Dr Ben Spencer
MP for Runnymede and Weybridge · Conservative · United Kingdom
“On protection from flooding—I am glad that the Minister with responsibility flooding is on the Front Bench—there is no mention of the River Thames scheme in the Budget. The largest infrastructure scheme put forward by the Environment Agency is notably absent, which is deeply, deeply concerning. How about supporting children and families?”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Sadly, this Budget does not tackle the critical national issues that we face. It does not have a plan to reduce spending on welfare. It does not have a plan to increase spending on defence. It does not have definitive interventions to improve growth, tackle our spiralling debt or deal with the record high taxes all of us currently face.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The fact that the Chancellor and the Prime Minister would rather have a non-Budget and call a general election than make the hard decisions today tells us everything we need to know about this Labour Government. There is another way with the Conservatives, and I am looking forward to it and so are my constituents.”
House of Commons28 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“We therefore welcome the narrow scope of the legislation and look forward to confirmation from the Minister regarding the preservation of the wider constitutional relationship between the Crown, the Government and the established Church.”
House of Commons21 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“This has been one of the most interesting, wide-ranging and perhaps unexpected debates that I have had the pleasure to listen to in this House, with fascinating contributions from the hon. Members for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) and for Mid Derbyshire (Jonathan Davies), the Father of the House, my right hon.”
House of Commons21 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“To single out Roman Catholics and Jews and prevent them from carrying out the responsibilities of public office solely because of their faith is not a distinction that has any place in modern Britain.”
House of Commons21 October 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
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“I will come to my speech, but as we are having a debate on this point, but does the Minister’s answer not risk a gilded defensive posture being set up by MSPs? If they list terms and conditions for the use of their services that essentially bar everything, they can say that any liability—if there is ransomware or they get hacked—is completely on the client, as opposed to themselves. Does the Minister’s explanation not risk MSPs taking a very defensive posture to ensure that the client is liable for any problem? Given that the clients are usually not regulated entities, this provision effectively becomes meaningless.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“What assessment has the Secretary of State undertaken of whether changes to the penalty regime are likely to influence board-level attitudes towards cyber-security?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is concerning that board level responsibility for cyber-security has steadily declined among businesses since 2021, with 38% of businesses having a board member responsible for cyber-security in 2021, compared with 27% in 2025. The enforcement model clearly needs to be more effective, and increasing fines is only one part of that. Regulatory capacity to undertake supervision and enforcement remains a concern, as does perceived reticence on the part of regulators to impose fines on critical infrastructure providers, due to the risk of destabilising essential services and increasing costs for consumers. In our oral evidence sessions, many witnesses, including Richard Starnes of the Worshipful Company of Information Technologists, raised the issue of greater responsibility at the highest levels of management for cyber-resilience.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Government’s impact assessment states that these changes have been made because of concerns reported by regulators that “enforcement under the NIS Regulations has been constrained by unclear band structures and a maximum penalty which is insufficient to deter non-compliance across all NIS sectors”, which goes back to my previous point. Enforcement activity under the NIS regulations has been sparse, inconsistent and insufficiently effective to increase cyber-resilience to the levels necessary to meet the proliferating cyber-security risks to our most critical sectors. Fundamentally, the existing approach to enforcement has not achieved the necessary change in attitude to cyber-risk at the highest levels of regulated entities.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I think I will follow up in writing on my intervention to try to dig down into the explanation of how liability will be laid down when the client is not a regulated entity but is receiving services from regulated entities. That is an important point, because these are quite hefty fines. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne pointed out, even with £34 an hour lawyers, there will be a lot of industry activity to try to avoid liability in the context of a substantial cyber breach, which can be significant. More generally, the clause makes significant changes to enforcement practices under the NIS regulations, including to increase the financial penalties regulators can impose for infringement of the regulations, and to set out a clearer system of tiered penalties, based on the severity of infringements.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“New clause 9 reflects issues raised by the major attack on JLR, which cause such disruption and threatened the stability of regional jobs and supply chains. Those attacks caused significant public concern, but they would all remain out of scope after the Bill comes into effect.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), and new clause 9, tabled by the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, together, as they have some thematic overlap. New clause 1 seeks to bring all entities, other than small businesses and microbusinesses, in the food production, distribution and retail supply chain into the scope of regulation as operators of essential services. New clause 9 also touches on the regulation of food supply chains. It would require the Secretary of State to designate retailers of “food and essential goods (when part of a large-scale distribution chain)” and manufacturers of “critical transport equipment” as providers of essential services to be brought into the scope of regulation. Those new clauses reflect concerns about the cyber-attacks targeting the food retailers M&S and Co-op last year.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That agility introduced by this measure has been broadly welcomed as appropriate, given the fast-evolving nature of malicious cyber-activity. Given the extent of the Secretary of State’s new powers, however, it is important to put in place guardrails to ensure that the appropriate response to emerging threats is indeed further regulation, rather than market-led or insurance-based mitigations. Can the Minister provide any further information at this stage about the procedure that will be followed in deciding whether to expand the scope of regulation to ensure consistency and transparency? Hon. Members have tabled several new clauses that would prompt the Secretary of State to use her duties under clause 24. I will speak to new clause 1, tabled by the hon.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Part 3 is a very important part of the Bill. It gives the Secretary of State a range of powers, including ones to bring additional sectors into the scope of regulation, to update the NIS regulations, to publish statements of strategic priorities for regulators and to publish codes of practice that set out cyber-security measures for entities to comply with their regulatory duties. Clause 24 includes a power enabling the Secretary of State to specify new services that can be brought into the scope of the NIS regulations, and to designate additional regulatory authorities. Those powers are intended to allow the Secretary of State to identify additional critical sectors and respond to emerging threats quickly.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Importantly, the measures also provide for a regular review of competent authorities’ approach to discharging their regulatory obligations. That measure is necessary given the inconsistent approach to oversight and enforcement of the NIS regulations so far. We know that there are existing challenges relating to the capacity of competent authorities and there is the ongoing issue of securing sufficient cyber-security professionals to staff the teams. It is all well and good making statements, but they need to be followed. What strategies does the Minister anticipate will be needed and used to support—and, where necessary, drive up—standards of regulatory oversight when competent authorities fall short of the aims set out in the statement?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. Clause 25 introduces a power for the Secretary of State to issue a statement of the Government’s strategic priorities in relation to the security and resilience of network and information systems with regard to essential activities. The statement will set out the responsibilities of regulators and specify objectives to secure the Government’s priorities. Competent authorities must be consulted in the drafting of the statement, and the Secretary of State must issue a report in every 12-month period on regulators’ compliance with meeting the objectives within it. The changes aim to address important challenges around consistency in the approach to regulation that were identified by the previous Government’s second post-implementation review of the NIS regulations.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Minister is being generous with his time during this important debate. I was just thinking through his earlier response to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton about using the cost reclaims to employ cyber-security professionals. That goes to the heart of the concerns about the Bill and its approach to regulation. We have heard that the industry, including regulators, is struggling to recruit cyber-security professionals. What gives the Minister confidence that, just because some money will be sloshing around in the regulators, there will be the ability to recruit cyber-security professionals, who are going to be essential to the implementation of the Bill?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“However, the Government should clearly be reporting on the Secretary of State’s exercise of the powers at regular intervals to ensure transparency. We will discuss that in due course when we come to clause 40, on the report on network and information systems legislation.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Furthermore, clause 31 specifies that the Secretary of State may direct competent authorities to undertake certain activities, including mandating functions in connection with monitoring and securing compliance with relevant requirements, investigating suspected non-compliance and mitigating the effects of non-compliance on the part of regulated entities. Clauses 32 to 35 provide for the Secretary of State to issue ancillary directions to facilitate information-gathering, investigation and enforcement activities on the part of regulators. Taken together, the clauses give the Secretary of State a strong suite of powers to respond to emerging cyber-security risks. Again, I recognise the necessity of being able to respond quickly in fast-changing circumstances.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I confess, Mr Stringer, that I suspect I am also guilty of speaking a bit fast in our previous debates. I will do my best to slow down and speak in a lower tone, as I know that can also help, particularly with certain types of hearing impairment. To continue the theme of agile regulation, clause 29 enables the Secretary of State to update the NIS regulations through secondary legislation. Clause 30 enables the Secretary of State to impose requirements on regulated entities, which may include directions to take specific actions to increase cyber-resilience, to report on certain matters and to appoint a UK representative if the entity is based outside the UK.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In view of that, and the fact that codes can be revoked and reissued, can the Minister provide reassurance to regulated industries that a lead-in time will be built into any requirements to allow businesses to prepare to achieve full compliance?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“David Cook of DLA Piper commented that, after laws come into effect, the process of businesses understanding where they need to get to “often requires a multi-year programme of reform.” ––[ Official Report, Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Public Bill Committee , 3 February 2026; c. 5, Q1.] The code of practice is not envisaged to be legally binding, in the sense that a failure to comply is not of itself evidence of a failure to meet obligations under the NIS regulations or the Bill. However, clause 38 states that it would be admissible as evidence in legal proceedings so, in that sense, the code is binding in all but name.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 36 provides that the Secretary of State may issue a code of practice for regulated entities to set out measures that they should take to demonstrate compliance with their duties under the NIS regulations, or any requirements imposed by the Secretary of State under clause 29. If done well, the code could be a repository of best practice, setting proportionate, consistent and effective standards for regulated industries. That will require constructive and open consultation with regulated sectors to identify the challenges facing those sectors and how best to address them. One issue that came up in oral evidence was the question of the lag between regulation making and industry adoption.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“For the sake of clarity on the legal status of the codes, I entirely agree with the Minister that it is important to get this right, and my understanding of codes of practice in a different area—statutory codes of practice relating to the Mental Health Act—is that case law says that deviation from the code of practice should be done only for cogent reasons. That is a pretty high bar to pass in terms of deviations. I should declare an interest as a former consultant psychiatrist and someone who operated subject to that particular code of practice. For absolute certainty, will the Minister write to the Committee and make the status very clear, along with reference to relevant case law in terms of other codes of practice? Does the clause override that jurisprudence or not? That would settle the question as the Bill goes through Parliament.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In view of the concerns voiced by the hon. Members for Henley and Thame and for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, and by the shadow ministerial team, will the Minister explain why five-year intervals have been selected and whether the Government will look at this important issue again?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 40 requires the Secretary of State to publish a report every five years on the operation of the NIS regulations and parts 3 and 4 of the Bill. Reports should include a review of any exercise of powers under parts 3 and 4 by the Secretary of State. Given the wide-ranging powers granted to the Secretary of State under those parts, I have some sympathy for amendment 26, tabled by the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, which seeks to reduce reporting intervals from five years to three. The shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez), raised this issue on Second Reading. She suggested that annual or biannual reviews might allow for effective parliamentary scrutiny of the NIS regulations and of the Secretary of State’s exercise of powers to respond to emerging threats.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I have two questions for the Minister. Given the impact on devolved legislation, can he confirm that the consultation will extend to devolved authorities should it impact on them? My second question is more generally on the theme of devolved authorities. Can he confirm that, as part of the publicised “reset” negotiations with the European Union, bringing Northern Ireland into scope of NIS2 regulations is totally off the table?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“A report to Parliament, which may well be redacted, on the exercise of functions under part 4 will not be sufficient to ensure that this power is used proportionately. Has the Department considered introducing an obligation for the Secretary of State to report to the Intelligence and Security Committee when she exercises powers under part 4? We discussed the Chinese super-embassy earlier. Later in the Committee’s proceedings, I will talk about an Opposition new clause that would deal with that problem effectively.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The exercise of these powers by the Secretary of State could have far-reaching consequences for businesses, which may experience interruption to their commercial activities, as well as the potentially considerable time and expense in adhering to a request made on national security grounds. I have spoken on several occasions in the House and in this Committee about the critical risks posed to our cyber-security and national security by hostile state actors and their affiliates. It is, of course, right that the Secretary of State should have this power, but it should be used only in extremis. Like other extensive powers granted to the Secretary of State under part 3, it must be subject to oversight and guardrails.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 43 grants the Secretary of State powers to issue directions to regulate entities where there is a risk to national security, or where an action must be taken in the interests of national security. Directions can include requirements relating to the management of systems, the yielding of information and the removal or modification of goods and services. The Secretary of State may also require a regulated entity to engage the services of a skilled person to comply with directions issued. The Secretary of State has wide discretion to dispense with providing reasons for directions or consulting with the affected parties on the basis of national security considerations. Clause 44 clarifies that the Secretary of State’s directions under part 4 prevail if there is a conflict between those directions and another statutory requirement.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I really do not understand the Minister’s answer. If it has not been published on national security grounds, how will we know that it has been laid? The whole thing could be entirely secret. Surely it has to go to the ISC as an accountability mechanism.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I really think we should be very critical about this. What we are doing now is parliamentary scrutiny. There will be directions in future, which we expect to be laid, and they will also be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Even where they are redacted because of national security concerns, somebody, or some mechanism of Parliament, will be able to scrutinise them. Can the Minister confirm that?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I reiterate the point that these powers are necessary; however, given the potential for significant cost and administrative burden for businesses, they should be subject to contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous oversight by parliamentary authorities, observing the necessary confidentiality protocols. I also make the point that these information-gathering powers apply extraterritorially and may lead to conflict with regulated entities’ data privacy obligations in other jurisdictions. What discussions has the Secretary of State conducted with industry and law enforcement counterparts in other countries about the approach to information sharing for this purpose, and the implications for companies operating services on a cross-border basis?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 45 gives the Secretary of State powers to require regulatory authorities to monitor and report on regulated entities’ compliance with directions given under clause 43 for reasons of national security. Clause 46 provides the Secretary of State with extensive information-gathering powers through the use of information notices to facilitate the giving of directions and monitoring of compliance with directions under clause 45(4). Clause 47 empowers the Secretary of State to conduct inspections to assess whether a regulated entity is complying with directions issued under clause 45(4). The Secretary of State may appoint a third party to conduct the inspection, and require the regulated entity to meet the costs associated with this.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clauses 48 to 52 deal with notifications and financial penalties where a regulated entity is deemed not to be compliant with directions issued by the Secretary of State under part 4. In particular, clause 48 would grant enforcement authorities powers to issue a contravention notice if they believe a person has failed to comply with a requirement under part 4. The notice must set out details of remedial steps to address the failure, as well as the financial penalty that the enforcement authority intends to impose. Clause 49 would require penalties to be set at a level that is appropriate and proportionate, with the maximum penalty being £17 million or 10% of turnover. A maximum daily penalty of £100,000 applies to ongoing breaches.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Can the Minister provide any update on the development of protocols between authorities to ensure that information shared is limited to that which is necessary for effective oversight and enforcement in relation to national security risks?”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The provision also allows for the sharing of information with other UK or overseas public authorities with equivalent cyber-security or national security functions. Government amendments 23 and 24 seek to amend that clause to provide for directions and notices issued under this part to be sent by email to relevant persons who provided those contact details to regulatory authorities. Some reassurance on the extent of information sharing for businesses is delivered through provisions specifying that disclosures of information should be limited to that which is relevant and proportionate. However, those are high-level and subjective terms, open to interpretation by the authority sharing the information.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Clause 53 would grant the Secretary of State powers to issue directions to regulators where this is necessary for national security reasons, and to allow a reasonable period for the regulator to comply with that direction. Clause 54 provides that directions may be amended or revoked by the Secretary of State. Under clause 55, directions to regulated entities or regulators must be laid before Parliament unless that “would be contrary to the interests of national security.” I repeat my earlier question about the ISC’s role regarding scrutiny. Clause 56 would permit the Secretary of State and regulatory authorities to share any information obtained under part 4 with each other and the NCSC.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“That includes the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act 2023, which came into effect last year. Russia and Iran were placed on an enhanced tier of the scheme, which applies to foreign powers considered to pose a risk to the UK’s safety or interests. The Government said that that was in response to those countries being identified as presenting an elevated national security risk. China was conspicuous by its absence, despite the director of GCHQ having confirmed in 2024 that her organisation devotes more resource to China than to any other single mission.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“New clause 3 would compel the Secretary of State to review and report to Parliament on the risk to networks and information systems posed by foreign powers appearing on the register under new clause 2, with specific regard to activities undertaken from abroad and the risk posed by locations or premises controlled by those states in the United Kingdom. New clauses 13 and 15, in the name of the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, look as if they have been tabled in the same spirit of genuine concern about the risk of foreign hostile state interference and control in critical systems and supply chains. There is an established precedent in UK legislation for maintaining registers or lists of hostile state actors and other entities presenting a threat to our national security for use by Government.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“New clause 2 contains an obligation for the Secretary of State to establish and maintain by regulation a list of foreign powers presenting a significant cyber-security risk to the UK. The list must include states that have been confirmed by GCHQ as having perpetrated a cyber-attack, whether by a state department, agency or affiliate, on the UK in the preceding seven years. It must also include foreign powers that GCHQ has warned pose a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Given that established and growing threat, new clause 3 would compel the Secretary of State to review, among other matters, the cyber-security risk to surrounding critical networks in the vicinity of the super-embassy site in the City of London. In the Commons debate on the embassy application in June last year, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) reminded the Minister for Housing and Planning that the Government’s own cyber-security experts, Innovate UK, have warned about the threat to the City of London from the embassy. My hon. Friend made specific reference to the Wapping telephone and internet exchange that would be surrounded on three sides by this new embassy—not to mention the fibre cables I referred to earlier, which carry highly sensitive information and run beneath this site.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Frankly, I find it astounding that, according to my understanding, in response to the planning decision being granted our security services said that they would take measures to start moving sensitive digital cables. It strikes me that a decision about sensitive digital cables should have been pertinent to the planning application in the first place. The Government remain reluctant to name China as a threat to UK national security, despite the overwhelming and growing portfolio of evidence. In case the Government are still in any doubt, we need look only at the oral testimony given to this Committee by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China for a clear picture of the role of China and its state affiliates at the forefront of the cyber-security threats to our critical sectors.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“As I said at the start, there is simply no point in granting the Secretary of State powers to issue directions on the basis of national security if the Government are not willing to be clear-eyed about the most critical cyber-security risks to the nation. I therefore submit that the new clauses are a vital addition to the Bill to focus the attentions of the Secretary of State to ensure that her functions under part 4 are carried out in the best interests of our national security. No responsible Government would or should vote against such provisions. Parliament should make it crystal clear that the Chinese Communist party is a threat to the United Kingdom. We must support new clauses 2 and 3. Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned. — (Taiwo Owatemi.)”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I do not want to repeat the discussion that we had a moment ago. I think it is complete lunacy to permit the building of a super-embassy—one of the biggest in the region—next to highly critical data transmission. I am also concerned by media reports that the Prime Minister’s recent visit to China was greenlighted only following the final approval of the embassy. I am deeply depressed that, following the visit, Jimmy Lai has been effectively sentenced for life. I respect the tone and constructive way in which the hon. Member for Harlow approaches this debate, but it is fair to say that the Government are sadly weak on standing up to hostile state actors such as the Chinese Communist party.”
House of Commons10 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way in this very important debate. This issue affects constituencies across the country, including mine—we have problems at Weybridge station. May I draw to her attention my new clause 69 to the Railways Bill, which sets out a requirement for an accessibility strategy that the Government have to report on? I have intervened on her now, but I hope to intervene on the Minister later for his comment on that.”
House of Commons9 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Specifically on third-party funding, does the Minister agree that when it comes to infrastructure projects such as airport expansion, noting Heathrow’s proximity to my constituency, airports really should be a key target in terms of further funding, in order to improve accessibility on our railways?”
House of Commons9 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Minister knows this is coming. He has just mentioned the Railways Bill, so would he care to comment on my new clause 69, which would require the setting out of an accessible rail strategy, not only on step-free access but on lift downtime? I feel a bit guilty in a sense, because we have lifts in Weybridge in my constituency, but one of the biggest problems is that they are not functional a lot of the time, so people who are travelling play a sort of Russian roulette as to whether the lifts are going to be available, with all the disruption that follows. Could the Minister please comment on the strategy that I am proposing?”
House of Commons9 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Many of those new regulations are necessary, but as lawmakers we should be conscious of the burden that we are placing on industries and particularly on small and medium-sized enterprises, which are the lifeblood of the UK economy and which have fewer resources to navigate complex layers of regulation. It is therefore incumbent on all of us to enact laws that are clear and capable of practical implementation.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“Industry stakeholders have welcomed the Bill as essential for bringing the cyber rules governing critical infrastructure in line with modern threats, economic realities and technological developments, and for moving our cyber-security regulatory framework into closer alignment with international partners to ease cross-border operations for businesses that provide services overseas. In some respects, at least, the Bill identifies the right problems, but, crucially, it falls short of providing workable solutions. In embarking on our scrutiny of the Bill, the Committee should be acutely aware of the raft of digital legislation with which businesses and regulators have been asked to grapple in recent years.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The previous Government recognised that in their post-implementation reviews of the NIS regulations and in a subsequent series of consultations on proposals to improve the cyber-resilience of the entities that are most important to the UK economy. Those consultations included a review of information security risks relating to outsourced IT provision, data centres and organisations controlling large amounts of electrical load. The last Government’s work assessing those threats has informed this Government’s decision to bring data centres, managed service providers and large load controllers within the scope of the NIS regulations.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“The Bill will also grant extensive powers to the Secretary of State to respond to emerging cyber-threats, including the power to bring further sectors within the scope of regulation, giving directions to regulated entities and issuing a code of practice that sets out measures for compliance with duties under the NIS regulations. Recognising the increasing role of malicious cyber-activity as a threat to our national security, part 4 will give the Secretary of State far-reaching powers to issue directions to regulated entities for reasons of national security. Covid turbocharged the digitalisation of all aspects of the economy and our daily lives, bringing new opportunities but at the same time heightening the exposure of digital systems to exploitation by malicious actors.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I thank all hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for taking part, and the officials for their work on the Committee stage of this important Bill. The Bill will significantly update and expand the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 by bringing new services within scope of regulation, giving sector regulators the power to designate critical suppliers, updating and expanding the reporting regime for cyber-security incidents and making significant changes to the regulatory funding model and regulators’ information-gathering and sharing powers.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I am reminded of the Committee’s evidence session earlier this week, in which expert after expert lined up to raise concerns around the scope of the definition. Although they acknowledged the importance of and appreciated the reasons for leaving some things to secondary legislation in a climate as fast-moving as the IT and digital sector’s, they raised concerns about the uncertainty that is coming for business and the need for extensive consultation so that businesses can feed into and have some degree of influence over the regulations that they will have to abide by.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗
“In the past few weeks, reports have circulated that a Chinese state-affiliated group hacked the communications of top Downing Street officials between 2021 and 2024, yet the vital organs of our state, central Government Departments and agencies carrying out the most critical functions, are left unprotected and unaccountable for their cyber-resilience under the Bill. If we do not address these problems, we risk the Bill becoming yet another missed opportunity for the Government. These are opportunities that we can ill afford to miss if we are to safeguard our economy and our national security.”
House of Commons5 February 2026Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0Source ↗