Mike D. Rogers
Representative for Alabama · Republican · United States
“(8) An assessment of NATO's deterrence efforts in Romania, including a description and evaluation of-- (A) United States force posture in Romania, including any new rotations to Romania intended to enhance deterrence following the 2025 decision to end the rotational presence of a United States brigade; (B) consultations with NATO allies r…”
“(8) An assessment of NATO's deterrence efforts in Romania, including a description and evaluation of-- (A) United States force posture in Romania, including any new rotations to Romania intended to enhance deterrence following the 2025 decision to end the rotational presence of a United States brigade; (B) consultations with NATO allies r…”
“(a) Requirement for Risk-based Approach.--Section 3843 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 3843. Contractor business systems: monitoring and surveillance standards ``(a) Requirement for Risk-based Approach.--The Secretary shall implement an agile, streamlined risk-based approach to surveillance of contra…”
“(a) Requirement for Risk-based Approach.--Section 3843 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: ``Sec. 3843. Contractor business systems: monitoring and surveillance standards ``(a) Requirement for Risk-based Approach.--The Secretary shall implement an agile, streamlined risk-based approach to surveillance of contra…”
“(b) Modification of Certain Certifications and Assessments.-- (1) Certifications.--Section 1249(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) is amended-- (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``The certification described'' and inserting following: ``(1) In general.--Except as prov…”
“(b) Objectives.--The Commander shall ensure that the Cognitive Performance Enhancement Program-- (1) improves readiness, resilience, and recovery, using evidence-based holistic and proactive high-performance brain training that has a validated ability to scale cost- effectively across the special operations forces enterprise; [[Page H4842…”
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“4201) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (4)(B), by inserting ``except as provided in paragraph (5),'' before ``shall not apply''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(5) Exclusion for shipbuilding programs.--Paragraph (4)(B) shall not apply to manufactured articles procured in connection with a shipbuilding program.''. SEC. 1838. TRIENNIAL REVIEW OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR DEFENSE SUPPLIERS.”
“4841 note) is amended-- (1) by striking ``September 30, 2027'' and inserting ``February 28, 2027''; (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end; (3) in subparagraph (G)(ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (4) by adding at the end the following: [[Page H4884]] ``(H) a methodology for establishing common part numbering system for AM materials, processes, and parts; and ``(I) a methodology for qualification testing for small run critical parts.''. SEC. 1837. ENHANCED DOMESTIC CONTENT REQUIREMENT FOR SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS. Section 835(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 338; 10 U.S.C. note prec.”
“Section 1846(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (F), by striking the word ``and''; (2) in subparagraph (G)(ii), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and (3) by adding the following new subparagraph: ``(H) risk-based policies and best practices to prevent the dissemination of information or capabilities that enable influence of entities located in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea over the production of parts, including a preference for the use of parts produced through secure, domestic advanced manufacturing processes.''. SEC. 1836. MODIFICATIONS TO ADVANCED MANUFACTURING POLICY REVIEW AND GUIDANCE. Section 1846(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60; 10 U.S.C.”
“``(2) Notation.--Not later than 60 days after receipt of the plan described in paragraph (1), the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency shall update the No Bid Solicitation List to include a notation for items that have been identified under subsection (a)(1) as critical readiness items of supply.''; and (2) in subsection (e), by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: ``(3) The term `No Bid Solicitation List' means the list maintained by the Defense Logistics Agency identifying solicitations that have received no bids or no responsive offers within required procurement timelines. ``(4) The term `covered system' has the meaning given in section 4324 of title 10, United States Code.''. SEC. 1835. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE RELATED TO ADVANCED MANUFACTURING.”
“``(d) Implementation.-- ``(1) Working group.--Following receipt of the plan described in paragraph (1), members of the collaborative forum established under such section 1844 shall establish a working group (or other appropriate organization) to implement such plan by developing or identifying advanced manufacturing solutions to increase the production of critical readiness items of supply identified under subsection (a)(1), where such solutions are likely ensure the production of such items not later than 24 months after the date of the establishment of the working group.”
“Section 1842 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) is amended-- (1) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsections: ``(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit the plan required by subsection (a) to-- ``(1) the collaborative forum established under section 1844 of this Act (Public Law 119-60; 10 U.S.C. 4811 note); ``(2) the Defense Logistics Agency; and ``(3) the congressional defense committees.”
“(b) Life-cycle Sustainment Plan.--Section 4324(b)(1)(C) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, where such considerations shall include the application of alternative methods to support sustainment, including reverse engineering, reengineering, and advanced manufacturing (as defined in section 4841 of this title)''. SEC. 1834. REPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN FOR ADVANCED MANUFACTURING FOR CERTAIN CRITICAL READINESS ITEMS OF SUPPLY.”
“(b) Limitation on Use of Certain Amounts.--The Secretary of Defense may not use amounts made available before the date of the enactment of this Act to carry out activities under the authority of subparagraph (Q) of section 4817(g)(1) of title 10, United States Code, as added by this section. SEC. 1833. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF ALTERNATIVE MATERIAL SOURCES. (a) Defense Modernization Account.--Section 3136(d) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: ``(7) For developing alternative material sources, through technologies including reverse engineering, reengineering, and advanced manufacturing (as defined in section 4841 of this title), to meet operational requirements.''.”
“(b) Limitation on Use of Certain Funds.--The Secretary of Defense may not use funds made available before the date of the enactment of this Act to carry out activities under the authority of subsection (g)(1)(L) or (g)(1)(P) of section 4817 of title 10, United States Code, as added by this Act. SEC. 1832. INCLUSION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN USES OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE FUND. (a) In General.--Section 4817(g)(1) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by section 1831, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(Q) Biotechnology and biomanufacturing.''.”
“(a) In General.--Section 4817(g)(1) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 867 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), is amended-- (1) by amending subparagraph (L) to read as follows: ``(L) Ships or submarines, including technologies and capabilities supporting the assembly or automation of ships or submarines, new or modernized infrastructure for the construction of ships or submarines, and infrastructure or capabilities for the maintenance, sustainment, or battle- damage repair of ships or submarines (including private- sector drydock and ship repair infrastructure components and systems).''; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(P) Advanced microelectronics packaging, including substrates, interposers, heterogeneous integration, and related manufacturing capability and capacity.''.”
“(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified annex. Subtitle B--Provisions Relating to Defense Industrial Base Manufacturing SEC. 1831. CLARIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE USES OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE FUND.”
“(a) Report Required.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the following: (1) The feasibility of including requirements for Bills of Materials, including software, hardware, artificial intelligence, and cryptography, within DoD Instruction 5000.87 and the Software Acquisition Pathway. (2) The expected value of the information gained through Bills of Materials as it relates to risk management and supply chain integrity. (3) The necessity of establishing a new system or consolidating existing systems to perform asset management within the Department to house the information in Bills of Materials as it relates to weapon system components currently in use across the Armed Forces.”
“(4) Decisions of the Secretary regarding production rate increases and capacity expansion of defense articles (as defined in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403)). (b) Objectives.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary shall seek to achieve the following objectives with respect to the defense industrial base: (1) Expand production capacity. (2) Stabilize critical suppliers and of the defense industrial base. (3) Incentivize capital investment in critical production lines. SEC. 1818. REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF REQUIRING BILLS OF MATERIALS FOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION.”
“(e) Adversarial Capital Defined.--In this section, the term ``adversarial capital'' means loans or other forms of financial assistance provided to entities in the national and technological industrial base. SEC. 1817. INTEGRATION OF DEMAND FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES INTO INDUSTRIAL BASE PLANNING. (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall include projected demand for foreign military sales, including any foreign military sales that are in progress, in-- (1) Any industrial base assessments conducted by the Secretary. (2) Munitions production planning documents. (3) Sustainment planning for major defense acquisition programs (as defined in section 4201 of title 10, United States Code).”
“(d) Reporting Requirements.-- (1) Initial establishment.--The Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a notification of the designation of an office under subsection (a) and the establishment of the Economic Security Risk Assurance tool in accordance with subsection (c). (2) Annual report.--Not later than December 1, 2027, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report analyzing the activities of the office designated under subsection (a). The report may be provided in classified form and may include any recommendations of the Secretary to reduce or further mitigate risks related to adversarial capital in the national and technological industrial base.”
“(c) Economic Security Risk Assurance Capability.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of the office designated under subsection (a) shall establish and maintain a capability to be known as the ``Economic Security Risk Assurance'' capability, which shall-- (1) consolidate and analyze information related to adversarial capital flows to entities in the national and technological industrial base, supplier identifiers, links between programs of the Department of Defense and suppliers, and other information as determined by such head; (2) enable analysis and reporting to support the assessment and risk mitigation of adversarial capital in the national technology and industrial base; (3) provide visualization of the risk of adversarial capital on entities in the national and technological industrial base; (4) enable federated access by program managers, portfolio acquisition executives, and other appropriate officials of the Department of Defense to supply chain illumination efforts of the Department; and (5) enable the office to better perform the duties outlined by this subsection.”
“(6) Implementing and maintaining continuous automated monitoring of entities in the national [[Page H4883]] and technological industrial base for changes in corporate control, beneficial ownership, geographic sourcing, and supply chain structure. (7) Issuing automated alerts to appropriate members of the acquisition workforce and affected stakeholders upon detection of significant risk indicators of adversarial capital. (8) Applying corroboration protocols requiring validation of significant risk indicators of adversarial capital across not fewer than two independent data sources before forming the basis for risk-tier elevation, mitigation action, or referral to appropriate law enforcement or regulatory authorities.”
“(5) Working with stakeholders to develop and implement clear legal, contractual, and technical procedures to-- (A) support and enable identification of beneficial ownership data of subcontractors (at any tier) and suppliers in the national and technological industrial base that is relevant to national security; (B) ensure appropriate liability protections for such subcontractors and suppliers making good-faith disclosures of data described in subparagraph (A); (C) implement a voluntary risk-sharing framework under which national and technological industrial base entities may share supplier risk information and receive validated risk assessments of the supply chain of such entity in return, with safeguards for proprietary data.”
“(2) Tracing the flow of adversarial capital from its source to entities in the national and technological industrial base. (3) Identifying and monitoring dependencies of entities in the national and technological industrial base on foreign adversaries by identifying-- (A) single points of failure, critical chokepoints, and foreign adversary-controlled aspects of relevant supply chains that could vulnerable to adversarial capital; and (B) tactics, techniques, and procedures used by foreign adversaries to gain influence or control over such entities. (4) Providing specific recommendations to Secretary of Defense on actions or policies necessary to reduce adversarial capital flows for mission-critical weapons systems, technologies, and materials.”
“(b) Duties.--The Secretary shall ensure the office designated under subsection (a) is responsible for the following: (1) Facilitating collaboration among elements of the Department of Defense and with other stakeholders, including private sector entities and academia, to identify and mitigate such risks, including-- (A) by coordinating, deconflicting, and synchronizing adversarial capital risk management activities; (B) by facilitating timely sharing with entities in the national technology and industrial base of threat information, vulnerability assessments, and risk indicators; and (C) by establishing relationships, including through cooperative research and development agreements, to support shared informational understanding of the commercial and economic domain to advance the economic security interests of the Department.”
“SEC. 1816. ASSESSMENT OF RISK RELATED TO ADVERSARIAL CAPITAL IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE. (a) Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall designate an office within the Office of Industrial Base Policy with primary responsibility for assessing and mitigating risks related to the use of adversarial capital by the entities in the national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 4801 of title 10, United States Code).”
“(b) Briefing Required.--Not later than March 1, 2027, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing detailing-- (1) the reliance of the United States on imports or scrap for aluminum production, including reliance on foreign adversaries or other foreign sources that are at risk of supply chain disruption; (2) the current alumina and primary aluminum production capacity in the United States and a near- and long-term assessment of the robustness of such capacity; (3) the status and risks facing advanced aluminum fabrication facilities that are an essential part of the defense industrial base; (4) insights and findings from the ``Aluminum Wargame'' executed by the Defense Logistics Agency under the Defense Logistics Agency Industrial Base Campaign of Learning series; (5) an assessment of the need for large-scale aluminum extrusion capabilities in the United States to support current and projected national defense requirements; (6) an assessment of workforce, permitting, infrastructure, and energy considerations associated with sustaining or expanding large-scale aluminum extrusion capabilities in the United States; (7) opportunities for increased secondary aluminum production in the United States to increase domestic defense- grade aluminum production; and (8) policy, acquisition, or investment options the Secretary of Defense is undertaking or considering to mitigate identified risks or gaps in domestic aluminum extrusion capacity, including potential public-private partnerships or other industrial base support mechanisms, as appropriate.”
“(a) Report.--Upon enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall transmit to the congressional defense committees the report titled ``Primary Aluminum Sector Industrial Base Assessment Report'' issued by the Industrial Analysis Division of the Defense Contract Management Agency and submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy on April 9, 2025.”
“(2) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``covered article'', ``designated order'', ``Federal Acquisition Security Council'', ``foreign adversary'', ``recommended order'', and ``source of concern'' have the meanings given, respectively, in section 1322 of title 41, United States Code (as amended by section 1804 of this Act) in that term in section 1321(3) of title 41, United States Code (as amended by section 1804 of this Act). SEC. 1815. REPORT ON PRIMARY ALUMINUM SECTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT.”
“(g) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes-- (A) an assessment by the Secretary regarding national security risks posed by the procurement or use of optical fiber and optical fiber cable produced or assembled by an entity that is a source of concern based on such entity's affiliation with the People's Republic of China; (B) an assessment of the extent to which such optical fiber is present in, or procured for information networks or communications systems of the Department of Defense, or the networks of Department of Defense contractors and subcontractors; (C) an assessment of the availability of alternative sources of optical fiber from domestic suppliers or suppliers from a country that is not a foreign adversary; (D) an update on the status of the recommendation for evaluation made in accordance with subsection (b); (E) an update on any recommended order or designated order issued or under consideration by the Federal Acquisition Security Council with respect to optical fiber or optical fiber cable from any source of concern affiliated with the People's Republic of China; and (F) any actions taken or recommended to be taken by the Secretary to mitigate risks identified under subparagraph (A), including any proposed amendments to the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation.”
“(f) Scope of Evaluation.--The recommendation under subsection (b) shall specifically request that the Federal Acquisition Security Council evaluation under paragraph (1) of such subsection consider, at a minimum-- (1) whether an entity that produces or assembles optical fiber and optical fiber cable in the People's Republic of China would meet the definition of source of concern; and (2) potential vectors for intelligence collection, disruption, or degradation of national security communications through optical fiber infrastructure procured from such an entity.”
“(d) Effective Date.--This section shall apply to contracts awarded on and after October 1 of the first fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act. (e) FASC Recommendation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall direct the Department of Defense official serving on the Federal Acquisition Security Council to formally recommend that the Council-- (1) evaluate optical fiber and optical fiber cable (including fiber optic cable assemblies) sold, produced, or developed by any entity that constitutes a source of concern due to the relationship of the entity to the People's Republic of China; and (2) determine, based on such evaluation, whether to issue a recommended order with respect to such source of concern, or any covered article sold, produced, or developed by such source of concern.”
“(c) Waiver Authority.-- (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense may waive the prohibition under subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis if the Secretary determines that-- (A) the waiver is necessary for the national security interests of the United States; and (B) no practicable alternative exists from a source not described in subsection (a). (2) Limitation.--A waiver granted under this subsection shall be limited in time and in scope to the minimum extent necessary. (3) Notice.--Not later than 30 days after granting a waiver, the Secretary shall submit written notice to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives describing-- (A) the justification for the waiver; (B) the duration and scope of the waiver; and (C) the plan to transition to compliant materials.”
“(3) The term ``professional services'' includes one or more of the following services: (A) Engineering. (B) Architecture. (C) Design. (D) Environmental consulting. (E) Financial consulting. (F) Program management. (G) Legal. SEC. 1814. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF CHINESE-MANUFACTURED OPTICAL FIBER BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (a) Prohibition.--The Secretary of Defense may not procure or obtain optical fiber and optical fiber cable produced, manufactured, or assembled by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the People's Republic of China for use in Department of Defense information networks or communications systems. (b) Covered Optical Fiber Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered optical fiber'' means single-mode or multi- mode optical fiber and optical fiber cable.”
“(d) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``foreign entity'' has the meaning given in section 225.772-1 of the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (or a successor regulation). (2) The term ``United States company''-- (A) means a business entity that-- (i) is organized under the laws of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States; [[Page H4882]] (ii) has its principal place of business located in the United States, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States; and (iii) is not directly or indirectly owned and controlled by a foreign entity; and (B) includes a joint venture for which a business entity described in subparagraph (A) holds an ownership interest greater than or equal to 50 percent.”
“(c) Reports.--Beginning on March 1, 2028, and annually thereafter through March 1, 2031, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes-- (1) a description of the effectiveness of the preference described in subsection (a) in improving acquisition outcomes in the procurement of professional services; (2) the effect of such preference on the number of domestic entities providing professional services to the Department of Defense; and (3) a summary of instances during the calendar year preceding the date of submission of the report where such preference was not applied, along with rationale for not applying such preference.”
“(b) Relationship to Other Preferences.--The preference established under subsection (a) shall not take priority over any preference for procurement from the procurement list established pursuant to section 8503 of title 41, United States Code, the Federal Prison Industries catalog described under section 4124(d) of title 18, United States Code, or under the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.).”
“(a) Establishment of Preference.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall revise the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure that with respect to contracts for the procurement of professional services, a contracting officer-- (1) shall establish a preference for offerors that are United States companies, to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with the interests of national security; and (2) may elect not to apply such preference if the contracting officer provides documentation, including a rationale, for not applying the preference, which may include evidence-- (A) that the Secretary of Defense prioritized the urgency of the procurement or delivery of professional services over such preference; (B) that no United States company is capable of fulfilling the requirements of the contract in a timely or cost- effective manner; or (C) of other circumstances determined by the Secretary.”
“(3) No automatic rescission.--Removal from the CMC List shall not automatically rescind an exclusion order. (e) Existing Designees.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the Council a written referral under subsection (b)(1) for each entity already appearing on the CMC List for which no exclusion order is in effect. SEC. 1813. DOMESTIC PREFERENCE IN THE PROCUREMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES.”
“(2) Recommendation to the president.--If, as a result of the review, the Council determines to issue such a recommendation, the Council shall transmit the recommendation to the President not later than 90 days after the date on which the Council completes the review. (3) Scope.--The recommendation shall apply Government-wide and include subsidiaries and affiliates identified in the referral. (d) Removal From CMC List.-- (1) Notice.--Not later than 90 days after determining to remove an entity from the CMC List, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Council of the determination and provide the basis for the determination. (2) Review.--Upon receipt of such a notice, the Council shall review whether to transmit to the President a recommendation to rescind or modify the exclusion order.”
“(c) Required Council Action.-- (1) Review required.--Upon receipt of a referral under subsection (b), the Council shall use the information provided in the referral and any other information the Council determines appropriate under section 1323(c) of title 41, United States Code, to review whether to issue a recommendation to the President for an exclusion order prohibiting executive agencies from procuring covered articles produced or provided by the designated entity. The Council shall complete such review not later than 270 days after the date on which the Council receives the referral.”
“(b) Mandatory Referral by the Secretary of Defense.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after determining to add an entity to the CMC List, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the Council a written referral recommending that the Council recommend an exclusion order for covered articles produced or provided by such entity. (2) Contents.--Each referral shall include-- (A) identification of the entity, including known subsidiaries and affiliates; (B) the basis for the determination under such section 1260H, consistent with protection of intelligence sources and methods; and (C) any additional information relevant to the Council's assessment of whether to recommend an exclusion order for covered articles produced or provided by such entity.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) CMC list.--The term ``CMC List'' means the list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note). (2) Covered article.--The term ``covered article'' has the meaning given such term in section 1321 of title 41, United States Code. (3) Exclusion order.--The term ``exclusion order'' means an order referred to in section 1323(c)(1)(A) of title 41, United States Code. (4) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Federal Acquisition Security Council established under section 1322(a) of title 41, United States Code.”
“(4) The term ``covered transaction'' means any Department of Defense contract, subcontract, cooperative agreement, grant, or other transaction with a value greater than $10,000,000. (5) The term ``critical supply dependency'' means a step in a supply chain for a biotechnology equipment or service characterized by a limited supplier base consisting entirely or almost entirely of covered foreign entities, such that disruption from a single covered foreign entity or a small set of covered foreign entities is likely to materially impair the availability of functionally interchangeable biotechnology equipment or services. SEC. 1812. FEDERAL ACQUISITION SECURITY COUNCIL EXCLUSION ORDERS FOR CHINESE MILITARY COMPANY DESIGNEES.”
“(b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. (2) The terms ``biotechnology company of concern'', ``biotechnology equipment or service'', and ``foreign adversary'' have the meaning givens, respectively, in section 851 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60). (3) The term ``covered foreign entity'' means an entity including any subsidiary thereof, organized under the laws of a foreign country if either the principal place of business of such entity is in a foreign adversary or the equity securities of the entity are primarily traded on one or more exchanges based in a foreign adversary.”
“(3) Annex contents.--The classified annex required under paragraph (1) shall, for biotechnology equipment and services described in paragraph (1)-- (A) identify any covered foreign entities analyzed in the report that the Secretary of Defense has recommended or is considering recommending to the Office of Management and Budget for designation as a biotechnology company of concern to inform that recommendation; (B) describe any additional legislative authorities or resource requirements necessary to adequately assess the vulnerability of supply chains for biotechnology equipment and services that contributes to the defense industrial base, including funding, personnel, data access, and technical infrastructure; and (C) elaborate as necessary on the contents of the unclassified report.”
“(2) Report contents.--The unclassified report required under paragraph (1) shall, for biotechnology equipment and services described in such paragraph-- (A) describe the supply chains for such biotechnology equipment and services, including an analysis of critical supply dependencies for such supply chains and the overall vulnerability of such supply chains to geopolitical risk stemming from critical supply dependencies; (B) identify the value of such biotechnology equipment and services, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total value of such biotechnology equipment and services, where the supply chain for such biotechnology equipment or service contained at least one critical supply dependency; (C) list the types of such biotechnology equipment or services with critical supply dependencies in defense industrial base supply chains that, if compromised, would cause significant potential disruption to military readiness; and (D) identify the top five percent of covered transactions for biotechnology equipment and services, as measured by the total expected value over the life of the transaction for biotechnology equipment or services obtained or funded by the Department of Defense for which the supply chains contain at least one critical supply dependency.”
“(a) Annual Reports.-- (1) In general.--Not later than March 1, 2028, and annually thereafter until 2032, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report with a classified annex that assesses, during the year preceding the date of the report, the extent to which the supply chains for biotechnology equipment and services obtained or funded by the Department of Defense through covered transactions contain critical supply dependencies.”
“(2) The term ``foreign ownership, control, or influence'' refers to ownership structures, governance arrangements, financial relationships, or other mechanisms through which a foreign person or entity may direct, materially influence, or control a supplier or sub-tier entity within the defense industrial base. (3) The term ``economic security risks'' means risks arising from supply chain fragility, economic coercion by a covered nation including financing by a covered nation, or other vulnerabilities in a commercial supply chain that may adversely affect national security. SEC. 1811. IDENTIFICATION OF SUPPLY CHAIN DEPENDENCIES.”
“(2) Annual report.--Not later than one year after the date on which the Program is established, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes-- (A) an assessment of the effectiveness of the Program in improving the Department's ability to illuminate, assess, anticipate, and respond to [[Page H4881]] risks across the defense industrial base supply chain; and (B) any additional legislative, regulatory, or policy recommendations necessary to strengthen defense industrial base resilience. (g) Definitions.--In this section: (1) The term ``covered nation'' has the meaning given such term in section 4872 of title 10, United States Code.”
“(f) Reporting Requirements.-- (1) Initial report.--Not later than April 1, 2027, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing-- (A) progress made in implementing the Program; (B) integration of Program activities with existing Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment activities and supply chain risk management activities; and (C) resource requirements, including funding, personnel, data access, and technical infrastructure.”
“(e) Commercial Technology Utilization.--The Secretary shall ensure that any advanced data analytics and artificial intelligence capabilities or tools to support the Program are procured-- (1) in accordance with the preference for commercial products and commercial services under section 3453 of title 10, United States Code; (2) in accordance with the requirements to use competitive procedures under applicable law and the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation; and (3) in a manner that provides the Department with flexibility to adapt procurement strategies to Program needs, evolving market conditions, and advances in technology throughout the life of the Program.”
“(B) A plan of action for successful implementation of the framework developed under paragraph (2). (C) Recommendations for employment of advanced data analytics and artificial intelligence capabilities or tools to support and enable Program activities, including capabilities such as-- (i) mapping of multi-tier supply chains across the defense industrial base, including domestic and international supplier networks; (ii) identifying and linking entities across public records, corporate registries, trade data, and other commercial datasets to identify foreign ownership, control, or influence; (iii) highlighting supplier concentration, single-point dependencies, and other structural risk indicators; and (iv) modeling and forecasting of supply chain disruptions and economic security risks.”
“(d) Implementation.--In implementing this section, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy shall, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and not later than 365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act-- (1) perform an identification and assessment of the supply chain illumination efforts, supply chain risk management activities, and policies of the Department of Defense, along with annual funding profiles associated with such efforts, activities and policies; (2) develop a common framework across the Department of Defense and with contractors of the Department to enable a holistic and coordinated approach for identifying managing risks within defense supply chains; and (3) provide the Secretary of Defense the following: (A) Findings and recommendations based on the assessment performed under paragraph (1), including recommendations related to expansion, consolidation, or cancellation of identified supply chain illumination efforts and supply chain risk management activities.”
“(c) Activities.--The Program shall-- (1) identify and characterize supplier concentration, single-point dependencies, structural vulnerabilities, and risks arising from foreign ownership, control, or influence; (2) inform Department of Defense policy and funding decisions intended to enable rapid, scalable response to supply chain vulnerabilities, including creation of stockpiles and identification of alternative domestic suppliers and surge capacity; and (3) support and inform Department of Defense efforts to reduce reliance on covered nations for supply chains essential to the national defense.”