Tony Tan Keng Yam
Singapore
“One of the problems which they have in Britain is that, up to recently, they have no means to stop people coming into Britain and preaching in their mosques messages of hate, jihad and violence. Here, MUIS monitors our mosques very carefully, what is being preached at Friday prayers.”
“Sir, I am not going to enter into a debate about whether the war in Iraq is justified or not. That is another issue. But I would say, Sir, that with all the measures which have been taken over the last three years since 9/11, including the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the arrest of the Al Qaeda leaders, the detention of the JI lea…”
“Sir, we are extending the CCTV coverage in our bus stations, MRT stations and other places in Singapore where people congregate. It is a part of life now. For example, at our MRT stations, all our CCTV cameras are those where the films are recorded and we can analyse them. Surveillance is one of the effective ways of deterring terrorism.”
“The Muslim community in the UK has contributed to the healing process and has worked hard with the other communities to strengthen the moderate voice of Islam.”
“I would say again, Sir, that what we should do is when you see something which is suspicious, if you see a bag which is left unattended, report to some authority. We will look into it. We have to. And I am glad that we are getting more reports today, be vigilant.”
“It could reach here. We have to live with it. We support the war in Iraq. We believe that it is good for us to join the coalition led by the US against terror. The fight against terror is worldwide. We cannot opt out by not taking part. We are in it. We must continue whatever the difficulties.”
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“Their intelligence arms are MI5 (which is their domestic intelligence arm) and MI6 (which is their external intelligence arm). MI5 reports to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, MI6 reports to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and GCHQ, which is their signal intelligence arm, reports to the Secretary of State for Defence. Ultimately, to ensure that these three intelligence arms work together, they have only one intelligence budget which is under the control of the Permanent Secretary for Coordination and he allocates it between the three intelligence arms and therefore compels them to work together. We have not gone as far as the British in our proposal. I do not expect that we will need to do so, but at the end of the day, we have to have an arrangement whereby SID and ISD will work together to enable the Government to have an integrated intelligence picture. If intelligence is not there, if the intention is flawed, then we can get into big problems, as the British and US governments are now finding over the situation in Iraq. That is fundamental. The National Security Coordination Secretariat is a work in progress. It is a start. We have to see how it goes on. And we may have to make modifications along the way. We may have to strengthen the powers and authority of the Permanent Secretary for National Security and Intelligence Coordination, and we will do so. But, I think, give it a try. The discussions which I have had with the Ministers, our Permanent Secretaries and other officials in our security agencies give me confidence that whatever be the difficulty, we will eventually get this coordinated intelligence and policy planning which is necessary to keep Singapore safe.”
“And, therefore, if any terrorists were to attack Singapore or Singaporeans' interest, it would most probably be overseas rather than at home. The SPRC discussed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), pointed out the danger, and MFA has now launched a programme to ensure that all our embassies are safe. Of course, that requires money. And through the normal process of budgeting, it may take some time. But this is an urgent issue. The SPRC made available the necessary money to MFA so that they could get the programme started as soon as possible because we cannot waste time when lives are at stake. Our officials, our Ambassadors, our foreign service officials in our embassies live and work abroad to serve Singapore, and we must ensure that their working environment is safe and that they will not be blown up by a car bomb or by a suicide attack. And through this process of a revolving budget, it has been most helpful in getting such programmes quickly off the ground and we will make the same arrangements, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Finance, for the National Security Coordination Secretariat. How do we ensure coordination between the domestic intelligence and the external intelligence agencies? It is very difficult. The difficulty of getting, for example, in the United States, the CIA and the FBI to work together is well-known. If you open any newspaper today, their problems are manifest. I hope that through the arrangement which we have set, through the good sense and cooperation of the individuals and the leaders in our intelligence agencies, we will be able to foster this cooperation. The British have the same problem and they have a lot of experience with terrorism because they have been fighting the IRA terrorists for many decades.”
“Dr Ong Chit Chung has asked whether the National Security Coordination Secretariat will be given an additional budget in order to influence other Ministries. I think the same question has also been asked by Ms Irene Ng about how we ensure that there is cooperation between the Ministries. Sir, let me say, first of all, that we should be proud of our security agencies - MINDEF, MHA, SCDF, the Police, SID and ISD. These are first-class organisations. They are staffed by dedicated professionals, led by competent leaders who have the vision and determination to keep Singapore safe. And because they are good organisations, it is to be expected that they would have different views about how to handle issues and different perspectives on how to ensure national security. If they were people without strong convictions, it would have been much easier to get agreement on the measures which I have just outlined. But because they are strong individuals with strong views, we have had to trash out these issues over many meetings and over many months, and that is good. I welcome that because I am assured by that process that they have applied their minds and where we have been able to get agreement, it has not compromised their core interests. But to ensure coordination, the most effective way is through the budgeting process. The Ministry of Finance has made available to the Security Policy Review Committee a revolving budget of $50 million which they top up from time to time, as and when we need to launch urgently some national security programmes. For example, we were very concerned over the last few months with the security of some of our embassies overseas. With the measures which we have taken in Singapore, we are confident that we have hardened Singapore.”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I thank the four Members for their questions. I thought I would answer these questions first. Mr Tan Soo Khoon and Mr Leong Horn Kee have brought up this question about involving the public to ensure national security for Singapore. Sir, this is a most important point. As I said in my speech just now, national security cannot be left to the Government alone. National security is the responsibility of every Singaporean. This has to be brought home to grassroots organisations, schools and to the general public. That is why we are preparing a public document to explain the ideas in the statement which I have just made, but in a much more friendly and accessible manner with illustrations, photographs and in simpler language. We will disseminate this publication at a national security seminar to be held in late August and make it available to schools and households. We would appreciate the help of Members of Parliament to distribute it to their constituencies. We will also make available a CD presentation which Members can use when they talk to their grassroots leaders. We also need to publicise this through the media, the newspapers, the television and the radio. We will arrange for discussions and interviews in order to put these points across. It is difficult to put across the main points and all these nuances in one presentation. I have set out the main points today. We will elaborate on these in the coming months. In this case, Members can do a great service to Singapore by working with the National Security Coordinating Committee and the Secretariat in order to put across these ideas and to explain the significance of these measures to the man-in-the-street and to the public.”
“I welcome your ideas, questions and views to continuously improve our efforts to safeguard Singapore's future.”
“The Government's efforts to deal with the threat of transnational terrorism can only be effective with the full participation of all Singaporeans. Everyone has a part to play in Singapore's national security. The key ideas behind the Strategic Framework for National Security will be disseminated to create awareness through a public document titled "The Fight against Terror: Singapore's National Security Strategy" to be launched in August at a National Security Seminar. Conclusion Sir, the most fundamental duty of Government is to protect the lives of our citizens and their property and interests. Fulfilling this duty requires constant vigilance and bold thinking to pre-empt and prevent terrorist attacks. In this connection, Sir, I - and I think the whole of Singapore - should pay a tribute to our security and defence agencies, particularly MINDEF, MHA and their agencies, and also SID and ISD, for their sterling efforts and hard work to keep Singapore safe from terrorist attacks, despite the turbulent and dangerous security environment in the last few years. The Strategic Framework for National Security will now establish the baseline which will enable us to further evolve our security strategy to deal even more effectively with the long term threat of terrorism that is constantly evolving and adapting. When the National Security Coordination Secretariat and its two agencies, ie, the NSCC and JCTC, are properly staffed and fully operational, our Government Ministries and agencies will be better placed to work even more closely and effectively with the people and the business community to keep Singapore safe and secure. I urge Members to support the Strategic Framework for Singapore's National Security which I have just outlined.”
“But 9-11 has reinforced the urgency and importance of dealing with terrorism and, where necessary, we have put in place several ad hoc coordinating arrangements to protect Singapore and Singaporeans from terrorist attacks. The Security Policy Review Committee that I chair has provided strategic policy direction and guidance. Ad-hoc committees of Permanent Secretaries have been set up to co-ordinate the development and implementation of strategic responses to various threats, including aviation security, land transport security and maritime security. Through these ad hoc arrangements, much has already been achieved in hardening Singapore against terrorist attacks. Since 9-11, we have put in place enhanced security measures that cover our land entry points, airport, seaports, critical installations and key public areas. We have also improved our capabilities to deal with explosives, and chemical and biological threats. The work we have done over the last three years has raised our overall vigilance and readiness, and helped to close obvious capability gaps that were identified. But, Sir, it is unwise to depend on such ad hoc arrangements in the long run. They must be replaced with robust institutional structures. The Strategic Framework for National Security will address the issues I have discussed, close the gaps which we have identified, and put in place the machinery to enable the Government to systemically deal with the security issues which confront our nation today. National resilience Sir, enhancing Singapore's national security cannot be left to the Government alone. The people and the business community must play their part.”
“It will be the focal point for strengthening the cooperation in counter-terrorism intelligence between the Security and Intelligence Division (SID) of MINDEF and the Internal Security Department (ISD) of MHA, particularly in the area of strategic intelligence needed for policy making. Working under the guidance of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, JCTC will have the challenging task of developing and enhancing the cooperative modus operandi between our two intelligence agencies (SID and ISD) that have hitherto worked largely independent of each other. JCTC will not be directly involved in operations but it will have full information access to ISD, SID and other relevant agencies pertaining to its conduct of strategic analysis on an all-source basis. In other words, Sir, JCTC will act as the integration node in the production of strategic counter-terrorism intelligence from its inputs from all sources for integrated analysis and assessment. JCTC will then be able to provide the higher level strategic picture that is needed to formulate national strategy and policy and plans for the development of national counter terrorism capabilities. Sir, coordinating the responsibilities and work of a number of Ministries and agencies is always difficult. But whatever the difficulties, we must succeed in better coordinating planning, policy and intelligence, because failure to do so will mean a degraded capability which will not be adequate to deal with the threat of transnational terrorism. Measures taken after 9-11 Sir, even before 9-11, we have been concerned with the issue of terrorism. Several of our Ministries and agencies, particularly the Ministry of Home Affairs, have been developing capabilities to deal with specific threats, eg, chemical and biological threats.”
“The Permanent Secretary (NSIC) will chair two Committees: (i) a National Security Coordinating Committee comprising the Permanent Secretary (Foreign Affairs), Permanent Secretary (Home Affairs), Permanent Secretary (Defence) and other Permanent Secretaries, when needed, to coordinate national security activities; and (ii) an Intelligence Coordinating Committee comprising these three Permanent Secretaries whom I have named, and the Heads of our intelligence agencies to oversee the work and progress of counter-terrorism intelligence efforts. To assist the Permanent Secretary (NSIC), the NSCS will incorporate two key agencies, ie, the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC). The National Security Coordination Centre will focus on national security policy coordination and planning. NSCC's operations will include developing programmes for risk assessment and public awareness and launching a national security course for public officers. NSCC will also monitor the on-going development of capabilities to address threats stemming from biological, chemical, radiological and cyber-terrorism as well as initiatives to enhance aviation, maritime and land transport security. A very important responsibility of NSCC is to build up, together with our think-tanks, a better and deeper understanding of the ideology which fuels the anger and the motivations of terrorists. More details are contained in the Fact Sheet which I am asking the Clerk of Parliament to give out to Members now. [Copies of Fact Sheet distributed to hon. Members.] Sir, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC) will focus on counter-terrorism intelligence coordination.”
“Sir, the key to ensuring national security today lies in strengthening co-ordination and integration among Government agencies involved in national security, particularly between the external and domestic intelligence agencies, because intelligence is a crucial weapon in the fight against transnational terrorism. In times of crisis, eg, when we were fighting SARS last year, there is no doubt that all Government agencies will work together to deal with the problems at hand. However, we should not wait for a crisis to happen. We must anticipate such problems and deal upfront with inter-agency issues that relate to national security policy and plans where there is no clear ownership among the various Government Ministries and agencies. We need to ensure that the policies and plans of individual agencies are aligned to and consistent with the national mandate. To this end, co-ordination in the development of national security strategy, policy and plans is most effective if it is driven from the centre of Government, which is the Prime Minister's Office. National Security Coordination Secretariat Sir, the Government has therefore decided to set up a new National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) in the Prime Minister's Office. The NSCS will be overseen by a Permanent Secretary for National Security and Intelligence Coordination (NSIC) who will report directly to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence.”
“" Sir, in this new security environment, the danger to us comes from an enemy without shape or country, and with the capacity to continually threaten Singapore and Singaporean interests. Today, national security means that we must be prepared not just to deal with the contingency of a conventional military conflict, but also to be always alert and ready to confront threats at the other end of the security spectrum, particularly those posed by transnational terrorism. Sir, we have already enhanced homeland security by implementing various measures to safeguard Singapore. But the impact of transnational terrorism will be felt in many areas, and the responses to the threat will be provided by many agencies. With transnational terrorism, the traditional approach of delineating the boundaries between Ministries and agencies, so that each is solely responsible for a particular area, will no longer work. The experience of other countries since the 9-11 attacks, as well as our own, shows the inadequacy of a stovepipe approach. The separation of responsibilities between the Ministry of Home Affairs for internal security and the Ministry of Defence for external defence leaves gaps in the defence of Singapore against transnational terrorism. Furthermore, no Ministry or Government department has developed the full range of competencies or capabilities to deal with this threat. The resources needed to deal with terrorism reside in many agencies. For example, aviation security draws on the resources of MINDEF for air defence, and of MHA for implementing the air marshal programme. Maritime security depends on the Police Coast Guard and the Navy working together with the Maritime and Port Authority to secure our port and territorial waters.”
“I do not intend to burden Members with recounting the innumerable opinions, books, reports and speeches which have dealt on this topic. In my view, the nature and significance of what transnational terrorism means to the world today is aptly summed up in a speech given by Mr George Shultz, the former Secretary of State of the United States, and delivered in May this year. Mr Shultz said, and I quote from his speech: "(Transnational terrorism) is the method of choice of an extensive internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of co-operation and progress. The movement's objectives are in four layers or phases: (i) to drive the international community's people and influences out of the Middle-East (the religious core of the Muslim world); (ii) to overthrow all Arab regimes that are in a working relationship with the international community; (iii) to gain a more entrenched and threatening foothold in the most populous parts of the Muslim world which have traditionally been different in their outlook from Muslims on the Arabian peninsula - these would include South East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia - and inside the Western world (which is Europe); and (iv) eventually to eliminate all vestiges of the international state system from a unified Islamic theocratic rule. " And Mr Shultz concluded that today: "The international state system is under determined attack by a religiously motivated movement using terrorist attacks of dramatic lethality as its weapon of choice. The war is against this movement, not just the weapon of terror.”
“This threat will be with us for a long time. We must be prepared for a long-drawn campaign against an enemy capable of conducting organised, deliberate and prolonged attacks. Sir, transnational terrorism is terrorism that is globalised. It has a global network with a global reach. It has an agenda that is unconstrained by geographical or political boundaries. Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda does not only target the United States. It also seeks to destroy America's allies in the West and throughout the world, overturning the international political order in the process, in order to establish pan-Islamic caliphates. Al-Qaeda has a network of affiliated terrorist groups across the globe, including, of course, the Jemaah Islamiyah in this region, who subscribe not only to Al-Qaeda's deviant ideology, but also to its extreme methods of terror. The attacks are more lethal and dangerous than ever before. If the terrorists are ever able to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, I have no doubt that they will use them. Their ruthlessness leaves no room for negotiation. More dangerously, these terrorists are not mere criminals. They have shown a degree of strategic sophistication that belies the extremism of their methods. The Madrid bombing is a clear example of a terrorist attack designed to achieve the strategic effect of changing a government, and dividing the US and its allies. Similarly, the kidnapping of hostages in Iraq going on almost on a daily basis is designed to affect the responses of countries in supporting the Iraqi government and the US-led coalition. Since 9-11, many commentators, analysts and security officials have discussed extensively about the nature of terrorist threats facing countries in the world today.”
“After almost a year of deliberation, study, discussions and many meetings, I have arrived at two main conclusions: First, national security in an age of transnational terrorism cannot be divided into separate tasks, eg, external defence against a military threat and internal security against terrorists and criminals. Rather, all countries, including Singapore, have to deal with a continuum of security challenges ranging from state-directed military threats to low-intensity conflicts to ideologically inspired and globally pervasive terrorism. And the second conclusion is that to cope with the new security challenges, we need to deal with security threats today on a "whole of government" basis, instead of dividing the tasks into watertight compartments to be dealt with by separate Ministries. Formulating and implementing an integrated and coordinated security policy is best done today by setting up a Coordination Unit at the centre of Government which, of course, is the Prime Minister's Office, which will coordinate strategic planning, policy formulation and capability development in security and intelligence to cope with the threat of transnational terrorism. The above conclusions have been accepted by the Cabinet. The purpose of my Ministerial Statement today is to explain how we have come to these conclusions and the measures which we will take to restructure our Government machinery to meet Singapore's new security needs. Transnational terrorism Sir, transnational terrorism has become a central concern for all countries in the world today. Transnational terrorism poses a serious and immediate threat to Singapore's national security. Singapore is a prime target for terrorists and we have to live with the real prospect of a terrorist attack.”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, in August last year, when I was appointed the Coordinating Minister for Security and Defence to review the security situation in Singapore, I asked myself two questions: First, what does National Security mean in an age in which transnational terrorism is the biggest security threat facing all countries in the world, including Singapore? Second, how can we best organise ourselves to continue to keep Singapore safe and secure against the threat of terrorism which threatens our economy and society? Sir, these two questions are simple to state but the answers are complex and difficult to formulate. The questions are not unique to Singapore. Every country in the world today is confronted with these two questions and is struggling to shape responses which are appropriate to their circumstances and situation. Over the past twelve months, I have discussed the subject at length with my colleagues, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Home Affairs and the Minister for Defence in the Security Policy Review Committee, with our Government officials and also with analysts and commentators who are knowledgeable in the subject. I have also led a number of study visits to various countries (including the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and some of our neighbouring countries) to meet with my counterparts in the defence and security fields in order to gather a range of perspectives on how other countries deal with their security concerns and how they have organised themselves to ensure their national security in this new security landscape.”
“MINDEF is aware of the noise issue and understands the concerns about the noise level generated by aircraft flying activities. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has been minimising its aircraft from flying over densely populated residential areas. However, due to our country's limited airspace, it is inevitable that our aircraft will overfly some residential estates in the vicinity of airbases. The RSAF needs to conduct day and night flying to maintain operational readiness for the defence of our country. We are already conducting a lot of aircraft training overseas, but in-country flying still needs to be done as our pilots need to be familiar with our local airspace environment. RSAF first instituted noise abatement measures in the late seventies. Over the years, other measures have been implemented incrementally. These include the following: a) Raising the minimum transit altitudes of RSAF aircraft overhead Singapore; b) Revising departure and arrival routings to minimise over-flights of residential areas; c) Having our aircraft take the quickest route to the training areas; d) Ceasing night-flying by 11.00 pm (unless absolutely necessary for operational reasons); and e) Scaling down the flying activities during the year-end examination period. We would like to assure residents that MINDEF/RSAF will continue to find ways to further reduce aircraft noise, while maintaining the operational readiness of the RSAF. NORTH-EAST LINE 3. Mr Low Thia Khiang asked the Minister for Transport what is the consideration determining that the North-East line be built underground and that it be driverless.”
“These heavier demands on our security system will continue for some time to come, given that the security environment in our region is unlikely to improve significantly for some time. Finally, Sir, to reiterate, security is the most basic requirement for our survival and continued success as a nation. The Singapore Armed Forces and our other security agencies must have the hardware and systems, and Singaporeans must have the commitment and resolve to ensure Singapore's security. Sir, I have dealt with most of the points raised by Members. The other points will be dealt with by my colleagues in the Defence Ministry.”
“In counter-terrorism, the effort has to be a multi-agency one, not only because of the multi-dimensional nature of the threat but also because this allows us to maximise our limited national resources. The National Security Secretariat, which is an inter-agency department located in MINDEF to coordinate this effort, has made significant progress in all three areas of prevention, protection and consequence management. In the area of prevention, intelligence is critical and we have had good cooperation with our regional countries. One of the most significant results yielded by this cooperation with our neighbours was the arrest of Mas Selamet Kastari, the leader of the Singapore JI group. The JI here has been crippled after the arrest of its members, but the threat of terrorism has not been eradicated and we cannot afford to be complacent. We have to harden our defences so that we do not offer tempting targets. And all Singaporeans will have to remain alert and vigilant. Sir, let me conclude by saying that we are living in uncertain times. Singapore is more vulnerable to the influence of the external environment than most other countries. We now have to grapple with new and more complex threats even as we have to continue to be prepared for conventional threats. The spectrum of threats has expanded and we must have the defence capabilities to deal with the whole range of threats if we want to ensure Singapore's security. The demands on our security apparatus have grown significantly. We have to grapple with more issues. We have to build up more capabilities. We have to develop more systems. We have to conduct more activities. And we have to do all of these within the limits of our manpower, including our National Service resources.”
“Training and exercising with advanced militaries, for example, the various services of the US armed forces, allow the SAF to benchmark itself against the best in the world. The fact that advanced armed forces are keen to expand the scope and complexity of their military exercises with the SAF, reflects their high regard for the professionalism of the SAF. Our cooperation with foreign armed forces also allows for collaborations in defence technology, and we have had fruitful collaborations with countries such as the US, France, Sweden and Israel. Sir, Dr Ong Chit Chung has asked whether MINDEF has enough resources to tackle both conventional military threats and low intensity conflicts or LICs. He has also asked about our efforts to combat terrorism. Dr Ong has zeroed in on the critical issue of security, and that is, the spectrum of threats, and potential threats that face Singapore, has expanded. This is one important reason why we are seeking an increased budget for defence. Since 11th September 2001, MINDEF and our other security agencies, as well as non-security agencies which provide expertise to deal with the wide range of LIC and terrorist threats, have been working hard to quickly develop our capabilities to deal with such threats. These are fundamentally different in nature from the security challenges that we have had to tackle in the past. Global catastrophic terrorism, in particular, is a complex threat which impacts on all dimensions of our national life. The target is not just our security, but also our economy and the fabric of our society. And the threat is constant. It is sustained. Our response has to be multi-faceted, and it must be coherent and integrated.”
“We cannot develop our military capabilities in a coherent manner and plan and spend prudently if we adopt a feast-and-famine approach, where we spend only in good years and cut back drastically in bad years. Security threats can appear much more quickly than it takes to develop the capability to deal with them. The steady commitment of the Singapore Government to developing our defence capability, and the support which Singaporeans give to this, have not escaped the notice of others. It is as much our military hardware as the commitment of the Government and our people to ensuring Singapore's security that underpin our deterrence policy. Sir, deterrence is one pillar of our defence policy. The second pillar is diplomacy, a subject raised by Dr Ong Chit Chung and Mr Ravindran. Singapore desires friendship and cooperation with other countries, particularly those which share common strategic interests with us. MINDEF therefore puts significant efforts into developing defence relations. This pays off in terms of enhancing our security in a number of ways. We have interactions with armed forces and defence establishments in our own region and all over the world. These include military exercises, military-to-military as well as policy discussions, interaction programmes at various levels, and cross-attendance of military training courses. The SAF has access to training facilities in about a dozen countries. At the multilateral level, we conduct land, naval and air exercises. All these interactions not only help to develop friendship and mutual understanding and confidence, they also offer benefits in terms of the professional development of our servicemen, including our National Servicemen who participate in these exercises.”
“If we are weak, those who want to impose their will on us may be tempted to go beyond spouting the rhetoric of war to actually try to use military force to subjugate us or prevent us from pursuing our national interests. If we want peace, we have to prepare for war. This is the basis of our policy of deterrence. We best avoid war not by merely advocating love and peace but by deterring those who may have aggressive designs on our security, territorial integrity and national interests. Potential aggressors must know that the cost of any military adventurism against Singapore would be too high for them. Sir, let me make one point clear. Singapore is not looking for a fight with anyone. We have put a high priority on developing cooperation and mutually beneficial relations with the countries around us. And we have every interest in seeing our neighbours do well, because an economically thriving and politically stable region is important for Singapore's own security and prosperity. Singapore desires friendly and cooperative relations with all countries in our region. But such good relations must be based on the fundamental principle that Singapore is a sovereign nation with our own national interests to safeguard and to promote. Having a credible defence capability ensures that we will not be pushed around. The SAF gives us the space to pursue Singapore's own best interests. Sir, the SAF has been systematically built up over more than three decades. Developing a defence capability takes careful, long-term planning and investment. It requires a strong and steady commitment. It is not possible to build up significant defence capabilities at short notice.”
“And for this reason, MINDEF has always kept details of its spending secret, and this is the practice in many other countries. This policy has worked and there is no reason to change it. Sir, in the context of the security environment, which I have outlined, adequate spending on defence is not an optional priority for the Government. Nor is adequate spending on defence just a desirable objective. For Singapore, adequate spending on defence is an absolute necessity. Security is the basic foundation on which we sustain our nationhood and build Singapore's future. Without security, there can be no economic development or political stability. There will be no foreign investments, for who will want to put money in an insecure small country. And, most critically of all, without security, Singaporeans will have no confidence in our future. Simply put, without a strong and credible SAF, there is no Singapore. It is in this light that I listened with astonishment to Mr Chandra Mohan's thoughts on defence, military spending and global peace and harmony. Mr Chandra Mohan argues essentially that the less we spend on the military, the greater could be the chances of peace. Sir, the real world is quite different from the rosy picture drawn by Mr Chandra Mohan. The fact of the matter is, no matter how much we may wish it to be so, less military spending does not mean more peace. Adequate defence spending is the insurance premium we have to pay for peace. We have to invest in defence so that we do not need to go to war. There is nothing more tempting to a potential aggressor than a soft and easy target.”
“We have had some taste of this recently, with attempts to paint Singapore as unreasonable and greedy, accompanied by wild allegations in a media campaign to whip up anti-Singapore feelings. Even the word "war" and the threat of war have been bandied about irresponsibly by some politicians. Over the past year-and-a-half, we have also faced the real and present threat of terrorism in our homeland. Singaporeans know how serious the threat is. The arrest of the Jemaah Islamiyah members has dealt a serious blow to the network in Singapore, but terrorism is an enemy we cannot afford to underestimate. The Al Qaeda has not been destroyed. Nor has the Al Qaeda given up its war of terror. We will have to grapple with the threat of terrorism for years to come. As Members can see, there are many challenges and uncertainties in our security environment. It is against this background that we have to consider our budget for defence, a subject raised by Dr Ong Chit Chung, Mr Sin Boon Ann, Mr Ravindran and Mr Low Thia Khiang. In these difficult times, Members are naturally concerned that the funds allocated for defence are spent wisely and with care to ensure that we get the maximum value for every dollar spent on defence. I want to assure Members that the Government and the Ministry of Defence are very conscious of the need to scrutinise carefully every area of our defence spending to ensure that there is no wastage or unnecessary expenditure of our hard-earned funds. A word about transparency of defence spending, a subject raised by Mr Low Thia Khiang yesterday. By its very nature, defence procurement and SAF operations are not subjects which can be opened for discussion in public. Doing so will compromise our security.”
“But we can enhance our security by developing cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships with those countries which share common strategic interests with Singapore, as well as by drawing the heavyweight countries into playing a more active and constructive role in multi-lateral forums which can help stabilise the regional security environment, eg, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In our region, serious political and economic challenges which have beset some countries have yet to be resolved. Economic problems will take some time to be sorted out, as domestic factors are compounded by external factors such as the US economy and a possible war in the Gulf. Political stability will depend, to some extent, on whether or not socio-economic conditions improve. So long as political and economic conditions remain difficult, there is an increased risk of low intensity conflicts erupting, with consequent destabilising effects on the rest of the region. The prospect of elections and leadership transitions could also have an impact on political stability. In Indonesia, there will be a more heated political atmosphere, as parties and presidential aspirants jostle in the run-up to the elections next year. In Malaysia, there has also been talk of early general elections, and there is general expectation of a leadership transition this October. Sir, I want to emphasise that Singapore wants good relations with all our neighbours. But we should not be surprised if, at a time of political changes and economic difficulties, there are those who find it politically advantageous to raise the Singapore bogey.”
“Sir, I thank Members for their pertinent comments and suggestions on the very important subject of defence and security. Sir, I will begin with the security environment, a subject that was raised yesterday by Dr Ong Chit Chung, Ms Irene Ng, Mr Sin Boon Ann and Mr Ravindran. The comments and views expressed by the hon. Members reflect how well Singaporeans realise that our security environment is a difficult and uncertain one. From global developments, to the regional situation, to our homeland, there are forces at work which could have a destabilising effect on Singapore's security. At this time of geopolitical flux, we must put enough effort and resources into enhancing our defence, if we do not want to put Singapore's security at risk. Sir, there is a general expectation that there will soon be a war in Iraq. Such a war will not only change the face of the Middle East, but it will also have far-reaching ramifications for the whole world. For us, one core issue is that weapons of mass destruction should not be allowed to proliferate. A similar danger looms in the Korean Peninsula. Here, it is not just the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea but the impact of this on the geopolitical landscape in the whole Asia-Pacific region, as the US, China and Japan respond to developments in the Korean Peninsula. These geopolitical developments at the global level will have consequences for the regional security environment and Singapore's strategic interests. We have limited influence on the policies and actions of the big powers.”
“Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I would like to report that the Committee of Supply has made progress on the Estimates of Expenditure for the financial year 2003/2004, and ask leave to sit again tomorrow.”
“As Members know, the Malaysian media reported extensively on the 24th December 2002 incident where a Malaysian marine police patrol craft brought along a group of journalists. Besides these violations, it is also regrettable that the Malaysian government has seized on the tragic accident involving RSS Courageous to try to advance their claim to Pedra Branca. The Malaysian government presented a Third Party Note to the Singapore Government on 14th January 2003 protesting "the violation of Malaysia's territorial waters around the Malaysian island of Batu Putih" by RSS Courageous at the time of the collision. The TPN further stated that as the collision had taken place in Malaysian territorial waters, the Malaysian Marine Department had commenced investigations and the TPN attached forms for the Commanding Officer of RSS Courageous to submit to the Malaysian Marine Department. It is most unfortunate that the Malaysian government has chosen to exploit this tragic accident which can only serve to stir up emotions and make it more difficult to have an amicable settlement of the issue. Sir, Pedra Branca is Singapore's territory. The RSN will continue to carry out its mission of safeguarding Singapore's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The RSN will continue to patrol our territorial waters off Pedra Branca. VESSELS PASSING THROUGH SINGAPORE (Security measures against terrorist attacks) 4. Dr Amy Khor Lean Suan asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether Singapore, as the world's largest container trans-shipment hub, is a prime target for acts of terror; and (b) what are the measures his Ministry is taking to enhance security and harden the area against terrorist attacks for vessels passing through the area.”
“Sir, the incident happened in Singapore territorial waters off Pedra Branca and Singapore did not ask permission from Malaysia to conduct search and rescue operation. To put this in the proper context, in accordance with well-established international search and rescue procedures, there is an arrangement for aircraft to enter foreign airspace in a search area to conduct search and rescue operation, if necessary. This requires prior diplomatic clearance to enter foreign airspace. For this particular operation, both Indonesia and Malaysia granted Singapore prior diplomatic clearance to enter their airspace to conduct search and rescue operation. As for joint patrols, there is no question of joint patrols in Singapore's territorial waters. Sir, as you know, the Singapore and Malaysian governments have agreed to refer the issue of Pedra Branca to the International Court of Justice. In fact, both sides have agreed to proceed with the signing of the special agreement on 6th February to International Court of Justice. Unfortunately, Malaysian government vessels from both their navy and marine police have recently stepped up their intrusions into Pedra Branca waters and this despite the fact that the Malaysian government is aware that after the two countries agreed in 1994 to take the case to the ICJ what happened on the ground at Pedra Branca will have no bearing on the judgment by the ICJ. There were three violations by Malaysian state vessels over the last week of December. There were five more violations last week. In these incidents, the Malaysian vessels came close to Pedra Branca and conducted various activities.”
“We deeply appreciate the assistance and co-operation our neighbouring countries extended to our Search and Rescue operation. I should also note here the dedicated efforts of the salvage crew in their attempts to recover the sheared-off portion of RSS Courageous under adverse monsoon conditions. We know how difficult this must be for the families who have lost their loved ones and we are deeply sorry for their loss. After the incident, the RSN has been keeping in close touch with the families to give them support and provide assistance. Professional counsellors have also been helping them through this difficult period. MINDEF will continue to provide the necessary support to the families of the four servicewomen. This has certainly been a difficult period for the RSN and the SAF. But it is also in such moments of adversity that the real quality and character of the organisation and its people shine through. The RSN plays a vital role in protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Singapore's waters. We cannot shy away from our responsibilities in the face of tragedy. The RSN will continue to conduct patrols to safeguard Singapore's territorial waters. I have every confidence that the RSN and SAF will overcome this tragic event and continue to discharge their mission with even greater determination.”
“There are inherent risks involved in military activity, and we take every precaution to mitigate such risks with intensive and comprehensive training of our people and a thorough system for risk management. We cannot entirely rule out accidents no matter how safety conscious we may be, because other elements such as errors of judgement and mechanical failures sometimes come into play. Whatever the cause of the tragic accident involving RSS Courageous, the SAF will use the findings to make further improvements so that we further reduce the risk of another accident. We can be proud of the way the crew of RSS Courageous responded in the extreme circumstances after the collision and the way the whole Navy has responded since then. It underscores the capability, resolve, and professionalism of the RSN, and its esprit de corps. In the face of difficult sea conditions, the Commanding Officer and crew of Courageous fought to stabilise their severely damaged ship, while tending to injured crewmates and searching for those who were missing. They displayed their mettle in the face of grave adversity and professionally and resolutely carried out what they were trained to do. A search and rescue operation was launched immediately after the collision. In the immediate aftermath of the collision, the Police Coast Guard provided critical assistance. Over a period of ten days, the RSN and RSAF conducted an extensive and intensive search and rescue operation. We received valuable assistance from the Indonesian armed forces. In coordinating the search and rescue operation, the RSN also sought the assistance of the Malaysian armed forces for the search of the Johor coastal areas as we wanted to cover every possibility.”
“The two vessels subsequently came into a close quarter situation, and both took action to try to avoid a collision. But unfortunately the collision took place. ANL Indonesia rammed into the right rear section of RSS Courageous and a portion of the tail end of the Patrol Vessel was sheared off. This portion included the aft mess, where four servicewomen who were off duty at the time were resting. The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) is carrying out an independent investigation into the incident, and MINDEF has given MPA our fullest cooperation in this investigation. The Commanding Officer and crew members of RSS Courageous have been interviewed by MPA. MPA expects to complete its full investigation by the end of the month and will make known its findings in due course. Separately, MINDEF has convened a Higher Board of Inquiry to determine what happened on the part of RSS Courageous. Until the various investigations are completed, we do not have a complete picture of the events that happened that night. At this juncture, it would not be appropriate for us to speculate on how and why the collision happened, or to apportion responsibility for the collision. I would like to reassure the House that MINDEF takes a very serious view of this incident and we will take close heed of the findings of the inquiries and rectify any problems that are identified. In the meantime, the RSN has taken immediate steps to reinforce the existing emphasis on safety and professional training. It is increasing checks on shipboard practices and operational training, and conducting a thorough review of its procedures and processes. Safety has always been a matter of high priority for the SAF.”
“Sir, the collision between the RSS Courageous and the merchant ship ANL Indonesia was a most tragic event for the Navy, the SAF and Singapore. On behalf of the Singapore Government, I offer our deepest condolences to the families of 1SG Seah Ai Leng, 1SG Heng Sock Ling, 2SG Chua Bee Lin and CPL Goh Hui Ling. This has been a very difficult time for their families and we share in their grief and sorrow. It is to be expected that Singaporeans want to know what happened that night and what caused the accident. The investigation by the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore is ongoing. MINDEF's own Higher Board of Inquiry is still in the process of putting up its report. It would not be appropriate for me to give a full public account at this point. But I will give Members some facts of the situation leading up to the collision. RSS Courageous, an Anti-Submarine Warfare Patrol Vessel, was conducting a regular operational patrol in Singapore territorial waters. This is part of the Navy's mission of safeguarding our territorial sovereignty. RSS Courageous was in the waters off Pedra Branca. There has been a spate of violations of our territorial waters at Pedra Branca by foreign state vessels recently. There were a number of violations in the two weeks before the incident, and there have been several since then. On the night of the collision, ANL Indonesia was heading out of the Singapore Straits towards the South China Sea. RSS Courageous was sailing in the opposite direction. The two vessels were headed in the general direction towards each other. RSS Courageous had detected ANL Indonesia on radar. ANL Indonesia was also visually sighted by the duty watch personnel on board RSS Courageous.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, I will take the three questions by Dr Ong Chit Chung, Mdm Ho Geok Choo and Mr Chiam See Tong together.”
“As we embark into the 21st century, these changes to the junior college curriculum and upper secondary school structure will be among the most important steps that we can make in the process of remaking Singapore. Much work lies ahead for the Ministry of Education to translate the proposed changes into workable procedures. But notwithstanding the bumpy road ahead, I urge all Members of this House not to let down our children but to have the courage to attack this problem head-on and endorse changes proposed in the MOE's report. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support the motion. EXEMPTED BUSINESS (Motion) Resolved, That the proceedings on the business set down on the Order Paper for today be exempted at this day's sitting from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1. - [Mr Mah Bow Tan]. JUNIOR COLLEGE/UPPER SECONDARY EDUCATION Debate resumed.”
“MOE has wisely chosen to continue to work with the University of Cambridge, Local Examination Syndicate, to keep the Singapore-Cambridge "A" level brand name while implementing the new JC curriculum and upper secondary school structure to allow schools to take various routes to prepare their students to sit for a variety of school-leaving examinations including the "A" levels, International Baccalaureate or the American SAT I and II. With more experience, we will eventually be able to settle on our own examination system which is not only rigorous and appropriate for our own needs but which will be internationally recognised. The new upper secondary school system also provides for the introduction of private schools. I welcome this initiative because it promotes competition. We have developed our national secondary schools and junior colleges to a stage where they are world-class. I am confident that our junior colleges and secondary schools will be able to meet the competition from private schools. In this connection, MOE could also consider allowing more flexibility in allowing Singaporean children to attend foreign systems schools. This will help to ease the worries of returning Singaporeans about the education of their children and will spur our own schools to achieve new heights of excellence. To sum up, Mr Speaker, Sir, we need a new junior college curriculum and upper secondary school structure because the world has changed. If we continue the present system, making adjustments when necessary, this will only defer the changes which will ultimately be necessary. It is better for us to grasp the nettle by the thorns and change the system so that we can keep our education system abreast and up-to-date and prepare our students to face the future with confidence.”
“Companies will have to be flexible and change their products more frequently. This puts a premium on having Singaporeans who are not only well-educated but who also have a flexible frame of mind and a nimbleness to cope with more rapid changes in the business and economic environment. Sir, in today's world, competency in skills is necessary but no longer sufficient for economic success. For our economy to succeed, our people need not only to be skilled but also be flexible and innovative. The new junior college curriculum and diversified upper secondary school system seek to nurture flexibility and innovation in our students by making the JC curriculum more broad-based and providing more latitude for our schools and junior colleges to provide education programmes that are better tailored to the needs and capabilities of their respective cohorts of students. The new system is a radical departure from the present system where the scope for a junior college or secondary school to go its own way is kept within fairly narrow latitudes. In the new system, more initiatives will be given to junior colleges and secondary schools to decide how to teach subjects and how to prepare their students for school-leaving or university entrance examinations. Sir, implementing the new system will not be easy. A whole generation of teachers will have to be re-educated in order to teach the new curriculum and, eventually, we will need our own examination system in order to complement the new JC curriculum and upper secondary school structure. Constructing a new examination system is difficult for a small country like Singapore.”
“Despite the competition, we have fortunately been able to hold our own in attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs). EDB expects manufacturing fixed asset investment commitment this year to remain at about S$9 billion, with more than two-thirds coming from foreign investors. However, to progress ahead, we need to move up the value chain and restructure our economy to complement our MNC base with a larger base of domestic enterprises and entrepreneurial companies. As our economy becomes more sophisticated, our people require different skills to survive and thrive in an environment of rapid and drastic change. At independence, what Singapore needed to do was to industralise rapidly to create a large number of relatively unsophisticated jobs to absorb the large number of Singaporeans who were unemployed or entering the workforce. In the 1970s and the 1980s, we moved up the skill and value chain, attracting industries that needed large numbers of trained technicians with technical skills at the polytechnic and the Institute of Technical Education level. As our enterprises became more capital-intensive and sophisticated, and as the supply marketing chain became more integrated into the world's logistics, it became necessary for us to educate more professionals with university degrees. Now, with the knowledge-based economy and our move into new areas like the life sciences, we not only need better-trained and innovative people, but also people with post-graduate education at the Masters and PhD levels. All these will ensure that we can keep ahead of the competition of low-cost countries like our neighbours and China. With an uncertain economic climate, it will also be more difficult for companies to rely on products which have long production runs.”
“When the US economy began to slow down in 2000, the initial expectation among many economists was that it would take perhaps 18 months, at most 24 months, for the slowdown to run its course and after that, the US economy would settle to a new base from which it would grow again. What is clear today is that this period of adjustment is going to be longer than had been expected in 2001 or even earlier this year. How long this period of adjustment will be is a question which is perplexing the best economic minds in the world. The effects of the US slowdown are being felt throughout the world, including in Singapore. Due to the impact of the US slowdown and the stagnation of the region's economies, our economy turned down sharply with negative growth last year and slow growth this year. In view of the current economic and security uncertainties, the outlook for the Singapore economy is cloudy. Sir, even after the world economy has recovered, Singapore will be faced with different economic circumstances from those we enjoyed during the 1990s. For one thing, there will be more competition with the entry of China into the world market. In the long run, China will make a positive contribution to world growth with its large domestic market. But in the immediate future, China will present fierce competition for foreign investments. With its large reserves of skilled labour at very low cost, China will exert deflationary pressure on prices world-wide and be a strong economic competitor to countries throughout the world, including Singapore. As a small open economy, Singapore will have to continue to rely on attracting multi-national corporations (MNCs) to locate their operations, particularly manufacturing in Singapore.”
“As Japan shows no sign of embarking on such a major restructuring of its economy, there is little expectation that the Japanese economy will recover its former vibrancy in the foreseeable future. Sir, in the two decades of the 1980s and the 1990s, Singapore, in general, enjoyed, despite occasional hiccups in 1985 and 1998, a very favourable combination of factors that enabled a small export-oriented economy like Singapore to achieve high growth. After struggling in the 1970s, the US economy began getting effect together in the 1980s. Companies restructured, slimmed down, took advantage of the latest developments in real-time information technology systems and generally achieved a sustained rise in productivity in the United States, which was not only higher but several times higher than that experienced in previous decades. The whole world, including Singapore, benefited from the strong growth of the US economy, particularly in the 1990s. And in addition to a buoyant US economy, Southeast Asia was also rapidly growing with the tiger economies of the East Asia being hailed as the fastest growing and most promising economic region in the world. All these favourable developments however came to an abrupt end with the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the meltdown of the dot.com and technology boom in the United States in 2000. As the United States is the growth locomotive of the world's economy, a slowdown in the United States has repercussions not only within the United States but also throughout the world.”
“We could have carried on with the present system for possibly the next 10 years, making adjustments here and there to meet difficulties or to fill in inadequacies as they arise. But when confronted with a major change in the operating environment, such incremental adjustments do not solve the problem. Instead, they aggravate the problem by perpetuating practices that should be jettisoned, if a country is to move ahead. A vivid example of how small incremental changes do not solve but merely aggravate a basic problem is the response by successive Japanese governments to the chronic problems in the Japanese economy. Japan had an enormous record of economic success for three decades, from the beginning of the 1960s to the end of the 1980s. Japan as Number One, the influential book written by Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel received wide publicity. Nations in search of development were urged to emulate the Japanese way of doing business. Japan's leading position in the world economy's sweepstakes came to an end in the late 1980s when the world moved from an essentially manufacturing based economy to an innovation, knowledge-driven economy. In this new economy, Japan's strengths of group cohesion, incremental improvements and life-time employment systems hindered rather than promoted economic progress. Many commentators, both in Japan and elsewhere, have come to the conclusion that for the Japanese economy to revive, a major restructuring of Japan's economic and monetary policies is necessary, and that minor adjustments would only prolong the deflationary slowdown in Japan, which has now lasted for more than a decade.”
“Our schools in Singapore, whether the elite independent schools or the more numerous neighbourhood schools, are all well-built and well-equipped, and give to every child in Singapore, no matter what is his or her social class or intellectual capability, at least 10 years of basic education, which will enable the child to proceed further to junior college, polytechnic or Institute of Technical Education and, from then, on to university for those with the determination and ability. As the Minister for Education from 1985 to 1991, I built on the solid foundation laid down by Dr Goh Keng Swee to fill out the education structure by upgrading our schools' physical infrastructure, improving the training of our teachers, and emphasising the critical role that principals play in motivating and guiding teachers and students in the search for excellence. Over the last 10 years, subsequent Ministers for Education - Mr Lee Yock Suan and, now, RAdm Teo Chee Hean - further improved the system with innovative measures, such as mass customisation and encouraging the learning of critical thinking skills. Today, as I have said, we have an education system in Singapore which is admired throughout the world, even in developed countries like the US and Europe, and which delivers a high standard of education to virtually every child in Singapore. If the system is working so well, the natural question to ask is: why then do we have to change it? Why try to fix the machine which is operating smoothly and delivering the goods? Sir, the reason why we have to change our education system is because the world has changed, and changed dramatically.”
“Consequently, large numbers of Singapore children were educated in vernacular schools, where teaching was conducted in Chinese, Malay and Tamil, and largely outside the purview of the Department of Education. After our independence in 1965, the need was for a national integrated system of education, with uniform characteristics which would be taught to all children in Singapore, regardless of their race or language background. A national system of education proved to be enormously difficult to realise, with political disturbances and even communal riots in the 1960s and 1970s disrupting the process of integrating the schools. A landmark in educational development in Singapore was the adoption by Parliament in March 1979 of the Goh Keng Swee Report on the Ministry of Education which shaped our present education system, with streaming at primary and secondary schools to enable children to study at a pace appropriate to their intellectual abilities. The success of streaming in our schools can be seen in the dramatic fall in the secondary school drop-out rate from 13% of each Primary 1 cohort of students in 1978 to just 2.7% last year. The primary school drop-out rate has similarly fallen from 6% for each cohort of Primary 1 students in 1978 to almost zero - actually, only 0.3% last year. Today, Singapore is admired throughout the world for our success in educating students of all intellectual capabilities, not only the gifted students but also the average students and all social classes.”
“Mr Speaker, Sir, I rise to support the motion moved by the Minister for Education relating to the Report submitted by the Junior College/Upper Secondary Education Review Committee 2002, contained in Paper Cmd. 8 of 2002. Sir, the changes proposed in the Report are of fundamental importance to the remaking of the Singapore economy and society. It is therefore appropriate that the Whip be lifted on this debate, so that when hon. Members vote on the motion they will do so not because they have been instructed by the Government Whip, but because they have studied the proposed changes and are personally convinced that the changes, even though difficult to implement and unsettling to parents and students, are nevertheless necessary, if Singapore is to nurture a generation of students who are well prepared to face a different world from that experienced by their parents in the first 37 years of our independence. Sir, the education system of a country cannot be divorced from the country's economic circumstances. For Singapore, our education system has evolved in response to changes to Singapore's economy and society. Prior to our independence in 1965, when we were a British colony and our economy depended on trade and servicing the British garrison in Singapore, there was no real need for widespread education of our people. Consequently, the British authorities concentrated on nurturing a small number of English language schools to educate clerks and a few professionals, particularly in medicine and law, to assist the Colonial Government to run what was then basically a simple economy.”
“The Government of Singapore has an agreement with the United States Government to base Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) F-16 aircraft in Continental United States to facilitate the training of RSAF pilots and technical crew. This arrangement allows the RSAF to overcome Singapore's lack of airspace and provides an opportunity for RSAF to benchmark itself against the United States Air Force (USAF). Such an arrangement also allows the RSAF to draw on the experience of qualified USAF personnel during routine training. For this reason, a selected class of USAF pilots is allowed to fly our F-16 aircraft under the agreement. The USAF pilot involved in the incident is an experienced Instructor Pilot who trains with our RSAF pilots. The issue of claims will depend on the outcome of ongoing investigations to determine the cause of the crash. WALL TILES AT MRT STATIONS 3. Mr Steve Chia Kiah Hong asked the Minister for Transport (a) why are the wall tiles, which are in perfect condition at various MRT stations, such as those at Commonwealth, Buona Vista and Clementi, being hacked off and replaced by a coating of cement and paint; (b) what is the purpose of these works and the amount spent; and (c) will these works add to the rising cost and ultimately in higher fares to be borne by commuters.”
“They can reduce the need for manpower in many cases. But it still takes time to master these weapons and to learn how to employ them effectively, both individually and as part of an integrated larger fighting force. This is something that we cannot compromise on. Let me assure Members that MINDEF would not want Singaporeans to spend more time than necessary to carry out their National Service duties, because we are acutely aware of the commitment and the sacrifices they have to make. This is something that we are also carefully studying in our review. Mdm Chairman, let me conclude by saying that few, among our older generation, will ever forget the tumultuous years in the early years of our history. It is a testament of Singapore's success that our children have known only peace and progress. But we should never forget that this is in large part because we have put considerable effort into building up our defence capabilities. We have peace today because generations of Singaporeans have put in considerable sweat and sacrifice to make Singapore safe and secure through National Service. But once our defence capabilities are eroded, it will not be long before we feel vulnerable once again and our security is put at risk. As we remake Singapore to meet the challenges of the future, as we must, let us not take defence for granted. Only when we have guaranteed our security, can we guarantee that Singapore will have a future.”
“A Corporal in a combat job will receive $520 a month (up from $330), a Third Sergeant will receive $660 per month (up from $420) and a Second Lieutenant will receive $970 per month, instead of $650. MINDEF will also raise the additional allowances given to operationally-ready NSmen who hold key or command appointments. This is in recognition of the vital leadership roles which such servicemen play and the additional responsibilities they are asked to shoulder. 6.15 pm The revised NS allowances will be implemented as from 1st July this year, in conjunction with the 35th anniversary of National Service. More details on the revised NS allowance will be given by MINDEF in a press release which will be issued after my speech. Mdm Chairman, the NS review is still in progress. We are now looking into the operationally-ready NS training cycle and examining ways to improve NS management and administrative efficiency. I thank Members for their suggestions and I assure them their views and comments will be taken into account. I hope to announce the outcome of these reviews later this year. A few words on the length of National Service, a point touched on by Dr Chong Weng Chiew. The length of National Service is determined by the time required to train our men to a level of military proficiency where they can not only handle their personal equipment but also fight effectively as an integral part of a large military formation - up to battalion, brigade and division level. The aim is to ensure that the SAF is operationally ready and effective. The process has to be thorough and robust, so that our men have the confidence to fight and win, when necessary. Technologically sophisticated weapons and equipment increase the potency and firepower of our soldiers, sailors and airmen.”
“They include examining ways to refine the NS training system, improve NS management and administration, and enhancing the NS experience overall. The review was supplemented by comprehensive surveys of National Servicemen and studies of other foreign conscription systems. A key consideration was that any changes, as a consequence of the review, must not undermine the operational readiness and effectiveness of the SAF. One focus of the MINDEF review was on NS allowance. Before I go into the details of the changes, which I will now announce, let me reiterate some of the fundamental principles of the NS allowance. National Service is a duty to the country. National Service is not a regular salaried job. Full-time National Servicemen are therefore paid an allowance; they are not paid market wages. The NS allowance is meant for basic personal upkeep, given that most full-time National Servicemen stay in camp, where accommodation, food and clothing are provided. Based on these principles, the NS allowance will be restructured and streamlined to reflect the different responsibilities undertaken by our National Servicemen. The revised NS allowance will comprise two main components - rank allowance and combat allowance. Those in leadership positions will receive a higher rank allowance, in recognition of the responsibilities they have to shoulder. The combat allowance will be paid to National Servicemen in combat vocations, to recognise the onerous nature of combat jobs. The revision will result in a significant increase in the NS allowance across all ranks. For example, the monthly NS allowance for a Recruit will increase from presently $240 to $350.”
“Since 1967, about 600,000 of Singapore's sons have pledged the Oath of Allegiance to protect and defend our nation. We are now into the second generation of National Servicemen - young men following their fathers into the service of our country. This year marks 35 years of National Service. NS is a national institution. NS has become a rite of passage for Singapore men. Shared NS experience brings together Singaporeans from different social, racial and religious backgrounds in the common mission of defending our homeland. As Members have noted, the economic progress and stability we enjoy today are possible only because we have a defence capability and security, and our defence capability is possible only because of the dedication and sacrifice of our National Servicemen. They form the backbone of a strong and capable SAF. As citizen soldiers, National Servicemen have to balance the demands of their civilian lives and NS duties. This involves commitment and no small amount of sacrifice. It has therefore been a matter of priority for MINDEF to give recognition and show appreciation for the contributions of our National Servicemen. MINDEF is committed to implementing the recommendations of the Third Committee to Recognise the Contribution of Operationally Ready NSmen to Total Defence (or RECORD III). Indeed, many of the recommendations have already been implemented and MINDEF is actively working on the implementation of the other recommendations. Beyond this, MINDEF has been conducting an in-depth review of our NS system and policies. This review covers many issues, affecting both full-time and operationally-ready National Servicemen.”
“At the beginning of this year, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre was created to integrate Singapore's multi-agency intelligence efforts as well as to serve as the point of contact for counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation among friendly countries. Singapore has been able to adapt to the new security environment - swiftly and with confidence - in large part because we have Total Defence. When the Jemaah Islamiyah group was uncovered in December and the rest took place, Singaporeans were neither gripped with fear nor paralysed by panic. Our people could withstand the jolt to our social fabric and take this threat in our stride. Singaporeans also had the confidence that the security authorities, including the SAF, could deal with the contingencies and safeguard our security. Singapore remained unshaken as we have strong foundations in Total Defence - Psychological Defence, Social Defence, Economic Defence, Civil Defence and Military Defence - and we must continue to strengthen this, as pointed out by Mr Heng Chee How and Mr Zainul Abidin. Let me go on to the topic of National Service which has been commented on by Dr Ong Chit Chung, Dr Warren Lee, Mr Zainul and Mr Heng Chee How. The Government, as I said, is fully committed to providing for Singapore's security, and Singaporeans, by and large, support this commitment to defence. It is a commitment which goes beyond supporting spending on defence to serving National Service. Our young men have to commit 2-2 1/2 years of their lives, starting from the age of 18 years old, and thereafter commit a few weeks a year to service in the SAF. And, should Singapore actually come under threat, they may have to make the ultimate sacrifice.”
“We realised that the inter-agency efforts need to be tightened and strengthened when the nature of the threats changed and the threats become more real, as a consequence of the deteriorating political and socio-economic conditions in the region. Our national security apparatus has therefore been beefed up to deal with possible contingencies. The National Security Secretariat and a ministerial-level committee, chaired by me, as the Minister for Defence and known as the Security Policy Review Committee, were set up with the objective of providing a swift and coordinated response to non-conventional security threats. But the need for coordination and integration of our efforts became even more urgent after the event of September 11 last year. The threat of terrorism now requires a level of intelligence, of monitoring, and of response which is quantitatively and qualitatively different and many times more demanding than what our system - or any system in the world - has so far been geared to handle. So we have put into place a comprehensive crisis response and management structure to meet the new requirements. This system is constantly being refined and enhanced. The terrorist threat is not unique to Singapore. Other countries in our region have uncovered terrorist cells linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. While Southeast Asian countries deal in their own ways with the threat of terrorism, to their security, all of us recognise the need to cooperate to combat this common enemy. One area where there has been useful cooperation is in the exchange of intelligence.”