Sir Geoffrey Cox
MP for Torridge and Tavistock · Conservative · United Kingdom
“Once upon a time, it would not have been necessary for a Secretary of State for farming to come to the House to say that the primary purpose of farming was food production. The central recommendation of Minette Batters’ report was to make food security a national strategic priority.”
“I will give way to the hon. Member for Colchester (Pam Cox) first, if she can give me just two seconds. I want to develop this theme, because it is very important to me. There are some things that have to be above politics. If there are not, we have no society to defend.”
“Not just now. I say to the House, in all conscience, that jury trial is precious. Why? It is precious because it unites all parts of the political spectrum. It is precious because it allows the people of this country to be directly engaged in the adjudication of guilt or innocence in thousands of cases across the country.”
“No, I am not giving way. I am mindful of time and I must complete what I have to say. This is a time when not just this House but the judiciary and the courts are under attack. The unprecedented attacks upon the judiciary and the legal profession are deplorable. Institutional trust is under siege, and now is not the time— [ Interruption.”
“No, I am not giving way. Let me make that clear now. I want to finish in a moment. The reality is that jury trial is too precious a thing to lose. We are faced with a question of principle here.”
“I should declare an interest at the beginning. I am a member of the Bar—that is not uncommonly known—I still practise at the Bar, and I have the honour to be a criminal barrister and a member of the Criminal Bar Association. I have spent 44 years at the Bar.”
The complete record
Every one of 617 lines we hold for Sir Geoffrey Cox, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 5 of 13.
“I cannot comment on the content of Cabinet discussions but, as I told the House last week, the judgment sets out the definitive and final legal position on the advice given to Her Majesty on the Prorogation of Parliament. We are carefully and deliberatively considering the implications of that judgment. We need some time to do it, but a Queen’s Speech is necessary to bring forward a fresh legislative programme, and a short Prorogation, as announced yesterday, is necessary—we are advised to this effect by the parliamentary authorities—for the Queen’s Speech.”
“I know that those matters are being actively considered. I am sure they will be considered in consultation and through the usual channels. As much time as conceivably can be made available will be made available to debate those very important matters. The Prime Minister is making a statement later this morning, and the Government are more than conscious—acutely conscious—of the need for all Members of this House to scrutinise any deal that may be agreed.”
“I have been considering that question. I am still considering it. I have not reached a conclusion. When I have, I will make sure the hon. Lady is informed.”
“May I tell the hon. Gentleman that I do believe in the law and I have spent 37 years of my life adhering to those professional values? As for the advice I may or may not have given to any member of the Government, he will know I am bound by the convention. I cannot tell him whether I have. I understand the purport of his question, and I do not criticise him for it in the least, but I regret that I cannot help him as to the content of any advice I have given.”
“I completely agree with both parts of my hon. Friend’s question. Plainly, the Law Officers’ convention is not a question of personal ownership by any particular Attorney General. It is a long-standing convention that protects all Governments on often extremely sensitive, complex and difficult subjects, sometimes affecting the most important interests of this country. Of course I agree that the Supreme Court’s judgment must be respected. It is final and binding as a matter of law, but it is peculiar to its circumstances.”
“My hon. Friend, as ever, from a background of practice in the law, feels, as I do, that those kinds of hearings—certainly US-style hearings—would be a regrettable step for us in our constitutional arrangements. The Government have no current plans to do so, but it is fair to say that the implications of the judgment and the continuing development of our constitutional arrangements will no doubt receive, properly, the intense scrutiny of this House.”
“The UK’s exit from the EU will have profound ramifications for our constitutional arrangements. As I have said many times, I think that requires a coherent, careful examination, possibly through some formal channel, of the means by which we are to be governed after we leave the European Union. I am not enthusiastic about the prospect of parliamentary scrutiny of judicial appointments and, as I said in answer to an earlier question, the Government have no current plans to introduce such an appointment system.”
“The priorities of my office are set out in the published business plan for this year, but on the UK’s withdrawal—I beg your pardon, Mr Speaker, I am answering the wrong question. I also beg the hon. Gentleman’s pardon— [ Interruption. ] Nobody noticed probably, the answers being the same. I can only plead that I am getting your cold, Mr Speaker, and was up far too late this morning. Again, I am not going to comment in detail on the content of Cabinet discussions, but the Supreme Court judgment undoubtedly represents a significant development in our constitutional arrangements. As I said the other day, it is important to take stock of the implications of that judgment not in the immediate aftermath of a ruling, but deliberately, carefully and thoughtfully. We should not jump to hasty conclusions.”
“The Government have no plans to introduce any such appointment system. The only thing I would say is that this House must have the right to determine the constitutional arrangements of this country, and of course parts of that will have to reflect on the role of the Supreme Court and its constitutional functions. But I agree with him that a US-style appointment system would be a wholly retrograde step.”
“I could not have put it better than that. I agree with every word that my right hon. Friend said. As I have had cause to say in the House only recently, we have one of the finest judiciaries in the world. Throughout the world, they are beacons of impartiality and independence, and the House should do all it can to promote, protect, and preserve those values. I agree that a US-style process of appointment would not be in the interests of this country and I do not think I can improve on the way he put it.”
“The priorities of my office are set out in the published business plan for this year. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union exercises the interest of my office in supporting the successful delivery of the Government’s objectives. We give legal and constitutional advice within the Government and throughout the Departments. Of course I am engaged in supporting preparations for future international co-operation between Law Officers’ departments and prosecution and other criminal justice organisations.”
“Certainly not. I stand by every one of them. When this Parliament assumes its responsibilities to pass a withdrawal agreement, then I might reconsider them, but certainly not at the moment. We may soon have a chance to assume those responsibilities if we can get a deal from the European Union. I hope then to see the hon. Lady vote for it.”
“The hon. Gentleman is quite right; there are some countries that will not extradite their own citizens. In those cases it is a case of bilateral discussion with them. There is the existing Extradition Act 2003, but if they will not extradite citizens, there is of course the option of trying them in that country. That is generally the option that those countries offer in connection with their own citizens.”
“Exactly, and that presents considerable difficulty, as the hon. Gentleman points out. However, we will be having bilateral discussions with those countries to seek to agree specific arrangements with them.”
“However, I will consider over the coming days whether the public interest might require a greater disclosure of the advice given to the Government on the subject. I am unable to give an undertaking or a promise to the hon. and learned Lady at this point, but the matter is under consideration.”
“At all times, the Government acted in good faith and in the belief that their approach was both lawful and constitutional. These are complex matters, on which senior and distinguished lawyers will disagree. The divisional court, led by the Lord Chief Justice, as well as Lord Doherty in the outer house of Scotland, agreed with the Government’s position, but we were disappointed that, in the end, the Supreme Court took a different view. Of course, we respect its judgment. Given the Supreme Court’s judgment, in legal terms the matter is settled, and, as the hon. and learned Lady will know, I am bound by the long-standing convention that the views of the Law Officers are not disclosed outside the Government without their consent.”
“As the hon. and learned Lady knows, the Supreme Court gave judgment on this issue yesterday, and that judgment sets out the definitive and final legal position on the advice given to Her Majesty on the Prorogation of Parliament. The Government’s legal view during the case was set out and argued fully before the Supreme Court. The hearing was streamed live and the Government’s written case was, and is, available on the Supreme Court website. I took a close interest in the case— [ Interruption ] —and I oversaw the Government’s team of counsel. I have to say that if every time I lost a case I was called upon to resign, I would probably never have had a practice. The Government accept the judgment and accept that they lost the case.”
“I am extremely grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for her kindness and solicitousness for my welfare. I am particularly attracted by the tempting prospect that she dangles before me, but she will know that I am obliged by the convention to say that I am not permitted to disclose the advice that I may or may not have given to the Government. But I repeat: the matter is under consideration.”
“We are fortunate in this House to have one of the finest judiciaries, I believe, in the world, and it is important to remember that the principles they set apply to both sides, as my right hon. and learned Friend has said.”
“I certainly can say to my right hon. and learned Friend that it is important when we reflect on judgments that may be seen to go against the short-term interests of any particular Government that we remember that they stand as precedents and principles for the future. I invite all my hon. Friends to reflect on precisely the situation that my right hon. and learned Friend has set out before the House, which is that this would stand for Governments of a colour of which those on my side would not approve and for their actions too. It is important that when we comment on the decisions of judges we remember that those judges are both impartial and independent, and they are entitled to reach the view that they have reached.”
“I do not know whether in the hon. Gentleman’s practice at the Bar he felt that just because he had given advice that might not have been upheld by a court he had no credibility. That is an absurd and ridiculous proposition. Furthermore, it was advice that was agreed with by the first instance court in Scotland and by the Lord Chief Justice of England. Is the hon. Gentleman calling for his resignation as well? Is he calling for the resignation of the Master of the Rolls? Is he calling for the resignation of the President of the Queen’s bench division? Is he calling for the resignation of Lord Doherty? [ Interruption .]”
“I will say one thing for the Scottish National party and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) if I may. Whereas in the hon. Gentleman’s case, no shameless piece of cynical opportunism is left on the floor, the hon. and learned Lady is a lawyer and a Queen’s counsel, and she knows that it is the most puerile and infantile of criticisms to say about a lawyer whose advice has been upheld by courts right the way up to the Supreme Court that somehow or other he should be held culpable for that advice. The fact of the matter is that this advice was sound advice at the time. The court of last resort ultimately disagreed with it, but in doing so it made new law, as it was entirely entitled to do.”
“I know that my right hon. and learned Friend will understand that it is not right for the Attorney General or any Cabinet Minister to comment on leaks of matters that occurred within Cabinet, be they accurate or inaccurate—it would set a wholly undesirable precedent—but let me say this. It was being mooted some weeks ago that Parliament might be prorogued from the beginning of September or even earlier until 31 October. I say straightaway to him that if that had been the proposition, I could not have stayed in the Cabinet while it was done.”
“I do not think that it was a constitutional coup. I know the right hon. Gentleman will know that I do not, and I do not believe that anybody does. These things can be said in the heat of rhetorical and poetical licence, but this was a judgment of the Supreme Court of a kind that was clear and definitive. It often happens that Governments lose cases. We did not agree with it, because of course we argued against it, but we accept the ruling of the Supreme Court, and we are proud that we have a country that is capable of giving independent judgments of this kind.”
“Let us be absolutely clear: from now on, the prerogative power of Her Majesty, advised by the Prime Minister, can be the subject—the justiciable subject—of the court’s control, and that was a judgment that the Supreme Court was perfectly entitled to make. What the implications are for the future of our constitutional arrangements will have to be reflected upon in the coming months and years, but it is never wise to reflect upon a court case and its implications in the immediate aftermath of that case. It will have to be done carefully and deliberately, and this House will have to decide, ultimately, whether these matters and these powers are for this House to regulate and control, or whether they are for the judiciary; but, at the moment, the Supreme Court has spoken, and that is the law.”
“I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s question. I do of course agree with him that legal advice, and particularly the role of the Attorney General, is always difficult, because one polices and intersects a very difficult line between giving advice of an impartial, and politically impartial, character, and being a political Minister, but I hope that I have endeavoured to do that with all the conscience and candour at my disposal—and when I say to the House, as I do today, “I accept that we lost; we got it wrong on the judgment of the Supreme Court; but it was a respectable view on the law to take, and that view was taken by four of the seven judges who had opined up to the point of the Supreme Court.” The Supreme Court has made new law.”
“The judgment is clear. The Government are assessing its short-term and long-term implications now, but the right hon. Lady can be quite certain that they will abide by its ruling, and by the content and implications of its judgment.”
“I have to say, and I think there is nothing wrong in venturing to express respectful disagreement, that what that will mean in future is that the Court will be obliged to assess whether or not a particular political controversy is sufficiently serious, excites sufficiently heated controversy, as to warrant the House sitting for any particular length of time; but be that as it may, that is the test that the Court has set, and that is the test that now must be applied.”
“I think I understood my right hon. Friend’s question correctly. The Court in this case was giving its judgment on a particular issue—whether or not Prorogation of this length could be the subject of judicial control and, if so, what was the correct test to apply to that judicial control. It chose to delineate a test that suggests that from now on, a Prorogation of any length must be reasonably justified. The Court included in its analysis the fact that there was before the House, and before the country now, a particularly acute constitutional controversy, which made it even more important that the House should sit.”
“The judges do not exist immune from criticism. There is nothing wrong at all in any member of the public, be it a Member of Parliament or otherwise, criticising a court judgment, but what is wrong is that motives of an improper kind should be imputed to any judge in this country. We are defenders of the entire democratic constitution and we must be sure, in everything we say—I agree with the hon. Lady if this is what she means—that we do not impute improper motives. With the judgments, we can be robustly critical; with the motives, we cannot.”
“My right hon. and learned Friend has great experience, as does my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) sitting next to him, of the role that I now have the great privilege to occupy. He knows how important confidentiality is to the ability of the Attorney General to give frank, unvarnished and sometimes unwelcome advice to those who are conducting the policy of the Government. So he is quite right. He discharged his functions, as did my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, with great distinction and I am proud to have been a successor of theirs.”
“There is nothing wrong with expressing robust critical views about a judgment. In so far as it imputes an inappropriate or improper motive, then it is wrong. I think it is a question of wording and of being careful with one’s language, but I took that remark, in so far as I saw it reported, simply to be a robust criticism of the judgment and nothing more—to which my right hon. Friend is entitled.”
“What I can undertake to my right hon. Friend is that there will be no Prorogation that does not comply with the terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court.”
“What I am considering is the public interest, and whether or not there are factors in this case connected closely with the public interest generally that should outweigh the Law Officers’ convention and lead to disclosure, but that is not only my decision. I am in the position, in a rough and approximate way, between a lawyer and his client, and I must ensure that there is proper consultation and proper reflection on what the public interest requires. That is what I have undertaken to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West to do, and in due course I will make my mind up.”
“It would, of course, be open to the House to decide to legislate otherwise, and no doubt that is one of the implications of this judgment that will have to be reflected upon in the coming months and years. I know that there was a widespread view that it was indeed a proceeding in Parliament, but the Supreme Court is as entitled to redefine, or at least to take a view of, its definition of the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights as it is to invent a new legal principle, as it did in this judgment.”
“My hon. Friend asks whether this came as a surprise. Quite a lot about the judgment came as a surprise, but that particular part proceeded from a quite strict, narrow interpretation of the Bill of Rights on what was a proceeding. It was interpreted to apply the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights to the core and essential business of Parliament, and it was held by the Supreme Court that such a proceeding—namely, the execution of the Queen’s Commission in the Lords, in the presence of Mr Speaker and those who attended that proceeding—was not sufficiently close to its core and essential business to attract the protection of the Bill.”
“Let me make it plain that I have never denied any member of the Cabinet any sight of any advice of mine. I am not certain who else asked for that advice and when, but I certainly have never denied it.”
“Let me say to my right hon. Friend that the Supreme Court invoked the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the convention of ministerial accountability to Parliament as a justification for making justiciable the decision to prorogue. That is what it was entitled to do, and it effectively amounts to converting a political convention into a legal rule. That, traditionally, was not thought to be possible; the Supreme Court has decided that it is, and I certainly do not in any way complain with its right to do so. I agree that Parliament has to determine the terms on which we leave, but this Parliament has declined three times to pass a withdrawal Act to which the Opposition had absolutely no objection. [ Interruption. ]”
“We now have a wide number in this House setting their face against leaving at all. When this Government draw the only logical inference from that position, which is that we must leave therefore without any deal at all, they still sets their face, denying the electorate the chance of having their say in how this matter should be resolved. This Parliament is a dead Parliament. It should no longer sit. It has no moral right to sit on these green Benches, and whatever— [ Interruption. ]”
“They don’t like to hear it, Mr Speaker. They don’t like the truth. Twice they have been asked to let the electorate decide whether they should continue to sit in their seats, while they block 17.4 million people’s votes. This Parliament is a disgrace. Given the opportunity— [ Interruption. ] Since I am asked, let me tell them the truth. They could vote no confidence at any time, but they are too cowardly to give it a go. They could agree to a motion to allow this House to dissolve, but they are to cowardly to give it a go. This Parliament should have the courage to face the electorate, but it won’t, because so many of them are really all about preventing us from leaving the European Union at all. But the time is coming, Mr Speaker, when even these turkeys won’t be able to prevent Christmas.”
“If the right hon. Member for Delyn (David Hanson) is so confident that his electorate will consider that his moral right to sit here is so strong, why does he not submit it to them now? All we need—I offer this to the Labour Front Bench—is a one-line Bill, which we could put through with Mr Speaker’s help, to fix the date of a general election by a simple majority, and we could have the election. Why does he not tell his Front Bench to put his confidence in his constituents to the test?”
“I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. In our constitution, when a Government can no longer govern because Parliament has withdrawn its assent, the moral and constitutional thing to do is to have the courage of your convictions, which this spineless gang on the Opposition Front Bench do not, and to table a motion of no confidence, but they have not got the guts to table that motion of no confidence because most of them do not want their own leader in power.”
“In answer to the hon. Lady’s last point, I completely and firmly support the independence of our judiciary. In Scotland, in England, in Wales and in Northern Ireland we have one of the finest judiciaries in the world. The fact of the matter is that the Supreme Court gave its judgment, and its judgment must be respected, but that does not prevent robust criticism of the terms of that judgment, which will no doubt be subjected to that criticism—that is onside. What is not onside is the imputation of improper or inappropriate motives.”
“I know that my right hon. Friend knows that, when it comes to the judges—though not to this shower on the Opposition Benches—I want to be, if I can, respectful and careful. It is important that we understand that these judges are protectors of all our freedoms and all our rights—”
“I wonder if you, Mr Speaker, in a well-earned retirement, would like to give lessons to Front Benchers. It could be the beginnings of a new and very glorious—or even more glorious—career. I have now lost my thread entirely—”
“I am not sure I discerned a question in that marshmallow of rhetoric, but in so far as there was a question, there is an answer. If the hon. Gentleman thinks the Government should no longer be governing, he should tell his leader to bring a motion of no confidence this afternoon and to agree to a simple one-line statute that fixes the election by a simple majority. We would be delighted to meet the right hon. Gentleman wherever he chooses in front of the electorate, who will judge whether the machinations he supports and the devices to which he resorts to make sure that this dead Parliament continues are right or wrong.”
“I cannot comment on matters that are plainly covered not only by the convention but by legal professional privilege, but I say to my hon. Friend that the Government’s position was set out clearly in argument—if she followed it all, she will know it went on for a very long time—and the Supreme Court decided against it. We accept that position.”
“I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. I cannot disclose what advice I gave. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, who first asked this urgent question, had that answer, and I am afraid I am going to have to keep giving it today. However, what I would say is that the Supreme Court did indeed, as it overtly and explicitly said, develop the law. It took what was a political convention—hitherto, in all the constitutional textbooks, described as unenforceable by a court—and decided that it would set a test and convert it into a legal principle and legal test. It was perfectly entitled to do that, just as this House will, in the coming months and years, have to reflect on the implications and on whether it is content to leave that position untouched.”
“I simply cannot comment on matters that pertain to the internal preparation of cases, which are covered by legal professional privilege. It is simply not reasonable to ask people to do so, particularly when it relates to individuals. The hon. Gentleman should make no assumptions one way or the other from what I am saying. The fact is that cases are covered by privilege, and that must be respected.”
“It is a new principle of law, which has been found to exist by the Supreme Court, and where, hitherto, it has not been thought that a court could go. However, the Court is entitled to develop the common law, and that it has done. This does set a precedent; it is binding, unless this House, in due course, considers that it should take action to alter that position.”