Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst
MP for Solihull West and Shirley · Conservative · United Kingdom
“I am normally a temperate man, but this is a farcical situation. I have huge respect for the Leader of the House, but I suspect that he has come here with gritted teeth, because the reality is that our constituents want to hear from the new Prime Minister.”
“We have seen it in genomics and targeted therapies and we see it in the increasing recognition that treatment must be shaped by the biology of the disease and the needs of the patient. There is no reason that lobular breast cancer should be left behind in that progress. There has been movement—it is right to acknowledge that.”
“One duty of a good health system is to reduce the burden on the patient and prove that they are worth listening to. Susan Michaelis understood that deeply.”
“Compassion reminds us why we keep working. Responsibility requires us to bring those two factors together. The last Government invested in cancer research, including support for the Institute of Cancer Research and the Royal Marsden biomedical research centre, along with wider work relevant to lobular breast cancer.”
“We have heard about how she challenged assumptions, gathered evidence and pursued truth in an area where the consequences mattered for passengers, crews and the wider public. In 2013, she received her devastating diagnosis of invasive lobular breast cancer.”
“We cannot dispute that that is a significant sum, but we have to look at it in the context of national health spending and what cancer costs: the cost to families and patients and the cost to the NHS when it is detected late or treated inadequately. We have to bear those factors in mind.”
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“I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment. Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces.”
“The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.”
“On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.”
“It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed. That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system. I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards.”
“We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability. Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life.”
“The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority. The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers.”
“I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service. Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades.”
“I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.”
“We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.”
“We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency.”
“It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered. There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point.”
“The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing.”
“We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both. Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.”
“This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension.”
“I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof.”
“Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused. I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach.”
“I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective.”
“That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen.”
“I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance. There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers.”
“I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— “(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction— (i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system, (ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner, (iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and (iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed, (b) must require that— (i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and (ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim, (c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.”
“That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.”
“I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand. Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly. At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.”
“On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn . Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 27 Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“The Prime Minister is absolutely correct to praise the service of our armed forces personnel, and I join him in doing so, but they are being let down by the failure to deliver the defence investment plan. That failure can only be the result of either inertia or incompetence within the Government. Which one is it?”
“I am grateful to my constituency neighbour for giving way. I was in the same meeting, and one of the big concerns was the loss of the special school planned for Tamworth Lane. Does my hon. Friend agree that that not only detracts from parents and pupils who would benefit, but puts additional pressures on mainstream schools?”
“Thank you, Mr. Speaker. On 21 November last year, Robert Clancy, a hugely valued and much loved member of my staff, took his own life. He was 29. While successive Governments have done a great deal to deal with the scourge of suicide in this country, there is much more that can be done. Will the Prime Minister personally commit to meeting me to discuss how we can prevent others from experiencing the unimaginable pain that Rob’s family and friends have endured?”
“Members of the armed forces community need to know what they can reasonably expect when engaging with public services. A clearly defined duty would help provide that assurance to them and their families. It would also support accountability. Where a duty is clearly defined, it is easier to assess whether it has been properly discharged. With the proposed definition in place, Parliament and others would be better placed to scrutinise how public bodies are applying the covenant in practice. Without a definition, that scrutiny becomes much more difficult; it is less clear what standard is being applied, and therefore harder to identify when that standard has not been met. Amendment 8 would strengthen both the operation of the duty and the ability to hold public bodies to account for its delivery.”
“The reference to appropriate weight would make it clear that the covenant must be taken seriously, even if it is not determinative. That reflects the approach taken in other areas of public law where due regard is applied, in which contexts the courts have been very clear that the duty involves more than simple awareness; it requires informed and timely consideration of the relevant principles as part of the decision-making process. Amendment 8 would adopt that well-established understanding and apply it in the context of the armed forces covenant, providing a much clearer framework within which public bodies can operate. It is worth reminding ourselves that clarity is important not only for public bodies, but for those affected by their decisions.”
“If due regard is interpreted differently in every area, the level of support available may itself vary significantly. Amendment 8 would support a more consistent and coherent approach. By defining due regard clearly, it would establish a common standard that can be applied across different public bodies. The proposed definition is deliberately balanced: it would require public bodies to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight, but it would not require a particular outcome in any given case, and it would not override other relevant considerations. It would simply ensure that decision makers exercise judgment and balance competing factors. At the same time, it would ensure that the covenant is not overlooked or treated as an afterthought. It requires active consideration—that is the way it must be interpreted.”
“Some public bodies may interpret the duty as requiring active and meaningful consideration of the covenant in their decision-making processes; others may take a more limited approach, treating it as a procedural requirement that can be satisfied with relatively minimal engagement. That variation matters in practice. Members of the armed forces and their families frequently move between different parts of the country, and they rely on services provided by local authorities, healthcare systems and other public bodies. A lack of consistency in how the covenant is applied can result in uneven access to support in those circumstances. Let us take the example of a service family who move from one area to another. They may encounter different approaches to school admissions, healthcare provision and housing allocation.”
“It reflects the principle that those who have served our armed forces, and their families, should not be put at a disadvantage compared with other citizens in accessing public services. It also recognises that, in some cases, special consideration may be appropriate. I think those principles are widely supported not just in this place but among the wider public. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that they are also reflected in the decision-making processes of public bodies. The effectiveness of the duty to have due regard to the covenant depends in large part on how due regard is understood and applied. In the absence of a definition, there is scope for variation.”
“However, the term “due regard” itself is not defined in the Bill or elsewhere, which creates a very real risk of inconsistent interpretation or application. Amendment 8 would resolve that uncertainty by defining due regard as requiring public bodies to “think about and place an appropriate amount of weight on the principles of the Armed Forces Covenant when they consider all the key factors relevant to how they carry out their functions.” That would not represent a change of policy; it would merely clarify how the duty is to operate. It would make explicit what many would assume is already intended, but which is not currently set out in the Bill. The armed forces covenant itself is well understood by many.”
“It is an enormous pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I want to focus my remarks on amendment 8, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East set out, seeks to provide a clear and practical definition of due regard in the Bill. If Parliament is placing a legal duty on public bodies to have due regard to the armed forces covenant, it is only right that it should be clear what that duty requires in practice. The Bill places a duty on specified public bodies to have due regard to the principles of the armed forces covenant when exercising certain functions, as set out in proposed new section 343AZA(5) of the Armed Forces Act 2006, including in areas such as healthcare, housing, education, transport and pensions.”
“For those reasons, I view the amendment as a useful and proportionate clarification that would strengthen the operation of the duty as set out in the Bill.”
“It is not about giving preferential treatment in all cases; it is about ensuring fairness in line with the principles of the covenant. That includes avoiding disadvantage and, where appropriate, providing additional support. The amendment would ensure that those principles are properly taken into account. Amendment 8 would make a targeted and practical improvement to the Bill. It would support a more consistent application of the armed forces covenant by public bodies, provide greater clarity for decision makers and those affected by their decisions, strengthen accountability, and reduce the risk of inconsistent interpretation. Most importantly, it would help to ensure that the covenant is applied in a way that has a real effect on day-to-day decision making.”
“If the duty is left undefined, there is a risk that its impact will vary significantly between organisations, which would undermine the aim of the Bill. The amendment would strengthen the Bill by supporting a more effective and consistent implementation. It would also reflect the practical realities of service life. Members of the armed forces and their families frequently experience moves and disruption as part of their service. They rely on public services in different parts of the country and need those services to respond in a consistent and informed way. A clear definition of due regard would help to support that consistency, providing a common framework for decision making that recognises the particular circumstances of the armed forces community.”
“By setting out what due regard means in this context, the amendment would provide a clearer basis for compliance. Importantly, it would reduce ambiguity. It is also relevant that the definition is framed in general terms; it does not describe details or steps that must be followed in every case. That would allow public bodies to apply the duty in a way that is proportionate to the circumstances that they face. That flexibility is important given the range of functions and decisions to which the duty will apply. The amendment aligns with the overall purpose of the Bill. The intention is to embed the principles of the armed forces covenant in the work of public bodies. A clearly defined duty would support that objective by ensuring that the covenant is considered in a consistent and meaningful way.”
“In each of those cases, the duty does not require a specific result; it requires consideration of the relevant factors, including the covenant, and a balanced decision based on those factors. Amendment 8 would therefore support decision making without constraining flexibility. We often hear concerns that defining duties in legislation may increase the risk of legal challenge. In my view, in this case, the greater clarity that the amendment would introduce is more likely to reduce that risk and be a protective factor. Where duties are clearly defined, public bodies are better able to understand and comply with them, which reduces the likelihood of disputes arising from uncertainty about what is required. Conversely, where duties are unclear, there is a greater risk of inconsistent application and challenge.”
“Instead, it would provide a clear instruction about how the covenant should be treated alongside other relevant factors. In practice, that may involve ensuring that decision makers are aware of the covenant and understand its implications. It may involve considering how policies affect members of the armed forces community and whether adjustments are needed to avoid disadvantage. Those seem eminently sensible and wise factors to put in this piece of legislation. In education, that could mean taking into account the particular challenges faced by a service child who moves schools frequently. In healthcare, it could involve considering continuity of care for families who relocate. In housing, it could involve recognising the impact of service-related mobility on access to accommodation.”
“I am grateful, as always, to my right hon. Friend for his intervention, because he has hit the nail on the head. This is not something novel; it is merely codifying—formalising in the Bill—what has already been written in evidence to us, which seems eminently sensible. It is important to consider the practical impact of the amendment on public bodies. The definition would not impose a new or onerous requirement. Public bodies are already accustomed to taking into account statutory duties and policy considerations in their decision-making processes. A requirement to think about the covenant and give it appropriate weight would fit squarely within that existing framework. It would not require extensive additional processes or resources. It would not mandate detailed reporting or specific outcomes.”
“Does the Minister not accept that there is inconsistent application of the covenant across public bodies, and that to try to fix that, which all of us on the Committee are seeking to do, there is strength in codifying it in the Bill?”
“I am grateful to the Minister for indulging me. I do not disagree that, to a greater or lesser extent, this is a matter of education, but there is the issue of guidance being guidance and not being mandatory. If a definition were included in the Bill, it would provide a much stricter framework—alongside the education piece for local authorities—to ensure that we are getting this right. Does he agree?”
“That was a lawyer’s promise; the Minister can read it as he wills. Does the Minister not think that having a definition of due regard in the Bill would assist the courts in interpreting its application in cases where a public body’s decision is challenged by a member of the armed forces community?”
“(4) Regulations under this section must include a requirement for a national authority to issue guidance on— (a) the transfer of patient records, (b) the continuation of treatment pathways upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies, and (c) the preservation of waiting list placement upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies.” This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make provision for NHS secondary care services to be appropriately transferred where a person who is dependent on a member of the armed forces must become ordinarily resident in an area for which a different NHS body is responsible for care as a consequence of the member of the armed forces on whom they are dependent’s military posting.”
“(2) The regulations must specify that the relevant health body must take reasonable steps to ensure that any course of secondary care treatment being provided to the dependent is appropriately transferred to an appropriate health body in the area to which the dependent relocates. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “appropriately transferred” means— (a) the dependent’s treatment or place on a treatment waiting list is maintained upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies, and (b) the dependent will not require a new referral form from a general practitioner or other primary care professional as a condition for continuation of treatment upon transfer of responsibility of care between health bodies.”
“I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert— “343AZC Continuity of NHS secondary care services (1) Within six months of the passage of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the continuity of secondary care treatment for a person who— (a) is a dependent of a member of the regular or reserve forces who is receiving secondary care services from a health body in one part of the United Kingdom, and (b) becomes ordinarily resident in another part of the United Kingdom when the member of the armed forces to whom that person is dependent is posted.”
“It does not attempt to redesign the structure of the NHS—that would be a fool’s errand—nor does it impose a rigid requirement on how services should be delivered.”
“It is important to be clear about what that represents—not a clinical judgment or a decision taken in the interests of patient care, but an administrative consequence of the way services are structured and commissioned across different parts of the NHS. It is in effect a failure of co-ordination. For the individuals concerned, however, it has a much more significant impact. It can mean delayed diagnoses, prolonged pain, deterioration in conditions that require timely intervention, and significant anxiety for families already managing the pressures of service life. It can also undermine confidence in the system and create a perception, justified or otherwise, that service families are being treated less favourably. The amendment seeks to address that problem in a proportionate manner.”
“While primary care is generally able to accommodate patient movement with relative ease, the same cannot be said for secondary care. Hospital treatment, specialist pathways and waiting lists are typically organised on a regional or trust basis. When a family crosses those organisational boundaries, continuity is not guaranteed. The consequence, in too many cases, is that dependants find themselves required to re-enter the system. A child undergoing specialist treatment, a spouse awaiting elective surgery or a family member under the care of a consultant may be told that because they have moved into a new area, they must obtain a new referral, join a new waiting list and effectively begin the process again from the start.”