Kanishka Narayan
MP for Vale of Glamorgan · Labour · United Kingdom
“May I, as ever, thank the Chair of the Select Committee for such a depth of expertise and experience, and in particular for the report that she mentioned, which has formed the basis of a lot of our thinking?”
“I first thank my hon. Friend for championing an incredibly important cause. Content promoting eating disorders is horrific, and I have to be clear that not just at the age of 16, but under the Online Safety Act 2023, platforms must already prevent children under the age of 18 from accessing content about eating disorders or self-harm.”
“This Government have led the world in tackling dangerous content online, including in law with illegal content duties that platforms must comply with, with our full backing for Ofcom’s enforcement of them, and by strengthening the law, with cyber-flashing, intimate image abuse and self-harm content all deemed priority offences needing to…”
“Do we want tougher accountability? Absolutely. That is why the codes published mean stronger review mechanisms, a direct line to law enforcement and a clear crisis playbook required of risky platforms. Do we want it to be faster? Absolutely. That is exactly why we have asked Ofcom to expedite those codes in particular.”
“Keeping people safe online at moments of real danger is a top priority for this Government. That is why we have asked Ofcom to expedite its work on updates to its codes of practice under the Online Safety Act 2023. All services face strict duties to deal with illegal content.”
“I first pay tribute to the families that I have met who have raised the issue of suicide forums, which the hon. Member rightly raises. I have committed to them in the past that we will continue to press for quicker remedies for them when they suffer the worst tragedies imaginable.”
The complete record
Every one of 602 lines we hold for Kanishka Narayan, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 1 of 13.
“Keeping people safe online at moments of real danger is a top priority for this Government. That is why we have asked Ofcom to expedite its work on updates to its codes of practice under the Online Safety Act 2023. All services face strict duties to deal with illegal content. Of course, it is right that platforms with a greater risk of viral content spreading must do even more to prepare for and manage periods of heightened risk.”
“Do we want tougher accountability? Absolutely. That is why the codes published mean stronger review mechanisms, a direct line to law enforcement and a clear crisis playbook required of risky platforms. Do we want it to be faster? Absolutely. That is exactly why we have asked Ofcom to expedite those codes in particular. On whether we take a risk-based or uniform approach, it is right that we focus our resources, in law enforcement and regulatory action, on those that are the greatest risk. We will continue to review that.”
“May I, as ever, thank the Chair of the Select Committee for such a depth of expertise and experience, and in particular for the report that she mentioned, which has formed the basis of a lot of our thinking? There are clear things that we have done in our engagement with Ofcom, such as ensuring we empower users, not least through the commitments made in the “Protecting What Matters” social cohesion strategy, which will follow up on a number of recommendations that the hon. Lady talked about, including empowering users of algorithms. Misinformation is very much under consideration, and I have spoken to Ofcom about categories of harm as part of the crisis playbooks. We will continue to review that.”
“This Government have led the world in tackling dangerous content online, including in law with illegal content duties that platforms must comply with, with our full backing for Ofcom’s enforcement of them, and by strengthening the law, with cyber-flashing, intimate image abuse and self-harm content all deemed priority offences needing to be proactively tackled, as well as political conviction in the face of non-compliance. When Grok nudified images, this Government stood up, called it out and won by being on the side of British families, not tech platforms.”
“I first thank my hon. Friend for championing an incredibly important cause. Content promoting eating disorders is horrific, and I have to be clear that not just at the age of 16, but under the Online Safety Act 2023, platforms must already prevent children under the age of 18 from accessing content about eating disorders or self-harm. Indeed, it is now a primary priority content offence, requiring a higher bar still to be discharged by those platforms. I will of course, as ever, be delighted to work with him and the eating disorders APPG on his further proposals.”
“I first pay tribute to the families that I have met who have raised the issue of suicide forums, which the hon. Member rightly raises. I have committed to them in the past that we will continue to press for quicker remedies for them when they suffer the worst tragedies imaginable. The Secretary of State and I will, of course, be delighted to look at whether there are ways we can make that a more systematic, rapid response.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for raising that critical question for Britain’s creative sector. Just yesterday, on British IP Day, I met with the Alliance for Intellectual Property, including artists, authors, publishers, journalists and media organisations, to talk about how our work on digital replicas and transparency will be critical to supporting the creative sector. I would be delighted to meet my hon. Friend and the APPG.”
“I hope he feels that the significant actions that the Government have taken—banning social media for under 16s, being one of the first countries to bring AI chatbots into regulatory scope to make sure that they are not producing illegal content, and banning romantic chatbots—have been pioneering and show that we are always on the side of the British public. My hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan) raised incredibly important points about how we ensure that the security of AI is central to the questions we ask in public policy. Across every aspect of Government, we are building a Labour vision for that. We are building state institutions that will last the test of time and ensure that we are kept safe from some of the risks of AI.”
“Friend the Member for Mansfield (Steve Yemm) brought a deep degree of expertise on technology to this debate and asked the central question: do we shape technology in the artificial intelligence revolution, or is it the other way around? His point about stronger competition, which was also raised by the shadow Minister, is important. The CMA has been acting in an area of collaboration between the previous Government’s aspirations on digital competition and this Government’s. I look forward to the enforcement of remedies across both mobile and business software when it comes to AI. My hon. Friend also raised questions about online safety.”
“The first is having enough critical inputs—NVIDIA graphic processing units, for example—to be able to play our way in the world. The second is having a diverse set of sources so that we have bargaining leverage in that context; one of the first things I did was meet SambaNova, Cerebras and Groq to diversify our engagement with chip companies. The third really important test is, where British strengths and economics allow, to build full-fat British capability. We have done that with our hardware plan—more than £1 billion supporting companies such as Fractile, OLIX, Salience Labs and others. That is the crux of our sovereignty strategy: a clear definition, a clear plan across every part of the stack on AI, and delivery alongside that. My hon.”
“That has been a huge focus for the Government, not least through the Mansion House reforms and the increased deployment pace at the British Business Bank, which is now deploying more than £2 billion a year in this area, but also through the half-a-billion sovereign AI fund, which is focused on building deep British capability. The point the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington raised about the balance of power is central. In response to the ask for a sovereignty strategy, we are not only talking about it—we are delivering it. We have defined the single most important question: where does Britain stand on the balance of power? Do we have strategic leverage to secure ongoing access to critical inputs? There are three tests we are focused on.”
“In particular, I reflect on the fact that in Lanarkshire there are significant sites that have pulled forward clean energy generation in solar and battery as a result of data centre investment, rather than instead of or in trade off with it. Again, we are focused on ensuring that both those aspirations are met, as they are in north Wales where our data centre investments are pulling forward the future of small modular reactor nuclear in this country. The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean) and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan), raised an important point about pension funds under allocation to British equities, in particular to British technology and AI equities.”
“Lady that again and again this Government have taken the side of people, not platforms—of British families, including Welsh families, not foreign tech billionaires. I would encourage her to join us in that mission. My hon. Friend the Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman) raised concerns about a particular data centre. I am not fully abreast of the plans on that particular site, but I am very conscious of the concerns he raised. I simply point out that, in theory, there are ways in which data centre investors ought to make sure that what they are doing supports our important clean energy and power goals.”
“This is a historic decision for the people of Wales, whose voices fundamentally shaped it. That is not tiptoeing; it is running fast but together towards the solutions that matter. On the hon. Lady’s particular questions, we are preparing legislative options alongside securing significant progress on blocking children from taking, receiving and sharing nude images. We have already secured more progress than any other country on this question. On her point on proactively dealing with national security concerns, the British Government are building capabilities, not least through the Security Institute and across our intelligence agencies, that are unparalleled in terms of ensuring that our national security is a priority on questions of technology. On when this Government will face up to tech platforms, I gently suggest to the hon.”
“I will not speak overtly about an individual company, but I will flag that I understand from the relevant Department that a supplier contract for the NHS federated data platform will be reviewed in line with standard contract management processes this year, on the question of its extension. I am sure that her contributions will be regarded in that context. I normally hold the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) fondly in my mind in our parliamentary debates, so I was sorry to hear her take a more political, point-scoring approach to questions of online safety. I was sad that she called putting the voices of Welsh kids and families at the heart our decisions “dilly-dallying”. Thousands of young people and families in Wales contributed to the decision on a social media ban.”
“That is the right thing to do. The hon. Member for Yeovil asked about wider opportunities that the Government will support to offset some opportunities that young people might lose as a result of the ban. There are exemptions for both education services and music streaming. Really importantly, on the day that we announced the social media ban for under-16s, we announced 180 youth hubs across the country. That means more than £500 million spent on arts, music and culture opportunities for young people, right across England. There was a series of contributions from Members with that point in mind. My hon. Friend the Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) raised very important points about concentration.”
“Friend the Member for Stockport raised an important point about kids’ experiences on social media and the impact on educational attainment. That is exactly my personal motivation behind the significant action we are taking to ban social media for under-16s as well. The hon. Member for Yeovil (Adam Dance) raised a series of questions, and I will address two of them in particular. He asked about compliance with social media bans. There are three things we have done to ensure we learn the lessons from elsewhere: more robust age checks; ensuring that enforcement is out of the gate on day one rather than delayed, so that companies feel the heat of enforcement early on; and to acknowledge that this will not be a 100% overnight compliance issue, but a long-term societal shift in culture, as previous regulations have created.”
“There are three things we have therefore done on open source that make Britain the best place in the world for open-source talent: first, a particular focus on talent, not least a major hackathon we have partnered on to invite the world’s best talent to come and build open source here; secondly, a series of offers of compute, direct involvement in Government strategy on open source and, to the extent it is helpful, personal mentoring from me for winners of public service development on open source; and thirdly, just this morning, significant funding of £30 million for a serious national lab, led by University College London, focused in particular on open-source models. Britain is at the frontier of open-source AI, and this is the right thing to have done for our sovereignty aspirations. My hon.”
“It is pretty clear, whether on questions of online safety legislation, where we have the most robust regime anywhere in the world, or on questions of the most innovative set of sovereignty interventions anywhere in the world, that every single decision that this Government have made on technology has been on the side of British values, in the spirit of collaborating and never capitulating. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Navendu Mishra) raised the two magic words: open source. I made a speech a few months ago talking about my passion for open source, not least because aspects of its Welsh grounding—Raspberry Pi, developed by a Welsh founder, is now opening up opportunities for kids in living rooms across the world to develop bits of software.”
“This debate gets to the heart of what I consider the central question in our politics, our economy and our national security: how we ensure that the extraordinary power of modern technology serves our society, strengthens our economy, protects our citizens, and is grounded in British values. Given the time we have, I will do the courtesy of responding to individual Members first before talking more substantively on the common issues. The right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) raised the central question: are we on the side of British values or shareholder values for firms located abroad?”
“It is always a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy, but it is a particular pleasure when we are discussing questions of digital markets and regulation, because I know that you bring expertise in and experience of these issues. I thank the right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) for securing this debate. He has held me to account in the main Chamber, we have spoken in the corridors of Parliament, and I am delighted that he has now convened a much broader debate on the role of big tech in society. I am grateful to him and to all other hon. Members for their contributions to this important discussion.”
“We want to go further on that, including looking at a range of economic levers to mitigate some of the risks. Through sovereign AI we are investing in British capabilities, through the Alan Turing Institute we are investing in national security-relevant AI, and through labs that were funded just this morning we are making sure that British capability, rather than foreign capability alone, determines the future of AI.”
“The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and I am personally interested in how we rest more agency and control in the hands of the British public and the British state when it comes to data. There are clear rules and regulations about both privacy and individual data consents that apply, but I want to go further still by building infrastructure that equips individuals to have greater control over their data. In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Poole’s points, through the AI Security Institute we have the best capability in the state to keep evaluating, understanding and mitigating risks. Through the AI Economics Institute, we have a deeper understanding of the impact of AI on jobs than pretty much any other country.”
“We have made similar judgments about other sectors on the basis of that systematic analysis, as I have shared in Committee and at other stages of the Bill’s consideration.”
“The NCSC also has strong relationships across sectors, actively working with them to share best practice and incident insights, and to strengthen overall resilience, such as by engaging with the British Retail Consortium following incidents affecting the sector last year. The food sector is unique among other critical sectors because of its high levels of diversity. In the analysis underpinning the judgments made in the Bill, there are approximately 20,000 SME food manufacturers in the UK alone, and many more farms, distribution centres, retailers and other types of businesses that form the UK’s food supply chain. Given the lack of a single point of failure, we think there are more proportionate levers to pull, rather than bringing food in scope of the NIS regime.”
“The NIS regime has been put in place to protect the most essential parts of our economy, often those whose disruption would cause an imminent threat to life. It is focused on a specific set of tests where sectors have little or no alternative service provision in the event of disruption and relates the latest systematic evidence of the threats that each sector faces. In that context, all Government Departments with sectoral responsibility work with their sectors on broader cyber-resilience. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs does so with food, and the Department for Business and Trade does so with retail, automotive and so on.”
“All organisations, from high street shops to manufacturing giants, should take steps to increase their cyber-security and resilience. The Government and the National Cyber Security Centre are making sure that the right tools are available for every part of the economy. I am sympathetic to their intent, and in particular with my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) when he talks about the impact of cyber-security incidents on local communities. The Government have committed to reviewing whether new activities need to be brought into the scope of the NIS regulations, but it is essential that any such decision is based on a systematic and specific assessment of carefully considering whether the regulation in these particular parts of statute are the most appropriate response.”
“I have also tabled Government amendment 27, which corrects minor drafting errors to ensure the Bill works as intended. Members raised a series of questions, and I will address them thematically. First, the question of scope was raised by new clauses 4, 20, 21, 5, 8 and 9. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, who brings consistent expertise and experience to these questions; the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western); and the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins) and for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick), who tabled amendments on the services and scope of the Bill.”
“Government amendments 7 and 8 make changes to align with two information-gathering Government amendments—amendments 16 and 17. Government amendment 11 makes consequential changes following an amendment made in Committee. That amendment enables information sharing between NIS regulators and other public authorities for cyber-matters outside the scope of the NIS regulations. Government amendments 14 and 15 clarify the safeguards for information sharing gateways, and amendments 9, 10, 12 and 13 make the necessary changes to ensure that the rest of the clause is consistent with the change made by amendment 14. Government amendments 18 to 26, to clause 57, allow regulators and the Secretary of State to issue notices related to the powers of direction to nominated representatives of regulated entities.”
“I particularly thank them for their recognition of my core belief: that the central question for our national security and resilience is the question of our technological and AI capabilities. We tested the Bill’s measures carefully before introduction, but we have since listened to feedback. There are a small number of minor, technical drafting improvements, which I will briefly go through. Government amendments 16 and 17 ensure that regulators can ask for the information they need to fulfil their obligations under the NIS regulations. This does not give regulators any new powers; it simply confirms that the current reasons for requesting information under the NIS regulations will still apply under the updated regulations.”
“I start by echoing the thoughts of many Members from across the House, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward). I did not know Jo Cox, but I admired her deeply. As we talk about our country’s resilience, her central message—that there is no deeper route to resilience than through the unity of our country and community—is top of our minds for all of us in this House. It is a pleasure to bring this important Bill back to the House this afternoon. The Bill will increase our cyber-defences and resilience, making the UK an even safer place to live and do business. I thank Members on both sides of the Chamber for their valuable contributions to this debate and for the expertise that they have brought throughout the passage of the Bill.”
“I am happy to the write to the Chair of the Select Committee about comparisons with the EU, but the broad thrust is that we have undertaken a specific analysis of whether the burdens of the Bill should apply in a systematic, proportionate and coherent way to sectors. The analysis suggests that food supply is not in scope for the reasons I mentioned—primarily diversity of supply—but I would be delighted to engage with him on the question of why Europe took a different decision. We have based our decision on our analysis here.”
“Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting an assessment of the ownership structure of every in-scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, and would distract the Government from more effective measures to protect our services.”
“I have made it clear to him, both in Committee and more broadly, that the Government value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. However, we do not consider that the report described in the new clause sits within the ISC’s current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Committee’s memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister. The Government are actively reviewing the Committee’s existing memorandum of understanding and will update the House in due course. New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would require the Government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned, in part or in full, by foreign states, and the risks that they pose.”
“I assure the shadow Minister, as I did in Committee, that the use of those powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence. That includes, where relevant, information about state actors involved in cyber-threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the register would provide to the Secretary of State. New clause 15 would require the Government to report annually on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting the Government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information that cannot be included in the report for national security reasons is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee.”
“The joint election security and preparedness unit, also raised by Members, works to protect UK elections and referendums, co-ordinating across Government on response to threats, including cyber-risks. JESP works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections and electoral infrastructure, particularly local authorities. JESP and NCSC regularly engage with political-party representatives as well. The question of a register of foreign powers has been raised in relation to new clauses 14 and 15, tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). New clause 14 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice, for the purpose of exercising powers under part 4 of the Bill.”
“I am going to make some progress but will try to come back to the Chair of the Select Committee shortly. The Government’s cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across Government, including local government. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has taken action to strengthen local authorities’ cyber-resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the cyber assessment framework for local government. In that spirit, I take particularly seriously the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) on supporting capacity even further with centralised capacity support from the Government Digital Service and other parts of cyber-capability in central Government.”
“There are a range of other levers—investment screening through the National Security and Investment Act 2021; telecoms and cyber data security requirements to protect data and networks; supply chain measures, such as those in the Procurement Act 2023; diversification requirements to reduce dependency and build resilience—all of which are important to respond to the deeply significant concerns raised.”
“Consideration of the scale of the business is not currently in that rubric, because there are also businesses that are small in scale but very material in life-threatening impact. I hope that is a satisfactory answer. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West for their amendments relating to the risks posed by communications modules made or controlled from outside the UK. Although I am sympathetic to their concerns, the Bill’s approach is intentionally technology and incident-agnostic. Instead of reacting to individual components in isolation, we focus on structural chokepoints and systematic dependencies in this context.”
“It is rare for me to have a point of divergence with the Chair of the Select Committee, given her experience and expertise. However, on that question I am absolutely not saying that Government support is limited only to the certain number of sectors covered by the Bill. There are a range of other ways in which the Government act to support sectors outside of the scope of the Bill. That is the right thing to do. The scope of this Bill—the only Bill horizontally applicable to large parts of the economy—is systematically and specifically set to sectors that are significant as essential services, sectors where there is the risk of significant disruption and threat to life, and sectors where alternative supply is limited. For those reasons, we have excluded retail.”
“They are also designed to be proportionate, recognising the need for stability among regulated entities and the importance of proper accountability. While I share my hon. Friends’ concerns, I encourage them to work with the Government on a systematic range of ways in which we can mitigate the risks they have rightly highlighted.”
“I will make some further progress. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley for his amendment relating to AI emergencies. I recognise his concerns, as well as those of my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. Technology is evolving rapidly, and Government must be equipped to respond. That is why the Bill grants the Secretary of State the power to direct regulated entities if the compromise of their network and information system, or the threat of it, gives rise to a national security risk. This could, for instance, require an entity to cease using and isolate an AI model. These powers are a backstop to an effective cyber-security regime, enabling Government to act swiftly in the face of unexpected national security threats.”
“I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley in the first instance and then to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar.”
“While I share his diagnosis and his objective, I hope that we can work together to consider how best to give it effect, including through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s overseas security and justice mechanisms for information sharing. I thank all hon. Members for their consideration.”
“Given the specificity of his question, I will suggest that I come back to my hon. Friend. The broad thrust is that through our investment control legislation and procurement legislation, there are a series of responsibilities on Departments to look at it. [ Interruption. ] Given your encouragement, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall move on. Finally, I will respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who raised a very important point. The most important thing to say is that I share his diagnosis, although for reasons mostly of technical drafting, I disagree with his prescription—I hope he will take that in the spirit in which it is intended. His amendment risks creating undue uncertainty in law for many other areas where we do not have an explicit requirement.”
“The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware from a response I recently gave him that both the complexity of the EU’s AI Act and its interaction with the Windsor framework are under consideration at the moment. The EU has made a proposal and we are working with it on that. I will be happy to engage with him on that particular question in due course.”
“In other words, drafted as it is, the amendment could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises its discretion not to disclose this in other regimes, as there is no explicit exclusion. For those reasons, while I totally agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis and his objective, I am afraid that the amendment in question risks undermining the objective.”
“As I say, I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis. Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK. Official Report , 8 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 6WC. (Correction). Thirdly, the way that the amendment is drafted risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific and explicit reference to fair trial in the legislation, it calls into question how other information-sharing regimes are interpreted, such as under section 114 of the Online Safety Act 2023.”
“I will not, because I am testing the patience of Madam Deputy Speaker— [ Interruption. ] With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will give way.”
“As ever, I would be delighted to work with the Chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one. I am delighted with the support that this House has shown for the intention and principles of the Bill, and I am grateful for Members’ consistent, principled scrutiny.”