Mark Garnier
MP for Wyre Forest · Conservative · United Kingdom
“Many commentators have commented about public sector productivity underperformance. EY tells us that the public sector has underperformed to the point where it has cut GDP growth by 3% since 2019. The Institute for Government highlights an average of nearly 1% underperformance every year for that same period.”
“My right hon. Friend raises another big argument that we could have on the issue of rural broadband, but it is worth making the point regarding internet connectivity that I was just coming on to. I know this is as painful in other constituencies as it is in Wyre Forest.”
“I remember the impact that was felt in 2015 when HSBC closed the last bank in Bewdley in my constituency; people were utterly dismayed. Happily, the post office stepped in and was able to help resolve the issues, but since then we have now discovered that that the post office is under threat.”
“As I say, I am not an apologist for banks, and I am keen to ensure that we get a balanced argument. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that that is an awful lot of money, but it all comes down to what should be the right and proportionate response.”
“If a branch is not viable, should the bank keep it open? We must look at the other opportunities. The last Conservative Government recognised that and were committed to retaining vital banking services.”
“New York is the biggest financial services centre in the world and London is the second biggest, but in New York, 80% of the turnover is driven by the domestic market of America, while just 20% is international; those numbers are reversed in the UK, where 80% of the activity is international.”
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“Overlapping interests exist in hybrid or workplace pension schemes, but unclear boundaries and differing enforcement powers can create regulatory gaps and inconsistencies. That ambiguity causes compliance difficulties for employers, trustees and industry stakeholders, and may ultimately affect pension savers. The new clause would require the Government to establish a statutory joint protocol between the FCA and TPR, clearly defining and publishing their respective roles and responsibilities. The protocol must outline formal co-ordination mechanisms between the FCA and TPR, include a published framework specifically addressing oversight of hybrid and workplace personal schemes where regulatory remit overlaps, and include a requirement for regular joint communications from both regulators to guide industry and clarify regulatory boundaries.”
“I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This will be the last new clause I will be talking to. It looks at the guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. In preparing for this Bill, we spent a lot of time engaging with the industry just a mile and a half up the road. Among the industry there is persistent confusion regarding the division of regulatory responsibility between the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. The FCA regulates contract-based pension schemes—personal pensions, group personal pensions and stakeholder pensions—focusing on firm authorisation, conduct and consumer financial advice. TPR regulates trust-based occupational schemes, including defined-benefit and defined-contribution trust schemes, and it targets schemes, governance and employer duties.”
“New Clause 39 Section 38: commencement “(1) The provisions in section 38 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State. (2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”— (John Milne.) This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation. Brought up, and read the First time .”
“I am highly reassured by the Minister’s words. The important point is to ensure that if the bodies are to work together and do this, we need to keep them held to account on it. The Financial Conduct Authority was set up as an independent regulator and reports back to such things as the Treasury Committee. Presumably, TPR reports back to the Work and Pensions Committee. Already we can see a potential problem there, because separate Select Committees are doing the investigation. That is an important point, but I am confident that the Minister and his civil servants are aware of the problem and will be resolutely super sharp-focused on this issue to ensure that we have regulatory clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn.”
“I think we can all agree that he has a terrific future in front of him as an individual who can get stuck into really quite dry, anodyne Bills. Of course, I also thank the members of my office staff, who have worked extraordinarily hard. I had not quite realised how difficult it is to be in opposition and up against the might of the Government, but my office staff have done very well, so I thank them all very much indeed.”
“Amendments 255 and 256 relate to the value-for-money framework timeline that we discussed when we considered clause 41 on Tuesday and are related to Conservative amendment 257, which was withdrawn. When we considered amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth, the Minister committed to consider the matter on Report, so I will not press those amendments today. This is, however, because I think it is the last time that I will speak in this Committee—or I hope it will be—a good opportunity to thank everyone. I say a huge thank you to everyone who has worked incredibly hard: the Clerks; you, Ms Lewell, and your fellow Chairs; and all the DWP officials who have supported the Minister who, frankly, with his not inconsiderable inexperience and youth, has done a magnificent job of working in his first Bill Committee.”
“It provides for the key provisions imposing the asset allocation requirement to fall away if they are not brought into force before the end of 2035. Amendment 242, in clause 101, page 98, line 37, at beginning insert— “( ) Chapter 1 of Part 4 comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed. ( ) Chapter 2 of”. This amendment provides for the commencement of the new Chapter relating to the consequences of the Virgin Media case . Amendment 243, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, after “section 96” insert “and (Information to be given to pension schemes by employers)”.— (Torsten Bell.) This amendment provides for the commencement of NC20. C lause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“It allows, however, for provision relating to that requirement (e.g., provision around applications for approval) to be commenced before that date in anticipation of the requirement itself taking effect. Amendment 228, in clause 101, page 98, line 34, at end insert— “(5A) If section 38 has not been brought into force before the end of 2035 in respect of the insertion of— (a) Condition 2 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: Master Trusts), and (b) subsection (7B) in section 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: group personal pension schemes), section 38 is repealed at the end of that year in respect of the insertion of those provisions.” This amendment transposes and clarifies the provision currently in clause 38(16).”
“Amendment 227, in clause 101, page 98, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert— “(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(b) may not provide for the following to come into force before 1 January 2030— (a) section 38(4), in respect of the insertion of Condition 1 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (Master Trusts to be subject to scale requirement); (b) section 38(8), in respect of the insertion of section 26(7A) of that Act (group personal pension schemes to be subject to scale requirement) (but nothing in this subsection prevents section 38 from being brought into force before that date in respect of the insertion in that Act of other provision related to that mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)).” This amendment ensures that schemes will not be legally subject to the scale requirement before 1 January 2030.”
“I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendments made: 225, in clause 101, page 98, line 24, leave out “after 31 December 2029”. This amendment, together with Amendment 227, means that relevant Master Trusts and group personal pensions will not have to comply with the scale requirement until after 2030, but that Chapter 3 of Part 2 (including provision relating to the scale requirement, such as the application can otherwise be brought into force at any time in accordance with regulations. Amendment 226, in clause 101, page 98, line 25, at end insert— “(ba) Chapter 3A comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State and the Treasury jointly may by regulations appoint;”. This amendment provides for commencement by regulations of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.”
“This is a very uncontentious and highly technical part of the Bill. We have no objections to any of these provisions and so will be supporting them.”
“This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025. Amendment 40, in clause 29, page 28, leave out lines 8 and 9.— (Torsten Bell.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39. Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 30 Enforcement by the Pensions Regulator Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Perhaps it is exciting for those who enjoy dry reading. We in the Opposition have no objections. Amendment 36 agreed to. Amendments made: 37, in clause 29, page 27, line 30, leave out— “a relevant person, other than the FCA,” and insert— “the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme”. This amendment ensures that the FCA cannot be required to pay compensation under small pots regulations. Amendment 38, in clause 29, page 27, line 39, leave out “Subject to subsection (4),”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39. Amendment 39, in clause 29, page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (4).”
“Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.”
“This is not something we want to press, but we feel very strongly that the Treasury and Treasury Ministers should think very carefully about it, because, as I say, hard work is not a reason not to do the right thing. There is much more support from the industry for the magnetic pot rather than the lifetime pot, which stays with one provider.”
“Just because it is a lot of work does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing to do, so I urge him to think about it. The Minister made a very important point: somebody could move from one job to another and find that their pension moves from a fund that offers good value for money and is performing well to a fund that is performing worse. But exactly the opposite is also the case. If somebody frequently changes jobs, the law of averages and statistics means that over their lifetime they will get the average rate, which means they do not get stuck in one or the other. One would cancel the other out—it is a maths problem. The Minister has made his points.”
“That helps to reduce the administrative burden on individuals and the number of small pots, and that can reduce costs for consumers and help the overall consolidation of the market. These changes have been backed by some in the industry, including Hargreaves Lansdown, which has said that having a single pot would simplify someone’s pension investment, bringing transparency and clarity. It has said that for those who move jobs frequently, a single pension pot would be invaluable. The Minister made a couple of points. The first was about the substantial overhaul of the system to be able to deliver reform. Although I appreciate that this may be outside the scope of the Bill, we should not worry about substantial overhauls to make things better for people who are saving for their retirement. It is incredibly important that we get this right.”
“By changing our current proposals from a lifetime pot to a magnetic pot proposal where the pot follows the individual, we hope we can bring down some of the administrative costs of the initial lifetime pot proposal. Our new clause 36 will provide for a pension pot that would follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider. This approach could reduce fragmentation while retaining the advantages of employer oversight and collective governance. This would have similarities with the Australian system, where a person can staple to their first chosen pension provider so that it follows them from job to job.”
“I will speak to our new clause 36. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; I will come to those in a minute. The Government dropped plans for the lifetime provider or “pot for life” model, which would have allowed individuals to direct all workplace pension contributions into a single, personally chosen pension pot throughout their career. That was first proposed by the Conservative Government. Although we appreciate that the initial lifetime pot model has not had support from the current Government or, to be fair, from the industry, we believe there is much merit in exploring a model that would allow for pensions to follow individuals between jobs. The new clause would ensure that fragmented small pots are not left as workers move between jobs.”
“I think the Minister has got this the wrong way round. It was the lifetime pot, which was being paid into as people went around, that the industry did not like, because that was administratively quite difficult. The stapled pot—stapled to the lapel, or whatever, to be dragged around like the Australian one—is what we are proposing this time round, which is the new version that the industry does agree with. I think the Minister might have got his notes upside down.”
“Fiduciaries are best placed to set the correct balance between asset classes, and equities have liquidity, governance, transparency of pricing, equality of treatment between investors, and other advantages for pension funds.” Finally, the Association of British Insurers said: “A mandation reserve power would undermine trust in the pension system and create a risk of political interference in capital allocation, which would undermine the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment.” I understand that this is a reserve power of mandation, but it sets a very bad precedent, so we will oppose the clause.”
“By creating the risk of political interference in capital allocation, the power undermines the UK’s global reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment”. Which? has said that this measure “may result in schemes making worse or riskier investment decisions that may not be in the best long-term financial interests of savers.” Aviva has said: “as currently drafted in Section 28C, the power in the Bill goes far beyond this policy intent and the scope of the Accord, with very limited constraints on how, and under what circumstances, the requirements could be introduced.” The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said: “We are concerned about the introduction of investment mandation powers, and potential interference of those powers—or their threatened use—with trustees’ fiduciary duties.” Unison has said: “We have significant concerns about these clauses.”
“The Pensions Management Institute has said: “this provision sets a dangerous precedence for Government interference in the fiduciary duty of trustees to act in members’ best financial interests.” Pensions UK has said: “this ambition is subject to fiduciary duties and is dependent on supporting actions by Government, namely that there will need to be a strong pipeline of investable UK assets. Without this, schemes will be competing against each other for the same assets, which risks asset bubbles and poor value for money.” The Investment Association has said: “It comes with significant risks for members in the form of capital being poorly allocated if political preferences take priority over member needs. Any resulting poor investment outcomes will be borne by the member.”
“Savers deserve clarity about who ultimately protects their hard-earned pension pots. It has been said that this merely provides the powers to do mandation and does not necessarily force firms to do this, but I will come to that later. Our amendment 275 highlights the fact that there is a political party, whose Members are not in attendance here, which has already said that if it gets into government—and, let’s face it, it has a fighting chance—it will mandate pension funds to invest in the UK water industry in order to support the Government renationalising the UK water industry. I would like to highlight some of the issues that have been raised.”
“Their role is not to follow political direction but to uphold the trust placed in them and the fiduciary duty they owe, which is the foundation of confidence in the pension system. As has been said in multiple responses to the Bill, clause 38 as currently written undermines the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment. When trustees select investments, they must find the safest and strongest options for beneficiaries. Can we even be confident that the Government will be able to provide a pipeline of investment opportunities? Pension funds could end up being forced to fight against each other for a selection of low-performing assets. If these powers are used, it changes accountability. If mandated investments fail, is it the trustees or the Government who should answer for those losses?”
“I would like to speak to the wider clause before coming to our amendments. It is important to get on the record that this is a very bad clause. The Minister mentioned asset allocation, and this measure, which is known as mandation, has gone down incredibly badly with the pensions industry. Mandation risks undermining the core obligation of trustees, which is to act in the best interests of savers. Pension savings reflect decades of work and are not an abstract figure on a balance sheet—they are the hope of a secure future for millions of people. Trustees and fund managers bear a legal responsibility to protect and grow these savings, investing wisely where the best opportunities may be found.”
“I beg to move amendment 250, in clause 38, page 37, line 12, at end insert “or (c) the relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement.””
“If we lose that diversity and essentially create a handful of the same scheme propositions, employers and members will lose out on this benefit. Realistically, it will be extremely challenging for new entrants to the market to have a chance of building the required scale. Our amendments create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services as part of the new entrants clause. This will allow boutique or niche providers to continue operating if they demonstrate diversity in the market or serve a specific member need, even if they do not meet the £25 billion threshold.”
“The risk is that the policy could reduce competition, limit consumer choice and stifle innovation by making it harder for smaller, specialist providers to operate or enter the market Clause 38 provides little detail of the meaning of the “ability to innovate” and how “strong potential for growth” will be measured, but it is essential that the Bill provides a credible route to support innovation. If we tie the pensions market up by restricting it to a handful of large providers focused on back-book integration and building scale, there will be less space for innovation aimed at pension member engagement. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice and creates competition, and competition is an important part of this. Smaller schemes are chosen by employers for specific reasons.”
“The Bill sets a minimum asset threshold of £25 billion for workplace pension schemes to operate as megafunds by 2030. This is not, in itself, particularly controversial, and we are all fully aware of the arguments about scale being effective when running pension funds. The requirement is intended to drive consolidation, improve economies of scale and boost investment in UK assets, but there is concern that such a high threshold could disadvantage boutique or niche funds or new entrants into the market that provide specialist services to cater for financially literate members who prefer a more tailored approach to their pension management. For example, Hargreaves Lansdown has highlighted that its £5 billion fund serves members who value investment autonomy and expertise.”
“Having learned over the past 10 or 15 years about the effects of having large scale only, we are now having an argument about potentially stifling the pensions equivalent of companies such as Starling, Metro, Revolut and other innovators coming into the pensions market. I was hoping that from debating the amendments I could be convinced that the Minister would take away the thinking behind what we have come up with: that innovation should be good, and that there should permanently be new, fresh blood coming through. However, I do not think that he has got it. I was not going to push the amendments to a vote, but I now feel motivated to do so.”
“I remember being on the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards after the financial crisis, when we were trying to sort out Labour’s previous mess, and not a single ab initio banking licence had been issued for 100 years. The only way that companies could get into the banking market—as Virgin and Metro were doing—was by buying dormant banking licences. I remember having long conversations—successfully, as it turned out—in order to try to allow companies such as Starling into the market. I think that Starling received the first ab initio banking licence for 100 years.”
“I am not entirely happy with the Minister’s comments. I am slightly surprised, and I thought he might have listened a bit more carefully. We absolutely understand the economies of scale. A large, £25 billion pension fund can do amazing things. We are 100% behind that. We have not disagreed with that at all. However, I somehow feel myself listening to the Minister and hearing the reverse of the arguments we were making as we tried to allow new-entrant banks into the market after the financial crisis. Those of a certain age—and the Minister turned 43 the other day, so he will remember the financial crisis—know that the problem was that a few very big banks were spreading the contagion.”
“I beg to move amendment 248, in clause 38, page 41, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 43. This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.”
“Amendments 248 and 249 talk about removing mandation—something I spoke about when we debated clause 38, so I will not cover those amendments other than to say that it is something we feel strongly about. Amendment 275 concerns mandation with regard to the water industry. It comes as a result of an announcement from the leader of Reform about potentially using pension fund money to invest in Thames Water, and part of Reform’s manifesto talked about nationalising the water industry, but using pension fund money to own 50% of those holdings. To a certain extent, that is performative because we are talking about a specific sector. This amendment specifically talks about the water companies, but it could be carried forward to any other potentially nationalised sector.”
“This is rather strange, because I wanted to intervene on the intervention, but I hope that my hon. Friend will come on to the various other things that we have proposed. For example, we have proposed looking at the Maxwell rules, which are driving the incentive of pension fund trustees to invest in gilts because of the implications of volatile markets for balance sheets. We are trying to look at the wider regulation that is driving certain behaviour, and I hope that my hon. Friend will raise that in due course. We are 100% behind the Bill—not every single part of it, although the thrust is very good—but, as my hon. Friend will mention, there are areas that could be changed to achieve its aims.”
“It should mandate consultation with the Debt Management Office and industry stakeholders to monitor and mitigate risk to market stability. We are not trying to stop the Government persuading pension funds into equities or other alternative investments, but we need a proper conversation with the Debt Management Office about what that means for the cost of Government borrowing, which could potentially be significant.”
“A low gilt allocation scenario would mean that pension sector allocation of gilt holdings would drop to 10% of GDP by around 2040, down from around 30% today. That in itself, all other things being equal, would result in an extra £22 billion of debt interest payments on the current gilt market. We are highly concerned that a wholesale move from the gilt market by the pension industry places even more burden on the Treasury to manage debt payment. As the deficit continues to grow, the Government must have laser focus on the impact on the gilt market in relation to how they fund Government debt. The new clause introduces a requirement for an impact assessment before any regulatory or policy changes that could materially alter DB schemes’ asset allocations away from gilt.”
“Otherwise, there will be a falling market. We all know what a gilt crisis looks like for pension funds. The 2022 gilt crisis highlighted the market’s vulnerability to large and sudden sales by pension funds, which triggered a fire-sale spiral and required Bank of England intervention to stabilise prices. It was not a good day. The Debt Management Office and market experts have noted that the gilt market is highly reliant on pension fund investment, and any structural reduction in demand could impact Government borrowing costs and market stability. The Office for Budget Responsibility has highlighted concern about the impact of a low gilt allocation scenario, which is likely if the Bill achieves the outcomes that the Government want.”
“I rise to speak to new clause 32, which looks at the effects of some of the changes on the UK gilt market. Defined-benefit pension schemes are major holders of UK Government bonds, with pension funds holding around 28% of the gilt market —the UK Government bond market—as of early 2022. Those investments provide stable, long-term funding for the UK Government and are essential to the functioning of the debt market. Significant shift by DB schemes away from gilts and into equities—which, in itself, is not a bad thing, as long as it does not happen in a disorganised way, which could be prompted by policy changes—may reduce the demand for gilts, potentially increasing yields and destabilising the market. At the end of the day, if 28% of the ownership of the gilt market is taken away, somebody else needs to be found to buy it.”
“I thank the Minister for talking through the amendments. We understand the intention behind them, but we are worried that, as can often be the case, there may be an unintended consequence: the creation of a closed shop for master trusts. We do not want suddenly to find that, in trying to make a transition pathway, we end up making things more difficult because it has been interpreted in the wrong way. We are minded to oppose the amendments, but perhaps the Minister could instead give us his thoughts on how we can ensure that they do not get used the wrong way and that we do not end up with a closed shop of master trusts.”
“I completely understand that. The question is, what is plausible? One man’s plausible might be another man’s impossible. That is the bit that we are worried about: how to ensure that someone is not squeezed out who otherwise could be in it.”
“However, we welcome the compromise set out in amendment 278, which would ensure that external transfers do not take place until VFM assessments are available. Frankly, that amendment is better-crafted than ours. If we had done them the other way around, I would have deferred to the advice of the hon. Member for Tamworth on whether she wanted to move the amendment. She was right to withdraw her amendment, and we will withdraw ours, but I urge the Minister to write to us both on the outcome of this matter before Report. It would be useful to have his comments beforehand so that we can challenge him on Report, and possibly move the amendment again—who knows?”
“The industry has highlighted to us a concern that the Government’s proposed sequencing will not provide enough time between contractual overrides becoming permissible and VFM assessments being conducted, which will totally undermine the effectiveness of consolidation and value improvement. Pensions UK has encouraged the Government to accelerate that and to bring forward the implementation to allow schemes to make progress on consolidation sooner, so that the override is in place well in advance of the VFM framework. We drafted amendment 257 with the idea that if transfers took place before the VFM framework was implemented, further guidance from the FCA would be required on how and when overrides could be used.”
“I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 41, page 53, line 7, at end insert— “ 117GA FCA guidance (1) The FCA must issue guidance on contractual overrides. (2) Guidance on contractual overrides must include— (a) when and how overrides can be used; (b) how to demonstrate transfers are always in members’ best interests; and (c) how contractual overrides are independently certified.” Amendments 255, 256 and 257 ensure that contractual override powers are operational in advance of the first value for money assessments. The amendment is very similar to amendment 278, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth.”
“Amendment 146, in clause 41, page 54, line 3, leave out from “scheme”” to end of line 4 and insert “means a personal pension scheme within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 1(1) of that Act);”. —(Torsten Bell.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140. Clause 41, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 42 Default pension benefit solutions”
“(1B) Regulations under subsection (1A) must in particular require the FCA to include in such general rules provision designed to ensure that the independent person does not have a conflict of interest.” This amendment requires the Treasury to make regulations about the requirements that need to be met by an independent person appointed under section 117E. Amendment 145, in clause 41, page 53, line 38, leave out from “benefits”” to end of line 39 and insert “means money purchase benefits within the meaning of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 181(1) of that Act) or the Pension Schemes (Northern Ireland) Act 1993 (see section 176(1) of that Act);”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 140.”
“I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendments made: 143, in clause 41, page 53, line 8, leave out “Powers to make” and insert “Treasury”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 144. Amendment 144, in clause 41, page 53, line 25, at end insert— “(1A) The Treasury must by regulations require the FCA to include provision of a description specified in the regulations in general rules made in compliance with section 117E(4)(a) (how to determine whether a person is independent), alongside any other provision included in such general rules.”
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer has managed to dig her own £30 billion black hole in the economy, but can the Minister reassure the City of London and this House that there are no plans to increase taxes on our banking and wider financial services sector in the upcoming Budget in November?”
“I also congratulate the hon. Member on her elevation to Economic Secretary to the Treasury; I am sure she will do very well. The UK banking sector provides a valuable service to our economy, keeping money in circulation, funding business and mortgages and all the rest of it. The financial services sector is the UK’s biggest export sector. According to UK Finance, UK banks generate around £45 billion in tax every year, but because of things like the bank levy, UK banks now pay an effective rate of around 46%, which is higher than competitors in New York, Frankfurt, Dublin and Singapore.”