Adam B. Schiff
Senator for California · Democratic · United States
“(b) Antitrust Exemption.-- (1) In general.--It shall not be considered a violation of any provision of the antitrust laws for-- (A) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange information or assistance relating to a covered artificial intelligence security risk in good faith for the exclusive purpose of a covered artificial inte…”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3749-S3750] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6561. Mr. SCHIFF (for himself and Mr.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S3750] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6564. Mr.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S3736] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] VOTE EXPLANATION Mr. SCHIFF. Mr.”
“(d) Protection of Sensitive Information.--Nothing in this section shall require disclosure of classified information, controlled unclassified information, export-controlled information, proprietary information, operational security information, or information that would increase risks to national security.”
“District Judge for the Southern District of Texas: Nay. Due to unforeseen circumstances on Wednesday, June 24, I was unable to be present for the following rollcall vote No. 187. Had I been present, I would have voted as follows: 1. Rollcall vote 187--Cloture motion Michael J. Hendershot to be U.S.”
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“(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means-- (A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (D) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; (F) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; (G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and (H) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. ______”
“(a) In General.--Not later than 12 hours after detaining an alien at an installation of the Department of Defense, including installations in the United States, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the alien registration number of such alien. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given such term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S3750] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6564. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following: SEC. 1050. REPORTING OF ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBERS OF ALIENS DETAINED AT INSTALLATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.”
“(d) Protection of Sensitive Information.--Nothing in this section shall require disclosure of classified information, controlled unclassified information, export-controlled information, proprietary information, operational security information, or information that would increase risks to national security. (e) Report to Congress.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees describing-- (1) implementation of this section; (2) categories of facilities subject to the guidance; (3) significant incidents reported at covered facilities; (4) corrective actions undertaken following such incidents; and (5) recommendations for additional legislative authority, if necessary. ______”
“(2) Significant incident.--The term ``significant incidents'' means any event that leads to-- (A) an evacuation; (B) a public health emergency; or (C) a disaster declaration from a government entity. (c) Guidance.--The guidance required under subsection (a) shall include requirements for covered facilities to-- (1) maintain regular coordination with local emergency management agencies, fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and other relevant first responders; (2) designate a community liaison responsible for communication with local officials and community members; (3) maintain procedures for notifying local authorities and affected communities following a release, fire, explosion, or other incident that may pose a risk to public health or safety; (4) provide easily accessible and publicly available information regarding emergency notification procedures and appropriate protective actions for nearby residents; (5) conduct periodic outreach or informational briefings for local stakeholders regarding emergency preparedness and community safety; and (6) establish mechanisms through which community members may submit questions or concerns regarding facility operations.”
“(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish guidance governing community engagement and emergency preparedness practices for covered defense industrial facilities. (b) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Covered facility.--The term ``covered defense industrial facility'' means a facility operated by a prime contractor or subcontractor that-- (A) performs manufacturing, storage, testing, processing, or disposal activities in support of a Department of Defense contract; and (B) conducts activities involving hazardous materials, energetic materials, explosives, propellants, toxic substances, or other materials determined by the Secretary to present a significant potential risk to surrounding communities.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S3750] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6563. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title III, add the following: SEC. 358. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.”
“The Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to Congress that details the assistance that has been provided by the Department of Defense to the Department of Homeland Security since January 20, 2025, which is associated with immigration enforcement operations, including-- (1) investigatory assistance; (2) using military bases to detain immigrants; (3) securing operational control of the southern border; and (4) any other support that was carried out with funds appropriated by Public Law 119-21 or Public Law 119-98. ______”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S3750] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6562. Mr. SCHIFF submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the end of subtitle E of title X, add the following: SEC. 1050. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE REPORT.”
“(2) Rules of construction.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to-- (A) create any immunity or exemption from the antitrust laws if the Attorney General determines that the non-Federal entities are not acting in good faith or are otherwise unreasonably engaging in anticompetitive acts; or (B) to limit any private right of action for any violation of the antitrust laws that is not exempt under subsection (b). ______”
“(c) Injunctive Relief.-- (1) In general.--The Attorney General may seek, in a court of competent jurisdiction, an injunction against the initiation or continuation of the provision or exchange of information or assistance by non-Federal entities described in section 3 that violates the antitrust laws if the Attorney General determines that the non-Federal entities are not acting in good faith or are otherwise unreasonably engaging in anticompetitive acts.”
“(4) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (1)(A) shall not be construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost information. (5) Exemption from disclosure.--Any information submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to paragraph (1)(B), including any written notice submitted under that [[Page S3750]] subsection and any information derived from such submission that would reveal the substance of such submission, shall be-- (A) used solely for the purpose of subsection (c); (B) deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code; and (C) withheld, without discretion, from the public under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code.”
“(2) Limitation.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a non- Federal entity receiving information or assistance unless the non-Federal entity uses such information or assistance for a covered artificial intelligence security purpose and has implemented reasonable internal controls to limit the extent to which such information or assistance can be used for other purposes. (3) Affirmative defense.--In any action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws, the exemption provided under paragraph (1) shall constitute an affirmative defense, and any non-Federal entity claiming the exemption shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the entity's actions were taken in good faith and for the exclusive purpose described in paragraph (1).”
“(b) Antitrust Exemption.-- (1) In general.--It shall not be considered a violation of any provision of the antitrust laws for-- (A) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange information or assistance relating to a covered artificial intelligence security risk in good faith for the exclusive purpose of a covered artificial intelligence security purpose; or (B) 2 or more non-Federal entities to provide or exchange information or assistance for the exclusive purpose of coordinating strategies to reduce covered artificial intelligence security risks via delaying or otherwise limiting the release, deployment, use, development, training, testing, or evaluation of artificial intelligence, provided that the non-Federal entities submit prior written notice of the proposed coordinated delay or limitation to the Attorney General, detailing the specific covered artificial intelligence security risk and the scope of the proposed restriction.”
“(7) Unauthorized access.--The term ``unauthorized access'' with respect to artificial intelligence-- (A) means unauthorized access or use of artificial intelligence; and (B) includes-- (i) extraction or copying of model weights, parameters, or other nonpublic model information; (ii) systematic querying or automated extraction designed to distill, replicate, or reconstruct model capabilities; and (iii) compromise affecting the integrity, reliability, or security of artificial intelligence, including through malicious code, a backdoor, manipulated data, or compromise of an artificial intelligence model, training dataset, or artificial intelligence component.”
“(F) Be vulnerable to unauthorized access that-- (i) creates a substantial risk of a consequence described in subparagraphs (A) through (D); or (ii) is for the benefit of, at the direction of, or under the control of-- (I) a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code); or (II) an entity owned, controlled, or directed by a covered nation. (6) Exclusive purpose.--The term ``exclusive purpose'', with respect to the provision of information or assistance, means for the purpose of, with not more than an insubstantial part of the information or assistance being for other purposes.”
“(D) Autonomously improve, or substantially facilitate the autonomous improvement of the capabilities of artificial intelligence in a manner that creates a reasonable risk of a consequence described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). (E) Be stolen, weaponized, trained, developed, or deployed by a covered nation (as defined in section 4872(f)(2) of title 10, United States Code) or an entity owned, controlled, or directed by a covered nation in a manner that poses a significant threat to the national security, including through covert, clandestine, undisclosed, or otherwise concealed development activities that attempt to evade detection or verification.”
“(B) Cause a disruption to, degradation of, impairment of, or loss of operational control over critical infrastructure that is reasonably likely to result in a significant impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. (C) Substantially reduce the ability of a developer, deployer, owner, operator, user, evaluator, auditor, Federal department or agency, or other governmental authority to oversee, evaluate, monitor, control, contain, restrict access to, disable, or terminate such artificial intelligence, if the applicable person or governmental authority has authority or responsibility to do so, including through unauthorized, deceptive, evasive, or malicious activity involving such artificial intelligence.”
“(4) Covered artificial intelligence security purpose.--The term ``covered artificial intelligence security purpose'' means the purpose of protecting against, identifying, evaluating, testing, analyzing, preventing, investigating, or mitigating a covered artificial intelligence security risk. (5) Covered artificial intelligence security risk.--The term ``covered artificial intelligence security risk'' means the potential for artificial intelligence, including during development, training, testing, evaluation, deployment, use, or release, to do 1 or more of the following: (A) Substantially facilitate the development or deployment of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or offensive cyber weapon.”
“(a) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Antitrust laws; non-federal entity.--The terms ``antitrust laws'' and ``non-Federal entity'' have the meanings given those terms, respectively, in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501). (2) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 4001 note). (3) Assistance.--The term ``assistance'' includes the provision of software, hardware, data, personnel, and other resources.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Pages S3749-S3750] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] SA 6561. Mr. SCHIFF (for himself and Mr. Banks) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4784, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows: At the appropriate place in subtitle G of title X, insert the following: SEC. ___. COLLABORATION ON ADVERSARIAL THREATS AND AI SECURITY RISKS.”
“Rollcall vote 189--Cloture motion Arthur Robert Jones to be U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas: Nay. ____________________”
“District Judge for the Southern District of Texas: Nay. Due to unforeseen circumstances on Wednesday, June 24, I was unable to be present for the following rollcall vote No. 187. Had I been present, I would have voted as follows: 1. Rollcall vote 187--Cloture motion Michael J. Hendershot to be U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio: Nay. Due to unforeseen circumstances on Wednesday, June 24, I was unable to be present for the following rollcall vote No. 188. Had I been present, I would have voted as follows: 1. Rollcall vote 188--Confirmation Michael J. Hendershot to be U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio: Nay. Due to unforeseen circumstances on Wednesday, June 24, I was unable to be present for the following rollcall vote No. 189. Had I been present, I would have voted as follows: 1.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 113 (Monday, July 13, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S3736] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] VOTE EXPLANATION Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. President, due to unforeseen circumstances on Wednesday, June 24, I was unable to be present for the following rollcall vote No. 185. Had I been present, I would have voted as follows: 1. Rollcall vote 185--Cloture motion John George Edward Marck to be U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas: Nay. Due to unforeseen circumstances on Wednesday, June 24, I was unable to be present for the following rollcall vote No. 186. Had I been present, I would have voted as follows: 1. Rollcall vote 186--Confirmation John George Edward Marck to be U.S.”