is a faith-based system; like any religion, it has its moderates and its zealots. Like religious fundamentalisms, there can also be secular fundamentalisms.”
“We know from elementary logic that it is impossible to prove a universal negative. Whether god exists or not cannot be proved or disproved by evidence or logic. It takes faith to believe or not to believe in God or gods. A lot of faith is needed to believe there is no divine. As Turkish journalist Mustafa Akyol wrote: "it is the atheist’s opium to regard that unsubstantiated faith as established fact." Thick secularism is thus an anti-religion religion. As Hamlet said to Horatio: "there are more things in heaven and earth, ... than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Secular democracies like Singapore should be neutral not only between traditional religions but also regarding modern religions with atheistic foundations. What is the situation in Singapore? Deputy Prime Minister Wong in a recent media interview emphasised the secular nature of the political arena and how keeping 'religion' and 'politics' separate was a key rule of political engagement. What this means specifically is that laws and policies derive their legitimacy not from divine sanction but from a democratically elected government. Law generally applies to all and equally protects all citizens, regardless of race, religion or social status. Clearly, the Singapore model of secularism is anti-theocratic in that religious tenets and secular law are separated, not conflated as in the Hebrew state under Mosaic law or Ottoman empire where mosque and state were united. Theocracies are anti-democratic and oppressively homogenising, especially in plural societies like ours. While anti-theocratic, Singapore secularism is not anti-religious. This is a vital distinction.”
“This principle of limited government opposed state absolutism in suggesting Caesar did not wield absolute authority: while a citizen was to obey civil authority, he was to enjoy freedom from state interference in matters pertaining to the worship of God. Religious liberty thus limits state power. America first experimented constitutionally with dividing sacred from secular authority, rejecting the European conflation of civil and religious power. This idea of "two jurisdictions" was revolutionary in ancient Rome, where emperors as political leaders were worshipped as gods. Early Christians who refused to worship Caesar were thrown to lions in the Circus for committing treason, not blasphemy. Senior Minister of State Zainul Abidin Rasheed described Singapore secularism as "secularism with a soul". This deft juxtaposing of the material and the metaphysical speaks of the co-operative relation between state and religion in Singapore. The Constitution does not forbid the state to lend financial or other support to a religion; thus we have the Islamic Religious Council as a statutory Government body serving the Muslim community. In 1989, Foreign Affairs Minister George Yeo observed the Government was "secular but it is certainly not atheistic". This evinces a rejection of a thick, atheistic version of secularism. A "thick" secularism constitutes a substantive ideology which, like any other religion, speaks to first order questions of life and death and how human action ought to be guided. Secular humanism, which posits a morality independent of god, is a comprehensive anti-theistic worldview. Some courts recognise it as a religion. It dogmatically asserts the absence of god, without empirical evidence.”
“There are, in fact, many secularisms or degrees of secularity. This complex term needs to be unpacked. Historically, "secularism" originates from the Latin "saeculum", meaning "temporal", worldly affairs, rather than "spiritual" other-worldly matters. The word "secular" is an emblem of intense historical conflict. Atheists like George Holyoake in 1846 used it to indicate disinterest, rather than opposition, to religion. Today in some circles, "secularism" connotes systematic hostility towards religion, as a synonym for a politicised form of ideological atheism whose creed is that humanity is destined to wholly shed religious conviction. The atheistic word was made flesh in the atheistic state produced by the Russian Revolution of 1917, devoted to Marx’s assumption that religion stupefies the masses and must be eradicated to bring forth the new Communist Man. The other prophets of evangelical atheism include Sigmund Freud and Friedrich Nietzsche who famously declared "God is dead" and considered religiosity the "intellectual infancy of humanity." Some still speak with this same hubris, advocating that the "poison of religion" be banned from the public square; this brand of illiberal atheism is peddled in their best-selling books, espousing untutored views that denigrate religion as foolish superstition. In origins, the principle of secularity dates back to the Roman Empire. It derived from the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth to Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s.”
“When French President Sarkozy advocated a "positive secularism" which views religion as an asset, not a danger, he provoked many in a country with a strong anti-clerical tradition dating back to the bloody French revolution, who thought this violated strict French secularism. In contrast, "religion", which may not include a belief in God or gods, is generally viewed in Singapore as a constructive social force, although the Government appreciates its destabilising proclivities where abused for political gain. [Mdm Deputy Speaker (Ms Indranee Rajah) in the Chair] 4.36 pm In a recent interview, Deputy Prime Minister Wong Kan Seng reiterated that religion and politics must not be mixed, as a basic rule of engagement. This is sound, though there are difficulties of definition as no bright line demarcates "religion" from "politics". We need to understand what "secularism" entails in Singapore for more specific guidance. Singapore, like many other countries, bucks the "secularisation" thesis arising out of Europe. This postulates that religious belief declines as societies modernise. Clearly, the European experience cannot be universalised. As Singapore modernises, it remains a religious society within a secular state, where 80% of Singaporeans profess a religious faith. A state’s attitude towards religion turns upon its model of constitutional secularism. "Secularism" is a protean, chameleon-like term: what it means depends on the context and who is using it; it can be a virtue or a vice. "Secularism" has been used to describe varied state attitudes towards religion, from support, to antagonism to benevolent neutrality. It is timely to eschew glibness and examine the Singapore model of secularism with precision.”
“Or in more contemporary parlance, "Who died and made you king?" A relativist may argue there are no moral absolutes – it all depends on the person. However, in saying "there are no moral absolutes", the relativist is being inconsistent in making an absolute statement about morality. If morality is subjective, a consistent relativist cannot defend the correctness of any contingent moral position. The truth is, anyone speaking for or against a position acts as an advocate. We all come to public debate proposing specific moral views. Only the Government may impose a view by law. Parliament must decide what morality to clothe beneficial legislation with. Where there are diverse views, an overlapping consensus may be possible through patient dialogue. However, consensus may be elusive, if not impossible, on controversial questions of law and profound moral disagreement. This is the reality of politics, and a persistent feature of philosophical pontification and theological discourse. In this context, the President reminds us of the overriding objective to "live peacefully together" despite our differences. The constitutional liberty to speak and debate cannot flourish without order and prudent self-restraint. Neither religion nor irreligion has the right to break the peace. A commitment to free democratic debate entails protecting speech we disagree with. Voltaire said, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." This is tolerance applied to dissenting views, which must be reciprocated, to succeed. A militant model of secularism calls for a dogmatic separation of religion and state. In such jurisdictions, people may object when others with religiously-informed values debate public policy.”
“This threat to social harmony, where secular groups aggressively push radical agendas is a flash-point which, if not firmly corralled, may wreck the ship. Where emotions run high, as recent events have made us aware of, we need clear terms of engagement to preserve civil, intelligible discourse within our secular democracy. The President’s speech discerned a new type of politics which does not involve political parties or partisan politics. Instead, it involves political lobby groups with shared agendas. This may be described as ideological politics, which throws up standard political dichotomies like "conservative/liberal" or "left/right." Like most labels, these are over-simplistic. A Talmudic proverb instructs us to "Examine the contents, not the label of a bottle", which is wise if we are interested in substance over sound-bites, with rigorous argument over aggressive rhetoric. Bald assertions must not be allowed to masquerade as arguments. For example, chanting the mantra of being "inclusive" evades the more basic question of what to include or exclude, and why. Dante Alighieri in his poem the Divine Comedy, wrote: "The hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who remain neutral in times of great moral crisis." Concerned citizens will always want to speak to the moral or ethical basis of law and policy and their views will differ, depending on the religious or non-religious philosophies shaping their moral beliefs. Intellectual honesty knows there is no neutral ground in public debate over moral issues: anyone who believes in a system of ethics must make moral judgments and discriminate between right and wrong. If you tell someone "Thou shalt not judge", they may retort "but thou art judging me".”
“This takes the form of tensions between groups or sectors of society going beyond the classic example of inter-religious group hostility, as when a preacher insults another faith or cases of insensitive proselytisation. Social tensions can also manifest between "religious groups" and non-religious or "secular" groups. The President exhorted "all groups to practise tolerance, restraint and mutual respect" so we can peacefully co-exist "in a multi-racial, multi-religious society". This applies to all concerned parties, "not just to religious groups venturing into the secular domain but also to secular groups which want to strongly push their views and change our social norms". Edmund Burke said "All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing." So, when activists aggressively seek to advance their own agenda, this will provoke concern and resistance from other citizens. People with different visions of what constitute good public values will disagree about rights, and about what is wrong and right. Such disagreement should be welcomed, not feared. It is evidence that citizens do take the common good seriously and care about what our society should and could be. A key issue for sustainable democracy is whether we can disagree without being disagreeable. Can a citizen make or criticise a view, without resort to vilification or making personal or professional attacks? Such forms of infantile bullying do not advance debate, indicating a naked intolerance of competing views and a degenerative brand of politicking marked by vulgarity, vociferation and threats of violence. This augurs social fragmentation, thwarting democratic debate by intimidating dissenters.”
“" The MICA addendum states that a mid-term censorship review committee will be convened to review new media regulations to provide "more choices in content without compromising Singapore's racial harmony, social cohesion and strong family values." Similarly, MHA states that cyberspace's dark side, such as facilitating transnational crime and terrorism will be dealt with by "remaining committed to the values and fundamentals which have made Singapore what it is today". I will focus on two things the President highlighted: first, the need to preserve social cohesion; and second, the evolving political system; and may I add, the evolving nature of Singapore politics. The President warned that challenging times exert "stresses" on society. As Singaporeans, we are in the same boat and the rowers need to have some unity in spirit to propel the boat forward. Jean-Paul Sartre said, "Only the guy who isn't rowing has time to rock the boat." The President identified three fault-lines which threaten to dissipate the social capital of trust between different communities. First, the fault line caused by economic disparity between the rich and poor; the Government's commitment to providing social services, creating new jobs and skills upgrading seeks to alleviate the burdens of lower-income Singaporeans, to help secure an economically inclusive society. Second, the fault-line between citizens, new citizens and non-citizens. MCYS will spearhead community bonding efforts through, for example, the National Integration Council. Third, the President discerned with acuity a new threat to social harmony.”
“Sir, uncertainty breeds insecurity. We now face the deepest recession since Independence. The President's Address struck a note of sobriety. He spoke of the "global financial crisis" and the turbulent waters the good ship Singapore must navigate "when the storm clears" in a "less benign and predictable" post-crisis global landscape. The only safe ship in a storm is leadership, where the only constant is change. Leadership must give hope that we can survive this storm. The Government's intention to address immediate priorities and to continue investing in the future well-being of Singaporeans is encouraging. For example, to help the needy, ComCare will be updated, struggling HDB households will receive assistance with immediate mortgage repayments. To secure Singapore's long-term survivability, there are plans for a new university and tertiary institutes, perhaps a new medical school and more hospitals to care for the coming "silver tsunami". To foster economic competitiveness and development, new markets are being sought, Singapore is being promoted as a prime international arbitration venue in Asia. The Singapore Companies Act will be reviewed and re-employment laws will be enacted to strengthen social-economic infrastructure. The Government knows that economic troubles can have social and political consequences too. A ship sailing into a maelstrom must batten down its hatches, to secure the vessel. In this, it is good to have the moral compass of our fundamental values to cohere us, and a strong hand on the rudder to ensure we do not run aground on the shallows. Seneca, a stoic philosopher said, "If one does not know to which port one is sailing, no wind is favorable.”
“Or is public order being used here to indicate prevention of a disorder of a grave nature, beyond maintaining ordinary law and order? In addition, the protection of the rights and freedoms of other persons must be considered. These may include the right to carry on lawful business and, perhaps, other rights like the right to be free from harassment. A pretty hefty fine of up to $20,000 is imposed on any person contravening any clause 36 order without reasonable excuse under clause 37 but, presumably, if the direction is oral rather than in writing, it is invalid. So an unreasonable direction is also invalid and presumably open to challenge before the courts on grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness. Could the Minister confirm this? Finally, a drafting point in relation to clause 40 which gives powers of arrest without warrant to any police officer who "in his view" offends any provisions of this Act. This is similar to section 40 of the Miscellaneous Offences Act. Although "in his view" is subjectively couched, the courts have construed such clauses not to preclude objective judicial review. It would be preferable to substitute the phrase "has reason to believe" for "in his view" to underscore the commitment to a government of laws, not of man. Despite the efficient quality of this Parliament, I would urge the Minister not to let the Second Reading debates be a formality but to consider incorporating these amendments to the Bill or even calling or putting it before a Select Committee before submitting it for Third Reading.”
“However, one ground that triggers move-on powers is when someone is just about to or has committed an offence under clause 35(1)(d). Why would the police want to exercise a move-on power rather than to arrest the criminal? There are some important safeguards which condition the exercise of police move-on powers to prevent their arbitrary or over-exuberant misusage. First, the police officer must have a reasonable rather than a bare suspicion that the undesirable behaviour listed in clause 35 has been or is taking place. The word reasonable indicates objective review, which promotes accountability. Second, the police officer must be at least a sergeant and must issue a written direction that is reasonable in the circumstances. This could include directing a person to leave the regulated place for a stated reasonable time of 24 hours maximum or to remove to a stated reasonable distance under clause 36(4). Clause 36(2) is to be commended as it strikingly acknowledges that a citizen's right to peaceful assembly is involved and cannot be brushed aside for reasons of efficiency. Indeed, the police are enjoined not to give a clause 36 direction unless it is reasonably necessary to serve three identified interests, which indicates a holistic approach towards balancing goods and rights. These include public safety and public order. Usually, public safety relates to the security of the public or their freedom from danger, which includes dangers to public health. Public order is not necessarily antithetical to disorder and is wide enough to include considerations of public safety within its ambit. If public safety is a part of the wider concept of public order, is there a specific need to differentiate these grounds here?”
“Could the Minister clarify the types of situations where, regarding any public place, the Commissioner under clause 13(2) may if necessary in the public interest prohibit the holding of all public assemblies or processions, or those of a certain description, for up to 28 days? The exercise of this power must relate not to the threat of public disorder, but to serious public disorder or serious public nuisance. What differentiates public disorder from serious public disorder? Could the Minister give some illustrations? Further, why is this power needed when there are already ministerial powers to prohibit processions and assemblies on an ad hoc basis? Sir, I am concerned with the wording of each person who takes part in a public assembly or procession under clause 16(2) for instance. This is vague and warrants more careful definition. Does mere presence at the assembly suffice, or must the person act positively to show he took part in the assembly? What if the person is a passer-by who was at the wrong place at the wrong time? Sir, under Part IV, clause 36 enlarges police powers by giving the police move-on powers in relation to any person at or near a regulated place if a police officer reasonably suspects the person's behaviour has certain undesirable effects. Four sorts of undesirable behaviour are identified in clause 35(1)(a) to (d), such as disrupting a gathering or displaying behaviour which is disorderly, indecent, offensive or threatening to someone entering or leaving a regulated place under clause 35(1)(b). Move-on powers may be aptly used to promote safe streets and public spaces, such as where menacing youths threatening people at MRT stations are instructed to move on. Freedom from fear is a primary social good.”
“Is this fair? The Minister, under clause 11, may hear appeals against certain decisions of the Commissioner. The Minister's decision is final but High Court supervision is not precluded as there is no provision that this shall not be called into question in any court of law. Is this correct? The Minister can allow or reject the appeal or substitute it with his decision. Under clause 11(3)(d), the Minister can direct the Commissioner to reconsider his decision. I find this a bit odd, given that the Minister's decision is final. Such a power approximates that of judicial review where courts will not touch on the merits of a case. If the Commissioner reconsiders the case and maintains his original decision, is there any other mode of recourse for the person affected by this later decision? Sir, by dint of clause 13, the Minister has powers to ban ad hoc a proposed public assembly or procession. If the Commissioner had granted a permit, the Minister can effectively veto this if of the opinion that it is necessary in the public interest. Public interest also triggers the clause 12 ministerial powers to identify prohibited areas. Presumably, exercises of ministerial powers in the public interest are reviewable, while public interest is a wide term, it cannot be so wide as to encompass anything under the sun. What then falls under the ambit of public interest in relation to clauses 12 and 13? Public interest is a broader category than public order. In a persuasive Malaysian case (Re Tan Boon Liat [1976] 2 MLJ 83 ), public interest was identified as having many facets such as public order, public health, public security or safety or public morals. Restraints on assembly for us must be within the Article 14(2) constitutional framework.”
“Clause 7(2)(e) refers to feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different groups in Singapore. Other statutes have typically referred to hostile feelings between different religious groups or between different races. This appears to recognise a new source of social instability stemming from inter-group hostility, spurred by militant activists defined along secular or non-racial lines. Ideological conflict, particularly over morally controversial issues, can precipitate social disharmony. Is this the drafter's intent? If so, can the Minister elaborate on what kinds of scenarios or groups clause 7(2)(e) might cover? Clause 8 provides that conditions may be imposed on the organisers or participants taking part in a static or mobile demonstration which in the Commissioner's opinion is necessary to prevent the situations enumerated in clause 7(2)(a) to (g). What if the conditions imposed are unreasonable or make it impossible to effectively carry out the assembly? I note that the Commissioner's decisions to impose conditions is subject to ministerial appeal under clause 11(1)(c) and, presumably, to judicial review as well. Is this reading correct? A uniform condition is the organiser of the assembly or his nominee must be present throughout its duration, the intent being to ensure good order and public safety as clause 8(1)(b) states. Thus, imposed conditions must advance this purpose and conditions unrelated to good order and public safety would be ultra vires or invalid. Why should the police regulate the number and size of banners, placards under clause 8(3)(b)? How does that affect public order? Furthermore the requirement under 8(3)(c) to engage sufficient marshals to keep order is onerous in terms of responsibility and cost on venue operators.”
“The consequences listed in clause 7(2) require some clarifications as to what they entail or mean. First, clause 7(2)(a) refers to when proposed assemblies might cause Public Disorder or property damage. Is public order the flip side of public disorder? Public order is a narrower concept than law and order, which is breached whenever law is breached. Public order does not affect specific individuals in localised incidents but rather, the community or public at large; it is threatened where public tranquility is disturbed and human life and safety endangered. In some conceptions, Public order relates to the fundamental principles which organise society, including respect for rights. Extremely broad conceptions of public order have emerged in our case law, as where public order is said to be threatened by inaccurate information alleging the financial impropriety of public institutions. In what sense is public order being understood here? Clause 7(2)(b) refers to Public Nuisance, which a judge has described as the Proteus of Public Order founded in contempt for the rights of others. How is public nuisance to be defined? Will it drawn from statutes like section 13A of Miscellaneous Offences Act in relation to using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour which cause harassment or distress? Clause 7(2)(c) relates to obstructions in any public road as does the degree of obstruction matter. Whether it is something we can walk around or is not susceptible to circumvention? A procession may slow down traffic, is this sufficient reason for denying a permit? Clause 7(2)(d) refers to placing the safety of any person in jeopardy. Does this mean just one person or a group of person? Does this refer to the demonstrators or observers? Or all?”
“Clause 6(c)(viii) refers to "other particulars and information" relating to a particular assembly which the Commissioner may require. These cannot be known by a person before giving prior notification to the Commissioner so it must be something required after notice is given. This clause is so broad it is wide enough to include a request for extraneous political matters,such as whether assembly participants are members of any political party, for example, or to stipulate their religious affiliation. Are these relevant public order considerations? The Commissioner may refuse to grant a permit under clause 7 if he has reasonable grounds for apprehending that the proposed assembly or procession may bring about any of the seven consequences listed in clause 7(2)(a) to (g). These objective factors and the word reasonable indicates that this decision is subject to judicial review. These seven consequences are important as the need to avoid them may shape the conditions accompanying a permit under clause 8(2) as well as provide a possible ground for cancelling permits under clause 10(2)(d). The Commissioner should be obliged to give adequate reasons for not granting a permit, and not merely identify a bald conclusion; or, at least to cite the specified ground for rejection. Otherwise, a disappointed party will be disadvantaged should he invoke the ministerial appeal procedure under clause 11(2). This should similarly apply to clause 10 powers in relation to cancelling permits. While courts may imply a duty to give reasons as a facet of natural justice where the justice of the common law supplies legislative deficiencies, it is better that Parliament lead the way by framing clear statutory duties to promote good administration.”
“Sometimes, the effectiveness of a demonstration springs from its spontaneity such as gatherings springing from an outpouring of grief for a public figure's death or national tragedy. Will allowances be made for this? Under clause 6(5), the Commissioner has discretion to accept shorter notice where "reasonably satisfied" earlier notice could not have been given. Could the Minister indicate what might be an acceptable timeframe for shorter notices? Guidelines help regulate discretion. There is no Ministerial appeal where the Commissioner decides not to accept shorter notice. Why is this? Sir, the use of the term "reasonable satisfaction" in clause 6(4) is significant in indicating that decisions must rest on an objective factual basis. Does judicial review lie? There is a difference between a fundamental right and a mere state grant which the state may take away where expediency rears its pragmatic head. To better reflect the constitutional status of the right to peaceful assembly, I suggest clause 6(4) be redrafted to replace the word "may" with "must" so that the Commissioner "must" accept shorter notice where evidence indicates "it is not reasonably practicable to give advance notice." Unless the Commissioner is reasonably satisfied that shorter notice be rejected, the presumption should incline towards facilitating the better enjoyment of a fundamental liberty. Should the Commissioner reject shorter notice, he must inform the affected person in writing "as soon as practicable", certainly before the intended activity takes place. Clause 6 should be amended to require the Commissioner to furnish adequate reasons rather than merely give a bare notification of decision.”
“While we do not expect a Speakers' Corner to be carved out of Orchard Road, will future corners only be allowed inulu or more remote areas? Who will police observance of conditions? Under clause 12, the Minister may delineate prohibited areas where all assemblies and processions are banned. These may include vital public institutions like the Istana or Parliament House, which activists might consider the most effective site for demonstrations. Those who conduct demonstrations within such areas may be fined up to $5,000 and $10,000 for participants and organisers respectively. How were these benchmarks arrived at? Does the Minister consider this a moderate or steep criminal sanction? Also, are there plans to include foreign missions under clause 12, for example? An organiser must give the Commissioner advance notice of intention to organise a public assembly or procession under clause 6(1) within the prescribed period which I presume will be provided for in regulations to be adopted under clause 47. Prior notice enables the authorities to take the necessary measures to facilitate demonstrations by settling routes, regulating traffic, to reduce the risk of disorder. Could the Minister give an indication of what the prescribed period for notice will be – whether six hours as in Finland or seven days as in Hong Kong? This is important where time is of the essence, such as where organisers hope to commemorate the birthday of some important personage. Will regulations also provide for a specified time period within which the Commissioner must decide on whether to grant a permit and formally communicate that decision to the applicant?”
“First, is there any precedent for defining as an "assembly" or "procession" a demonstration or march by one person in aid of any one of three stipulated purposes, such as to publicise a cause or oppose the Government? Why is the number of participants treated as irrelevant given that in notifying the Commissioner under clause 6(c)(iii), information about the number of persons likely to participate in a assembly or procession is required? A common law assembly consists of three persons; an unlawful assembly under the Penal Code relates to five or more persons. When the 1986 English Public Order Bill was debated, the original number of three persons was raised to 10 and eventually 20. In densely populated Hong Kong, a public procession needs more than 30 persons, whereas only two are needed in Singapore. Is not an assembly of one or procession of two much too wide and extreme a definition, too restrictive of civil liberties? Further, what does "to mark or commemorate any event" encompass? Will a birthday celebration in a public restaurant require a permit? This overly wide provision should be more restrictively formulated. The Bill contains powers to exempt places or persons from its operation. Sir, could the Minister indicate what types of persons, assemblies or processions clause 46 may apply to? What criteria will be used to identify exceptional cases? Also, in relation to unrestricted areas under clause 14, geographical spaces are exempt from the notice and permit requirement, which is a good move. Aside from Hong Lim Park, are there plans to introduce more 'Speakers' Corners'? Location is key to whether a demonstration will be occasion for effective communication.”
“Second, is the principle of individual dignity – how is the individual respected in the way he is treated? (a) Are there limits on how far rights can be limited? Is mere convenience a good enough reason to restrict rights or must restrictions satisfy a localised standard of reasonableness or proportionality, to ensure against the exception gobbling up the norm? (b) Is a decision-maker obliged to give reasons to a citizen when making an adverse decision, or is the citizen curtly dismissed? Third, does the Bill hinder or facilitate participatory democracy, which is sustained by freedoms of speech and assembly? Any regulatory regime must appreciate the need for reasonably hearing differing views in a peaceful environment. Politics is not only for politicians but for all citizens, within and without formal processes. This encompasses peaceful protests and citizen journalism, which clause 38 might hinder by authorising the seizure of films of law enforcement activities, such as shots of security officers attending opposition political rallies which some have uploaded on the Internet as a sort of 'show and shame' strategy. Of course, there are valid and sensitive policing activities relating to terrorism or civil unrest. If these are filmed, I am sympathetic towards having powers to order someone to cease and desist filming, to facilitate on-the-spot checks and to require footage to be surrendered. However, broad powers can be abused for non-security reasons, particularly when powers go beyond seizing films to banging down doors "by night or by day" without a warrant, in search of suspected footage. This is perhaps over-extensive. Let me turn to the Bill proper and my concerns with certain clause 2 definitions.”
“Closer to home, the events of the past few days where demonstrations scuttled an ASEAN summit in Pattaya are sobering. Indeed, Part III of this Bill creates a 'Special Events' regime which will help the hosting of major international events. We are not hermits but citizens who share a common space. Rights carry responsibilities. Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that rights such as peaceful assembly are subject to legal limitations designed to secure "recognition of the rights of others" and to meet "the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." Has the Public Order Bill managed to strike a happy equilibrium where rights are meaningfully enjoyed rather than illusory? The Bill may be assessed against three main criteria, aside from the objectives of ensuring effective policing powers. First, based on the virtues of the rule of law. The Bill confers broad discretion ary powers on the Minister, Commissioner and Police which curtail rights of expression, assembly and personal liberty, through arrest and move-on powers. (a) Does the Bill provide clear guidance on how to exercise discretion so as to avoid arbitrariness and to realise the Act's purposes? The law must be clear enough to guide and enable citizens to plan their actions within its stable framework. (b) Is the decision-making process sufficiently transparent? Must decisions be rendered within specified time limits? (c) Are there mechanisms for holding decision-makers accountable, such as appeal processes or judicial review? All power has legal limits and should not be unfettered. Who will guard the guardians who guard our public order? What if public powers are abused? Does the law provide for this contingency?”
“How do we strike an appropriate balance between liberty and security? Peaceful assemblies are a potentially effective method of communication and integral to extra-parliamentary politics. They are an important, if blunt, way for civil society to participate in public life by expressing ideals or highlighting grievances, perhaps through slogans rather than reasoned debate. A responsive government may value this as a barometer of public sentiment. I remember as an undergraduate in England, demonstrations were a regular occurrence, whether against the Poll Tax, Apartheid or cries to "Free Mandela” which kind of dates me. Other righteous causes such as toppling dictators such as Ceaucescu in Romania or Marcos in the Philippines were also a product of large-scale people power demonstrations. In this light, it is good that the Public Order Bill squarely addresses the issue of political demonstrations and assemblies – in the past under the Public Enter tainments and Meeting Act, "any lecture, talk, address, debate or discussion", including those of a political bent, were defined as "public entertainment" and grouped together with funfairs and peep shows, which I always thought was ludicrous, trivialising political communication. Conversely, demonstrations can trigger violence where the right to peaceful protest is abused by militant activists wanting to forcefully impose their views on other people. Demonstrations may champion noxious causes, like the march of Neo-Nazis through a village where many Holocaust survivors resided, which is a famous example of how assembly rights can disrupt the even tempo of community life. Demonstrations may cause great offence and give rise to counter-demonstrations, escalating social tensions.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, the Public Order Bill is a major piece of public law legislation. It shapes the contours of the fundamental liberties of free expression and peaceful assembly enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. While the law protects many interests, only the most vital interests enjoy the status of constitutional rights. To be more than "zi lao hu" or paper tigers, constitutional rights must be given due respect and not treated as disposable interests. However, rights are not absolute. Article 14(2) expressly allows Parliament to impose restrictions on assembly rights which it considers "necessary or expedient" in the interests of the "security of Singapore" and "public order". However, there should be a freedom-friendly standard of necessity. It is trite that rights cannot exist without order, in the face of anarchy and lawlessness. However, we do not just want "order", we want a just order, one befitting the aspirations of a democratic, not autocratic society. Excessive order is tyrannical; an excessive focus on rights breeds an unhealthy narcissistic indi vidualism which disregards the rights of others and the common good. Our goal is not to be lop-sided rights fundamentalists or authoritarian apologists but to seek the via media of ordered liberty, a balance between freedom and necessary restraints. Are the regulations and restrictions in this Bill reasonable or repressive? I think none of us would have a problem with banning outdoor activities which glorify terrorism or precipitate collective violence which robs us of a secure environment where we can live peaceful lives. So, too, innocuous activities like cultural processions should be facilitated. The difficulty relates to political or cause-related assemblies, processions, demonstrations.”
“Will a reasonable reimbursement regime sound the knell for altruism where the motivation to donate is monetary? Will the ends justify the means? Will this take us a step closer towards commodification? Will this induce the poor to enter a devil's bargain to become a source of spare body parts, for the rich, in order to support themselves? With the increasing objectification of the human body, the treatment of individual human beings as saleable commodities follows from the logic of the slave trade. There are parallel concerns in relation to the objectification of the body in relation to surrogate motherhood, cloning and genetic testing. What is being lost by this? We cannot lose sight of these bigger issues. Sir, since the Government intends to go ahead with this scheme, how do we prevent the scheme's exploitation, to ensure that the prospect of reimbursement of reasonable expenses is not the sole incentive for organ donation? How will the Government ensure an effectively monitored scheme which provides fair, equal and publicly controlled compensation or reimbursement? I hope the Minister will fully address these concerns.”
“Are the increased risks of hypertension, long-term psychological effects on the donor, transfusion transmitted hepatitis or AIDS adequately explained to the living donor? Has the Ministry commissioned research or consulted existing research findings on these issues? Third, is there or will there be standardised criteria for donor suitability, in both medical and psychosocial terms, which the Government will ensure is implemented? What role with the Government play, if any, in relation to guarding the well-being of potential donors as well as the follow-up of their welfare? Can the Minister shed light on the process by which a donor is considered medically suited as well as psychosocially suitable? What criteria is used, by whom, and who supervises this? Sir, the physician's duty is to do no harm. In the case of living organ donation, the physician must risk the life of a healthy person to save or improve the life of a patient. To what extent can we justify causing physical injury to a healthy donor for the benefit of a sick recipient? Surgery is risky business. An article I read in a medical journal estimates the risk of death for kidney donors as being one in 3,200. How is permissible risk in relation to the donor, to whom no physical benefit accrues, measured? Is there any agreement on criteria or guidelines for which health conditions, such as hypertension or vascular disease, may disqualify a potential living donor? Who determines competency in allowing individuals to choose to donate? Is the team that evaluates donor suitability the same team that evaluates recipient suitability – if so, how are the conflicts of interest handled? Lastly, what is the moral or social cost to society?”
“Will there be a regulatory body to oversee the interests of donors and to ensure that those donor-recipient arrangements are above board? To ensure that financial stressors, rather than genuine altruism, are not the sole, if primary, reason for the arrangement being undertaking place? If non-resident donors are eligible under the comprehensive reimbursement scheme, is there not a danger of exploiting people from poorer countries? An article in Kidney International (2008) reported that often the very poor are the ones who exchange their kidney for a payment of some US$1,000 to US$5,000 while brokers charge recipients anything from $100,000 to $200,000. It is estimated that in 'kidney colonies' like Tamil Nadu, where poverty is extreme, kidneys are considered a financial reserve and some 5,000 people are estimated to have donated kidneys for cash. In addition this has not led to their long-term economic benefit and in fact, they have suffered a deterioration in health status. Second, there is often an information asymmetry or deficit on the part of the donor. What safeguards are in place to ensure that a donor appreciates the range of risks associated with living organ donations, to the extent this is known, to ensure he freely consents to it? There appears to be some debate within the medical community about the under-estimation of health risks to healthy donors and their emotional well-being in the long run, as well as an overstatement of recipients' quality of life, in understating the long-term toll of powerful anti-rejection drugs. The immediate operative risks to donors can be stated with some certainty but what about the long term effects? For kidney donors, for example, there is a risk of renal failure as kidney function normally declines with age?”
“Only the rich can afford this high-end medical treatment through their financial resources or insurance status. The vulnerable poor are frequently the sector of the population desperate enough to provide an organ. We do not want to arrive at a situation where this becomes the case. This would be nothing short of discrimination against the poor. What steps will be taken, if at all, to ensure fairness amongst those in need, especially poor Singaporeans? Will some form of public assistance be extended to them? Or is this just a scheme they have no access to? A preferential regime for the rich? So long as the transaction takes place directly between a donor and recipient, the rich will be more likely to receive transplants than the poor, though one might argue that if a wealthy person procures his own private kidney, without resorting to the black market, the entire public pool of kidney increases which may benefit poorer patient with renal failure. If saving lives is a paramount value, this surely cannot be limited to saving the lives of those with financial means. Will the Government step in to level the playing field, for example, through grants or subsidies? Or perhaps disinterested private charities can be encouraged to sponsor and underwrite reimbursement costs wholly or partially? This would minimise the role of that personal wealth place in the likelihood of a recipient receiving an organ. From the perspective of the donor, what steps will be taken by the Government as regulator to ensure that the prospect of reasonable reimbursement of costs does not serve as a financial inducement or otherwise exploit the poor, whether from home or abroad?”
“How do we protect poor donors from exploitation? While HOTA makes provision to deal with commercial dealings in organs by unscrupulous intermediaries who exploit the poor and disenfranchised, both within and frequently beyond national borders, what about national de facto commercial dealings guised as "reasonable reimbursement" arrangements? What safeguards are there to ensure against this eventuality, to especially protect non-resident donors from lower income countries? A related issue is should we preclude foreign donors from receiving reimbursement. The Minister has said we should not discriminate between organ donors based on nationality. However, while Article 12 of the Constitution does provide for equality under the law, Parliament is able to draw distinctions, even on the basis of nationality, if it is reasonable to draw such a classification. If there are good reasons for distinguishing between national and non-national living organ donors, the law permits this. A good reason to draw this distinction is to prevent commercial exploitation and so not to facilitate de facto contracts for organs. I would echo the sentiments of my fellow parliamentary colleagues that we should perhaps take an incremental gradual approach towards rather than allowing HOTA to apply to both foreigners as well as Singapore citizens. With advancing medical technology able to prolong human life, demand for organs will continue to increase – but how far do we carry this? What are the competing considerations and what is the Government’s role and responsibility in all this? Sir, a real concern is that this law will essentially provide an option for the Rich and be a lure for the Poor, who may take the risk of donating an organ to escape straitened financial conditions.”
“First, what is the standard of reasonableness to be applied to altruistic living donors? The differences in the loss of earnings for the CEO of a Fortune 500 company and of a rural subsistence farmer are huge, although it is really only the poor who would be monetarily induced to donate organs. So too reasonable costs of medical care will turn on variable factors like the age and health status of the donor. How will reasonable costs be calculated? What standard will be applied to assess reasonably incurred expenses, costs, insurance and the underwriting of medical care? Will this be left to the two parties involved, treating this as a private affair? Or will the Ministry of Health set and enforce a ceiling for compensation? Or provide a tariff or guidelines for each compensable item whether in the form of a minimum sum, a ceiling, a percentage, a flat rate? Or will it leave everything for calculation on a case by case basis where relevant factors might include age, financial status, the type of organ, the length of the recovery period, etc? There have been some newspaper reports suggesting that $50,000 constitutes reasonable reimbursement: will an upper limit for reimbursement be stipulated? What is the guarantee that initially modest payments will not increase over time until the point it does in fact become valuable consideration? Are items like the potential expenses of long-term medical care even known? What if a kidney donor should develop renal failure down the road, will provision be made for that risk? Who will regulate and ensure adherence to reasonable terms? How do we ensure fair terms where one party has unequal bargaining power, this usually being the richer party who can afford to foot these considerable costs?”
“It is a problem of Desperate Need and Desperate Supply. Mdm Halimah has eloquently demonstrated the transnational dimensions of this sorry deficit: what if foreign donors working in Singapore, suffering economic woes, are the ones who are tempted to donate organs for cash? What if Singapore becomes a hub for organ transplants flowing from wealthy recipients and indigent donors? Thus, reimbursement for reasonable expenses might disguise an "organ for profit" model. How do we draw the line between comprehensive reimbursement and organ sales contracts for "valuable consideration"? What will be the role of the Government in this? Will it adopt a detached, "hands off" approach, privatising donor-recipient transactions and adopting essentially a "contract"-based model? Or will supervisory oversight, which I think is absolutely necessary, be retained? I do not think a laissez-faire model is appropriate here; some element of protectionism is needed for various reasons. The Act appears to oppose organ trading while supporting the view that compensation and reimbursement to donors not amounting to inducement is ethically permissible. The amendment may be designed to remove financial disincentives, and it is a fair enough point, to ameliorate the financial hardship incurred by donation, including reimbursement for lost wages for instance. However, how does one ensure a distinction is preserved between removing financial disincentives and providing financial incentives or profit? The introduction of money, in the form of reasonable costs incurred, into the equation changes everything. Commercial transactions may be cloaked as altruistic donations. This cannot be desirable. Various problems relate to the comprehensive reimbursement regime arise.”
“In such cases, the Government might underwrite compensation in recognition of donation as a form of public sacrifice, whether in cash or in kind, such as free health insurance for life, educational support or tax credits. Has this avenue for increasing organ supply been considered for the Singapore context? Directed donation could be to a loved one or intimate friend, where one can appreciate the pre-existing emotional bond and the willingness of a prospective donor to risk surgery and assume a personal risk for the benefit of the recipient, who is someone whom they care about. The donation is an expression of love. While one cannot love without giving, one can give without loving. Directed donation could also involve, in an act of radical altruism, a Good Samaritan donor giving an organ to a specific person to whom the donor has no prior emotional connection. This is a potentially life-threatening sacrifice. While this amendment does not embrace the market solution and indeed seeks to heavily penalise third party organ trading, the concern is that the quantum of compensation may be significant enough to induce potential living unrelated donors to sell their kidneys or lobes of liver. Aside from commodifying organs, and the thorny question of computing reimbursement, the problematical issue of exploitation also arises because it is the poor who will find the prospect of compensation or reimbursement attractive, particularly if this runs into five or even six figures. What may appear as innocent incentives to some will look like irresistible offers to others. This temptation may arise where the compensation package may be viewed as a quick fix to financial problems, given the duress that flows from desperate poverty. This is the sadness of the problem.”
“In addition, because organ donation is not risk-free, compensation also extends to short or long term medical care and insurance protection which is "reasonably necessary" flowing from the donor operation. The basic thinking is that reimbursing living donors may increase organ supply. We know what we have to gain from this policy change; but we must also ask, what do we have to lose? Clearly there is more at stake here than increasing organ supply. We have to look at the issue holistically from all angles, consider all interests – the welfare of the patient, the welfare of the donor, the role and duties of doctors and Ethics Committee, and the gains and moral costs to society. Only then can we know what is at stake. While I do not have an issue with providing compensation for justifiable expenses, such as the loss of earnings for a live donor, which could act as a disincentive, what is unsettling is the fear that section 14(3)(c) opens the back door to what is in substance, though not in form, a de facto contract for the sale of an organ. If commerce rather than altruism becomes the norm, if organs are given in return for something of material value, something is lost because organ donation is no longer about altruism but is about less virtuous motives. Living donors are heroic precisely because of their personal sacrifice for the benefit of the health of the community. The scheme for comprehensive reimbursement presumably applies only to directed donation as opposed to non-directed donation where the donor gives to a general pool and the donated organ goes to the neediest stranger.”
“Indeed, one might view section 14(2A) as a guard against commodification, where the human body is treated as a form of property which can be traded and where human beings are viewed as vendors of saleable spare body parts, which is an affront to human dignity. Section 14(2A) seeks to close the front door to commercial dealings in organs by intermediaries. Penalties for third party transactions have been significantly enhanced, with fines raised from $10,000 to $100,000 or imprisonment from one to 10 years. This is laudable. In relation to the issue of reimbursement, this amendment appears to view "pure" altruism as a romanticised myth. Section 14(3)(c) represents a "sea change" or distinct and major policy shift in relation to living organ donation. Under the existing HOTA scheme, a contract or arrangement to reimburse expenses necessarily incurred by a person in relation to the removal of an organ is not prohibited. The new section 14(3)(c) will significantly broaden what expenses the donor can be reimbursed for. The standard shifts from necessary to reasonable expenses. It permits the comprehensive reimbursement in money or money’s worth of various costs which are "reasonably incurred" by a living organ donor in relation to the entire process of donating an organ, such as the removal or storage of the kidney or part of a liver. A contract for such costs does not fall within the existing category of prohibited contracts for the sale of organs. This exemption of arrangements relating to reimbursing the costs incurred by an altruistic living donor is meant to be comprehensive. It extends not only to direct costs, but also to any loss of earnings, accommodation, travel and childcare expenses "reasonably attributable" to the living organ donor.”
“The third method is cause for some controversy. It relates to the novel proposal to allow living organ donors to receive compensation or, to use the preferred term, reimbursement for expenses incurred other than those directly related to the surgical process itself. In a nutshell, while the intent of the amendment is not to legalise organ trading, the fear is that this will be the de facto effect. There has been some thought given to appropriate nomenclature. The very fact that the term "reimbursement" is being used rather than "compensation", which sparks connections with commerce or contract, reveals an underlying uneasiness. I believe this is because of a felt disconnect between a laudable end but questionable means. The fear or concern is that we are ushering in a market for organs because of the thin line between defraying the out of pocket expenses of donors and the organ-for-profit model, the market model. The idea of a market for organs, of kidneys for cash is distasteful and strikes many as morally repugnant. Are we engaging in semantics to disguise or distance ourselves from our discomfit with the underlying issues? What’s in a word? We need to heed the advice found in an old Talmudic proverb to "examine the contents, not the bottle." Whatever the intent of the HOTA amendments are, we need to ask what is their effect. Are we effectively exchanging a model for organ donation based on selfless altruism to one based on the commercialisation of organs, the sale of body parts governed by the profit motive? As a worst case scenario, are we exchanging altruism for organ capitalism? It bears reiteration that this is not the intent of this amendment.”
“The motive or intent of this current amendment is clear enough: there is a need to do something about the persistent and persisting gap between the demand for and supply of organs which can save lives, or really, prolong a finite human life and ease suffering. That is a worthy goal. The entire thrust of this amendment represents the latest efforts to increase organ procurement, to reduce the organ deficit. The method is threefold, one more controversial than the others. First, the age limit of 60 for cadaveric donations has been removed by deleting section 5(2)(d). This is not problematic. Second, the new section 14(7) will allow for paired living donor organ transplants by stipulating that this is not tantamount to a contract for the selling or buying of organs, which the law continues to prohibit under section 14 of HOTA. Paired living donor organs will not constitute "valuable consideration" where donor consent is present. This is a form of voluntary reciprocal altruism. The intent is that by allowing recipients to swap their incompatible donors with another donor/recipient pair to make a good donor-recipient match, more people will get a new kidney. This is quite an innovative solution and has worked to increase organ supply in other jurisdictions. To this second method, I will only ask whether the Minister could clarify what measures will be taken to ensure that no one backs out of this sort of arrangement? I understand in other jurisdictions that such operations are done simultaneously, requiring four operating rooms, to ensure the recipients that both will receive their donated kidneys. Does the Minister see the need for the state to supervise this process or does it prefer to leave it to the relevant parties to sort out amongst themselves?”
“Sir, the fact that the Whip has been lifted on this debate demonstrates the Minister’s appreciation that it implicates matters of conscience and ethics, that it raises troubling moral issues which Members struggle with. The problem is clear enough: the current regime under HOTA, based on presumed consent and altruistic donation, has failed to meet the demand for transplantable organs. The parameters of possible options are defined by various extremes we do not wish to resort to. First, organ conscription (where the state treats human organs as a public good and takes it by force). Neither has organ socialism been adopted, where anyone who needs an organ is allowed access to an organ pool, regardless of whether or not he has contributed to its upkeep. Under the Singapore system of presumed consent, priority is given to those who do not opt out of the scheme. In form, our model still rests primarily on that of the altruistic donor. One way to increase the supply of organs is to allow people to sell their kidneys and lobes of liver. However, we have not embraced the market solution as the optimal solution to resolving a shortage of organs or indeed, any other desirable thing. Nor should we. GK Chesterton quipped: "Art like morality, consists of drawing the line somewhere." So we have drawn the line against organ commerce. We have not gone the way of unhinged organ capitalism, where body parts are treated as commodities for sale to the highest bidder. Just as some desires are not desirable, there are some choices we should not choose. Singapore still prohibits organ trading. The Minister has emphasised that these amendments do not carry the intent of legalising organ trading.”
“Also, it appears that the existing Act and these amendments do not require the relevant decision makers, such as the Board of Film Censors and Committee of Appeal to give reasons for their decisions. Why not include a statutory duty to give reasons for their decisions, as a matter of good governance? This would also help flesh out the contours of what is a permissible and non-permissible party political film. Sir, we do not need a sledgehammer to crack a nut. More proportionate methods for restricting fundamental liberties are a good thing. I appreciate the prudence of a gradual, incremental approach towards section 33 and the move away from killing the message or chilling the messenger. Insofar as this Amendment marks a shift from absolute bans to a more calibrated form of regulating political speech where the Board acts as a kind of bouncer, I support the Bill.”
“Also, can he confirm that it falls to the Board of Film Censors to decide on whether a film is sufficiently undramatic so as to qualify as a section 2(3) exemption? Sir, I note that section 35 which empowers the Minister to prohibit the possession or distribution of any film considered contrary to the public interest still applies. This is a catch-all clause, wide enough to catch party political films which the Board of Film Censors considers has passed the test of being non-partisan and unbiased. It is a very broad power. Will further guidelines be provided to limit the Minister's discretion in this respect, to prevent section 35 from being a backdoor way to ban films which are found to escape the jaws of section 33? The new section 4(a) empowers the Minister to appoint Advisory Committees to advise the Board of Film Censors. The Board may but is not required to consult with the Advisory Committee. Indeed, the Board can disregard the consultation. What then is the point of creating an Advisory Committee if its views may be so easily discounted? It seems a little unnecessary, perhaps even a waste of time. If the point is citizen participation, I can appreciate the value of that. However, to allay any fear that the Advisory Committee will be peopled by many a reputable personage who will merely rubber stamp the Board's decisions, there must be a way to demonstrate that consultation has in fact taken place and that this is a meaningful process. Would the Minister consider adopting a rule requiring the gazetting of any disagreement between the Advisory Committee and Board and mandate that these bodies provide the basis for their reasoning? This will give the public a more transparent view of this kind of contestation taking place and promotes good governance.”
“" Films that record a lawful event, such as anniversary celebration videos by political parties fall within this exemption under section 2(3)(d), presumably because it is these serve as personal records. A political party may make a video in celebration of themselves, perhaps in hyberbolic terms, but this is not meant for mass consumption and therefore will not pollute the well of public information meant to inform public debate. Live recordings of lawful events such as processions under section 2(3)(c) or documentary films under section 2(3)(e) providing accurate accounts of actual events, persons or situations are exempted provided such event, person or situation is not depicted in a dramatic way. Under sections 2(3)(f) and (g), films which contain a political party or politician's manifesto made by or on behalf of the candidates are also exempted provided they contain no animation and are shorn of dramatic elements. These are open-ended terms! The assessment of whether something is dramatically depicted will vary between "drama mamas" and those of a more phlegmatic bent. How do we measure drama? I appreciate that the intent is to regulate films which contain inaccuracies, convey false impressions or otherwise provoke irrational emotionalisms which precludes the finding of common ground which is so essential to the political enterprise. Could the Minister elaborate on how degrees of drama will be measured? Do we know it when we see it? For example, would a negative advertisement campaign against one's political opponent, subtly disguised or incorporated within the rational presentation of a political manifesto, qualify as an exemption?”
“This sort of personal politics is not what the term party political refers to, I imagine. Second, partisan politics, which speaks to a certain kind of politics that depends on formal or informal political alliances and party allegiances. This is the stuff of contemporary parliamentary politics. This would fall squarely into the term party political films. The attempt to portray one political party in a more favourable light, for example, either by promotional propaganda or by attacking one's competitor. A third kind of politics may be characterised as ideological politics which relate to disparate stances on an issue, which is not party-based. For example, whether a libertarian or conservative approach is taken towards censorship, gambling or prostitution. This could also fall within the definition of a film directed towards a political end as section 2(b)(vi) relates to Government policies or issues of public controversy in Singapore. Can the Minister speak to whether or not further guidelines will be provided, perhaps in a code or subsidiary legislation, as to what bias and partisan means? This will help whittle down subjectivity in the exercise of discretion in this matter. Perhaps some guidance can be drawn from the list of films exempted from treatment as a party political film. The list of exceptions to the category of party political film in clause 3 is extended to include five more types of films. As I was reading the expanded section 2(3) listing, my first thought was that if there was a film about the Films Act, it might be called: "No drama please, we are Singaporeans" or "the Importance of being Earnestly Serious?”
“The governing factor in liberalising this regime is to preserve an idealised vision of elevated political debate which is rational and objective, by weeding out sensationalistic, emotionally manipulative films. Permissible films must be factual and objective; if they are distortive, this does not serve the free speech goals of advancing truth and accuracy of information in democratic debate. Emotion is verboten as it undermines this ideal. The model is a documentary rather than a reality show, dramatisation of a live or historical event or mockumentary. What criteria is provided to ascertain whether a film is partisan or biased? We are wading in a sea of grey, given the inherent subjectivity of this stipulation. Can a party political film be unbiased? Does not a film-maker have a message to convey, which is driven by his or her opinions and values? Even news coverage by licensed broadcasting services make value judgments just by dint of the choices of which stories are covered and how they are covered, how much face time is given to a politician or otherwise, whether a range of viewpoints are covered fairly and equitably or whether journalistic bias creeps in? If the opposite of bias is neutrality or impartiality, one must ask, is this even desirable, let alone possible? Can a party political film be neutral on political positions? Politicians must stand for something. This is how voters decide whether to stand with or walk away from them. Sir, can a film on political matters be non-partisan? What is a partisan or non-partisan political matter? When is a matter political in nature? I can think of three types of politics at least. First, personal politics relates to personal ambition and the pursuit of power, for example, office politics.”
“In relation to party political films, political persuasion is the name of the game and this must relate to garnering political support, including to influence voting outcomes. Making films which are intended to or are likely to affect elections would still be subject to section 33, it appears. This Amendment seeks to clarify what kind of film is directed towards a political end in Singapore in current section 2(a). This is, to say the least, an ambiguous category. Ambiguity is not a helpful guide to lawful behaviour – one virtue of the rule of law is providing a stable legal order which sustains a certain degree of predictability in one's environment. This enables us to make effective choices between all the options available to us. Making and exhibit party political films is an offence. If one cannot identify in advance what a party political film is, this may deter the making of films, which may be of great value. Expression will be chilled for fear of falling foul of the law. Under clause 2 of the Amendment, the Board of Film Censors is mandated to decide what constitutes a party political film for section 33 purposes. The proposed section 2(2)(b) removes the ban by providing that films relating to political matters may now be permitted if they are not partisan or biased. The existing section 2(2)(b) identifies seven examples of what a political matter is. This includes matters relating to elections, referenda, MPs, Government, political parties and policies. This is a description rather than a definition of political matter. It is pretty comprehensive and would seem to capture, if not colonise, the entire sphere of public life, politics, politicians and policies.”
“A discerning citizenry is a maturing citizenry; maturity is also marked by traits of civility, self restraint, a sense of proportion and propriety which are crucial to the long-term sustainability of democratic deliberation. The fear in lightening up on party political films is that the public will get misled, misinformed by distorted half-truths, riled up or driven to emotional distraction and unfortunate action. With free speech, we let in the good stuff as well as a good deal of rubbish. Thus, there must be a new social compact of trust between governor and governed that citizens will not, when speech laws are liberalised, embark upon Gullible’s travels but will shoulder the burden of discernment in evaluating the content of the speech communicated by political films. Sometimes, parents have to let go and children have to assume responsibility. While the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, so too, "personal responsibility is the price of liberty". That said, lifting the blanket ban on party political films is of value to both speaker and hearer. To the voter is presented more information about politicians and their agendas. This enhances informed decision-making. To the politician, their viewpoints and positions can be directly communicated, through a high impact medium which can spread virally, in the good sense, without third party mediation. They can control their message, guard against misrepresentation and correct errors. This promotes accuracy and truth, two goals free speech is designed to serve. Now to the nuts and bolts of this amendment. We speak to communicate, to reach the mind of others, to persuade conviction, which is of little worth unless it is converted into conduct.”