Gregory Stafford
MP for Farnham and Bordon · Conservative · United Kingdom
“As I have mentioned before, the spanking new dental surgery in Haslemere hospital has sat entirely unused since it was built, and, as far as I am aware, there are no plans to use it.”
“My first point can be summarised as: “Don’t repeat a mistake to find out whether it was a mistake.” Thousands of children have already received puberty blockers through the former Tavistock pathway, and my view is that, before exposing a whole new cohort, the Government should complete the long-promised data linkage study to establish wha…”
“I declare that I am a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety. Patient safety cannot be something that is discussed only after a tragedy has occurred. It requires a culture of accountability, transparency, and most importantly, action.”
“That is a complete contradiction of the ban. Thirdly, clinical equipoise does not exist in the evidence if the evidence already points to significant risk and uncertain benefit. The Cass review concluded that the evidence base for puberty blockers is weak and that concerns remain over bone health, fertility and neurodevelopment.”
“Such a process and principle are closely connected with new clause 98 and the Government response to the Hughes report on those harmed by sodium valproate and pelvic mesh. Those are deeply serious issues involving people who have suffered life-changing consequences and have spent years seeking recognition and redress.”
“When the Secretary of State appeared before the Health and Social Care Committee last week, I questioned him on that issue directly. While he confirmed that the Department remains committed to meeting that 2030 target, which was first established by the previous Conservative Government, no plan—or indication of when a plan would come—was…”
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“When providers must attract and retain patients, they have a stronger incentive to deliver timely, high-quality services, and to innovate in how they provide care. In that sense, competition is not an end in itself but a means of improving outcomes and responsiveness for patients. If both sides of the Committee support clause 5, because we are interested in choice and competition, amendment 59 is the logical extension of that. The amendment is also clear about where the new obligation choices would apply. It covers a range of out-of-hospital services, including diagnostics, audiology, hearing-aid care, dietetics, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and so on. By clearly defining the services in scope, it provides a realistic and workable road map for implementation.”
“My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I do not want to go down the cataracts route, but she and the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket have both mentioned them. Clearly, cataracts are a relatively low-complexity, high-volume type of operation. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that some providers can do five or six operations per list, while other places are doing two or three. That is often about the private sector being able to move more quickly, which is obviously better for patients, as well as for clinicians, who want to do the surgery that they have trained for. Unlike the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, I think that competition can play an important role in driving improvement.”
“We need to understand whether the Bill is really about making our NHS more efficient by removing levels of bureaucracy, as was the stated intent of the Minister and the previous Secretary of State, or whether it is simply a political power grab where we keep all the bureaucrats and the inefficiency of the current system.”
“What my hon. Friend describes is the real nub of the Bill. If we are to abolish NHS England and move most of its functions to the ICB level or to the Department of Health under a Secretary of State, it would be utter madness for us to, at best, move one set of bureaucrats from NHS England to the Department of Health and therefore gain no extra efficiency, or at worst, as seems to be the case in this clause, not only transfer the NHS England bureaucrats, but create a whole new set of bureaucrats and committees to continue the functions already performed under NHS England.”
“Will the Secretary of State set up a competition in various areas of healthcare, technology, disease or treatment? Will they say, for example, “We want to find the best technology for dealing with cataracts”? Will a call go out for people to submit bids and say, “We have produced this amazing new laser treatment,” in order to win the prize? Or will it be entirely open-ended? Will people come into the Department of Health and Social Care to this new committee and say, “We have created this amazing piece of innovation—give us some money for having done so”? It is so unclear in the Bill. As I say, I am absolutely certain that the Minister knows the answer to those questions because this clause and subsection would not be in the Bill if she had no idea what she was hoping to achieve by them.”
“I have been in enough Bill Committees to know that civil servants do not write something into Bills unless they have an idea of what they want to do with it. I would be very interested to hear from the Minister what sort of committee it will be, how many people will be on it, how much remuneration they will receive and how they will establish themselves and fulfil the function that the Secretary of State gives them. If we do not know that, the proposal is so open-ended that I would have real concerns about letting it go forward in the manner in which it is currently written. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East suggested—I do not think he was joking—that the word “prize” made this sound like a game show. That is part of what we need to understand.”
“Will they be given to the private sector—I know that Labour Members have antibodies against the private sector—or to university research functions? It is very unclear who the prizes will go to. Even more interestingly, proposed new section 1CC(3)(b) says that prizes may relate to “work done at any time (including work before the commencement of this section).” So they could be given for something that happened prior to the Bill coming into force, but we have no idea how far back that could go. Are we talking months, years or decades? There is no clear outline about who will get the prizes, how much they will be, what innovations or technologies they will be for, or the point in time that is being referred to. Then the clause says that the Secretary of State may set up a committee.”
“I will not keep the Committee too long. We need to look closely at what the clause is trying to achieve, both on innovation, which I support, and on the prizes. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East asked a number of pertinent questions about the prizes, and I want to expand on that before I talk about the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. We have no idea what scale of prize we are talking about. Is it thousands of pounds, tens of thousands of pounds or millions of pounds? Will the prizes be given to individuals or to organisations? Will they be given to NHS bodies? I think not, or at least not exclusively, because the clause suggests that they could be for research.”
“I have many concerns about the clause as it currently stands, and I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify some of the Opposition’s questions. I entirely endorse amendment 58.”
“Crucially, paragraph (d) of the amendment represents a significant and commendable commitment to fairness and inclusion by prioritising equal access to new technologies, medicines and models of care regardless of geography or socioeconomic background. It would help to tackle long-standing inequalities and move decisively towards ending the postcode lottery that we often see in care quality. The focus of the amendment would ensure that innovation benefits all patients, not just those in the most advantaged areas. It would ensure that rural and coastal communities are aligned with the urban. As someone who represents a semi-rural seat, I see those inequalities in service delivery, quality of care and innovation. The large towns in my constituency receive far more money and get far better services than the surrounding villages.”
“In particular, her amendment rightly emphasises the importance of “timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations”. Timeliness is so important to patients. We need innovation quickly. Again, it worries me that the prizes could be given for innovations that could have happened weeks, months, years or decades ago, according to the wording. We also need to ensure that innovation is not in isolated pockets, either in terms of geography or type of service. We need something that is consistently delivered across the healthcare system. By highlighting the need to address things such as procurement, the regulatory sector and cultural barriers, my hon. Friend’s amendment would support a more proactive and enabling environment for innovation to flourish, not one that shuts it down, as some Labour Members have suggested.”
“My hon. Friend’s point is correct. There is so little detail in the clause about how these prizes will be awarded and how the committee that will award them will be set up that we have no idea how conflicts of interest will be dealt with. That is another reason that the Minister needs to explain to the Committee how this is going to work. My hon. Friend mentions “Dragons’ Den”. I see her as the Deborah Meaden of our Committee, so I look forward to seeing that play out—I will not say what that makes me. What I see from amendment 58, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham— I hope I am not misrepresenting her—is once again an attempt to codify, clarify and strengthen what is fairly woolly wording within the Bill.”
“Accurate workforce predictions will ensure that we have the right number of healthcare professionals available. We will see a reduction in shortages and more consistent, high-quality care. I support amendment 54, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, because it ensures that clinically trained managers maintain patient-facing roles, making better use of scarce clinical expertise and improving workforce efficiency. It strengthens accountability, like amendment 50, by tracking and increasing the proportion of care delivered by qualified professionals, helping to optimise staff deployment and reduce pressure on frontline services. I have some concerns about amendment 33, but amendments 50 and 54 have my support, and clause 7, hopefully amended, will also have my support.”
“One of the key things that we will need to do as a Parliament when the Bill becomes an Act is to convince the public that, when this new world of how the NHS is going to be managed and operated comes in, they can have confidence that the treatment they get is the best that it can be and that those who are being trained and working in the NHS get the training that they require and are being established as some of the best in the world. Independent audits would make such forecasting more credible and give reassurance to the public and the stakeholders that the workforce planning is evidence-based and not potentially politically influenced, which is one of the big problems about having the Secretary of State in charge of everything throughout the Bill. The key thing must be improved patient care.”
“Perhaps, too, it lacks some of the prioritisation or proportionality that I would like to see in the Bill—as I have said, however, I think that otherwise the training element is pretty good. Moving to amendment 50, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I entirely support it. This amendment would be extraordinarily useful, because the NHS publishes independently audited forecasts of the workforce every five years, but the amendment would lead to better long-term planning. Regular, independently audited forecasts would help the NHS to anticipate staffing needs, plan training and recruitment, and use resources more effectively and with more efficiency. Amendment 50 would also increase transparency and trust.”
“I shall speak briefly to the amendment that was just moved by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket. I do not mean this rudely, but it is a relatively motherhood-and-apple-pie amendment. The onus would be on the Secretary of State to recognise that smoking, exposure to air pollution, occupational risk and harmful substances are bad, but I think we all agree on that. If the Secretary of State, or any future Secretary of State, does not already recognise that, I would be pretty surprised. I have a number of issues with the amendment, the first of which is that it expands some central duties without clear limits. Potentially, it could be a gateway to what I would describe as interventionism.”
“The danger here is that if the Bill does not deal with those problems and close regional gaps, it is not immediately clear from the clause how the Secretary of State could intervene to ensure that ICBs have the autonomy to make decisions based on their local populations and ensure at the same time that patients do not receive a worse service just because they happen to live in one ICB area rather than another.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I agree heartily with the shadow Minister, and a couple of other things concern me about clause 8. On the one hand, the clause appears to bring more centralisation, but on the other hand it pushes things down to an ICB level at the same time. I am worried that if we have individualisation of ICBs, we will only exacerbate the disparity of services across regions. I would be interested to understand from the Minister how the Secretary of State’s functions will allow the independence of ICBs and, where an ICB understands its local population well, ensure that patients do not end up in a postcode lottery based on which ICB area they happen to live in.”
“By framing this power in such open terms, the clause risks undermining those objectives. It will create the possibility of fragmented funding decisions, with resources distributed across a wide range of initiatives without clear and consistent frameworks, and it may lead to duplication of effort or to supporting projects with benefits that are uncertain or difficult to evaluate. Without clear criteria or structured oversight, it will become more difficult to ensure that funding is directed to the areas of greatest need.”
“Control over public expenditure ultimately lies with Parliament, yet the clause delegates a wide and flexible spending power to the Executive with little direction as to how that power is to be exercised. While it may be said that Treasury rules, audit requirements and general public law principles continue to apply, those are external controls and they do not substitute for clear statutory discipline within the provision itself. The practical consequences of such a broad power need to be considered. The NHS is already under considerable financial strain; as we all know, demand is rising and resources are constrained, and there is a continuing need to ensure that funding is allocated in a way that delivers measurable improvements in outcomes. In that context, certainty, prioritisation and efficiency are essential.”
“Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has said, private entities, charities, individuals and any person engaged in activities that the Secretary of State considers to be beneficial to the health service. That breadth is not accompanied by a corresponding statutory safeguard. The clause does not set out criteria for eligibility, priorities for funding or principles to guide decision making. It does not impose limits on the sums that may be disbursed, nor does it require any structured process for allocating funds. There is no express provision for transparency, such as publication of decisions or reporting obligations to another body such as Parliament. That absence is significant.”
“I endorse the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I am particularly concerned about subsection (2)(a) of proposed new section 12DA. On examination, this provision raises significant concerns about the control of public expenditure and the efficient use of resources within the health service, and I find it rather vague. There is no definition of the terms used, no indication of scope and no express limitation on how the power is to be exercised. When read together with subsection (1) of proposed new section 12DA, the effect, as I read it, is to allow the Secretary of State to provide funding to an extremely wide category of recipients. That includes not only public bodies and established NHS providers but, as my hon.”
“The shadow Minister has outlined a couple of hypotheticals for the future, when we have a different Prime Minister and a different Secretary of State. One might go down a route of more privatisation, another down a route of removing the private sector from health service provision. My concern is more practical and for the here and now: if the clause stands part of the Bill, it must be because the Government have some desire to do one of those two things now. Would it not be a good idea to hear from the Minister which of those two options it is?”
“I want to take the Minister back to her rejection of the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham on the basis that—I paraphrase—she felt the definition of “patients” was too limiting because it would not count people who had not entered the health system at that point. The clause itself, however, refers to the benefit for the health service. Is the Minister suggesting that the health service, as defined in the Bill, includes what happens before people enter what I would describe as the health service? Is it something before that point? She seems to be saying that our definition is too narrow, but her definition in the Bill must apply to those who have entered some kind of formal setting. Or is the health service wider than that?”
“Those objectives, I am afraid, are very difficult to reconcile with a model in which local leaders remain subject to direct ministerial dismissal. Partnership working flourishes when organisations have confidence in their independence and responsibilities. It is weakened when authority is increasingly concentrated at the centre. For all those reasons, I believe that amendment 47 in the name my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raises an important principle. It is not about protecting poor performance or shielding individuals from accountability; it is about ensuring that accountability is exercised through proper governance structures rather than political control. Expanding ministerial powers to hire and fire local NHS leaders risks undermining all of those principles.”
“Therefore, the question is not whether the current Secretary of State or Minister would misuse the power, but whether Parliament wishes to establish a framework in which future Secretaries of State possess the ability to remove local NHS leaders whose decisions, views or priorities may conflict with their political objectives. That is a much more serious question. Finally, we must remember what ICBs were trying to achieve, even if we do not think that they have achieved it or performed in the way that we wanted them to. If we go back to the principle of why they were set up, they were designed to encourage collaboration rather than some sort of command-and-control structure. They were intended to bring decision making closer to patients and communities. They were established to support long-term planning across local health systems.”
“Strong organisations attract strong leaders when governance arrangements are stable, predictable and professionally driven. They do not attract them through uncertainty and political intervention. Sixthly, we need to consider the precedent being established. Powers granted to one Secretary of State are inherited by the next, as the hon. Member for North Shropshire said. Members may trust the intentions of the current Minister—I certainly do. They may also believe that these powers would be exercised responsibly—and at the moment I think they would be. However, legislation must be judged not on how it is going to be used by one individual, but on how it could be used by any future holder of the office.”
“Fifthly, I think the clause as drafted would present a risk to recruitment and retention. The NHS already faces significant leadership challenges. Senior leaders are expected to manage enormous budgets, oversee complex organisations and make difficult decisions under intense public scrutiny. If we create a system in which their tenure can ultimately depend upon ministerial whim, we may deter talented individuals from seeking those positions. As my hon. Friend said, the NHS needs leaders who are willing to innovate, take calculated risks and make difficult long-term decisions. It does not need a culture in which leaders are constantly looking over their shoulder, wondering whether a politically controversial but clinically necessary decision could threaten their position.”
“Of course, none of those mechanisms of accountability will disappear if amendment 47 is adopted. The amendment would not create any kind of immunity from accountability; it would simply ensure that accountability is exercised through the established governance structures, rather than through direct ministerial intervention on a chief executive. Indeed, one might ask whether a Secretary of State is really the best person to assess the performance of an individual ICB chief executive. Such judgments often require detailed understanding of local service pressures, workforce challenges, demographic factors, financial constraints and so on. Those are matters better evaluated by individual organisations with operational expertise than by politicians operating at national level.”
“Supporters of ministerial intervention often point to examples of failure and ask what should happen when an ICB is underperforming. That is a fair question, but the answer is not that the Secretary of State must personally possess dismissal powers. A range of mechanisms already exist: ICB boards have governance responsibilities; NHS England has oversight powers; professional regulators oversee the conduct of clinicians; there are provisions in employment law for procedures when it comes to misconduct and capability issues; and auditors and inspectors can identify failings. It would be far better if the Bill strengthened those provisions to ensure that accountability was brought forward, rather than giving the Secretary of State the ability to fire and hire as he or she sees fit.”
“No Secretary of State, regardless of ability or commitment, or indeed their own background in the health service, can personally manage every NHS organisation in England, and I do not think they should. The more powers we concentrate at the centre, the greater the temptation for Ministers to become involved in operational matters that are better addressed through professional expertise and local knowledge. My hon. Friend’s amendment seeks to preserve that distinction in a singular and precise way. It recognises that Ministers should govern the NHS and be held accountable at the top by us as Members of Parliament and our constituents, but should not seek to manage every aspect of it. Fourthly, there is a practical problem.”
“If Ministers possess the power to select and remove those leaders, they will inevitably become more directly responsible for those management decisions, so far from increasing accountability, this might dilute it by creating uncertainty about where true authority lies. Thirdly, there is a constitutional concern. Whether one likes it or not, the previous Act created a balance between democratic accountability and operational independence. Parliament rightly determines the funding, priorities and legislative frameworks, and Ministers rightly set national policy, but operational decisions have been made by healthcare professionals and the statutory bodies established for that purpose. That distinction exists for a good reason.”
“Secondly, excessive ministerial power blurs the lines of accountability. The Minister, in her defence, has argued that Ministers need powers because Ministers are accountable. I get that argument, but one of the most important principles of effective public administration is clarity of responsibility. If the Secretary of State gains extensive powers to appoint and dismiss local NHS leaders, it will become increasingly difficult to know who is actually responsible for outcomes. When performance improves, Ministers will claim credit; when performance deteriorates, local leaders may be blamed.”
“Leaders will become more cautious, perhaps more risk-averse and potentially less willing to challenge national policy when local evidence points in a different direction. ICBs have benefited from the ability to speak truth to power. A system in which senior NHS leaders fear dismissal by Ministers risks discouraging precisely that kind of honesty. Do not get me wrong: there are good ICB chief executives and bad ICB chief executives, ones who understand their role well and ones who feel that they do not need to engage at all with their local communities. I have a very good ICB in what is currently Surrey Heartlands, soon to be a larger organisation, and an ICB that does not do the job as well—I will not name it, but any student of geography will be able to work out which one it is.”
“If those leaders know that their continued employment ultimately depends on the confidence of the Secretary of State, there is a real risk that the independence of their judgment will be weakened and that patient safety will diminish. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham tackles a core question: should an ICB chief executive focus solely on what is best for patients and the local health economy, or should they have to consider whether their decisions may attract ministerial displeasure? Even if the power is rarely used, and even if, as my hon. Friend said, there are currently some guardrails in the clause, its existence will change behaviour—it must do.”
“Integrated care boards were established in various forms under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 precisely to remove politicisation to ensure that decisions in our healthcare service were made for the benefit of patients on the basis of clinical evidence and the needs of the local population, not on the whim of any Secretary of State or Minister. More importantly, ICBs were brought in to make sure that local health systems, local authorities, clinicians and communities made decisions based on local need. Those politically independent ICB chief executives were expected to exercise professional judgment, make difficult decisions about priorities and resources and sometimes deliver messages that Ministers, and indeed local Members of Parliament, found uncomfortable.”
“I rise to support amendment 47, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and to ask a few questions about clause 11. I completely understand the thinking behind the clause. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care is probably the most politically impotent of all Secretaries of State: as my hon. Friend said, they pull levers and not much seems to happen, because they do not have the control over the health service that the public think they do—or indeed, that Members of Parliament think they do, judging by the number of us who stand up and demand that the Secretary of State do things in our local areas. I understand the Government and the Secretary of State’s desire to change some of that, but there is concern about the potential politicisation of NHS leadership.”
“My hon. Friend says that we do not know the effects, but a number of children have been put through this process via the now discredited Tavistock process. Why does she think that the NHS will not refer to the data linkage study and use the data that would have been gained from the children who were put through that process, in order to find out what the effects are before deciding to put a whole new cohort of children through what is clearly a damaging procedure?”
“There is a third option, which is to get NHS England to motor ahead with the data-linkage study, so that we can use the data that has already been collected to find out the answers to the questions that the Secretary of State is posing. Only then, if the information is not there, should the trial go ahead. Why is he not pushing that third way?”
“That feels to me to be a much more systematic way of addressing the concerns of patients, families and staff in the place where those concerns happen, having mechanisms to escalate those through the NHS so you can bring them to regions—some investigations get done at the NHS England level—and having the CQC as an independent body that can separately review and spot if there are problems but also ensure that those investigations within the NHS are happening well.”
“I would like to point out that since HSSIB was established, the NHS has established its own much more rigorous, much more robust investigatory teams and processes. Of course, I am not saying that they are perfect—we can all see that—but I encourage all colleagues here today to look at the work they are doing, the specific areas they are reviewing, the outputs of those reviews and the ways in which those are leading to improving care.”
“For example, if the CQC is going round the country and spotting a particular problem with the way in which anaesthesia is being given or with managing patients post-surgery, the CQC could then say to HSSIB—that team of people with specific expertise—“Can you go in and take a look at this? Can you do a detailed focus review of this particular area of care that we are spotting through our visits and which seems to be a particular challenge?” It is that bit about enabling the CQC to identify a problem and then asking HSSIB to review it in detail, and HSSIB bringing its expertise in investigations into the CQC to enable the CQC to go deeper and then come back to the NHS with particular areas, but also to supplement the work of the NHS.”
“More specifically, if, as you said to the Health and Social Care Committee, the safe space element would be retained and HSSIB would operate as an independent organisation, how can you square the fact that it would remain independent and yet be part of the CQC? If it does remain independent, what is the need to bring it into the CQC? Dr Dash: The point of bringing it into the CQC, as I said before, is that we are trying to simplify this landscape. There are so many different organisations continually commenting and doing reviews—often replicating the same reviews that other people have done. The concern is that it is distracting rather than enabling. The hope that I had when I made the recommendation, and still have now, is that by bringing HSSIB into the CQC, you can align the work of the two.”
“Q I should declare that I am a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety. Apologies, Dr Dash, I have questioned you on this many times, but I am going to continue to do so. When the King’s Fund, the Nuffield Trust and the Health Foundation were in front of the Health and Social Care Committee and they talked about bringing HSSIB into the CQC, all three of them said very clearly: “Don’t do it.”. In fact, I can find almost nobody apart from you and the Department who thinks that moving HSSIB into the CQC is a good idea. Does that give you any pause for thought about whether you are recommending the right thing?”
“Q What happens if the problem is the CQC? Dr Dash: Well, we then have to deal with that as a problem. That is the same as saying, “What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?” We have 150 organisations—150. What if the GMC is a problem? What if the Nursing and Midwifery Council is a problem?”
“Our worry has been about what is not in the Bill, and what is the rightly and fantastically ambitious agenda to improve health for people and patients, versus the opportunity cost of a largely technical piece of legislation that reorganises some central functions.”
“I go back to my first answer: what is honestly the opportunity cost of doing some of this at the expense of more focus and attention on, for example, delivering care closer to home? There is a lot of energy and activity in that area, but the Government want to make really good progress over the next few years. To take that example, if you are really serious, you need to understand what the barriers are to delivering more care in the community, closer to people and patients, and wrapping services around patients. It requires you to flow money differently and to have a different incentive scheme, but that is nowhere near this piece of legislation.”
“Q Sarah, when we were at the Health and Social Care Committee, you and your fellow panellists seemed to suggest that the Government could achieve what they needed to in the 10-year plan without this reorganisation. Could you delve into that a bit more and tell us why you think that is the case? Sarah Woolnough: The Government have an incredibly ambitious agenda, which is partly articulated in the 10-year plan. Our ongoing concern has been that some of the biggest-ticket items that the Government rightly want to achieve to fundamentally shift power to patients—delivering a shift towards prevention, moving care closer to home and allowing more digital enablement—do not require this kind of legislation or a reorganisation.”
“Q Would you agree with that, Mr Lant? Jacob Lant: Yes. I kind of think, as the debate goes on, that—with the changes to Healthwatch in particular—you could achieve so much without legislation. You could beef up the internal functions for listening to a patient and engaging with them without legislation—there is no requirement for that. You could invest more resource in that, and you could do the same with Healthwatch. You could think about the resourcing of the structures and the support they receive, so you could make that whole system better without legislating to get rid of it. As Sarah said, the NHS changes are a distraction at a time when we should be moving on with focusing on patient care.”
“Essentially, and just to reassure the Committee, if we see something of a criminal nature, if there are significant regulatory concerns, we have protocols in place to be able to escalate that. But there is a real risk that potentially, if we held information that the CQC needed in part of its regulatory function, in its enforcement function, we would not be able to share that, because of our legislation, and we would not want to share it, because we want to maintain the trust in the system. It would need to go to the High Court to be able to get hold of it.”