← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Alicia Kearns

MP for Rutland and Stamford · Conservative · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

I am grateful to the Government for considering improvements to the A605 and Tinwell junctions on the A1, but the current plan is to put traffic lights in place and National Highways agrees that that is not the right approach.

TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

Nobody asked for this, and the lack of a mandate has been compounded by councils like Rutland county council refusing to engage with any opposition councillors.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REORGANISATION · 2026-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

Ann Widdecombe was a force of nature, and my heart goes out to all her friends and loved ones. The BNO route has provided sanctuary for Hongkongers fleeing the autocracy of the Chinese Communist party. However, its effectiveness should not be measured in visas granted, but in whether people are actually safe here.

BRITISH NATIONAL OVERSEAS VISA · 2026-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

Do the Government really believe that not a single organisation in the UK is engaged in political influence on behalf of the Chinese Communist party, and if not, how many investigations have there been into those failing to disclose? The annual report on FIRS was due to published by the end of June.

BRITISH NATIONAL OVERSEAS VISA · 2026-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

To all the mothers and your stolen children who have wrongly carried grief and shame for so long, you were denied the love that you deserved and tortured by a state—and the silence only revictimized you. We are sorry.

HISTORICAL FORCED ADOPTION · 2026-07-02 · READ IN HANSARD

In 2023, I secured funds from the last Government to conserve and bring home our 10-foot sea dragon to Rutland. Unfortunately, Rutland county council has now overrun on another project and has decided not bring the ichthyosaur back to Rutland, which will cost our local economy in terms of future prosperity.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE · 2026-07-02 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 603 lines we hold for Alicia Kearns, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 2 of 13.

  1. We support the ambitions in the Bill, we want the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be designated, and we want the Bill on the statute book, so the Government will find no enemies on our Benches today—only an Opposition determined to ensure that this law protects our people and our country. That is not a cause that belongs to those on one side of the House alone. The Government are right to bring forward this legislation, but they must now have the courage to get it right. The head of MI5 warned us that state-based threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, and that since 2022 our security services have disrupted more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. The delay of the last 14 months should not be undone by haste today, because a half-built Bill will not redeem that time; it will simply compound the danger.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. There are more organisations that will need to be designated in future. The law must fit not just one adversary but all. Otherwise, it is a single-use power dressed up as a meaningful law. We support the principle of this Bill without reservation, and we will support it on Second Reading, but we will support it in the right way, with scrutiny, attention and determination to ensure that a rushed process does not result in us not meeting the scale of the threats we now face. It is vital that the Government engage today in good faith and listen to Members on all sides. Their failure so far to accept any amendments does not give me cause for optimism, but there is still time for them to accept some.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. We are writing a law for every hostile state organ that comes after it, and the next may look nothing like the last. I think of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist party, of whose reach I have spoken often, and I hope the day comes when the Government turn this power on it. I doubt that that will happen, but I set out that ambition. That day will come only if we build this Bill for the second designation, the third and the fourth. As drafted, this legislation has been written with a single, already sanctioned organisation in mind, and that shows. There is no reference to sanctions read-across in the Bill because the IRGC is already sanctioned. The Government said, “We don’t need to do a read-across for sanctions because the IRGC is already sanctioned.” I am not just looking at the IRGC.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. It is littered with omissions. I have already set out some of them. Additionally, Jonathan Hall said that we should give powers to the police to strip passports at the border, but the Government have not included that. It was proposed that there should be serious police protection orders, but they have removed them. We are gifting defences to would-be perpetrators, and the Bill should not be left as it is. These examples are only the gaping holes I could find in the two and a half days and late nights that I was given to find issues and table amendments. There is one more thing that the Government and the House must hold in mind as we fix our gaze on Tehran. This power is rightly organisation agnostic. We must not write a law for the IRGC alone.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. However, there is a slight concern, because that is followed by: “(whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).” We would all like to say, hand on heart, that no one who works for our country as a civil servant—a Crown servant—would ever betray us, but technically, under this legislation, we could not prosecute anyone who did so, even if they did so outside their official capacity and were therefore genuinely working to abet another organisation. Again, if the Home Secretary would like to clarify how we would prosecute rogue civil servants, I would be happy to take an intervention from her—but there isn’t one. The Government decided that it was wise to attempt to pass such vital legislation in just one day, but we think that scrutiny is important because the Bill needs to work as well as it can.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. The reality is that an individual such as that would not be captured, because they would have diplomatic protections under the Vienna conventions. I admit that I have not been able to find an amendment that would correct that. That is why we have scrutiny of the House, because the shadow Front Bench is not the sole arbiter of where the gaps are. We would have been able to do this if we had had more time. However, I will use this as a chance to touch on the fact that there is a protection in the Bill that if a person acts “for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment”, they are protected against any interactions they may have with the IRGC.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. That is precisely the point that I made in my opening speech. The Government are saying that it is not legitimate to engage with these bodies. Of course they want a carve-out to protect Crown servants, but that is explicitly included in the Bill. What they are doing, essentially, is creating a carve-out whereby people could say that it was legitimate for them to engage with the IRGC, and that somehow it would not be inherently dangerous or unbeneficial to engage with it. We are creating a threshold that I do not believe the courts will be able to meet, so we will not get the prosecutions that the Bill is designed to create.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. I have been very clear that we must stand by our Jewish communities. Yesterday, I sat down with the Jewish Leadership Council, the Community Security Trust and representatives of other organisations. They do not recognise the need to rush this Bill through the House, and they want us to scrutinise it in order to close the gaps that we discussed in that meeting. Although I wish we could have acted sooner, and I fully support the Bill and want to get it done, they want to get it done right, so that we do not have the gaps that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) has just set out.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. One of the powers that the Government could look to take—outside this Bill, because it is not within its scope—would be to give the Charity Commission the power to wind up a charity. It currently does not have that power, but we can be absolutely certain that states are creating brand new charities across our country specifically to infiltrate them. That might be my hon. Friend’s best course of action to get that done, and I am sure he would have the full support of most of the House for it.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. In the end, this is not about us, the timetable, or whose name sits at the top of the amendment paper—it is about protecting our people and giving our police what they need. I support the Bill, which is why I have spent hours and hours over the past week trying to get it right. I urge the Government to work cross-party, accept our amendments—be it here or in the other place—and ensure we give our police and prosecutors the power that we all know they will not fully have without those amendments.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. I am not here to frustrate this Bill; I am here to complete it. Take the amendments and lay them as Government amendments, or lay them in the Lords. We do not want to make this party political; we just want to close the holes in the Bill. Accepting an amendment that ends the absurdity of having a higher bar for the sponsor than for the terrorist is the right thing to do. In Committee, I will take the House through all 13 amendments we have tabled, clause by clause, to highlight what stands between the Bill in its current state and what it should be. It is not ideology, not a desire to delay, and not politics; it is time that was not given. Strip away the procedure: two years from now, there will be a prosecution, and we need to ensure that we do not allow a defendant to be freed by words written in haste.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. I say directly to Government Members, to all those who have spoken so powerfully—I thank every Member for being so clear-eyed about the threats that the IRGC, the Chinese, the Russians and the North Koreans pose to our country—that they did not campaign for so long for a Bill containing these powers just for them to fall at the first legal hurdle. They did not demand action against hostile states just to hand them a gentler regime than we use for terrorists. The amendments before them are not Opposition traps; they are the protections we need, and I think many Government Members feel in their gut that they are needed. I came to this place because national security had been my career—tackling terrorist groups such as Daesh and tackling the Russian Government. I stand by the offer I made to the Government, in the spirit I always make it.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. It will be a decision to put in place weaker powers against hostile states than those we already hold against the terrorists those states fund, to leave a plot that is merely planned beyond the reach of the law, and to let inspired attackers fall through a gap that our terrorism law rightly closed two decades ago. It will, I fear, be a decision made to suit a timetable that has everything to do with internal party politics, rather than the threat. It will not be the Prime Minister’s decision alone—it will belong to every Member who walks through the Lobby to oppose the amendments tonight.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. My right hon. and gallant Friend was absolutely right to mention the Islamic Centre of England—we must give the Charity Commission the power to shut down such organisations. He was also right to touch on TikTok; few have as much expertise as he does in this area. It is a weaponised platform. China does not allow its own children to have access to it, and countries such as India have taken action to say that they will not have it in their country. We must protect our country. I now turn to the difficulty that the Government can no longer escape. The gaps in this Bill have been named; we will discuss them in more detail shortly in Committee, but they are on the amendment paper. If they are waved away tonight, not in ignorance but in full knowledge, no one will be able to call this haste any longer; it will have become a decision.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. The openness of our society is a strength, but of course it also provides more points of entry for those seeking to harm us. He also rightly touched on the impact on our Jewish communities, as so many on both sides of the House did. It is because of that impact that our amendment requiring prosecution of those who fly flags or wear uniforms in support of these organisations must be considered. Even last weekend, we saw people marching through Jewish communities, flying the flags of proscribed organisations to intimidate and scare. I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) for once again sharing the work he did with Jo Cox—I know that they were very good friends. I think we all remember where we were when we heard of her brutal murder, and this House has less heart as a result of her loss.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) was absolutely right about concerns around the need for engagement with the IRGC or similar bodies to be for “a prohibited purpose”. There is no good reason for that threshold at this point. He pointed out that there is a very clear distinction in the legislation between supporting on the one hand, and assisting or receiving material benefit on the other. The Government must explain why they are treating those separately. It was a pleasure to listen to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), who has been clear-eyed for a long time about the threat from the IRGC and the Iranians. He is particularly right to raise concerns about charities and the way in which they are exploited.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) rightly set out the experience of our Jewish communities. They are terrified and they are suffering, and this Bill will go some way towards helping them. He also rightly touched on the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to address, because it is not an organisation, although some like to talk about it as if it was. It must be tackled in the same way as an ideology such as Nazism, and we must find a way of dealing with it, because those who subscribe to its ideology are using funds to undermine this country. I also welcome his managing to include a discussion around AI in this debate. I thank the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) for raising the point about our need to stand by our Jewish communities. My right hon.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. I was offered a briefing only once, three days after the deadline for amendments had passed; however, we were able to rectify that. She is also right to raise questions about future misuse—an issue that I did not have time to go into, so I am grateful to her for touching on that. The hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst), who I am sure will return to the Chamber in due course, touched on the Australian model. Under one of our amendments, assisting a designated body, or accepting money or any sort of benefit from it, would carry a sentence of up to 25 years. We believe that the sentence for supporting such a body, which is 14 years or a fine, should be increased for those actively assisting it, or receiving material benefit from it. My good friend my right hon.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. We have the Bill before us today, and we have amendments before us today; the only thing we are being asked to leave for later is the part that makes this Bill effective. I want to touch on the speeches made, starting with that by the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis), who rightly spoke about the importance of civil liberties. Our amendments would give clarity on some aspects of that issue, particularly the flying of flags and the wearing of uniforms. The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), was absolutely right to say that there has been insufficient scrutiny thus far. I am surprised that her Committee was offered a briefing only once this Bill had completed its passage through the House.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. The people hunted by proxies on our streets, and by hostile states, are owed more than sincerity; they are owed a law that holds in the police station, in the courtroom and at the border on the day it is tested. I know what the answer will be—that gaps can be dealt with on another day, in some future Bill, but this House has heard that before, and we have learned what “another day” means. I never took my Government’s word when they said that to me, as anyone will know who watched me damned well refuse to take it when I was Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I will not take it today, because “another day” is where good intentions are sent to be forgotten, and the country does not get to tell the assassin at the journalist’s door that the relevant clause is pencilled for the next Session.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. Our enemies will study and exploit that asymmetry, because bad laws made quickly are not easily redeemed, and the effect may be felt for years in courtrooms in cases that collapse, and in the quiet calculations of the very people we are trying to deter. Let me be clear about what is and what is not in question. I do not doubt the Government’s good faith. I do not doubt for one moment that the Ministers want to make our country safe, but good faith is not a working law, and good intentions do not disrupt plots. A Bill that reaches the statute book but fails in the courtroom is worse than no Bill at all, because it lets us tell ourselves that we have acted, while the threat goes untouched.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. I welcome the Minister to her place for the first time, and I wish her every success in a vital role in our country and in the Government. Let me end where I began. We support this Bill and will not push its Second Reading to a vote, because its principle is sound. The power is overdue, and the Government are right to seek it, but let the House be in no doubt about what is being asked of us today. We are asked to take a Bill that was laid before Parliament only last week, and progress it through all stages in just one day. It is what the House would normally do over months. However, the threat is permanent. Haste is temporary, but the harm can be enduring.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. That is very different from saying, “We will be able to prosecute, and we must be able to do so.” We should be wanting to pass clarifying amendments to put additional protections into law so that it is watertight, to ensure that the actions of anyone in Manchester planning something abroad will definitely be captured.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. Yes, the law specifically covers UK citizens who then travel abroad to commit a crime in support of these proscribed groups. However, it explicitly states that that does not apply if they are planning the crimes here in the UK and they happen abroad, unless it is prejudicial to the safety of the UK. It would be very straightforward for a lawyer to argue that something that takes place in Iraq is not prejudicial to the safety of the UK. When I met Foreign Office and Home Office lawyers last night, they said it was “likely” that that would be captured. I said, “I recognise that ‘likely’ is hopeful, but it is not absolute.” [Interruption.] The Minister will be able to answer in a moment. I am formally repeating the conversation that I had, a conversation that was requested, in which I was told that this was “likely”.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. (7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.” This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. (5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power. (6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of— (a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018; (b) asset-freezing measures; (c) trade sanctions; (d) export controls; (e) immigration restrictions; (f) public procurement restrictions; or (g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. (4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to— (a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work; (b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity; (c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or (d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. (3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to— (a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion; (b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas; (c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction; (d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes; (e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms; (f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and (g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f).

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. (2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against— (a) a person in the United Kingdom; (b) a United Kingdom national; (c) a person resident in the United Kingdom; (d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or (e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert— “33AA Conduct relevant to designation (1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in— (a) transnational repression; (b) abusive lawfare; (c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity; (d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe. On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on. The sentencing gets the gravity backwards.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets? The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group. Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point. The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible. In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them. I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had. Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason. On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us. Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. The Minister gives the example of a diplomat, and she is right that our diplomats in Tehran will need to engage with the IRGC—it is nonsense to suggest that they would not be able to do so—but that is why there is a specific exception for that in the Bill. Proposed new section 17A(5) refers to a person who “acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).” As I have mentioned, I am concerned that that means that anyone who is a traitor and works for the civil service would have protections under any circumstances, but it means that we do not need that additional threshold, because diplomats are already specifically protected in the Bill at another point.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. I fully recognise the Minister’s point that she is trying to align the provisions with those in the National Security Act, but as per my argument earlier, let us improve the National Security Act while we are at it. The Minister says that the question is whether she is minded to make the change; I say she should be minded to. If someone actively assists or materially benefits from a hostile state while committing treason, it is absolutely right that they should get a tougher sentence than that for just flying a flag or supporting a hostile state. Those acts are still heinous, but a far worse crime has been committed. I ask the Minister to consider making the change when the Bill is in the Lords.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to want this. However, there is already a requirement under law for Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to review all terrorism legislation and related legislation, including the National Security Act 2023—which this would fall under—every single year, and to report back to Parliament. Hopefully the hon. Gentleman will be reassured that this is already covered in law, and that there is a specific requirement.

    NATIONAL SECURITY (STATE THREATS) BILL · 2026-06-17 · READ IN HANSARD