Mike Wood
MP for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire · Conservative · United Kingdom
“The overwhelming cytokine storms, microvascular clotting and rapid progression to acute respiratory distress syndrome and multi-organ failure seen in covid intensive care units are classic manifestations of viral sepsis.”
“Up to 50% of sepsis survivors suffer prolonged physical, cognitive and psychological impairments from debilitating fatigue and cognitive brain fog to severe muscle weakness and post-traumatic stress disorder.”
“That makes it so difficult to have a meaningful figure for the number of cases, deaths and serious disabilities as a result of sepsis. We really need more consistency in the way that is coded, as well as a guide to best practice. I join the Minister in offering my condolences to the hon.”
“Absolutely. Of course, some infections are almost unavoidable, but where infections such as UTIs can clearly be reduced with the right care and precautions, we must do everything we can to reduce those risks. Every Member in this Chamber has constituents whose lives have been permanently transformed by sepsis.”
“Like many in politics, my behaviour can at times appear to some people to be a little idiosyncratic; fortunately, Laura realised that, even for a Member of Parliament, that was not entirely normal behaviour.”
“The international theme for this year could not be more apt: “Invest in Sepsis—Save Lives.” The World Health Organisation recognises sepsis as one of the leading causes of death and disability globally, estimating that sepsis-related illnesses account for one in every five deaths worldwide.”
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“Is that agreed upon criteria to ensure that errors are not happening? Are they trained and do they have the proper skills to enable them to investigate without accusing, for example, innocent people and impacting adversely vulnerable individuals?” –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 6, Q2.] That critical question goes across clause 41. I ask the Minister: how will PSFA staff be trained to make that distinction that Dr Kassem said was so difficult to reach? What agreed-upon criteria will they use to make those determinations? Will independent oversight be in place to prevent wrongful allegations of fraudulent behaviour? The potential for subjectivity and inconsistency in these judgments could have serious consequences for those affected.”
“We have concerns about the balance of probabilities standard that clause 41 relies on, which means that the PSFA must determine on this relatively low civil standard of proof whether the loss was due to fraud or error. That issue arises at various points in the Bill. It is a material distinction, as it significantly affects the deduction imposed on individuals. Although we certainly support the Government’s seeking to recover 40% where individuals or organisations have the means to pay such an order, we would encourage the Government to consider whether, in very exceptional circumstances, that figure ought to be increased. As Dr Kassem highlighted in evidence to the Committee, in regard to assessing fraud, “Do we have criteria that tell staff in the public sector how to differentiate between fraud and error?”
“This is a probing amendment asking the Government to look at whether 40% will be appropriate in all circumstances and, if not, whether this can be managed through other means. I move on to the broader content of clause 41. The clause sets out the proportion of a person’s net earnings that may be deducted to recover amounts lost due to fraud or error. The Bill specifies that in cases of fraud, the Public Sector Fraud Authority may deduct up to 40% of a person’s net earnings for the affected period. In cases of error, the PSFA may deduct up to 20% of net earnings. It is that first figure that we seek to change with our amendment.”
“In those circumstances, it might be appropriate for the Minister to seek an earnings deduction order of above 40%, if they are satisfied that the behaviour has been fraudulent and has caused loss to the taxpayer. As we said this morning, our reasoning is simple. If an individual has committed fraud, then they ought to return the money as quickly as that can reasonably be done without causing extreme hardship and adversity. We have various concerns about the decision making within PSFA, but the capacity and ability of officers to make the decisions on affordability apply whether it is a 20% deduction order or a 99% deduction order—we need to resolve the decision-making process in any event.”
“We have tabled amendment 20 to remove the cap on the maximum deduction in cases of fraud. I should say from the outset that we would not expect deduction orders of above 40% to be used in most circumstances. For most circumstances, 40% is an appropriate maximum level for deduction orders to be set. However, we question whether having the legislative cap removes some flexibility. There might be particular circumstances where a lump sum deduction order would otherwise be imposed but there was not sufficient credit to be able to recover that money if a very high-income individual or organisation were involved without discoverable accounts from which a lump sum order might be made.”
“I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment , by leave , withdrawn Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 42 The employer’s administrative costs Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“We urge the Minister to provide clear assurances that the measure will prevent excessive deductions, while allowing employers to make sure that they are not out of pocket as a result of administering a deduction from earnings order. If the Minister can outline the specific safeguards to ensure that the employer cost deductions remain fair, transparent and proportionate, we are happy for the clause to remain in the Bill.”
“Presumably, she will commit to consulting the normal range of stakeholders—employers, employee groups and other stakeholders—before setting those regulations. Will the regulations include a maximum allowable deduction—either a fixed sum or a proportion of the value of the order—to prevent disproportionate employer charges? We are content for clause 42 to stand part of the Bill, as the principle of allowing employers to recover genuine and proportionate costs is reasonable, given the responsibilities being placed on them. However, we need the Government to provide an adequate explanation as to how this provision will operate in practice.”
“The Minister referred to a framework. I do not know whether she meant to suggest that there might be a percentage cap and whether that is how she intends this to operate. If employers are able to deduct costs, there is a risk that a significant portion of recovered funds, or employees’ earnings, could end up being absorbed by employers’ administrative expenses, rather than being returned to the public purse or finding their way into the employee’s pay packet. Clause 42 gives the Minister the power to make regulations regarding those costs. Given the lack of detail at the moment as to what would be contained in those regulations, can the Minister at least outline what specific types of regulations the Government expect to introduce under that power?”
“Clause 42 provides that when an employer receives a deduction from earnings order, they may also deduct an amount from the liable person’s earnings to cover reasonable administrative costs incurred in complying with the order. As with the mirror provision for banks, we need greater clarity on what will be considered reasonable administrative costs for employers, and what the Minister would expect to appear in the regulations. Specifically, can the Minister provide a definition or specific example of the costs that employers may claim? Have the Government conduced an assessment of the potential financial impact of this provision on employers, on the total funds ultimately recovered by the Treasury and on the subject of the deduction order? Will there be a cap on the amount employers can deduct, to prevent excessive costs?”
“On the timeframe for lodging that appeal, would it be appropriate to allow appeals that would otherwise be out of time where particular circumstances apply that explain why an application could not be made within the usual 28 days? Although we broadly support the mechanisms set out in clauses 43 to 49, there are key areas where we will be looking for more clarity and detail either today or as the Bill progresses, particularly around the key issues of fairness, proportionality, the application of deduction from earnings orders, and clear, accessible processes for reviews and appeals. Will the Government commit to publishing detailed guidance as early as possible on the processes governing variations, revocations and appeals, and also consider amending the Bill to ensure greater clarity around the very rigid time periods?”
“On the timeframe, we discussed extenuating circumstances in relation to other clauses, and the Minister indicated that she was willing to go back and consider whether some flexibility over time periods might be appropriate to allow for exceptional circumstances. Is she able to confirm that that also applies to clause 48? On the grounds for review, the Bill states that applications cannot be based on the “existence or amount” of a payable sum—as the Minister indicated, that will have already been set by an independent body, or will at least be reviewable by an independent body. What grounds for review does she see as being considered valid under clause 48? Skipping ahead to the first-tier tribunal in clause 49, we agree with that provision because, again, it provides an independent avenue for appeal and ensures due process.”
“Will the Minister outline how a liable person will be able to make representations? Will it be purely in writing, online or via a hearing? Within what timeframe is the liable person permitted to submit that response? Clause 47 grants the Minister the power to revoke a deduction from earnings order, and requires revocation once the full payable amount has been recovered. Beyond recovery of the full amount, in what other circumstances may a deduction from earnings order be revoked? On clause 48 and applications for a review of the Minister’s decision, a liable person can ask for a review.”
“It would therefore be helpful to have a better understanding of the specific circumstances that are to be considered as valid grounds for varying an order, and whether the Government have any level of expectation as to what percentage of applications will be successful, based on either precedent from other schemes or the operation of the PSFA in its current form. If an application is refused, is there an appeals process beyond clause 49, which provides for the tribunal appeal, or is that envisaged as the final decision-making body? On clause 46 and the process for varying deduction orders, subsection (2) states that before a variation is made, the liable person must be given an opportunity to make representations regarding the proposed changes. If an order is revised, both the liable person and their employer must be notified.”
“Clause 45, which relates to applications to vary a deduction from earnings order, allows the liable person to apply to the Minister to vary an order and requires the Minister to notify the individual of their decision. How soon after an order is issued is it envisaged that an individual would be able to apply for a variation? A balance obviously needs to be struck between allowing for variations to reflect genuine changes in the circumstances and preventing people from seeking to frustrate or hold up the system.”
“Clause 43, as the Minister said, grants Ministers the ability to suspend and restart deductions under a deduction from earnings order at any time by notifying the employer. As with the equivalent measures relating to direct deduction orders, we are looking for further details on the circumstances in which the Government anticipate that this power is likely to be used and whether the PSFA will be required to regularly review the liable person’s financial situation to assess whether deductions remain fair and sustainable. Is there a systematic review process planned or in place under this legislation to ensure that deductions do not cause financial hardship, or does the legislation rely on the subject of the deduction order appealing against it if those charges become excessive?”
“Will there be a grace period or flexibility for employers who unintentionally fail to meet the 10-day notification requirement? As with other clauses in the Bill, it would have been helpful to see the draft code of practice before assessing how this clause will operate in practice. It would be helpful if the Government published detailed guidance during the passage of the Bill on how they intend to regulate the responsibilities of both employers and individuals. Clause 44 imposes important compliance obligations, so it is critical that these do not unfairly burden employers or create practical difficulties for individuals subject to deduction orders. Will the Minister provide as much detail as possible, as early as possible, on the notification process before the clause comes into effect?”
“To what extent do they fit into obligations that employers, and particularly new employers, already have? Will there be a simplified digital system for submitting notifications? Can that be done alongside other notifying processes that employers must already follow? To what extent have the Government engaged with businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, to assess the impact of the new obligations? On the notification process, how exactly are liable persons and employers expected to submit these notifications? Will it be an online portal or physical documentation? Will there be a standardised form or system to streamline that process? Can the Minister also confirm what penalties or consequences will apply if either a liable person or an employer fails to comply with these notification duties?”
“Clause 44 introduces new obligations for liable persons and their employers in relation to deduction from earnings orders. The clause requires that, if a liable person leaves employment, they must notify the Public Sector Fraud Authority, and, if they start new employment, they must notify the Minister, including a statement of their expected earnings in any new roles. Employers are also subject to strict notification requirements. If an employer hires a liable person who is subject to a deduction from earnings order, and is aware of that, they must notify the Minister within 10 days of hiring the individual and provide a statement of the liable person’s expected earnings. How will the Government ensure that those new requirements do not create unnecessary administrative burdens for employers?”
“Where the individual has not notified anyone of their new employment, does the Minister expect a new employer to have any way of finding out that a new employee is subject to one of these orders? Obviously, there is the question of whether employers are aware. Particularly for small employers, I am not sure that they would necessarily understand the significance of an oblique reference to one of these deduction orders. People are obviously familiar with child maintenance deductions but less so with one of these cases. How can that be addressed?”
“On clause 55, regarding fixed and daily penalties, the clause sets penalties for failing to provide the information at a daily rate of £300 for continued failure to provide information, or a fixed penalty of £300 for other failures to comply. Can the Minister explain why £300 has been chosen as the penalty amount? Is there any significance to the sum? Clearly, £300 is a significant amount of money for most individuals, apart from the extremely wealthy, but it may not be as significant a sum for many organisations, particularly if we look at serious organised fraud. To what extent does the Minister believe that £300 will prove to be a deterrent or effective penalty?”
“If they are to decide upon penalties to be imposed, what level of seniority will they have? Will there be any independent oversight of those decisions? Clause 54 sets out liability of individuals for organisational failures and extends penalties to individuals within an organisation that fails to comply with investigatory or recovery requirements. How will failure to prevent non-compliance be assessed? How will due diligence measures be taken into account? Will there be an element of a safe harbour principle, where people can demonstrate that they had sought the best advice or otherwise taken reasonable measures, but that in spite of those the fraud had not been prevented?”
“Clause 52 states that a penalty may not exceed 100% of the loss to the public authority or the benefit gained by the individual or organisation. Can the Minister clarify how the Government decided upon that as a maximum penalty? Is there an equivalent figure in other legislation that has been used as a comparator? The Bill allows banks and employers to claim administrative costs when handling fraud-related deductions, as we debated earlier today, so have the Government assessed how administrative costs are likely to compare with penalty amounts? Turning to clause 53 and penalties for non-compliance, the clause allows the Minister to impose a penalty on a person or body that fails to comply with the requirements in chapters 2 and 4. Can the Minister clarify who the authorised officer referred to within the clause is?”
“6, Q3.] Will the Government look again at how this Bill might be amended so that it can better tackle fraud carried out for personal gain, even if that gain is non-financial, where it causes the public sector organisation to suffer loss? Clause 51 allows penalties to be imposed on individuals within an organisation. Dr Kassem also said, “when you talk about fraud, you are talking about fraud committed against the public sector by individuals as well as organisations. The procedures cannot be the same in each case”. –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 5, Q2.] Can the Minister explain how the Bill differentiates between fraud by individuals and fraud by organisations, or are the approaches broadly similar under the Bill?”
“The clause states that the fraud must result in a loss to a public authority, but, in evidence to the Committee last week, Dr Kassem raised concerns that fraud is not always financially motivated. She said that “the definition of fraud can be a bit limiting in the current Bill, because, first, it assumes that fraud is happening for financial reasons when that is not necessarily the case. There are non-financial motives…A disgruntled employee can be as dangerous as someone with a financial motive.” –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c.”
“As the Minister said, this is a large group of clauses, so I will try to get through them as quickly as I can. However, given that the provisions grant the PSFA the power to impose penalties on individuals and organisations—powers more often associated with a court or a tribunal—it is important that that we are confident that it is going to do so in a fair, proportionate and effective manner and with due regard to the aims of this legislation. Clause 50 grants the Minister the power to impose penalties where, on the balance of probabilities, they are convinced that a person has committed fraud to obtain an incorrect payment for themselves or another, or has committed fraud resulting in a loss to a public authority. The decision to impose a penalty must be made by an authorised officer.”
“I thank the Minister for confirming that there will not be a choice on whether to pay a penalty rather than being prosecuted, but I am interested to hear what measures will be put in place for guidance on the decision-making process within the PSFA to ensure that the appropriate channel is used in each case, and that a loophole is not created whereby some individuals or organisations get away with what might be a relatively modest penalty payment, while others are subject to criminal prosecution for similar transgressions. I think I have covered all the clauses. I would be very grateful if in particular the Minister could offer some clarification on the question of why the Bill appears to be limited solely to financial fraud, and on that differentiation between individual organisations.”
“Clause 61 sets the interest on late penalty payments at 2.5 percentage points above the Bank of England base rate. I understand that that is the same as the HMRC interest charge for late payments. Has any economic analysis been conducted to determine whether that level of interest serves as an effective deterrent, based on HMRC’s own experience? Clause 63 states that a penalty cannot be imposed if the person has already been convicted of an offence for the same act. Likewise, if a person has already paid a penalty, they cannot later be prosecuted for the same offence.”
“I am very pleased to have this visibility of an important element of the Bill. That is one of the reasons why it stands out among so many of the references to codes of practice and other regulations yet to be decided. I do not think that the Government will struggle to amend the figure as appropriate, as time goes by, to allow for the changing value of money, but I would like to hear from the Minister whether she feels that there is a risk that the amount of £300 is too low to deter large organisations from ignoring such requests. On clause 59, which confirms that the penalties will be imposed by formal notices, I would like to know about the mechanisms that will be in place for individuals and organisations to challenge the penalty notices specifically, as distinct from challenging the other notices under the Bill.”
“I think we will come back to this issue at a later stage. I want to see some action on amendment 11 going forward, but, for now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.”
“As I stated, those are largely probing amendments in areas that we would like to see the Government work on during the passage of the Bill. However, for now, we do not intend to push them to a vote. Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 4 Reviews”
“In the amendments, we propose to replace the Minister with the first-tier tribunal in that process, which would be equivalent to the processes that would be expected when a decision of HMRC is reviewed. Our amendments would ensure that an independent third party is involved with the review process. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why there should be no ability for such an appeal to be made, whether it is made immediately against the notice for information or perhaps as a second appeal stage. We need to be satisfied that there is a good reason why people who are the subject of those notices, which may be quite onerous, particularly for individuals and smaller organisations, should not have the ability to appeal to an independent body. Normally, natural justice would assume that to be the case.”
“I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why there is no ability to have an independent appeal of the kind that would generally take place against HMRC decisions and notices, through the first-tier tribunal. That is why we tabled amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18: to change the appeal body from the Minister for the Cabinet Office to the first-tier tribunal. We are concerned that, given it is the Minister who has been given the power to investigate fraud, it is then a case of allowing the Minister to mark their own homework if they—or the people acting on their behalf—review the decisions themselves. I would like to understand the Minister’s view on whether that is an effective use of ministerial time and capacity. Does she envisage that any such appeal decisions would be delegated?”
“The amendments are all about ensuring that there is not just independent oversight but an effective independent channel of appeal against information notices that does not just go back to the same organisation that issued the original notice. Clause 4 will allow for the person to whom the information notice is given to appeal the notice up to seven days after it is issued, but that appeal will go back to the Minister for the Cabinet Office—or, in practice, the PSFA—to review it and decide whether to revoke, amend or uphold the notice. As drafted, it gives the Minister significant power, as really the only responsible person who can review the decision to give the notice. There therefore appears to be a significant lack of independent oversight.”
“I thank the Minister for those responses, but I think that the first-tier tribunal is perfectly capable of dismissing applications that are without merit, without significantly extending the time. Given the importance of an independent appeal mechanism, I wish to push the amendment to a vote. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
“Amendments 12 and 13 are in a similar vein to amendment 14 —they allow the individual or organisation issued with an information notice to apply to the independent body or board for an extension to the 10 working days within which they are currently required to provide information requested in the notice, if they are reasonably unable to comply. Sorry, have I skipped ahead a section?”
“This includes confidential business records or journalistic material. Otherwise, the Minister for the Cabinet Office has a very open-ended power to require different types of information. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain whether the Government would consider allowing those issued with information notices to apply specifically for an extension if they cannot reasonably provide the information within the time period requested.”
“Sorry, it has been a while since I have been on a Bill Committee. The amendments would allow the individual or organisation to apply for an extension to the 10 working days within which they are currently required to provide information requested in an information notice, if they are reasonably unable to comply. This is a common sense approach to support people who are engaging with the process and prevent them from being hit with penalties, which was never the intention of the legislation. This is also important because we do not know precisely what information the Minister will be able to ask individuals to provide, other than that an information notice cannot require the giving of particularly sensitive—such as excluded or special procedure—material, as defined in sections 11 to 14 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”
“I thank the Minister for her response, which offered some moderate reassurance. We would be comfortable if either it was included in the Bill or we at least had sight of the code of practice, which will actually define that decision-making process. A fundamental flaw of this Bill Committee is that we are being asked to make decisions on something that may be produced in the future, of which we have no advanced sight. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Our amendments aim to balance these powers, and I am naturally disappointed that the Minister was unable to consider accepting at least some of them.”
“Clause 4 gives the Minister a considerable amount of power to compel individuals, as well as organisations, to provide an unspecified range of information within what could be very tight timescales, on pain of a fine of £300 a day if they fail to comply. The only route to appeal these powers is going back to the person or organisation that is exercising them, and we are concerned about the natural justice of this approach. The legislation, as drafted, involves no impartial third party in the review process on a case-by-case basis, so it leaves individuals with nowhere else to go if they disagree with what is being asked for, or cannot practically comply with the request in the specified timeframe.”
“I would be grateful if the Minister explained what sort of information the Government envisage being requested, under what circumstances, and what safeguards will apply to the sharing of that information.”
“Clause 5 will give the Minister enormous powers to request and share information for the purpose of facilitating the Minister’s exercise of the core functions under the Bill. Given that the Minister’s core functions are to decide whether to investigate and take enforcement action, we are concerned that almost any information could be shared to facilitate the making of those decisions. Likewise, the Minister may share information onward. If they give consent, the information may go further yet. Again, this is a case of the Minister marking their own homework. They get to decide who knows what and whether it gets shared onwards, without any external oversight from an impartial third party.”
“As the Minister says, the clause will add the Cabinet Office to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The Act governs the powers available to the state to obtain communications and communication data, provides statutory safeguards and clarifies what powers different public authorities can use and for what purpose. This legislation will give the Cabinet Office further and greater investigatory powers. Government amendment 1 seeks to clarify that this applies not to the whole of the Cabinet Office, but to the Public Sector Fraud Authority only. I am glad that the amendment will rectify that fairly major drafting error. Obviously, the Opposition support the amendment.”
“Clause 9 amends the Police Reform Act 2002 so that an individual may go to the director general with complaints or misconduct allegations in relation to the Public Sector Fraud Authority. However, it appears that there remains discretion for the Minister, who only “may” make regulations conferring functions on the director general in relation to public sector fraud investigators and “may” disclose information to the director general. Does the Minister intend to make those regulations? What may they contain? If regulations are made under those provisions, what parliamentary procedure will they be subject to?”
“Is the Minister satisfied that a higher executive officer is of equivalent rank and experience to a police inspector? Salary bands would suggest that they are not. A quick search suggests that the starting salary of a higher executive officer may be as little as £38,000, whereas a police inspector in London would typically be on at least £61,000. That suggests that there will be some disparity in the level of seniority that one might expect between the two positions. Is she satisfied that a higher executive officer has the seniority for the very far-reaching powers that the Bill would give them? Turning to clause 8, it is welcome that there is a role for the magistrates court—we finally have some external oversight—where a Minister must apply to make a decision about an individual’s property.”
“What training will those investigators have in order to carry out their functions appropriately? In evidence earlier this week about public sector investigators, Dr Kassem said: “Are they trained and do they have the proper skills to enable them to investigate without accusing, for example, innocent people and impacting adversely vulnerable individuals? That would be the main challenge, in my view.” –– [ Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 6, Q2.] Paragraph 3(2)(b) of schedule 1 states that an authorised investigator may be “a higher executive officer”, which is adding to the positions specified in PACE. The comparable position in the police appears to be specified as “a police officer of at least the rank of inspector”.”
“Clauses 7 to 9 give authorised investigators the powers to enter and search premises and execute search warrants, and powers for the seizure, retention and disposal of property. Those are obviously extensive powers with potentially significant consequences. While strengthening powers to tackle fraud is welcome, we have some concerns. For example, clause 7(3) states: “An authorised investigator is an individual who is authorised by the Minister to exercise the powers conferred by this section.” The clause would extend some PACE powers to authorised investigators at the PSFA to investigate offences of fraud against a public authority. An authorised investigator is defined as a Cabinet Office civil servant of at least higher executive officer grade.”
“What assets are taken into account, and what is the process before the legal system becomes involved? Clause 12 sets out that the recovery methods can be used only to cover the amount where the liable person agrees or a court or tribunal has determined the amount is recoverable. Where the liable person does not engage, what mechanisms exist to encourage them to do so? Are there penalties if a court or tribunal is involved, and how long is the legal process typically expected to take, given current capacity? What does capacity look like at the moment? We feel that, in principle, the powers could be proportionate, but that depends on how they are to be exercised. I would be very grateful if the Minister clarified some of those points.”
“Clause 10 allows the Minister for the Cabinet Office to act on behalf of another public authority to recover a recoverable amount, including bringing court or tribunal proceedings, and recovered money will be returned to the other public authority unless it is agreed that the Minister can retain some or all of it. We have some questions about what has to be agreed ahead of time. Can the Minister just act, or do they need prior approval from the public authority beforehand, so that there is clarity about the basis on which the Minister for the Cabinet Office is acting and any division of recovered funds? Clause 11 sets out the recovery notice that the Minister must give before proceedings can be brought to court or a tribunal, and what is included in it. How is it decided how much can be recovered?”