J. French Hill
Representative for Arkansas · Republican · United States
“``(2) Selection of economic indicators.--Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Board of Governors shall-- ``(A) complete a study on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of either nominal United States gross domestic product (as published by the Department of Commerce) or the Consumer Price Index (…”
“``(2) Selection of economic indicators.--Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Board of Governors shall-- ``(A) complete a study on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of either nominal United States gross domestic product (as published by the Department of Commerce) or the Consumer Price Index (…”
“(B) Selection of economic indicators.--Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall-- (i) complete a study on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of either nominal United States gross domestic product (as published by the Department of Commerce) or the…”
“(B) Selection of economic indicators.--Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall-- (i) complete a study on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of either nominal United States gross domestic product (as published by the Department of Commerce) or the…”
“(2) Guidance.--The term ``guidance'' means a financial agency statement of general applicability, intended to have a future effect on the behavior of regulated parties, that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue, or an interpretation of a statute or regulation, but does not include-- (A) a rule promulgated pur…”
“(2) Guidance.--The term ``guidance'' means a financial agency statement of general applicability, intended to have a future effect on the behavior of regulated parties, that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue, or an interpretation of a statute or regulation, but does not include-- (A) a rule promulgated pur…”
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“SEC. 104. CDFI BOND GUARANTEE IMPROVEMENT. (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the authority to guarantee bonds under section 114A of the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 (12 U.S.C. 4713a) (commonly referred to as the ``CDFI Bond Guarantee Program'') provides community development financial institutions with a sustainable source of long-term capital and furthers the mission of the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (established under section 104(a) of such Act (12 U.S.C. 4703(a))) to increase economic opportunity and promote community development investments for underserved populations and distressed communities in the United States.”
“4703(b)) is amended by adding to the end the following: ``(5) Annual testimony.--The Secretary of the Treasury (or a designee of the Secretary) shall, at the discretion of the Chair of the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Chair of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, annually testify before such committees (or a subcommittee of such committees) regarding-- ``(A) the operations of the Fund during the previous year; ``(B) steps the Secretary and the Fund are taking to support community development financial institutions through the financial agent mentor-protege program; and ``(C) steps the Secretary and the Fund are taking to coordinate with regulators to ensure [[Page H4709]] certification and reporting requirements are appropriately streamlined for community development financial institutions.''.”
“(B) The mean and median times to approve such applications, with times for each State shown separately. (C) To the extent practicable, common reasons leading to denial or withdrawal of such applications. (2) Definitions.--In this subsection: (A) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any territory of the United States. (B) State depository institution.--The term ``State depository institution'' means-- (i) a State depository institution, as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813); and (ii) a State credit union, as defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752). SEC. 103. CDFI FUND TRANSPARENCY. Section 104(b) of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (12 U.S.C.”
“(2) The mean and median times to approve such applications. (3) To the extent practicable, common reasons leading to denial or withdrawal of such applications. (e) Annual Report on State Depository Institution and State Credit Union Charter Applications.-- (1) In general.--The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration Board shall, jointly, and in consultation with State banking regulators and State credit union regulators, publish an annual report that includes the following, or with respect to any equivalent procedure used by such agencies includes the following: (A) The number of applications for a State depository institution charter received, approved on a preliminary basis, approved on a final basis, denied, withdrawn, inactive, expired, mooted, returned, returned pending resubmission, or otherwise dispositioned.”
“(2) Top-tier depository institution holding company defined.--In this subsection, the term ``top-tier depository institution holding company'' means a depository institution holding company (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)) that is not controlled by any other depository institution holding company. (d) Annual Report on Federal Deposit Insurance Applications.--The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation shall publish an annual report that includes the following, or with respect to any equivalent procedure used by the Corporation includes the following: (1) The number of applications for deposit insurance received, approved on a preliminary basis, approved on a final basis, denied, withdrawn, inactive, expired, mooted, returned, returned pending resubmission, or otherwise dispositioned.”
“(c) Annual Report on Depository Institution Holding Company Applications.-- (1) In general.--The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall publish an annual report that includes the following, or with respect to any equivalent procedure used by the Board of Governors includes the following: (A) The number of applications to become a top-tier depository institution holding company received, approved on a preliminary basis, approved on a final basis, denied, withdrawn, inactive, expired, mooted, returned, returned pending resubmission, or otherwise dispositioned. (B) The mean and median times to approve such applications. (C) To the extent practicable, common reasons leading to denial or withdrawal of such applications.”
“(4) To the extent practicable, common reasons leading to the denial, withdrawal, or expiration of preliminary approval of such applications. (b) Annual Report on Federal Credit Union Charter Applications.--The National Credit Union Administration shall publish an annual report that includes the following, or with respect to any equivalent procedure used by the agency includes the following: (1) The number of Federal credit union charter applications received, approved on a final basis, denied, withdrawn, inactive, or returned pending resubmission. (2) The mean and median times for final approval of such applications. (3) To the extent practicable, common reasons leading to application denial, withdrawal, inactivity, or to applications being returned for resubmission.”
“SEC. 102. NEW BANK APPLICATION NUMBERS KNOWLEDGE. (a) Annual Report on National Bank and Federal Savings Association Charter Applications.--The Comptroller of the Currency shall publish an annual report that includes the following, or with respect to any equivalent procedure used by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency includes the following: (1) The number of applications for a national bank or Federal savings association charter received, approved on a preliminary basis, approved on a final basis, denied, withdrawn, inactive, expired, mooted, returned, returned pending resubmission, or otherwise dispositioned. (2) The mean and median times for preliminary approval of such applications. (3) The mean and median times for final approval of such applications.”
“``(B) Extension.--Unless the Federal banking agencies make the determination described in subparagraph (A), the authorities under subsections (a) and (b) shall be permanent. ``(C) Termination.--If the Federal banking agencies make the determination described in subparagraph (A)-- ``(i) subsections (a) and (b) shall only apply to a qualifying community bank that became an insured depository institution before the date of such determination; and ``(ii) the Federal banking agencies shall issue a report to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and make such report available to the public, containing such determination and the reasons for such determination.''; and (3) in subsection (e)(6)(B), by striking ``between January 1, 2026, and December 31, 2028'' and inserting ``on or after January 1, 2026''.”
“Section 908 of the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act is amended-- (1) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``180-day'' and inserting ``90-day''; (2) in subsection (c)-- (A) in the heading, by inserting ``and Extension'' after ``Study''; (B) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following: ``(2) Safety and soundness determination; extension of pilot program.-- ``(A) Determination.--Not earlier than January 1, 2031, and not later than June 30, 2031, the Federal banking agencies may, jointly, determine that subsections (a) and (b) have had a significant adverse effect on the safety and soundness of qualifying community banks.”
“TITLE VII--STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY AND INVOLVEMENT IN BANK RESOLUTIONS Sec. 701. Least Cost Exception. Sec. 702. Enhancing Bank Resolution Participation. Sec. 703. Failing Bank Acquisition Fairness. TITLE VIII--FACILITATING INNOVATION AND BANK PARTNERSHIPS Sec. 801. Merchant Banking Modernization. Sec. 802. Bank-Fintech Partnership Enhancement. Sec. 803. Discretionary surplus fund. TITLE I--NEW BANK FORMATION AND LOCAL COMMUNITY ACCESS SEC. 101. PROMOTING NEW BANK FORMATION.”
“Fair Audits and Inspections for Regulators' Exams. Sec. 303. Supervisory Modifications for Appropriate Risk-based Testing. Sec. 304. Financial Integrity and Regulation Management. TITLE IV--REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY Sec. 401. FDIC Board Accountability. Sec. 402. Stop Agency Fiat Enforcement of Guidance. Sec. 403. Regulatory Efficiency, Verification, Itemization, and Enhanced Workflow. TITLE V--STRENGTHENING LOCAL BANK FUNDING Sec. 501. Bringing the Discount Window into the 21st Century. Sec. 502. Keeping Deposits Local. TITLE VI--PROMOTING BANK COMPETITION AND MERGER CLARITY Sec. 601. Bank Competition Modernization. Sec. 602. Merger Agreement Approvals Clarity and Predictability. Sec. 603. Merger Process Review. Sec. 604. Bank Failure Prevention.”
“(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Main Street Capital Access Act'' or the ``Main Street Act''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I--NEW BANK FORMATION AND LOCAL COMMUNITY ACCESS Sec. 101. Promoting New Bank Formation. Sec. 102. New Bank Application Numbers Knowledge. Sec. 103. CDFI Fund Transparency. Sec. 104. CDFI Bond Guarantee Improvement. TITLE II--TAILORING BANK REGULATION Sec. 201. Taking Account of Institutions with Low Operation Risk. Sec. 202. Small Bank Holding Company Relief. Sec. 203. Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations. Sec. 204. Community Bank Regulatory Tailoring. TITLE III--FAIR AND TRANSPARENT BANK SUPERVISION Sec. 301. Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision. Sec. 302.”
“Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1438, I call up the bill (H.R. 6955) and ask for its immediate consideration by the House. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bost). Pursuant to House Resolution 1438, in lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Financial Services, printed in the bill, an amendment in [[Page H4708]] the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 119-35 is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read. The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows: H.R. 6955 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.”
“The provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not apply to any global systemically important BHC (as such term is defined in section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation). The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XIX, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit. The question is on the motion to recommit. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it. Ms. GARCIA of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed. ____________________”
“Motion to Recommit Ms. GARCIA of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit. The Clerk read as follows: Ms. Garcia of Texas moves to recommit the bill H.R. 6955 to the Committee on Financial Service. The material previously referred to by Ms. Garcia of Texas is as follows: Ms. Garcia of Texas moves to recommit the bill H.R. 6955 to the Committee on Financial Services with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendment: After section 1, insert the following: SEC. 2. LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO G-SIBS.”
“Speaker, I urge everyone on both sides of the aisle to support this bill. Echo Alexander Hamilton, our first Secretary of the Treasury, when he said that our banks in this early founding of our Nation are the nurseries of our national wealth. Mr. Speaker, today, 250 years later, long after the adoption of our government, our community banks, our credit unions, they are the nurseries of the national wealth that help our families and our businesses succeed. I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I yield back the balance of my time. The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired. Pursuant to House Resolution 1438, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.”
“Democrat from Michigan Don Riegle, U.S. Senator, 1995. Was it ever implemented? No, but it will be implemented when this bill becomes law. This bill is focused on more capital, more deposits, more business, more success for our community banks, which in turn helps every one of our towns in this country. Who is for it? Community development financial institutions, our CDFIs, have bipartisan support. They are for this bill. Our community development officials across the Nation are for this bill, as they were for the housing bill. The National Bankers Association, our national association for African-American bankers, wrote a letter for this bill. {time} 1350 Mr. Speaker, this bill has overwhelming support to increase competition and help our community banks thrive and succeed, which means our towns will thrive and succeed. In closing, Mr.”
“The bank is smaller than $500 million, and I said, how are things going? He said, it is going great except when I have five exams in a row and then the loan pipeline goes to zero. Because, guess what, I am the chief loan officer and the chief compliance officer in this small bank, and when my community bank is filled with bank examiners for an IT exam, a trust exam, an investment exam, an AML, anti-money laundering, and Bank Secrecy Act exam, a loan quality exam, a consumer compliance exam, I can't make loans. If you are well-managed and have high capital, you get some relief in this bill. That is who this bill, Mr. Speaker, is aimed at. If you have a concern that your exam was unfair, we return some fairness in the exam process. You can go and actually question, was my exam fair or not? Whose idea was that, Mr. Speaker?”
“They had to comply with those [[Page H4731]] laws before Dodd-Frank, and they comply with them since Dodd-Frank. I reject the idea that somehow we are limiting or curtailing or blocking or making ineffective consumer compliance. Secondly, it is our hometown banks, both rural banks and urban banks in our towns and cities, that benefit from this banking set of provisions. As the ranking member noted, in our housing bill that we collaborated on successfully--that we got passed and it became law on July 10--banks had some provisions there that helped them. This is the same theme continuing in this bill. If you are a small, well-managed bank under $6 billion, you get some relief, Mr. Speaker. If you are well-managed, have good capital, you can help schedule your exams. I was with a community banker in North Carolina this week.”
“I thanked Andy Barr, our majority subcommittee chair, a few minutes ago, but I will also thank Dr. Bill Foster of Illinois, who serves as the ranking member on our Subcommittee on Financial Institutions for his collaboration with Mr. Barr on this succesful bill. Mr. Speaker, I heard a lot of charges about this bill, that somehow this bill benefits Wall Street versus Main Street, and I just couldn't disagree more. I noted that two-thirds of these bills have strong Democratic support, along with our Republicans. Secondly, there is nothing in this bill that weakens consumer compliance. The fair lending laws, the fair housing laws, and the equal credit opportunity laws, all those consumer statutes are upheld in this text. They are not really affected by this text. Banks have to comply with those laws.”
“Speaker, two-thirds of the bills in this package that we are voting on, the Main Street Capital Access Act, are supported by Members on the Democratic side of the aisle. This is a truly bipartisan package of bills. We have significant work and support from individual Members on the Democratic side of the aisle in partnership with House Republicans. I also thank Maura Woosley, who is the majority staff director, Jae Jang, and their entire team in the majority working with the minority staff, and the minority staff to craft this package. In Congress, you can't put together the kinds of successful legislative packages that the House Financial Services Committee has done in this Congress without a very hardworking and competent staff. I thank them on both sides of the aisle.”
“I don't know exactly what they are being told by Trump, but I know Trump is in charge, and he is charging a lot of what is going on. I urge my colleagues to please vote ``no'' on this bill, and support the citizens, support their constituents, not Wall Street. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the time remaining. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Arkansas has 5\1/2\ minutes remaining. Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, first, before I start, I thank the ranking member and the committee members on her side of the aisle for their work with us on developing this bill over many months. Mr.”
“He is in control. He is running this country. Those people who are selected to run these so-called independent agencies are those who will do nothing but what they are told to do. That is probably because the groups who represent actual people oppose this bill. That is what they are told to do. That is the leadership they have. Now is not the time to plant new seeds for the next crisis. Now is not the time to juice the mega banks' profit margins. Now is not the time to legitimize Trump's efforts to gut the CFPB, fair lending, and other consumer protections. Again, I am so proud and pleased with the work we did in a bipartisan manner. I am so proud and pleased that we were able to negotiate through some very tough times. I am so proud to announce that we had to give some, and we took some. They gave some, and we worked it out.”
“Speaker, this bill is a distraction from what Congress should be focusing on: ending the affordability crisis caused by Trump's failed policies. Nothing in this bill will help consumers afford groceries or pay for gas. Do you know who is not suffering during the affordability crisis? Wall Street. This bill would loosen the guardrails on Wall Street mega banks even as they report record profits. Even Chairwoman Foxx admitted that this bill is all about deregulation and rolling back Dodd-Frank, a law she said she strongly dislikes. Chairman Hill said they received drafting assistance from Trump's regulators and banks, but not from organizations that represent workers or consumers. Mr. Speaker, we are not stupid. We understand that Trump controls all of his so-called organizations that are independent. He tells them what to do. We get that.”
“Now, here come Republicans to push for what they and their allies want: financial deregulation. This bill has 24 Republican provisions compared to just 2 from Democrats. In fact, I am disappointed that my friends on the other side of the aisle are advancing provisions that even contradict our carefully crafted bipartisan agreement in the housing bill. There is a provision in this bill on de novo banks that goes beyond our bipartisan deal, allowing regulators to decide whether to make permanent reforms that really should be for Congress to decide. We struck a compromise in passing the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, and I think everyone who voted for that should honor that compromise. Ultimately, Mr.”
“National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low-income clients), New Yorkers for Responsible Lending, Oregon Consumer Justice, Oregon Consumer League, Proud Ground, Public Citizen, Rise Economy, South Dallas Fair Park Innercity Community Development Corporation, Strong Economy For All Coalition, TCH Development, Inc, Transparency Task Force, Utah Housing Coalition, Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, we know how to support community banks and credit unions. We just did that with our landmark housing bill, and I was pleased to work with the chairman of that committee, Mr. Hill. It became law just a few days ago and included five Republican bills and four Democratic ones that were focused on supporting community banks.”
“Moreover, it is deceptive to suggest that banks need merchant banks to make affordable housing and small business investments, because most banks can and do extend commercial credit for these purposes already. For the reasons above, we urge you to oppose this dangerous deregulatory package and protect borrowers, small investors, retirees, and the integrity and stability of our financial system. Sincerely, African Community Housing & Development (ACHD), AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, ASIAN. Inc., Communications Workers of America (CWA), Community Housing Development Corporation, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Reports, Delaware Community Reinvestment Action Council Inc., Fair Finance Watch, Freedom Equity Inc., Georgia Advancing Communities Together, Inc., Indivisible, National Association of Consumer Advocates.”
“Bank merger scrutiny needs to become more robust, and this section would move in the opposite direction--further enabling a pattern of rubber-stamping mergers, increasing costs for depositors, customers, and small businesses as well as heightening systemic risk. Sec. 801. Merchant Banking Modernization. This section would extend the alliance between the megabanks and merchant banking that can create anticompetitive problems and complex combinations of banking and commerce, as happened when JPMorgan was charged with manipulating aluminum prices through its merchant bank affiliates' ownership of an aluminum warehouse. These merchant banking partnerships are more likely to run afoul of the mixing of banking and commerce and primarily benefit the biggest banks. There is no need to extend this by 50 percent.”
“These anticompetitive problems will be more acute for those with limited transportation and for services that are more commonly received at community banks, like small business loans and farm loans. Sec. 604. Bank Failure Prevention. This section would weaken oversight of bank mergers by imposing a strict 120-day deadline--running from initial submission, regardless of whether the record was complete-- for regulators to approve or deny applications, regardless of whether the application is complete or all necessary information has been provided. This would limit regulators' ability to consider input from affected stakeholders and properly evaluate the risks of consolidation.”
“These reviews could divert limited agency resources from supervision and enforcement while creating repeated opportunities for industry to weaken or eliminate protections that remain necessary. Sec. 601. Bank Competition Modernization. This section would weaken scrutiny of bank mergers involving institutions with less than $10 billion in assets by directing regulators not to consider whether qualifying transactions would substantially reduce competition or restrain trade. This would permit greater consolidation in many local and rural markets without a meaningful assessment of the effects on prices, service quality, branch access, or the availability of small-business and agricultural credit.”
“The mandated disclaimer could encourage regulated firms to disregard prudent supervisory expectations unless every standard is first imposed through a lengthy formal rulemaking or enforcement action, weakening regulators' ability to respond quickly to developing risks. [[Page H4730]] Sec. 403. Regulatory Efficiency, Verification, Itemization, and Enhanced Workflow. This section would require financial regulators to conduct more frequent reviews of existing rules and place greater emphasis on cumulative compliance costs and regulatory burdens. This would still institutionalize a recurring deregulatory process that treats longstanding safeguards as burdens to be minimized.”
“FDIC Board Accountability. This section would alter the criteria for serving on the FDIC, reduce the consideration of consumer protection and enforcement of consumer protection and consideration of regulatory compliance. Sec. 402. Stop Agency Fiat Enforcement of Guidance. This section would require financial regulators to emphasize that supervisory guidance is not legally binding and that failure to follow guidance does not itself establish a violation of law. Guidance is an important tool for communicating supervisory expectations, identifying emerging risks, and encouraging institutions to correct unsafe practices before they become violations or crises.”
“This would give regulated firms another avenue to delay and complicate enforcement, increasing litigation costs and weakening regulators' ability to address misconduct and unsafe practices promptly. Sec. 304. Financial Integrity and Regulation Management. This section would open the door and pressure regulators to remove reputational risk considerations when assessing a bank's safety and soundness. Reputational damage has historically contributed to instability in major banks. Eliminating consideration of reputational risk would hinder regulators' ability to identify and mitigate risks, potentially increasing the incidence of money laundering, financial fraud and exploitation, national security threats, and bank failures. Please also see this letter signed by 25 public interest organizations opposing the FIRM Act (H.R. 2702). Sec. 401.”
“This additional appeals process, layered atop existing mechanisms, would enable banks, especially large banks, to challenge numerous supervisory findings, thereby impeding effective oversight. Such changes would undermine the post-2008 financial crisis regulatory framework, increasing systemic risks and exposing the public to potential abuses. Robust supervision is necessary to maintain financial stability and protect consumers, and this section undermines it. Addidonally, this section now includes new language that would also allow banks, credit unions, executives, and other institution-affiliated parties to move certain enforcement and civil penalty proceedings from the appropriate regulator to federal district court.”
“While not easily quantifiable, sound management and public confidence have repeatedly proven vital to bank stability, as evidenced by failures like Riggs Bank, SVB, and Credit Suisse. The proposed changes would not eliminate risk but would instead conceal real risks from regulators, making supervision more mechanical and increasing the likelihood of future financial crises. Sec. 302. Fair Audits and Inspections for Regulators' Exams. This section would significantly weaken bank supervision by allowing bank to appeal any supervisory determination to a new external ``Office of Independent Examination Review,'' which would conduct a de novo review without deference to the original findings.”
“Importantly, the automatic increases of supervisory thresholds would include--and thus periodically erode--Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) coverage and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) applicability, undermining fair lending accountability and weakening critical tools that help detect and deter redlining and other forms of racial discrimination in mortgage and small business lending. Sec. 301. Halting Uncertain Methods and Practices in Supervision. This section would undermine effective bank supervision by restricting the CAMELS rating system to ``objective'' criteria only, sidelining important qualitative factors like management quality and reputational risk. These factors are essential in identifying and deterring harmful practices, such as predatory lending, money laundering, and risky environmental exposures.”
“At a time of overlapping risks, this kind of across-the-board threshold inflation is likely to lead to supervisory and regulatory gaps and obscure risk from view until it is too late--all simply because the economy has grown or prices increased. The result would be a banking system that is more opaque and less resilient when conditions worsen--increasing financial fragility and the probability that losses will need to be socialized through emergency interventions or outright bailouts.”
“The practical effect would be to steadily and broadly expand the number and size of banks that are excluded from regulatory oversight. The threshold increases would inappropriately reduce compliance under statutes that were designed for genuinely smaller and simpler banking institutions with limited systemic footprint, and would happen without any determination as to whether the affected exemptions remain appropriate, whether the institutions have become more complex or interconnected, or whether raising the thresholds would create new supervisory gaps. Over time, this section would reduce the number of institutions and activities subject to baseline guardrails, weaken transparency, increase conflicts of interest, and blunt early warning and accountability tools embedded in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) framework.”
“This section would establish automatic increases to asset thresholds for enhanced prudential oversight every five years, allowing problems to fester unaddressed in increasingly large institutions that could have significant systemic implications. The failures of Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic demonstrate the danger of mechanically raising asset thresholds--the last round of tailoring reduced scrutiny of institutions whose failures ultimately required extraordinary government intervention. Sec. 204. Community Bank Regulatory Tailoring. Under the pretext of relief for community banks, this section would rewrite a wide swath of federal banking, consumer financial protection, and fair lending laws by mandating automatic increases of a broad range of statutory thresholds every five years based on inflation or nominal economic growth.”
“The Federal Reserve has long recognized that bank holding companies should ``serve as a source of strength for their subsidiary banks.'' Allowing parent holding companies to operate with higher levels of debt would undermine that principle and, instead of ``a source of strength,'' holding companies may even drain the resources of the subsidiary banks in order to service excessive debt. By allowing larger institutions to operate under looser standards, this section could dangerously incentivize increased leverage, reduce bank safety and soundness, and accelerate bank consolidation. Additionally, this threshold has already been eroded over the past decade, raising it from $500 million to $1 billion in 2014, and again to $3 billion in 2018. Sec. 203. Tailoring and Indexing Enhanced Regulations.”
“Regulators already tailor rules based on institution size and risk, which makes this legislation unnecessary and potentially harmful by creating additional legal and procedural barriers to effective oversight. Sec. 202. Small Bank Holding Company Relief. This section would double title consolidated asset threshold under the Small Bank Holding Company and Savings and Loan Holding Company Policy Statement from $3 billion to $6 billion, posing risks to subsidiary small banks and the financial system. This change would allow a broader range of bank holding companies to operate with higher levels of debt and be exempt from certain capital and leverage requirements, particularly in order to facilitate mergers.”
“The provisions discussed below show how H.R. 6955 would magnify ongoing agency deregulation and dismantle safeguards needed to identify and contain risks before they harm families, the financial system, and the broader economy. Section by section concerns Sec. 201. Taking Account of Institutions with Low Operation Risk. This section would significantly weaken financial regulation by mandating that agencies prioritize reducing compliance costs for financial institutions over protecting consumers and ensuring financial stability. The section would create fertile ground for even large banks to challenge regulations in court by claiming undue burden, potentially overturning existing Dodd-Frank rules and hindering future regulatory actions.”
“At the same time, the bill would weaken transparency and accountability, making it harder to detect problems early and intervene before they turn into crises. The competition and merchant banking provisions in Sections 601, 604, and 801 would add new stress points by accelerating bank-fintech/crypto arrangements, and making it easier to rubber stamp mergers and concentration--while expanding merchant banking des that blur the line between banking and commerce and increase conflicts of interest and complexity. This radical legislation would compound an already aggressive deregulatory spree at the Federal Reserve and other banking agencies. Taken together, these changes would be more damaging than the sum of their parts, leaving the financial system dramatically weaker and more vulnerable to instability and crisis.”
“As a result, fewer institutions, activities, and risks would remain inside baseline guardrails even as the system grows more complex and interconnected. The combined effect is to encourage higher leverage and risk-taking, thinner cushions of safety, and looser prudential standards. It would return the financial system to a pre-2008 pattern where risk migrates out of view, problems build for years at midsize and large institutions, and the public is left holding the bag when things break. The supervision and governance provisions in Sections 301- 304 and 401-403 would tie regulators' hands by narrowing what examiners may consider, slowing supervisory action, and giving banks more opportunities to appeal, contest, and delay findings.”
“As a result, fewer institutions, activities, and risks would remain within baseline guardrails even as the financial system grows more complex and interconnected. The combined effect would be higher leverage and risk-taking, thinner cushions against losses, and weaker prudential standards. It [[Page H4729]] would return the financial system to a pre-2008 pattern in which risk migrates out of view, problems build for years at midsize and large institutions, and the public is left holding the bag when those institutions fail. Sections 201-204 would raise statutory thresholds, expand ``tailoring'' well beyond genuinely small and simple banks, and hard-wire automatic future threshold increases.”
“Further deregulation is especially alarming at a time when financial regulatory agencies are under political attack, pursuing industry-friendly agendas, and starved of resources, and when there is effectively no oversight of financial markets. H.R. 6955 treats bank rules as burdens to be minimized rather than what they are: essential safeguards that reduce the likelihood and severity of systemic risk, bank failures, and publicly financed bailouts, while protecting consumers from predatory practices, redlining, and other forms of racial discrimination in lending. Sections 201-204 would raise statutory thresholds, extend ``tailoring'' well beyond genuinely small and simple banks, and hard-wire automatic future threshold increases.”
“Speaker, I include this letter in the Record. July 21, 2026. Re Oppose bank deregulation package H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act or the Main Street Act. Hon. Member of Congress, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Representative: The 28 undersigned labor, civil rights, democracy, consumer, housing, economic justice, and public interest advocacy organizations are writing to oppose H.R. 6955, the Main Street Capital Access Act or the Main Street Act. This dangerous bank deregulation package would undermine core safeguards and supervision, push risk into the shadows, and make the next publicly financed bailout more likely.”
“That is what we are supposed to do. Sometimes they can't find us. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. {time} 1540 Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, I have another letter that says: ``This dangerous bank deregulation package would undermine core safeguards and supervision, push risk into the shadows, and make the next publicly financed bailout more likely. Further deregulation is especially alarming at a time when financial regulatory agencies are under political attack, pursuing industry-friendly agendas, and starved of resources, and when there is effectively no oversight of financial markets.'' It was signed by the AFL-CIO, Americans for Financial Reform, and dozens of others. Mr.”
“They don't have time to listen to you talking about how you only have $200,000 and you want to buy this House around the corner. They are not interested in that. They are interested in the big money. They are interested in not only providing the loans for those who are spending a half million or so on a bank that they are trying to use to get a house. It is clear: The Big Banks are sick and tired of the way that they are being treated. They know they have a lot of power and a lot of friends in the Congress of the United States of America. They don't know a new day is coming and a new way is coming. People are learning more and more why they have a right to be disturbed about the way that they are being treated. I tell people: Don't be afraid to confront those Big Banks. Call us. Get your legislator to help you out.”