Jeanne Shaheen
Senator for New Hampshire · Democratic · United States
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 119 (Tuesday, July 21, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 21, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S4182] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] VOTE EXPLANATION Mrs. SHAHEEN. Mr.”
“Congressional Record, Volume 172 Issue 119 (Tuesday, July 21, 2026) [Congressional Record Volume 172, Number 119 (Tuesday, July 21, 2026)] [Senate] [Page S4182] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [ www.gpo.gov ] VOTE EXPLANATION Mrs. SHAHEEN. Mr.”
“AMC's advocacy for the passage of the Weeks Act in 1911 is another example of its work at the intersection of conservation and recreation. Known as one of the most important conservation laws in American history, the Weeks Act authorized the Federal Government to purchase private land for the purpose of restoring and protecting forests an…”
“AMC's advocacy for the passage of the Weeks Act in 1911 is another example of its work at the intersection of conservation and recreation. Known as one of the most important conservation laws in American history, the Weeks Act authorized the Federal Government to purchase private land for the purpose of restoring and protecting forests an…”
“Most recently, AMC promoted the passage of the Great American Outdoors Act and the permanent reauthorization of the Land and Water Conservation Fund. This legislation is helping to tackle a substantial backlog of maintenance projects on Federal public lands.”
“Most recently, AMC promoted the passage of the Great American Outdoors Act and the permanent reauthorization of the Land and Water Conservation Fund. This legislation is helping to tackle a substantial backlog of maintenance projects on Federal public lands.”
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“REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS. (a) Report on Russian and Chinese Intelligence Assets in Georgia.-- (1) Defined term.--In this section, the term ``relevant congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; (F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; (G) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.”
“34 et seq.; commonly known as the ``Cable Landing Licensing Act'') or related statutes; (4) to create any new requirement that non-Federal entities obtain additional Federal approvals, beyond those already required under existing law, before planning, constructing, operating, maintaining, or repairing critical undersea infrastructure; or (5) to authorize any Federal department or agency to direct, approve, or veto the day-to-day operational decisions of owners or operators of critical undersea infrastructure, including route selection, maintenance scheduling, or other commercial decisions except as expressly provided by other applicable law. Subtitle F--Countering China's Control of the Caucasus Act SEC. 8771. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering China's Control of the Caucasus Act of 2026''. SEC. 8772.”
“Nothing in this subtitle may be construed-- (1) to confer any new regulatory authority on, or to modify any existing regulatory of, any Federal department or agency with respect to owners and operators of critical undersea infrastructure, to authorize the provision of subsidies to critical undersea infrastructure, or to alter the responsibility of the private sector for the deployment, operation, maintenance, security, and repair of critical undersea infrastructure; (2) to involuntarily require non-Federal entities to share proprietary or confidential business information with the United States Government; (3) to alter existing statutory authorities or criteria governing communications services, or the licensing permitting, or authorization of submarine cable landings, spectrum, or domestic communications regulation, including any requirements under the Act of May 27, 1921 (47 U.S.C.”
“(c) Submittal to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the interagency committee, shall-- (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate congressional committees the procedures required under subsection (b); and (2) not later than one year after submitting such procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, submit to Congress a report on the implementation and execution of information sharing with non-Federal entities in the previous year pursuant to subsection (a). PART IV--LIMITATIONS AND RULE OF CONSTRUCTION SEC. 8764. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.”
“(b) Development of Procedures.--The procedures developed in accordance with this section shall-- (1) ensure the Federal departments and agencies that are members of the interagency committee have and maintain the capacity to identify and inform in near real time information regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage and indications of potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage to other appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent with the protection of classified information; (2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of the interagency committee and non-Federal entities for information sharing, including subsea communications infrastructure-specific information sharing and analysis entities; and (3) require members of the interagency committee and other appropriate Federal agencies which are sharing subsea communications infrastructure sabotage indicators or defensive measures to employ any applicable security controls to defend against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such information.”
“(a) Public-private Sector Information Sharing.--Consistent with the necessary protections of classified information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence material, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate Federal agencies shall, in direct coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and, as appropriate, with intelligence sharing partnerships with trusted allies, issue procedures-- (1) to enable the timely sharing of classified information regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, any indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to subsea communications infrastructure with non-Federal entities that possess the necessary security clearances; (2) to facilitate the timely sharing between members of the interagency committee and non-Federal entities of information related to subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, information relating to indications of potential sabotage, or other threats when such information can be declassified and shared at an unclassified level; (3) to promote the timely sharing by members of the interagency committee to non-Federal entities, and the voluntary, cooperative sharing by non-Federal entities to members of the interagency committee, of unclassified, including controlled unclassified, information regarding subsea communications infrastructure sabotage, indications of potential sabotage, and other threats to subsea communications infrastructure; and (4) to support the prevention or mitigation of adverse effects from sabotage or other threats to subsea communications infrastructure through the timely sharing by members of the interagency committee to non-Federal entities, and the voluntary cooperative sharing by non-Federal entities to members of the interagency committee, when and if appropriate, of information relating to indications of potential subsea communications infrastructure sabotage.”
“(2) A detailed plan for how the interagency committee will advance the objectives outlined in subsection (b). SEC. 8763. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS ON SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.”
“(2) Strategy elements.--The strategies required under paragraph (1) shall include-- (A) resourcing requirements to carry out the activities described in paragraph (1); (B) coordination with United States allies and partners and relevant subsea communications infrastructure industry stakeholders; and (C) the necessary technical expertise within the Federal Government to contribute to the analysis of subsea communications infrastructure sabotage. (e) Report.--Not later than 30 days after establishing the required interagency committee under subsection (b), the President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following elements: (1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff the interagency committee and United States Federal agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in subsection (b).”
“(d) Analysis of Subsea Communications Infrastructure Sabotage.-- (1) In general.--The President shall direct the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies to develop strategies to coordinate closely within the interagency process and, on a voluntary basis, with subsea communications industry stakeholders to review sabotage and other threats to subsea communications infrastructure, including where appropriate and consistent with applicable law and voluntary information- sharing arrangements, by leveraging analysis from aggregated industry data, to-- [[Page S3883]] (A) identify trends; (B) refine attributions, particularly in cases of subsea communications infrastructure sabotage; (C) identify geographic areas where subsea communications infrastructure may face elevated risk; (D) identify Federal Government functions and private sector engagement methods that can support, rather than direct, the security of subsea communications infrastructure; and (E) inform future risk mitigation efforts by Federal departments and agencies to support industry-led measures to reduce damage to subsea communications infrastructure.”
“(c) Coordination.--The President shall direct the interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United States Federal Government's operational authorities for subsea communications security and resilience. The overview shall include an interagency concept of operations describing how Federal departments and agencies will coordinate with one another and, on a voluntary basis, partner with non-Federal entities, including subsea communications owners and operators, to support the security and repair of subsea communications infrastructure in a variety of crisis scenarios.”
“(b) Establishment.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency committee (referred to in this subtitle as the ``interagency committee'') comprised of the heads, or their designees, of the appropriate Federal agencies and departments, to coordinate the United States Government efforts to-- (1) promote awareness of and support for the protection and resilience of subsea communications infrastructure; (2) facilitate voluntary collaboration and information sharing with relevant non-Federal entities, including relevant members of the subsea communications infrastructure industry, to identify and address shared challenges to subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience; (3) coordinate United States Government policies related to subsea communications infrastructure security and resilience; and (4) address other matters related to subsea communications infrastructure deemed appropriate and necessary by the President.”
“(3) In order to ensure United States agencies and departments appropriately account for the risks to subsea communications infrastructure and provide timely and coordinated support when warranted, the United States Government should improve interagency coordination and share risk assessments and best practices with the subsea communications infrastructure industry, while respecting the industry's primary responsibility for security risk mitigation, investment, and operational decision-making.”
“(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) There is no single agency where subsea cable owners and operators can engage the United States Government on security and resilience, including to seek coordinated assistance in identifying and addressing shared risks to subsea communications infrastructure. (2) United States Federal Government responsibilities for the protection of subsea communications infrastructure, damage reporting, information and intelligence sharing, and emergency response are spread across multiple departments and agencies.”
“(d) International Cooperation on Critical Undersea Infrastructure Sabotage.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the United States Government plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within relevant international bodies to encourage and facilitate appropriate information sharing between allied and partner governments and relevant private sector companies regarding threats to, and the sabotage of, critical undersea infrastructure. PART III--INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FROM SABOTAGE SEC. 8762. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COORDINATION ON PROTECTING SUBSEA COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.”
“(b) Assignment.--The Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy shall ensure that personnel assigned to oversee critical undersea infrastructure are provided sufficient time, resources, and ability to carry out those responsibilities effectively, including, as appropriate, by prohibiting dual-hatting arrangement that could dilute the Department's expertise. (c) Notification.--Not later than 15 days after fulfilling the expertise requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary shall notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.”
“PART II--DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE SEC. 8761. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED EXPERTISE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (a) In General.--The Secretary shall ensure that the Department has adequate expertise to support the Department's diplomatic and interagency engagement on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure, including-- (1) promoting the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure through international cooperation; (2) coordinating with United States allies and partners on foreign policy and security aspects of critical undersea infrastructure; and (3) representing United States interests and engagement in international bodies that address critical undersea infrastructure.”
“(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 5 years, the Secretary, in coordination with other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines efforts by the United States Government in the prior calendar year to work with international allies and partners to strengthen the security and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure, including-- (1) a list of current foreign policies, laws, or regulatory practices that may create barriers or constrain the ability of critical undersea infrastructure operators to install, maintain, repair, and protect critical undersea infrastructure and any steps taken through dialogue with allies and partners to address such challenges; and (2) a description of the progress made in the previous calendar year as a result of United States diplomatic engagement with allies and partners on these issues.”
“(b) Commitment of Personnel and Resources.--The Secretary shall devote sufficient personnel and resources towards-- (1) engaging with foreign countries, in coordination with other relevant Federal agencies and private industry, to promote international cooperation on the security and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure, including by helping address regulatory and diplomatic obstacles that may affect the timely deployment and protection by operators; and (2) working with allies and partners to improve collective preparedness and response times in the event of sabotage affecting critical undersea infrastructure, including, as appropriate, by supporting international coordination mechanisms that facilitate the timely deployment of cable repair and support vessels.”
“(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) as international critical undersea infrastructure expands, the complexity of the deployment and protection of subsea cables is increasing, which can create operational and security vulnerabilities that, if exploited, may have national security implications for the United States and foreign partners; (2) the United States, together with its allies and partners, is well positioned to offer technical, material, and other forms of support to international partners to enhance the resilience of international critical undersea infrastructure; (3) the United States Government should enhance its diplomatic engagement with trusted allies to support foreign governments and private industry efforts to improve the timely and effective deployment and protection of critical undersea infrastructure; and (4) given the importance of critical undersea infrastructure to United States and allied energy security and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly prioritizing capabilities designed to target United States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.”
“Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period. (c) Classification.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8758. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.”
“(5) A list of instances during the previous calendar year in which the United States, or allies and partners of the United States, documented anomalous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea infrastructure, including-- (A) any official United States Government response to counter the anomalous behavior; and (B) any coordinated diplomatic action with allies and partners. (6) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-based entities are involved in laying, maintaining, and repairing United States-invested cables. (b) Initial and Subsequent Reports.--The initial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act.”
“(4) An assessment of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC on sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including-- (A) any current or planned operational coordination against United States or allied and partner nation targets; [[Page S3882]] (B) any joint research, development, testing, or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure sabotage or seabed warfare capabilities; (C) any technology transfers or joint training related to critical undersea infrastructure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and (D) any coordination in procurement of advanced technologies related to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage, seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against the Russian Federation.”
“(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based entities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime militia or commercial vessels related to monitoring and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including-- (A) a description of recent capability developments related to sabotaging critical undersea infrastructure, including for both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and (B) a description of the PRC's use of ostensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research vessels for sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo- Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.”
“(2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including-- (A) a description of GUGI's use of ostensibly civilian research vessels to conduct critical undersea infrastructure seabed warfare, and potential sabotage; (B) an assessment of the impact of sanctions on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced technologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and (C) a list of suspected GUGI research or scientific vessels, including vessel names and International Maritime Organization and Maritime Mobile Service Identity numbers, and related equipment that are suspected of engaging in dual- use operations and probing of critical undersea infrastructure.”
“(a) Report.--To ensure appropriate deterrence, escalation management, and responses related to critical undersea infrastructure, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), in coordination with the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following: (1) A description, with respect to the applicable reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing, installation, and maintenance capabilities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation.”
“(f) National Security Interests Waiver.--The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees-- (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a report, including an optional classified annex, explaining the basis for the certification. SEC. 8757. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.”
“(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an individual or entity that is not a United States person. (4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321). (5) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321). (6) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' means-- (A) any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States.”
“(4) Exception for safety of vessels and crew.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to a person providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other significant damage. (e) Definitions.--In this section: (1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). (2) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).”
“(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities.-- Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (3) Exception for humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply to-- (A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, or humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or (B) transactions that are necessary for or related to the activities described in subparagraph (A).”
“(d) Exceptions.-- (1) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary-- (A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.”
“1705) shall apply to any person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any prohibition of this section, or an order or regulation prescribed under this section, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).”
“(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under clause (i) shall-- (I) take effect immediately; and (II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (c) Implementation; Penalties.-- (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.”
“(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.-- (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien described in subsection (a) shall be-- (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). (B) Current visas revoked.-- (i) In general.--The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.”
“(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this subsection are the following: (1) Blocking of property.--The President may exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.”
“(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or knowingly facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infrastructure, including-- (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly-- (A) commits acts of sabotage; or (B) conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and (2) any foreign person that the President determines knowingly-- (A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity; (C) facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1); (D) provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; (E) provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanctions; or (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.”
“[[Page S3881]] (3) A description of how the People's Republic of China entities leverage their engagement with relevant international bodies to further their strategic interests. (4) A description of how encouraging other countries and regional bodies to engage with relevant international bodies can better ensure coordinated, consistent global critical undersea infrastructure policies. (5) A description of international bodies relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the United States should increase its diplomatic engagement. SEC. 8756. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.”
“(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes the following: (1) A description of how strengthened United States Government engagement with relevant international bodies, including in coordination with the United States domestic subsea cable industry, could support United States national security objectives as it relates to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (2) A description of key objectives for promoting and protecting United States national security interests within relevant international bodies.”
“SEC. 8755. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFEGUARD UNITED STATES INTERESTS. (a) In General.--The Secretary, in coordination with the interagency committee, as appropriate, shall seek to deepen United States Government engagement with relevant international bodies to advance United States national security and economic interests as it relates to critical undersea infrastructure.”
“Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region. SEC. 8754. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) critical undersea infrastructure represents vital strategic and economic links between the United States and its partners and allies; (2) according to NATO, ``undersea cables carry an estimated $10 trillion in transfers every day; two-thirds of the world's oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of global data flows are transmitted via undersea cables''; (3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially across Northern Europe and East Asia; (4) private sector owners and operators of critical undersea infrastructure are responsible for the installation, maintenance, security, and repair of critical undersea infrastructure, and the role of the United States Government is to support, not supplant, those responsibilities through domestic and international coordination, including with the private sector and allied foreign governments, to improve security, threat detection, and incident response to address sabotage and policies that undermine critical undersea infrastructure resilience; (5) the United States Government has an important role to play in supporting international bodies concerned with the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting network resilience and redundancy, and encouraging the implementation of appropriate standards and best practices in support of these goals; (6) the United States Government should deepen its contribution to multilateral efforts to protect critical undersea infrastructure, including appropriate participation in NATO initiatives such as the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, allied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, Indo- Pacific initiatives, including the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and international organizations such as the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in order to advance United States national security and economic interests; and (7) the United States should work with allies and partners to support the private sector deployment of resilient critical undersea infrastructure networks, enhance shared situational awareness, strengthen joint preparedness, and formalize coordinated responses among allies and partners through improved information sharing and cooperation with private sector owners and operators to prevent, deter, and mitigate sabotage.”
“(6) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to ``build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network'' and ``to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States''. (7) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners.”
“(3) In February 2024, NATO Defense Ministers established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to coordinate information and threat intelligence sharing among private and public sector actors to protect critical undersea infrastructure. (4) In January 2025, following critical undersea infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Baltic Sentry to strengthen the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. (5) On February 21, 2025, the European Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to include the development and deployment of an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach.”
“(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, including-- (A) in January 2022, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the largest commercial satellite ground station on Earth; (B) in February 2023, the reported damage to subsea communications infrastructure connecting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; (C) in October 2023, the reported damage to the Finland-to- Estonia Balticconnector natural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland, in addition to the reported damage to subsea communications cables connecting Estonia and Sweden and Finland and Estonia; (D) in November 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea communications cables and the Lithuania-to-Sweden BCS subsea communications cable in the central Baltic Sea; (E) in December 2024, the reported damage to the Finland- to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea communications cables in the Gulf of Finland; (F) in January 2025, the reported damage to the Trans- Pacific Express subsea communications cable connecting Taiwan to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan; (G) in February 2025, the reported damage to a subsea communications cable connecting the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait; (H) in January 2026, the reported damage to subsea communications cables from Latvia in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepaja and Sventoji; and (I) in January 2026, the reported damage to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia involving a vessel named the Fitburg.”
“PART I-- INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. 8753. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure poses a growing threat to United States and allied security and economic prosperity.”
“(8) Subsea energy infrastructure.--The term ``subsea energy infrastructure'' means a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, including-- (A) to transmit electricity, including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations; (B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure; and (C) associated landing stations and facilities. (9) Subsea communications infrastructure.--The term ``subsea communications infrastructure'' has the meaning given the term ``submarine cable system'' in section 1.70001(h) of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and any subsequent update to such meaning.”
“(6) Non-federal entity.--The term ``non-Federal entity'' means any nongovernmental entity that is an individual, organization, or business involved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or construction of critical undersea infrastructure, including critical undersea infrastructure owners. (7) Sabotage.--The term ``sabotage'' means any act, or attempt to commit such an act, undertaken with the intent to cause damage to, or substantial interruption or impairment of, the safe and reliable operation of, critical undersea infrastructure, including by materially degrading the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data transmitted via subsea communications infrastructure.”
“(B) The Department of Defense. (C) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (D) The Department. (E) The Federal Communications Commission. (F) The Department of the Treasury. (G) The Department of Justice. (H) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the President. (4) Critical undersea infrastructure.--The term ``critical undersea infrastructure'' refers to both subsea communications infrastructure and subsea energy infrastructure. (5) Interagency committee.--The term ``interagency committee'' means the entity established under section 8762(b).”
“In this subtitle: (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code. (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means-- (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, and [[Page S3880]] the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (3) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate Federal agencies'' means the following: (A) The Department of Commerce.”
“(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes-- (1) any terms and conditions applicable with respect to the access authorized under subsection (a); and (2) a list of each organization or entity that has been provided access pursuant to subsection (a). (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. SEC. 8750A. SUNSET. This subtitle shall cease to be effective beginning on the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. Subtitle E--Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 SEC. 8751. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the ``Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026''. SEC. 8752. DEFINITIONS.”
“SATELLITE IMAGERY ACCESS TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES RELATED TO SCAM COMPOUNDS TO DISCOVER THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING. (a) Access to Satellite Imagery.--The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in coordination with, or at the request of, the Secretary, may provide nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and intergovernmental entities access to current and archival high-resolution satellite imagery, subject to appropriate classification and information security requirements, to help advance efforts to combat scam compounds, forced criminality, and human trafficking, including monitoring and documenting observable activities at scam compounds in Southeast Asia, which may be associated with human trafficking, including forced labor or forced criminality.”
“(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an assessment of existing forfeiture law that-- (1) outlines challenges or limitations to providing financial redress to victims of international scam compound operations; and (2) offers recommendations, if any, to amend existing forfeiture law to better enable the Department of Justice to recover assets that may be used to compensate United States victims of scam operations. (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form. SEC. 8750.”