← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Tim Roca

MP for Macclesfield · Labour · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his advice. If he gives me time, he may find that comes later in my speech. We should not allow Russia to make us talk ourselves into a place of weakness.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

There is a significant difference between spending 2.8% in 2028, 2.9% in 2029 and 3% in 2030, and remaining broadly flat and trying to make a leap—if we can prove that we can do that—at the end of that spending period.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

I agree with the right hon. Member, but I am not sure whether his point is relevant to the one I was making about the broad context of defence procurement. There has been great cross-party consensus on what we are doing with Ukraine, and we should ensure that that continues. I also want to comment on the defence nuclear enterprise.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

My hon. Friend makes the point well. Indeed, in a recent interview my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) talked about how the recent attacks on Iran had destroyed a huge propaganda apparatus, which had contributed to 3% of total nationalist propaganda for Scottish separation from the United Kingdom.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

Every capability we field, every production line we expand and every drone we manufacture add to our deterrence, and that is incredibly important. At the beginning of the debate we talked about the credibility of getting to where we need to be. To be straightforward, it is my belief that we need to reach 3% of GDP by 2030.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

I do not intend to focus on that too much, but I am sure that others will make the point about the decline in the size of the Army over the past 14 years, the decline in the size of the Air Force, and about the frigate fleet—we talk about the frigate gap—and what happened to frigate and destroyer construction.

REARMAMENT AND WARFIGHTING READINESS · 2026-07-08 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 364 lines we hold for Tim Roca, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 2 of 8.

  1. I will finish this point; I might then give way if I am feeling generous. That conduct was so grave that it resulted in a damning report, which I think the Leader of the Opposition abstained on, rather than voting in favour of it. Of course, that is quite aside from the fact that it also involved a criminal conviction. There is no equivalence—none—between those cases and what is before us today. If there was, there would have been a genuine attempt at a cross-party piece of persuasion. Instead, what we got from the Leader of the Opposition was a rambling rollercoaster on Iran, the two-child benefit cap, U-turns and so on. To attempt to draw that comparison is not just wrong but diminishes the seriousness of those findings in the past. It risks turning the Privileges Committee from a guardian of standards into a weapon of convenience.

    REFERRAL OF PRIME MINISTER TO COMMITTEE OF PRIVILEGES · 2026-04-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. The Minister will have recognised the strength of feeling on both sides of the House about wanting to see the defence investment plan published as soon as possible, and I hope Treasury Ministers will share that understanding. I believe that history is important. When Russia annexed the Crimea, we saw no meaningful increase in defence spending. When Russia violated Minsk I, we saw no increase, and when it violated Minsk II, we saw no increase. When it launched a full-scale invasion of a sovereign European country, we saw no meaningful increase. Does the Minister agree that the debate about defence needs to be constructive and, hopefully, cross-party, and that the country expects us to fund defence properly and urgently?

    STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW: FUNDING · 2026-04-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. The Minister is making an important point. The economics of higher education are actually quite complicated; there is a great deal of cross-subsidy, with the humanities and the arts effectively supporting science, medicine and engineering courses and so on. Does the Minister agree that we should be worried that the Opposition parties’ proposals would put jobs and the viability of universities at risk?

    STUDENT LOANS · 2026-03-18 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. Will the Leader of the House join me in congratulating Dan Blackman and in thanking all others at the Silklife church food bank, along with the other food banks and community groups across Macclesfield, including Cre8 and the CORE pantry, for their extraordinary dedication in supporting people who face food poverty? As Dan steps aside after six years of service, will the Leader of the House set out what the Government are doing to tackle food poverty, and wider poverty, including by increasing the national minimum wage, expanding free school meals and dealing with the cost of living for families?

    BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE · 2026-02-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. For my part, when I visited Gibraltar last year and met community leaders, including senior business leaders, I was very struck by how low the stock of the Conservatives had fallen with the people of Gibraltar. I think the Conservatives have some bridges to mend.

    GIBRALTAR TREATY · 2026-02-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. I put on record that I chair the all-party parliamentary group on Spain. I congratulate the Government on this significant agreement. Can the Minister confirm that it provides additional safeguards to Gibraltar’s sovereignty, while creating new economic opportunities? I think he was alluding to that with the airport. I thank him for the hard work he and colleagues have done in rejuvenating our important relationship with Spain, which is a key NATO ally and our seventh-largest trading partner. While I am speaking, Madam Deputy Speaker, may I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her commitment to the self-determination of the people of Gibraltar?

    GIBRALTAR TREATY · 2026-02-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. The IFS has shown that those in the middle earnings distribution repay the highest share of their lifetime earnings. As hon. Members have said, many people have no prospect of paying off their loans at all. That is not a progressive system, particularly when we are asking them to think about saving for a home, starting a family and contributing to society. We need to think about the public good that higher education is, and the fantastic contribution that graduates make to our society and economy. We need to look again at the structure and the thresholds, particularly the threshold freezes, and ask whether those in the middle are carrying too much of the burden and whether the balance between the contributions of the taxpayer and of the graduate has drifted too far.

    STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT PLANS · 2026-02-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. It is an uncomfortable truth that England now has the most expensive public university system in the world. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has told us that, while the taxpayer underwrites 45% of its cost, students and graduates cover 55%, which represents a profound shift in how we fund higher education in this country. A formative moment for me and for many others was watching the Liberal Democrats entering into coalition with the Conservatives in 2010 and not abolishing tuition fees, but in fact trebling them. We were told that that was progressive, but to a generation of young people, it felt like a gross betrayal. It is fair to say that graduates have a graduate premium, with earnings potentially a third higher than for non-graduates, but averages conceal as much as they reveal.

    STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT PLANS · 2026-02-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. I think there is an effort to do so, and UK policymakers are very proactive on cyber policy and are looking at different areas to work on, but the view of how it all goes together may not be as clear. One area where we are definitely behind is legislating around vendor behaviour and what we expect from the people who are making and selling technology.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (FIRST SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. The main things that NIS2 and CSRB are looking at are pretty aligned. There is a lot of focus on the same things. It is about expanding scope to make sure that we keep up with what we believe “essential” now looks at, and there is a lot of focus on increased incident reporting and information sharing. Again, the devil will be in the detail in the secondary legislation. The other thing I would say goes back to the earlier question about what is happening internationally. The nations that David mentioned, like Australia or the jurisdiction around the EU, are really proactive on cyber policy—as is the UK. They are taking a really holistic view, which David alluded to in his introduction, and are really looking at how all the pieces fit together. I am not sure that it is always super clear that the UK is doing the same.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (FIRST SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. However, we are talking about primary legislation now; a lot of the detail will be in the secondary legislation. We do not necessarily know exactly how those two things will line up against each other. The UK seems to be taking a bit of a different approach. The EU has very specifically tried to make the detail as clearly mandated as possible, because it wants all the member states to adopt the same basis of requirements, which is different from NIS1, whereas it seems as though the UK wants to provide a little bit of flexibility for the regulators to “choose their own adventure”. I am not sure that is the best approach. We might end up with a pretty disparate set of experiences. That might be really confusing for organisations that are covered by more than one competent authority.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (FIRST SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. Q This question is mainly for Jen. Your colleague Jamie MacColl has made a series of forthright comments about the Bill and compared it to NIS2. How does the Bill compare to legislation worldwide? Jen Ellis: As a starting point, I will clarify that I am a fellow at RUSI. I work closely with Jamie, but I do not work for RUSI. I also take no responsibility for Jamie’s comments. On the comparisons, David alluded to the fact that Europe is a little bit ahead of us. NIS2, its update to NIS1, came into force three years ago with a dangling timeline: nations had until October 2024 to implement it. My understanding is that not everybody has implemented it amazingly effectively as yet. There is some lag across the member states. I do not think we are too out of scope of what NIS2 includes.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (FIRST SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. What is the expectation on it regarding incident reporting? What does “significant impact” mean? Similarly, with the designation of critical suppliers, precision is needed around the definitions. From a regulatory perspective, without that precision, we will probably find ourselves in a series of potential cases arguing about the definition of an issue. To give an example, if the definition of MSP is vague, and we are saying to an MSP that we think it is in scope, and it is saying, “No, we are not,” then a lot of our time and attention will be taken up with those types of arguments and disputes. Precision will be key for us.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. Q I was reading the ICO’s response in December, as this legislation was proceeding, and it talks a little about having clarity around secondary legislation, the Secretary of State’s powers and the definition of “significant impact”. What are your concerns about the secondary legislation, or what you would like to make sure is right in it? Ian Hulme: There are two angles to that. From a purely planning and preparation perspective, it is incredibly difficult, without having seen the detail, to know precisely what is expected of MSPs and IDSPs in the future, and therefore what the regulatory activity will be. That is why, when I am answering questions for colleagues, it is difficult to be precise about those numbers. Equally, we are hearing from industry that it wants that precision as well.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. The balance is just about right in terms of primary and secondary, particularly because the secondary vehicle gives us the opportunity to ensure that there is a lot of consultation. The Committee will have heard throughout the day—as we do all the time from industry—that that is what industry is looking for. They are looking for periods of business adjustment—we hear that loud and clear—and they really want to be involved in the consultation period. We also want to be involved in looking at what we need to take from the secondary legislation into codes of practice and guidance.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. Q Is there anything that you would have preferred to see in the primary legislation, or do you think secondary legislation affords industry and Government flexibility? Ian Hulme: There is a balance to be struck. When something is written on the face of the Bill and things change—and we know that this is a fast-moving sector—it makes it incredibly difficult to change things. There is a balance to be struck between primary and secondary, but what we are hearing and saying is that more precision around some of the definitions will be critical. Natalie Black: I strongly agree with Ian. A regulator is only as good as the rules that it enforces. If you want us to hold the companies to account, we need to be absolutely clear on what you are asking us to do.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. Especially for people with bounties on their head, I imagine that it will be a huge worry that there might be more legitimate access to data than there is right now under the Data Protection Act.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. Chung Ching Kwong: The threat to privacy, especially to my community—the Hong Kong diaspora community in this country—will be in the fact that, under clause 9, we will be allowing remote access for maintenance, patches, updates and so on. If we are dealing with Chinese vendors and Chinese providers, we will have to allow, under the Bill, certain kinds of remote access for those firms to maintain the operation of software of different infrastructures. As a Hongkonger I would be worrying, because I do not know what kind of tier 2 or tier 3 supplier will have access to all those data, and whether or not they will be transmitted back to China or get into the wrong hands. It will be a worry that our data might fall into the wrong hands. Even though we are not talking specifically about personal data, personal data is definitely in scope.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. Q I, too, put on the record that I am a member of the IPAC caucus in this Parliament. Thank you for speaking to us today. May I turn the conversation a little on its head? We have been talking about national security and the threat from China and others. You were an activist in Hong Kong and made a great deal of effort to fight the Chinese Communist party’s invasion of privacy—privacy violations using the national security law—and other things. Do you see any risk in this legislation as regards civil liberties and privacy? We have had a bit of discussion about how much will go into secondary legislation and how broad the Secretary of State’s powers might be.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. Obviously, for critical infrastructure like the power grid and water, the Government need control over those things, but for communications and so on, there is, to a certain extent, a question about what the Government can and cannot do. But personally I do not see a lot of concerns in the Bill.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. Q From the other perspective—I am thinking about a UK Government in the future overreaching—do you think there is any risk from this legislation? Chung Ching Kwong: It is always a double-edged sword when it comes to regulating against threats. The more that the Secretary of State or the Government are allowed to go into systems and hold powers to turn off, or take over, certain things, the more there is a risk that those powers will be abused, to a certain extent, or cause harm unintentionally. There is always a balance to be struck between giving more protection to privacy for ordinary users and giving power to the Government so that they can act.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. The Bill effectively says that the sum total of those systems, in their ultimate impact on the risk exposure of an organisation, is the singular focus where regulators should place their emphasis. I would expect that individual regulators will pay heed to the particular prevalence of legacy systems and technical debt as a source of risk in their particular sectors, and as a result to the mitigations that ought to be placed. I think that being technology agnostic is the right approach in this context.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. Q The Committee heard this morning about the public sector’s level of technical debt. This Bill is important in terms of safeguarding essential services, but we heard that an important factor—notwithstanding this Bill—is tackling the enormous number of legacy systems. How do you see us running the two in parallel? Kanishka Narayan: That is a great question. Broadly, the Bill takes a risk-based and outcomes-focused approach, rather than a technology-specific one. I think that is the right way to go about it. As we have heard today and beyond, there are some areas where frontier technology—new technology such as AI and quantum, which we talked about earlier today—will pose specific risks. There are other areas where the prevalence of legacy systems and legacy database architectures will present particular risks as well.

    CYBER SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (NETWORK AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) BILL (SECOND SITTING) · 2026-02-03 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. We must support them in their decision, but ensure that in this country we do not recognise Russian claims for one minute. A just and lasting peace cannot be built on coercion or enforced surrender. It cannot be built by asking the victim to pay the price for the aggressor’s crimes. I stand with all my parliamentary colleagues today in standing firm for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its right to choose its own future and a peace that is real and genuinely durable.

    UKRAINE: NON-RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. Across the post-Soviet space, including Transnistria, Abkhazia and the Donbas, Moscow has deliberately kept territorial disputes unresolved as a way of holding its neighbours in limbo. Those conflicts are not accidents; they are tools used to maintain influence, block stability and make it harder for countries to choose their own future or their own alliances. We should not kid ourselves about what these frozen conflicts really are. They are not peaceful compromises; they are pressure points. They allow aggression to fester, and they show us that peace built by accommodating an aggressor does not resolve the case; it simply locks injustice in place. If, to stop the bloodshed, we have to accept non-recognition of occupied territories but de facto control by Russia—a frozen conflict—that again is for Ukrainians alone to decide.

    UKRAINE: NON-RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. They are talking tough but failing to use the enormous economic, military and political levers they have to apply real pressure. I thank the Minister for the work he has been doing to make sure that British sanctions and support have been robust for Ukraine. I am very concerned by data showing that overall military aid to Ukraine actually fell last year, even though countries such as the US, France and Germany stepped up their support. At this stage of the war, any drop in assistance sends the wrong signal. We need to give the Ukrainians everything they need and avoid the drip, drip of capabilities and arms that we have seen since the war began. Finally, we need to be honest about how Russia has used frozen conflicts to its advantage.

    UKRAINE: NON-RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. By 1939, the country was occupied and its independence was destroyed. Concessions do not bring security; they can sometimes invite catastrophe. When we talk about security guarantees, let us not overlook the most real and effective guarantee Ukraine has right now: the brave men and women of Ukraine’s armed forces. They are the reason why Ukraine still exists as a sovereign state. Their courage, discipline and sacrifice are what stand between freedom and occupation, and any peace must allow those forces to be equipped and manned at a level that deters future attacks. I worry that parts of the international community are not doing their bit. In my view, the United States Administration has been leaning far too heavily towards accommodating the Kremlin.

    UKRAINE: NON-RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. That is why I am deeply concerned by suggestions that Ukraine is being asked to give up Ukrainian-controlled territory in the Donbas as a precondition for peace or even as the price of future security guarantees. Let us be honest about what that means. My hon. Friend made the point earlier. The frontline in the Donbas is among the most fortified places on earth. It was built at great cost and defended with extraordinary courage. Thousands of Ukrainians have given their lives defending it, and they did not do so lightly or on a whim. One must have solid grounds to do so, and it must come concurrently with solid security guarantees. History warns us where this road leads. In 1938, Czechoslovakia was forced to hand over the Sudetenland, where most of its defences were, in the name of peace, and that peace lasted months.

    UKRAINE: NON-RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) for securing this debate and the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), who made some very powerful points about parallels with the Baltic states that I completely agree with. I think all Members in attendance are absolutely clear that if a state that invades its neighbour and holds territory by force gains political or territorial reward for that, it is not buying peace; it is simply queuing up the next war. Borders should not be changed at the barrel of a gun. At the same time, it must be said plainly that it is for Ukraine and Ukraine alone to decide what compromises, if any, it is prepared to make. It is not for us, not for allies and not for foreign politicians sitting far away from the frontline.

    UKRAINE: NON-RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES · 2026-01-29 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. It creates exactly the kind of grey zone in which hostile actors thrive, including an ever-expanding Chinese navy. This treaty removes that uncertainty. It closes off the space for challenge, rather than leaving it open.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. We see that every day in the South China sea. China has asserted expansive territorial claims that many countries do not recognise and that the international courts and tribunals do not recognise. What happens in response? Other states deliberately sail ships and fly aircraft through those waters and airspace to contest those claims and to test resolve. Uncertainty becomes a pressure point and ambiguity becomes an opportunity for interference. If we allow ambiguity to persist over the Chagos islands, and in particular over Diego Garcia, the same dynamic could apply. Our claims may be strong historically, but they are being increasingly contested in international courts. That does not make the base more secure; it makes it more vulnerable.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. I feel I should put on record at the beginning that I am not the Government’s trade envoy to Mauritius—[Hon. Members: “Yet!”] Hansard can record a diplomatic silence at this point. This debate ultimately turns on whether we understand the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be, much as some believe otherwise. We still live in an economically, militarily, politically and morally interconnected world, and that interconnectedness has not gone away. It has become more contested, more multipolar and certainly more strategic, but it has not ended. That matters, because this deal must be judged not on slogans or hyperbole but on whether it secures the United Kingdom’s security interests in that interconnected world. One of the central lessons of recent years is that uncertainty invites challenge.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. As I said at the beginning, interconnectedness is incredibly important and we cannot ignore the fact that international opinion matters. Yes, the world has changed. Power today is exercised through force—hard power has become incredibly important—but it is also still exercised through legitimacy, alliances and rules. If we expect others to respect international rules where it suits us, whether in Ukraine or the South China sea, we cannot be seen to apply them selectively elsewhere, except in the supreme national interest.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. It is where UK and US forces operate together against terrorist threats. It is a logistics, communications and intelligence hub, and it is central to safeguarding the global trade routes on which our economy depends. Without a secure base, all of that is placed at risk. Our Five Eyes allies in Canada, Australia and New Zealand support this deal, and our strategic partner India supports this deal. I want to address briefly the noise around President Trump’s social media posts, which the Minister dealt with very well earlier. Social media is not statecraft. What matters is the settled position of the United States, its military leadership and its security agencies. On that, there has been clarity for some time. The Pentagon, the State Department and successive US Defence Secretaries—Republican and Democrat—have supported this agreement.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. I disagree with the hon. Member, because the two situations do have parallels. In the South China sea, people are challenging Chinese sovereignty, and it has been proved not to have standing in international courts. At the moment, ambiguity is starting to arrive in our position over the Chagos islands. This treaty would remove it and remove cause for the Chinese navy to take advantage. Against this backdrop, I want to restate the tests that I set out in an earlier debate on this deal. Does the agreement protect our national security? Does it command the support of our allies and professional security community? Are the costs proportionate to the benefits? On each of these tests, the answer remains yes. Diego Garcia is a keystone of our joint security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. I cannot clear up that point for the right hon. Member, but I have great confidence that ministerial colleagues would be able to. We have been told at all points that this treaty would ensure the continued effectiveness of the base in the way that it is run now. There was an Ohio class submarine there in 2022, and I hope those arrangements continue under this treaty. From what I have heard from Ministers, there is no reason that they would not. Let us turn to the costs of the deal. It will cost a fraction of the defence budget for an irreplaceable asset—

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. I am sure that has been set out already in several debates. The point that has not been set out adequately and cannot be set out in huge detail is that, in exchange for providing the United States with facilities on Diego Garcia, the in-kind support in terms of intelligence and other matters that we receive from the United States must run into the billions every single year. Although we cannot put a figure on that, it is a really important element in this debate. There is no prosperity without security, and there is no security without certainty. In an interconnected world, those are not abstract principles; they are strategic necessities. That is why, in my view, this is a sensible, hard-headed deal, and a confident assertion of the United Kingdom’s national interest.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. We have heard from chief Ministers and leaders of the other British overseas territories how disappointed they have been in the rhetoric used by the Conservatives in trying to drag them into the situation. There is no question about our commitment to the British overseas territories. This deal is a completely separate matter.

    BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY · 2026-01-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. Adlington does not meet that test. I will end with a bit of history, because this House likes its history. In the Minister’s office hangs a picture of Clement Attlee, who I think is a hero to both of us. It was Attlee’s Government that created the green belt, precisely to protect landscapes like this from unchecked development. It was not anti-housing; it was pro-planning. It is about balance, foresight and stewardship. We owe it to that legacy and to future generations to show the same care now, so let us support new towns, let us build the homes our country needs, but let us also say calmly and clearly, in the Attlee spirit, that Adlington is the wrong place.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. Before I finish, I want to thank local campaigners and activists—people who never expected to become planning experts, transport analysts or ecology specialists, but who have given up their evenings, weekends, and indeed savings, to engage constructively, responsibly and in good faith. They have not shouted from the sidelines; they have done the hard work of evidence, scrutiny and civic engagement. That is democracy at its best. They deserve recognition. Let me be absolutely clear once more that this is not about saying no to development; it is about saying, “Not like this, and not here.” We should be building homes where infrastructure already exists, where growth can be absorbed sustainably, where local authorities are partners rather than bystanders, and where the environmental cost is justified by an overwhelming and proven need.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. Powerful points have been made already this afternoon about infrastructure. Those concerns have not been convincingly addressed in the case of Adlington, which has limited rail services, constrained road capacity and utilities that were never designed to support a town 20 times its current size. Fixing that would take decades, not years, and there remains no clear answer about who would pay, who would deliver or when any of it would realistically be in place. That has been compounded by the way that we have gone about this. We need engagement with residents, but there has been only one engagement session with local residents by the company Belport. Communities have been left scrambling for information about the proposal. That is not how to build confidence in a major national project.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. The council has delivered before, and with its new plan it will deliver again—but without dropping 20,000 homes into the open countryside, against the opposition of local communities. Opposing the Adlington site does not mean opposing housing; it means respecting the plan-led system rather than bypassing it. I mentioned brownfield land, and there are brownfield sites across Cheshire, Greater Manchester and the wider region that are crying out for regeneration, many of them close to jobs, transport, schools and services. Building there first is not anti-growth; it is sustainable planning. Indeed, there are alternative new town sites in the north-west that could be considered. Let us not jump straight into one of the most sensitive stretches of green belt in the region, next to a national park. Let us think again.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. That almost never happens in local government, and that alone should tell us that this is not a narrow ideological objection, but a considered judgment by the democratically elected planning authority for the area. I want to talk a little more about Cheshire East, because it really matters. It is not a council that avoids building homes. It has met its housing targets consistently in the past, it has adopted a sound local plan, and it has delivered thousands of homes and continues to do so. It is not a planning authority that is dragging its feet or shirking its responsibilities. It is now preparing a new local plan, which will set out how housing need will be met in years ahead—transparently, democratically and with proper public engagement. That is how planning should work.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Among all the sites recommended, Adlington stands out, not as the most suitable, but as the one that has faced the greatest opposition. That opposition has come not from one group, one parish or one campaign, but from across the community, across political lines and across civic society. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me before Christmas to discuss those concerns. It is particularly striking that the Campaign to Protect Rural England, which has not opposed a number of the other new town sites recommended by the taskforce, has taken a clear and firm position against Adlington. When it singles out one site among many, it is because something genuinely does not stack up. If that were not enough, Cheshire East council has voted unanimously against the proposal.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. It is a place shaped by continuity, with fields and farms; its working farmland is still producing food, supporting local jobs and sustaining wildlife. The proposal before Macclesfield would place up to 20,000 homes on 1,000 hectares of strategic green belt, wiping out 15 working farms, ancient hedgerows and bluebell woodlands, and fragmenting some of the most environmentally sensitive land in Cheshire. That matters, because the green belt is not an accident. It exists for a reason: to stop urban sprawl, protect countryside and make sure that we regenerate brownfield land. Once green belt on this scale is gone, it is gone forever. I want to make a broader point about the new towns taskforce and its shortlist, because it is quite telling.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. I support house building and development, and I support the principle of new towns, done well, in the right places, with proper planning, and in the right manner with proper infrastructure. This country needs homes, especially genuinely affordable ones, and new towns have a proud history of delivering them, when they are carefully planned and sensibly located. I do not oppose that ambition; I welcome it. But supporting the principle of new towns does not mean signing a blank cheque for every proposed site, and it certainly does not mean abandoning the basics of good planning—which brings me to Adlington. Adlington is not an empty space on the map. It is a small rural community of about 1,000 people, first recorded in the Domesday Book.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. In Macclesfield, one topic has dominated conversation for several months: the proposed new town at Adlington. It has been talked about on every street corner, in every coffee shop and at every parish meeting. Well, almost—for one glorious weekend, Adlington was briefly knocked off the top spot by the small matter of Macclesfield beating Crystal Palace in the FA cup. I am on dangerous ground, because I think the Minister was brought up in south London, so I will leave the football at that. Jokes aside, this is an important debate, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch (Katrina Murray) for securing it. I am not a nimby.

    NEW TOWNS · 2026-01-15 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. Ryan Cornelius reminds us what happens when we hesitate to act. Sanctions are not about vengeance; they are about drawing a line and saying that no official, no banker and no judge is beyond accountability when they participate in grave injustice. If we honour Sergei’s legacy, we must be prepared to act with the same clarity he showed even when it is uncomfortable or inconvenient, especially when one of our own is still paying the price.

    HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: MAGNITSKY SANCTIONS · 2026-01-08 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. The UK lacks a strategy for managing frozen assets and ensuring that sanctions contribute to justice for victims and survivors. Funds can remain untouched for years, losing value while survivors receive no reparations. I think here particularly of the family of Ryan Cornelius; his wife Heather is effectively homeless as a result of the circumstances she faces. At present, all the proceeds flow back to the Treasury rather than to those harmed by the underlying violations. Let us use these sanctions ambitiously, consistently and appropriately in combination with other mechanisms if they are effective in upholding human rights, tackling illicit finance and preventing this country from becoming a haven for war criminals and kleptocrats. Sergei Magnitsky showed us what courage looks like when the law collapses.

    HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: MAGNITSKY SANCTIONS · 2026-01-08 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. The inconsistency is particularly evident in cases involving UK strategic partners or trade allies, and in relation to conflict-related sexual violence, despite the UK's preventing sexual violence in conflict initiative. There is also a clear failure to use the regime robustly in response to British nationals arbitrarily detained abroad, such as Ryan Conelius. Beyond designation decisions, weak enforcement is further undermining the regime. To date, no fines have been imposed for breaches of Magnitsky sanctions. Reports indicate widespread evasion involving professional enablers, opaque corporate structures and overseas territories, as has been capably pointed out. In addition, there is no obligation for the Government to report to Parliament on the use of these sanctions. I believe that should change.

    HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: MAGNITSKY SANCTIONS · 2026-01-08 · READ IN HANSARD