YouSaid · the spoken record

Allison Nathan

lines on the record
14
first
2019-06-07
most recent
2019-06-07
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1
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podcast

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  1. “Looks like that is not just satisfied with the trade war, but also leading to a technology war. And then maybe a financial and then also visa issues and everything. So it's going to solve every aspect. Side of U.S. relations. You know, China could be a rivalry, but not a strategic rivalry, but maybe a cooperative rivalry, a healthy competitor, but not as an enemy in that sense. So I think that we really have to think hard, is U.S. ready to make China an enemy of the U.S.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  2. “And the talent dimension of innovation is critically important. And the other related danger is that we will put Chinese Americans as well as people from China, Chinese citizens, under a cloud of suspicion because of concerns that Chinese technological espionage is so prevalent on campuses and in companies that we just have to investigate all people of Chinese descent. And that could turn into and is already beginning to turn into an anti-Chinese version of a red scare, similar to the McCarthy era. Do worry that the way we're reacting to the threat we perceive from China is a kind of race to the bottom of a more closed, more restrictive economy, technological ecosystem, and society. Instead of becoming a better version of our open market democracy.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  3. “See a big hurting instinct in the face of a perceived security threat from China among Democrats and Republicans alike, and that's kind of taking us, we're hurting ourselves off a cliff. Because I believe that decoupling technologically because we believe that China represents a serious security threat will actually weaken our own technological innovativeness, our own ecosystem. If we restrict all Chinese tech investment in the United States, the loss won't be so much Chinese capital. I mean, there's plenty of venture capital in America. We don't need Chinese capital. But I believe that it will lead to a loss of Chinese talent.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  4. “They are not for 100 years, but I argue they're better than lift them immediately for a particular negotiating concession. Why not leave enough tariffs on that China has an incentive if you comply with this trade agreement provision here, which in the past you violated, if you do it now for one year or two years successfully, we trust you more we will reduce or cancel out completely a certain tariff as a reward and an incentive. That's a very different kind than the Alexander Hamilton approach, and ultimately it's consistent with the idea of going to zero tariffs between the US and China or as close to zero as possible within the next few years. That I interpret is what President Trump's objective is. He talks about being tariff man”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  5. “In general, tariffs are bad, they produce gross inefficiency and they slow the global growth rate. That said, tariffs have had two roles in the past. One is not part of the current negotiations, and I oppose this idea. That is what are called Alexander Hamilton tariffs, or to protect young industry's opportunity to grow, you slap huge tariffs on foreign products to protect the infant industries until they are competitive on a global basis. But that is not the kind of tariffs that the Trump administration is talking about. It's talking about under so called Section three of the Trade Act. It's talking about tariffs that are being used in a punitive way. That's the key word punitive. Or you might say as a means to get the other country to come to the bargaining table and to bargain seriously. Those kind of tariffs are short term”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  6. “So they're going to keep the tariff on, even though trade deal is going to be signed. So now if we have a trade deal, why should we still keep the tariff hanging there? So it's really an equal treaties, basically. It reminds the Chinese of all the histories. It's really unequal treaties. So you see that's not fair because if we had a deal, then get rid of the cause of where we started this trade negotiations because of the... So, if they're still hanging 100%, 20% of tariffs. How could he expect China to sign a deal like that? So I think there's quite some unreasonable request.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  7. “I think it's kind of a losing credibility now. I mean, he started his presidency and he's acted as if he's portrayed, so he actually came to China, visited China. I think at that time during his visit, he did very well of that visit. And he had also started a very good relationship with President Xi. Now, I think he's using too much his out of the deal style to handle this state-to-state relation. I think it's good, probably sometimes effective in the company-to-company relations, business relations, but it's really difficult using that kind of style, dealing with 1.4 billion people, the largest, most populous country in the world. He's probably viewed as a bully right now more and more so.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  8. “To run everything himself in a much more concentrated system of personalistic dictatorship. And of course the biggest blow to hopes that China was very slowly evolving toward a better governed form of authoritarian government was the fact that Xi Jinping got the Communist Party to abandon the practices of peaceful turnover of power at the top that China had achieved really the first communist country to have achieved that. It was quite an accomplishment. So this all made China look more threatening, more dangerous, and much harder to deal with. And that's only on the Chinese side. We haven't even gotten to Trump yet.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  9. “They change the perspective, the narrative about China's attentions, the Belton Road, Xi Jinping's foreign policy is also much, much more ambitious. China is now a major presence on every continent. And that also raised alarm bells. People saw Xi Jinping's global ambitions as kind of scary and something very, very new. And then politically, China has become a much more ideological political system under Xi, the Communist Party, has taken back the authority it delegated to government technocrats and is trying to run everything itself. And within the party, Xi Jinping is trying.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  10. “But to a form of state capitalism which puts Chinese private firms as well as international ones at a great disadvantage. And then China's own leadership and Chinese government's own foreign policy actions, particularly in regard to its maritime sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, where since the mid-2000s it's been defending those claims much more aggressively in violation of the legitimate international law rights of other claimants, other coastal states. And I really do think that China's actions in the South China Sea have been important, not just because of the South China Sea, but”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  11. “China brought a lot of it on itself, starting in the mid 2000s and then doubling down on its overreaching with the start of the Xi Jinping administration. China has really taken a U-turn back to the bad old days of the Mao era. In the beginning, Xi Jinping laid out some very positive economic reforms in the third plenum of the 18th Party Committee back in 2013, and everybody thought, oh, Xi Jinping is going to be a real economic reformer. But then nothing happened. None of it was implemented, really. And in fact, the state has just strengthened its role over the economy. So the market reforms have stalled out, and we've gone back to not quite to central planning.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  12. “One priority is paramount, reversing decades of calamitous trade policies. So bad. We are now making it clear to China After years of targeting our industries and stealing our intellectual property, the theft of American jobs and wealth Come to an end”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  13. “Trade wars and the continuing impact they have on the global economy and markets are top of mind. Trade has clearly been a major part of President Trump's agenda, in line with his longheld view, and I mean going back decades, that America has gotten a raw deal on trade. He first targeted Japan on these issues back in the nineteen eighties, and now his crosshairs have clearly shifted to China. Here he is giving the State of the Union address earlier this year.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

  14. “As tariffs are increasingly a weapon of choice, one already being used against China and the European Union, and now it seems against Mexico as well. Mexico shouldn't allow millions of people to try and enter our country, and they could stop it very quickly. And I think they will. And if they won't, we're going to put tariffs on.”

    2019-06-07 · Goldman Sachs Exchanges · Trade Wars 3.0 · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT