Matt Western
MP for Warwick and Leamington · Labour · United Kingdom
“Locally, about the equivalent of an Olympic-sized swimming pool of construction waste is dumped into Whitnash Brook every day. We cannot allow this kind of degradation to continue.”
“I congratulate the hon. Member for Waveney Valley (Adrian Ramsay) on securing the debate. Nature is screaming at us. I spoke to farmers last week who told me just how alarmed they are at the situation.”
“I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. She may be aware that we have had a plastics recycling facility in my constituency for several years. Only when it opened did we suffer an awful fly infestation across the town, as well as a horrendous odour.”
“I thank my hon. Friend, while he is still in post. Very briefly, he will be aware of the mockery that is the situation with dual-use goods between Israel and the Palestinian territories. Surely we can have some sort of ban on the products we are supplying that are essentially enabling civilisational erasure in Palestine?”
“My hon. Friend talks about leaseholders being treated with contempt. I have an estate in my constituency, Bishops Gate, where it took three years for FirstPort to respond to residents’ requests, and even when the council got involved, FirstPort refused its request.”
“Just yesterday, the Israel Land Authority published new dates for the tender for the construction of the proposed E1 settlement zone in the west bank. The bidding period for the tender ends in October, and once the contracts have been awarded, it will become impossible to stop E1. Why is E1 so critical?”
The complete record
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“I thank the hon. Gentleman, my friend. I was simply addressing the point made by the Leader of the Opposition, who suggested that the operation at No. 10 was the worst in living memory. It is quite obvious that that is absolutely not the case. We have had two very recent examples, in 2019-22 and then 2022-23, under Johnson and Truss. I want to make it quite clear that the way I see it, the mistake that may have been made by No. 10 is the clear delegation to the Prime Minister’s chief of staff, who was at the heart of an inner circle in No. 10 that no longer exists of Peter Mandelson, Morgan McSweeney and Matthew Doyle. As has come to light just this morning, Matthew Doyle was also part of the problem.”
“I am not close to those operations. I have never been a Minister—that is the honest truth—and to answer the hon. Gentleman’s point, I do not wish to be one either. I am not close enough to that, so I cannot answer that honestly, but what I can say is that I heard from Sir Olly Robbins this morning about how he was leant on and also what documents he may have had access to, including the vetting report. What we have heard today is that the chief of staff leant on the Foreign Office, whether it was about Matthew Doyle or the appointment of Peter Mandelson. That is the issue. The Prime Minister, in my experience of having known him since 2017, is absolutely as straight as a die. He may have accepted the advice and maybe that advice has now proven to be wrong, but he has been let down by those around him. He made a mistake.”
“I commend the Prime Minister—and also the leadership from the Foreign Secretary and the National Security Adviser, I am sure—for the work that is being done. I welcome the news about trying to resolve the issues in the strait of Hormuz, but I share the concerns that have been voiced across the Chamber about the situation in Lebanon and the west bank. Closer to home, the Resolution Foundation has stated that median working-age households will be hit by a £480 additional cost this year, which in my constituency is being described as the cost of Trump. Will the Prime Minister explain more about what can be done to assist households here in the UK?”
“I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his statement. GUGI has been at work since the 1960s, as I understand it; it has been doing extensive mapping for quite some time. In our report on subsea cables, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy came up with a great many recommendations, with which he will be more than familiar. When it comes to the defence investment plan, may I draw his focus to our recommendation on a sovereign capability in repair ships? Will he promise to look at that or agree to meet me to discuss it?”
“California banned them back in 2018, so it just goes to show how much could have been done in recent years. The capacity of the enforcement agencies is a real concern. The higher penalties will be very much welcomed by them, I am sure, but I reiterate that there needs to be greater capacity and expertise across the Electoral Commission and the enforcement agencies.”
“I very much welcome Sir Philip Rycroft’s review. It is long overdue when we think about how much money has been flooding in from Russia and elsewhere. There are questions about association, and certain individuals who have been donating significant amounts of money while living for 21 years not here but in Thailand. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which I chair, made many recommendations in our political finance report, which we published last week. I have tabled 11 amendments, which I hope the Secretary of State will very much view as constructive. I welcome the connection tests that the Secretary of State has mentioned to do with the individual and on a corporate level, and the moratorium on cryptocurrencies is extremely welcome.”
“I came into this place only in 2017. I was deeply disappointed by what happened in 2014 and our failure to stand by Ukraine on the invasion of Crimea. I think Michael Fallon was one of the few who said, “We should actually take action.” What was the hon. Gentleman’s view and what would he have done?”
“My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. The 1.5% is, of course, about security-related initiatives, and it is important that we get to those soon. As for the wider defence investment plan, I would just say a word of caution: we must get it absolutely right. I have been trying to work with colleagues on both sides of the House since the start of the Ajax project in 2016 to find a resolution to some of these problems. We must take great care and be very clear-eyed about the procurement strategy that we follow.”
“The Minister will know that in Warwick and Leamington, we have suffered extreme chemical pollution in the atmosphere from Berry Polymers. More recently, we have had an application from Bellway Homes that proposes dumping the equivalent of an Olympic-size swimming pool of building waste for every day that the development is being built, which will be several years. The common theme here is, of course, the Environment Agency, so will she agree to meet me and the Environment Agency urgently to resolve this pressing issue?”
“I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement. As he says, steel is national security and economic security. Can I just say, it is terrific at long last to hear a Government showing some mettle? [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] The array of measures in the strategy is impressive, from tariffs to procurement and scrap, but there are some concerns among our precious automotive sector. Could my right hon. Friend outline some detail about how this will relate to EU measures and how it will support UK manufacturers facing “made in Europe” tariffs?”
“The Government should ensure that the new national policing unit is properly staffed, and that the Electoral Commission has specialists and the appropriate tools for complex investigations—because they are complex. Finally, we must ensure that any changes are proportionate. Our report is very targeted and seeks to strike the right balance. It is important to note that we did not look at other contentious areas—for example, second jobs, think-tanks, media outlets and online campaign outfits, which also deserve scrutiny. I have tabled amendments aligned to these recommendations. I trust that this report is helpful to the Bill Committee and to the wider House.”
“Currently, the commission faces a Catch-22 situation: it cannot get that information without a major formal investigation, and it will not have grounds to launch an investigation without that kind of information. The Government need to fix that conundrum, so that the Electoral Commission has access to data. Fifthly, we must address crypto donations. We heard arguments for and against, but found no democratic imperative to allow crypto donations right now. The risks are way too high and the benefits too low, and the resource burden of trying to implement safeguards is disproportionate. We therefore call for a ban—a moratorium—until proper rules are in place, and the Electoral Commission should develop adequate safeguards ahead of the next general election. Sixthly, we need to be mindful of resourcing.”
“For example, the Government have committed to commencing section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which requires donors to declare money they have received in connection with a donation. But why does that only apply above £11,180, and why is it such a bizarre figure? Why are the penalties so low, and why is the threshold for a police investigation still so high? We therefore suggest introducing the measures through the Representation of the People Bill instead, which would allow the Government to lower the declaration limit to £500, widen the scope and increase maximum penalties to three years in prison. Fourthly, the Electoral Commission needs new powers to do its job. It must be able to require information from financial institutions about the source of a suspicious donation.”
“That hardly inspires confidence that risks are being investigated proactively, with the right expertise in the right place at the right time. The Government should use the police service reforms to create a new centralised political finance enforcement unit, staffed with expert secondees. Second is the need to fix basic loopholes. For example, the Bill proposes a cap on donations linked to UK-generated cash but then allows companies to donate their entire limit hundreds of times over to individual candidates and campaigners. We heard anecdotally that the rationale was to limit reporting burdens for business, which is a little bizarre. It is not hard to record making a donation—it is a matter of public record. That needs fixing. Third is the need for tougher declarations and penalties.”
“Already, Electoral Commission data shows that public trust is worryingly low. All of this matters right now because the Government have brought forward the Representation of the People Bill. There is much to like, and I commend the Government for their willingness to grapple with a politically sensitive topic. The Committee also welcomes the forthcoming Rycroft review on foreign interference. Our Committee concluded on six recommendations for change. First is the need for a new enforcement lead. Presently, responsibilities for foreign financial influence risks are split across MI5, Counter Terrorism Policing, the National Crime Agency, the Metropolitan Police Service, local police forces and the Electoral Commission.”
“Our political finance system is not designed to withstand a major effort by foreign actors to circumvent the rules, and what happens if political actors in the UK decide that they are not going to respect the rules and constitutional precedents? Presently, I have little confidence that the system would hold. Safeguards and deterrence are completely inadequate. Responsibilities and capabilities are fragmented. Too much problematic activity is apparently allowed or impossible to prove. Thresholds for criminal investigations are too high. Prison sentences are too low. The police are under-resourced, the Electoral Commission lacks the basic powers to do its job, and the general enforcement toolkit is slow, timid and retrospective. That all feeds the public perception that our politics is open to external influence—a belief that is corrosive.”
“Democracies around the world are under threat, and as democratic norms erode, so will corporate behaviour. That will only be made easier by new technologies that enable firms to evade due diligence checks. There is also deepening uncertainty about the trajectory of the current United States Administration, who have ambitions to shape the political direction of their allies. Wealthy individuals are a concern too: Elon Musk, for example, has reportedly considered a £75 million donation to a UK political party. As our political landscape becomes more fragmented, the likelihood of tight and unpredictable electoral races is growing. Adversaries could try to create the impression of having influenced a few races, even if they do not actually change outcomes, simply to make the losers doubt the legitimacy of the process.”
“Here, we have seen a British politician jailed for taking Russian bribes, alongside MI5 interference alerts about Christine Lee, who made around half a million pounds in political donations. This is all deeply concerning. The Government deserve credit for addressing the basic failures through the new Representation of the People Bill, alongside other work, but our Committee established that they need to go further. We have not yet seen a collapse in the integrity of our democratic processes, but we worry that a moment of reckoning may be coming. Indications suggest that foreign state threats are growing, and the possibility of an acute crisis can no longer be ruled out. Efforts to influence UK political positions on critical issues will likely increase between now and the next general election.”
“I am pleased to present the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s third report of this Parliament, on political finance and foreign influence, and I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this. Let me outline why this issue matters. First, the UK’s political finance system was designed for a more innocent age when state threats were lower and the “good chaps” theory of politics resonated more strongly, both at home and abroad. The scale of loopholes facilitating the flow of foreign money into UK politics is now recognised, and Transparency International UK estimates that it runs to tens of millions of pounds. Furthermore, US intelligence has estimated that Russia spent over $300 million to influence politicians in 24 countries between 2014 and 2022.”
“The Committee very much hopes that a new service will be able to accommodate that recommendation. We hope that there can be a centralised service, using whichever is the most appropriate vehicle; whether that be within the National Crime Agency or separately within the police service is for others to decide. The most crucial thing is that we do not have a disparate mix of agencies working in the same arena. The critical thing that we uncovered was how the Electoral Commission—which much of the investigation was about and where so much of the concern originates—often cannot access data and information from other agencies for GDPR reasons, and therefore it is frustrated in its work and many opportunities to prosecute or bring cases are not enabled.”
“The shadow Secretary of State is talking about how money may be spent from taxation. I highlight that local authority road maintenance budgets halved from £4 billion to £2 billion in the 13-year period from 2006 to 2019. If we look at inflation, Bank of England data shows that from 2006 to 2026, overall inflation ran at 74%, but fuel inflation was just 58%.”
“My right hon. Friend talks about the lessons learned. Despite my youthful good looks, I recall the 1979 Iranian revolution—the last Iranian revolution—which led to a fuel crisis globally. The importance of what we are doing is underlined by the need for the energy transition and the need to improve our domestic energy resilience. That is why we need to see more renewables and to roll out Rolls-Royce small modular reactors urgently and take a lead globally on that. My right hon. Friend talks about household support. What does he think President Trump was thinking about the impact that this situation would have on businesses and the humble motorist?”
“Order. I remind Members that they must bob if they wish to be called in the debate. I first call Gareth Thomas, who will be followed by Steve Darling.”
“I thank the Minister for his immediate update to the House, given the recency of this breaking news. He will know that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy did its report on the case of Cash and Berry, in which it made certain recommendations. The National Security Act 2023 is now fully in place. That is post the original Official Secrets Act 1911, which related to what was undertaken, allegedly, by Cash and Berry. Would the Minister agree that, given the essence of the grain of rice strategy pursued by China, we could see many more cases such as this, involving intelligence gathering by the Chinese as they seek to undermine our democracy and political system?”
“I would like the Bill to go further, with a longer qualifying period and profit measures to protect the system. I want a donation cap on corporate and personal donations. I want consideration to be given to amending the schedule of penalties to make it more proportionate to the donor’s wealth. We must ensure that the fees and salaries that companies pay MPs in whatever field, but particularly in media, fall under political finance regulations. I absolutely welcome the Bill. We need much tighter regulation across our political finance, including to address the interference with which states and individuals wish to influence our democracy. I very much look forward to working with the Ministers in the coming weeks.”
“I want there be a longer qualifying period and a profit measure to protect the system more against phantom businesses and shell companies. Elsewhere, our Committee is calling for a temporary moratorium on accepting crypto donations until the Electoral Commission produces statutory guidance and stronger systems. We want the Electoral Commission to have stronger powers, including the ability to compel financial institutions to provide information relating to funds connected to donations so that they can be investigated more fully. We want a single police lead for political finance and foreign interference, and a review into the sentencing of political finance offences. Personally, I think we need to look more at the role of think-tanks and how they are funded.”
“Beyond direct state influence, there is the issue of obscenely wealthy donors and corporations. Corporate donations have tripled over the last three elections in the UK, rising from £14 million in 2017 to £42 million in 2024. Beyond those challenges, the Bill introduces valuable provisions. The political finance reforms are good, and it creates a new “know your donor” requirement to ensure that political parties conduct the necessary due diligence. It requires parties to verify that companies that wish to donate can demonstrate sufficient revenue and a qualifying connection to the UK or Ireland, and it will enable the Electoral Commission to issue significantly increased penalties—up to £500,000. I would like the Bill to go further on business and corporate donations.”
“The Bill introduces timely reforms, such as extending the right to vote to young people, and it addresses the rising and ever more concerning issues of harassment and intimidation. With foreign interference expected to intensify the deterioration of the international security environment, and given the threats posed by wealthy donors, crypto and AI, I encourage the Government to go further. That is where I will focus my remarks. Last September, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy heard from Spotlight on Corruption that there has been foreign interference in 21 elections across Europe in recent years. Research from a 2022 US intelligence assessment estimated that Russia has spent $300 million on political influence in 24 countries.”
“Order. I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to speak in the debate. Clearly, there are quite a few Members so, on the basis of what I have seen, I ask Members to speak for four to five minutes—an informal application of a time limit—and we will see how we get on.”
“The four to five minutes was not kept to as tightly as I would have hoped, so we will have to go to a formal four minutes for speeches because of the number of Members who have indicated that they wish to speak.”
“We hope that this report has given the Government the wake-up call that they need to take this matter seriously. We will keep a keen eye on the Government’s progress in these areas, and we will conduct further scrutiny as required.”
“We will also keep a close eye on the commitments to upgrade security at cable landing stations, on which the Government have agreed to make progress. Of course, the damage that our adversaries can cause us is not without limitation. Cable-monitoring schemes are increasing, and NATO can track sub-surface activity closely in a crisis. Would-be saboteurs may be identified by the security services in advance of carrying out an attack, but the damage that our adversaries can cause is nevertheless extensive. Unless we adopt much better mitigations, a tipping-point scenario seems possible. From the evidence submitted to our inquiry, we estimate that severe disruption would include financial payment and supply chain failures, degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses and unexpected cascading issues, all at a time of crisis.”
“The recent announcement of further details of the Atlantic Bastion programme is welcome, but the capabilities outlined must be deployed at sufficient scale and pace to effectively deter threats to subsea cables. Furthermore, our Navy may be world-renowned, but our hands are tied by international law when it comes to intercepting suspect civilian ships outside our territorial waters. The Government have said that they are launching a comprehensive review of legislation relating to subsea cable infrastructure, but they have not elaborated in detail. They have committed to exploring options for a sovereign cable repair ship, and we will keep a close eye on the progress made on this key recommendation.”
“They had clearly engaged with the issues in depth, and there was a clear explanation of their rationale on each of our points. In particular, we are glad that the Government have committed to, first, establishing an oversight board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, to co-ordinate cross-Government work on protecting undersea infrastructure; secondly, updating impact assessments and strengthening contingency planning across critical public and private sectors; and thirdly, writing to landing station operators to emphasise the importance of robust security standards, and to ask them to produce emergency repair plans within 12 months. None the less, the Government response does not address the Committee’s concerns about developing a more robust military deterrent.”
“Many onward terrestrial links converge towards data centres. This all presents risks for low-level deniable attacks, which would be costly, provocative and hard to prevent. Another example is the lack of genuinely sovereign repair capabilities. The United Kingdom is currently reliant on cable maintenance and repair consortiums, but repairs can take many days or weeks, and there is no guarantee that these consortium ships will be available when we need them. Commissioning a cable repair ship does not happen overnight. There is little to no redundant repair capacity that could be purchased at short notice on the open market. The Government must look ahead and acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030. Our report covered many other issues, and we were encouraged by the Government response.”
“Concerned by the apparent lack of action in this area, my Committee launched an inquiry to assess the resilience of the United Kingdom’s subsea telecommunications cable network and the effectiveness of the Government’s work to protect it. We spoke in public and in private to security experts, lawyers, cable owners and operators, cable repair firms, former and serving naval leaders, policymakers from NATO allies, telecoms firms and those working in sectors reliant on data carried by subsea cables. We were encouraged to find that, in the business-as-usual scenario, the UK subsea cable network enjoys a good level of resilience. Nevertheless, there are points of vulnerability in the network and gaps in the Government’s work, such as onshore infrastructure. Cables come ashore via landing stations, which remain vulnerable to sabotage.”
“As we have seen over recent months in the Baltic sea, such activity can easily be made to look accidental and readily denied, but Russia and China are also developing more targeted capabilities and operating at greater depths in our oceans, where the cables are harder to access and repair. Governance of subsea cables has been fragmented across at least eight Departments, seven agencies and numerous private sector actors. Contingency planning has been inadequate and largely ignored the possibility of a co-ordinated attack. We rely on legislation from 1885, with the threat of a paltry £100 fine to deter acts of cable damage. The United Kingdom’s approach to subsea cables is no longer good enough.”
“For example, two newer cables carry 75% of transatlantic capacity. For centuries, the United Kingdom has felt secure as an island, but that geostrategic strength is now a vulnerability, as the subsea cables on which the world depends have become a new front in a hybrid war. Revisionist powers and their proxies are targeting liberal democracies’ critical underwater infrastructure. Their aim is to disrupt connectivity, inflict economic damage and cause panic. By attacking us in this way, below the threshold of war, our adversaries are demonstrating their ability to do more at a much bigger scale and a much faster rate, should hostilities escalate. Subsea cables can be cut by something as unsophisticated as a rogue anchor dragged along the seabed by a commercial vessel.”
“It is a pleasure to present the first report of this Parliament of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for this statement on the United Kingdom’s resilience and crisis preparedness in relation to subsea telecommunication cables. Subsea cables are critical to the UK’s economic prosperity and global influence. They provide crucial, irreplaceable connectivity between the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. Like the trade routes of old, they are the arteries and veins of global commerce and communication. They carry a staggering 99% of the United Kingdom’s international data, and $1.5 trillion-worth in global cross-border trading. That is across 64 cables, including 45 international connections, but capacity is concentrated in newer equipment.”
“I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his service on the Committee over so many years, which was hugely valued, and his point is absolutely fair. I have not seen the specific report that was published today, but it echoes the points that we have made in this report. We do not want to be alarmist, but we cannot accept any complacency about what the threats are, because there is a genuine risk. The truth is that there is the potential to reroute cables. There is a significant amount of traffic across the Atlantic—some of it comes into Ireland, some of it into mainland Europe, and some of it into the UK—so it is always possible for data communications to come through to us in different ways and, in an extreme crisis, for us to turn to satellites, although that capacity is significantly lower.”
“Work needs to be done on the legal side, but also on the hardware that we can deploy. As an island nation, this should be something on which we can develop a huge sovereign capability, which would also boost our exports.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for serving on the Committee and for the work he is doing in chairing the Defence Committee, and he is absolutely right. There are several elements to this. One is, as we have seen in the Baltic and around our shores, the nature of the threats. The attacks on cables are proving provocative, and we have to demonstrate a more muscular approach to how we view them. It is interesting to see that some of our peers in NATO have taken this a bit further, and we should look closely at that, but we are constrained by international law. I have mentioned the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, which is not fit for purpose. There needs to be some thinking along the lines of what we can do within our territorial waters to address any threat that is presented, such as we saw last year with the Yantar and other ships.”
“I thank the hon. Gentleman, and I will keep my comments brief. I absolutely agree that the legal side of this urgently needs to be addressed, and I understand from the Government that they will look very closely at it in their defence resilience Bill.”
“Various organisations that have been established have interests in this area. Of course, much of this is in the private sector. The Committee is concerned about how much of it is in the private domain and how much influence the Government can have. Collectively, there is a need for Governments to work much more closely on this issue, so we need to have closer ties with friendly nations that are facing similar challenges in order to build a greater deterrent. Atlantic Bastion is a good example of the work that can be done.”
“I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his question. I do not know about the timings—I am not close enough to the Government for that—but the United States did something interesting, which was to have a scheme to lease two ships, costing them $10 million a year. There are ways around this, but having a sovereign capability is going to be important or, to go back to the question asked by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean), we could combine with other nations to develop such a capacity.”
“The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, and it is absolutely true. We did not specifically look at the situation in Ireland. We will be doing further work on this in the coming months, because I think that is required and will be welcomed by Departments, but, yes, we need to meet the EU and Ireland to talk about those threats and how we can collaborate. He is absolutely right to identify Ireland as an important part of this.”
“There have been so many other attacks. Even our NHS is not safe. My right hon. Friend the Minister mentioned the attack on Synnovis. Last year, more than 11,000 NHS appointments were lost due to cyber-attacks. The attack in June 2024 on London hospitals by the Russian group Qilin saw 1,100 cancer treatments delayed, 2,000 out-patient appointments cancelled, more than 1,000 operations postponed and, tragically, the death of a patient. The message from across our international partners and the UK’s security services is clear.”
“The impact was significant, whether it be on cafés, restaurants, pubs or shops, which were all affected by the downturn that immediately led from the shutdown of the factories. The attack on Collins Aerospace was alluded to earlier. It crippled Heathrow airport, and I think Stansted was affected, too, but less so. It scuppered thousands of hard-earned family holidays in autumn last year, and the ramifications for the travel sector were significant. It is not just businesses that have been affected. We have seen attacks on councils, as we have heard, and charities. Even the British Library was knocked out two years ago, which impacted so much of our research potential across our higher education institutions. It has significantly affected the UK. The Electoral Commission got knocked out by an attack by Chinese state-sponsored actors.”
“When we are trying to increase GDP by 1%, 2% or whatever it is, a hit of 0.5% is so significant. While 43% of businesses have reported having any kind of security breach or attack over the past 12 months, that figure rises to 67% and 74% for medium and large businesses respectively. Every attack inflicts more pain on UK plc, meaning lower economic growth and lower tax receipts to fund our public services. As we heard earlier, the effects ripple through our whole society. We have just been talking about the attack on Jaguar Land Rover this summer; that attack cost the company an estimated £500 million, affected over 5,000 businesses and put thousands of jobs at risk, with many of those employees based in my constituency of Warwick and Leamington.”
“We are living in a cyber no man’s land where states or state-sponsored actors—proxies—can act with relative ease and impunity, leaving the world a more dangerous place. The cyber-realm is, and will remain, a key battleground, and it is one that we must seize. Every one of us in the United Kingdom needs to wake up to that fact, particularly with the development of AI and quantum computing and the extraordinary threats that will come from those developments. When it comes to being the target of cyber-attacks, the United Kingdom now ranks third among all nations. In 2024 alone, the NCSC handled an average of four major attacks every week—these are the really serious attacks—and the impact on the economy is staggering. In the same year, cyber-attacks cost the British economy £15 billion, or 0.5% of GDP.”