YouSaid · the spoken record

Andy Verity

lines on the record: 128
first: 2024-01-16
most recent: 2024-01-16
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

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“Order to see the next scandal around the corner, in order to see the next credit crunch coming, we released have to give it a try. And the vulnerabilities arising from these steepness of the rising interest rates, although perhaps overstated, I think for me, they're still the ones to watch”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yes, absolutely. No, I mean, I'd agree with you, it's always hard to read the runes, and sometimes it's easy to overstate the risks, you know. And journalists, I think, have a tendency to overstate the risks because it's a better story. If it's all going to help and if it's all going to be fine in a way. But often, well, as JP Morgan said, buy well there's blood on the streets. Who knows when the good time to buy is? Who knows maybe it's the time when everything seems most gloomy. I did think that there'd be an end-of-year rally, but then we had more trouble.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Much better than pretty much everyone, including myself, had had thoughts. But in the same way, it's not as if there's a commercial real estate loan and there's a lot of people talking about some issues there. It's not as if it goes 100 cents and then they mark it down to 99 cents, 98 cents. Things can go from 100 to zero. It's discontinuous.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, absolutely. A system seized up in March of last year. It seems like things would have turned in a nasty direction very pleasantly that things seem to have turned around. Future is very hard to tell. Earlier, the point you made about LIBOR, about how there really is no price for everything. If you want to go buy an orange, oh, it costs X here. If you go to a different store around the corner, it costs a little bit more, maybe a little bit less. And LIBOR is the range is $354 to $357. There's no one truth. I think the same is true about I mean, because it's interest rates if there's no truth for interest rates, there's no truth for the price of bonds. And, you know, the government allows and actually encourages banks to, at least in the US, I don't know about the UK, you know, post, I mean, the paper value of the bonds, even if there's been a 500 basis point surge and the bond is now worth 80 cents instead of a dollar. And likewise with loans, I think credit in the US overall for banks has performed.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“What 30 years, and that can't happen without consequences. And we all just in the financial journalism world need to work out where those consequences are coming down. Look under the hood a little bit, look under the skin and try to see where the vulnerabilities are. So that's what I'm doing.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, well, I mean, I'm looking quite closely now at all the vulnerabilities there are in the financial system. I was asked with what we had with SVB Bank, the various other American banks that were sort of caught with their pants down, as it were, with exposure to US treasuries on paper losses there. I think there are still all kinds of vulnerabilities on that. There are also, unfortunately, there's evidence in the UK that there's been some quite loose underwriting of various loans, not this time subprime mortgages, but I'm trying to work out where the loose money has gone and trying to trace any similar vulnerabilities that they might be to 2007 now because it feels like a fairly similar sort of context. I'm not trying to say 2008 is around the corner like it was last time, but this kind of level of adjustment in interest rates is what I think we need to all be looking at. We've had the steepest rise in interest rates for”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Right, exactly. And we need to be on our guard if there is a big political impetus to prosecute. And we derive satisfaction from seeing someone jailed that same satisfaction you get when you throw a tomato 300 years ago at the guy in the stocks and the pillories. That same satisfaction, we have the same brains. You know, we've got to be a bit careful that we don't enjoy that feeling of condemning someone a bit too much because the case might be misconceived and we might be condemning an innocent person.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And the regulators and the banks. And justice needs to be universal. That's a fundamental democratic principle. I'm not saying anything controversial with that. What the trials make clear is that whether you get prosecuted or not, can depend not so much on what you've done as how senior you are, where you stand in the hierarchy, who you know, what your status is. But in both the American and the British system, it's made really clear as a fundamental democratic principle that we should all stand equal before the law. It shouldn't depend on who you are.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And there's an effective backdoor privatization of the investigation and the prosecution of these things. I mean, in the case of Matt Connolly, New Jersey dad, who was later acquitted, it was found that Paul Weiss, the American law firm, who'd been effectively investigating it for the DOJ, and they'd had thousands of phone calls where they'd been deciding who would get prosecuted. And they made their case for a discount. And in this document where they're making their case to have a discount in fine, they say, well, here's why you should discount our fine. We did all this for you. Thousands of phone calls, thousands of meetings, and we gave you the evidence to prosecute people. And we even pointed you to the right document. So please give us a discount. And I just think for me, I don't think things should happen like that. I don't think people's liberty should be a pawn of a game between the prosecutors.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Goes The prosecutors want some real live individuals to be prosecuted. And that's how this has all happened. The prosecutors have outsourced their investigations, as the American courts have ruled, to the bank's lawyers. Obviously, if you ask a burglar for dust for fingerprints, they're not going to say, yeah, it was me that did it. No, they're going to say it's that guy over there. Look, the one clarry in the sack, which I just planted on him. The evidence is handed to the prosecutors and the regulators by the bank's lawyers.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“What outcome they want to appease public anger and they should be just looking at the law and the evidence and whether it makes sense. And the American courts, the traders would argue, finally did that in 2022. And they want the British courts to do the same. Well, still concerns me when our effect on this is the practice of scapegoating. So this has become, according to some lawyers, a sort of a cleaning service that every legal firm is expected to offer to any bank. that if they get in trouble with the regulators They can pay a fine, the shareholders will pay it, and then the lawyers will cooperate with the prosecuting agencies and the regulators and they'll come to a settlement and it will make it go away for the senior executives. It will make it go away for the senior lawyers, but at a price, not just of the shareholders paying fines, but also of the liberty of some of their employees who will be scared.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“In my epilogue, I'm sort of pointing to the book. I'm pointing to the fact that we think we're more rational in our justice system than we were in the past. We think it's not infected by politics. We think it's about evidence in the law. But actually what the whole episode shows is how much the justice system and what happens in the justice system has to do with politics. And in this case, the poisonous politics of Main Street getting angry with Wall Street, of the British public getting angry with the city of London. The anger that was generated by the financial crisis was deflected in the trials of traders down onto the traders. And they were the ones who paid the price. They would say that they had scapegoats. Others would deny that, but that would be their argument that they were scapegoats for the”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Politics has been operative here, but unfortunately the abolition hasn't done anything to diminish London's business. And I say unfortunately, a lot of people would say it's a star of the British economy and it creates a lot of business and a lot of tax revenues. But there's a valid American question to the British system from Wall Street to the City of London. Are you attracting so many dollars because your regime is too light? Is it actually, are you actually prospering off the back of the fact that you're making things easier for... Sanctioned oligarchs for all kinds of shady operators to bring their money to London anonymously and trade anonymously.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Has thrived off the euro dollar market. The market petrollars, dollars from Russia from their sales of gas after the discovery of gas in the 60s and 70s, they all found homes in London where they'd face lighter scrutiny than they would if they went to New York, then you had the Suez Crisis in 1956, which led the city for various reasons to do with rules and arbitrary and sorry regulatory arbitrage, effectively created the offshore system, the system where you're anonymous. You don't have a London address, you have an address somewhere in Belize or the Cayman Islands. All that stuff started really as an attempt for the city of London to keep attracting dollars in spite of the fact that Americans would like to control the market. So there's always been that tension. How come all those dollars are in London? How come the cost of borrowing dollars seems to be determined in London? We're suspicious of this rate from the start. So I think that”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, if you look at trading volumes, it hasn't had a particular noticeable effect. The city seems to be able to maintain its business in spite of Brexit, in spite of things like the end of LIBOR as a current rate. Yeah, I think that there is the city keeps prospering and thriving. And this is really interesting with the City of London. Part of the background to all this is it was the Wall Street Journal saying LIBOR was false. And it was American regulators saying it was wrong going after American and British traders and French traders, Algerian, etc. But it's part of this tension between Wall Street and London that there's always been. Why should it be that the main measure of the cost of borrowing dollars is a London rate? You know, the old enemy and all those kind of things you're taught in school, it's always been the case that London has, well, since the 1950s, it's been the case that London...”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, I'm not sure about that. Could you have another look at your LIBOR? And sometimes they correct it within the same day. So it's done in this sort of informal way. But it didn't really create any market distortions. I think the real difference is liquidity. So before the credit crunch happened, they would have very closely bunched together submissions. You know, there wouldn't be more than one or two basis points, apart three max. And then after the credit crunch came, they're all over the place. you know, 10, 20 points apart from each other. You had what you call dispersion. And that was because there was no liquidity. If you have enough liquidity, it becomes more obvious where the price is. And that's true of most commodity markets, isn't it? You don't need a very tight regulation because the market will sort itself out if there's enough cash running around, if there's enough assets changing hands. So I think LIBOR was pretty accurate before the credit crunch for 20 years.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It's funny, the verification system right early on what they used to do is have a system where if somebody quoted too low, everybody would gang up and make them come clean on that quote. And then it would become really obvious if they were lying because they didn't actually want the business. So that was one way to make it. And some people suggested that's how it should work, that some people should be made to cough up at the rate they quote. But for various reasons, that wasn't practical. It relied on a self-regulating system. where if somebody was looking at the market and saying, look, here's where the offers are coming in. I'm being offered 3.57, 3.56. Hang on, that bloke from Lloyd's is saying he can get it at 3.4. That's rubbish. If I can't get it there, he can't get it there. And they call up the British Bankers Association and say, can you put a word in? And a word would be put in in a very sort of old-fashioned London sort of city of London way.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And in the supposed golden age of LIBOR, you know, 2006 and before when the stated LIBOR matched the actual rates, was that because bankers just were honest and that's the way the system worked or was there a verification system that ensured they were honest and then that verification system lapsed in 2007 and 2008.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Not fully because they still have proxies for it, don't they, for certain contracts and certain legacy loans where they still have to have a, they sort of call it a zombie libel, don't they, where they've had to sort of maintain that? But LIBOR as a transaction rate, as the main measure of the cost of borrowing dollars, for example, yes, it's dead like that. LIBOR has the main measure of the cost of borrowing dollars is dead. It's been killed by the central banks. They were very keen to get rid of LIBOR. And the interesting question is whether it was because LIBOR really did a bad job at estimating the cost of buying cash or was it really because central banks didn't want a rate that was going to make it very clear when they lost control of interest rates.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It's clear from the evidence that I set out in my book that if there had been no low balling, that the TED spread, the measure of risk that everybody looked to in the market at the time would have been way wider. It would have been much more alarming. So to some extent, lowballing suited the central banks and governments trying to manage the crisis. And that's why they encouraged more lowballing, not less honesty here in the markets was a casualty firstly of the crisis and then of the attempt to manage it.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It's looking a bit publish, you know, and the regulators and central banks haven't been very good at managing those risks. It can be argued. So therefore, you need to get the temperatures, the patient's temperature down early enough, or even maybe give him a few prophylactic pills before he gets into sickness rather than trying to tamper with a thermometer or remove the thermometer. I mean, in a way, sulfur is like replacing LIBOR with a thermometer that doesn't move. You know, it's not going to tell you if you've got another credit crunch coming. And arguably it's manipulable.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It understated how worried the markets were because of the credit crunch about lending to each other. And therefore, it looked like there were less interest rates were less out of control than they really were. But, you know, really, let's stop treating symptoms, whether it's LIBOR or sofa or whatever. Let's start treating the underlying cause. Why did you have a credit crunch in the first place? Why now are there so many vulnerabilities in the financial system? Arguably because policy has just not been very good at controlling regulators and the central banks have not been that good at watching those risks blow up until it's too late. And that's when you get a credit crunch. Someone should have been saying early in the noughties, guys, you're lending too much to people who aren't going to be able to pay you back. Arguably, someone should have been saying a few years ago, can you be careful how much you're putting into US Treasuries?”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yes. I mean, there was a good analogy given by Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England at the time of the crisis, who came under a lot of criticism, actually. He gave though a helpful analogy when he was in front of Parliament, which is that LIBOR in a way is a measure of the temperature of the anxiety in the money markets. The higher it goes, the higher the TED spread is, the higher it goes beyond the risk-free rate, the more worried the market is. And they were using that as a barometer or a thermometer of the temperature of the patient, the economic patient in the credit crunch. But there's a question whether you give the patient some drugs like TOP to get its temperature down or whether you tamper with a thermometer. And the evidence in this book suggests that maybe the thermometer was tampered with. So low balling suited the central banks in a way because it understated the dislocation in the market.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And so people talk about the TED spread, the spread between Treasury rates, risk free rates, and the euro dollar LIBOR rate, what we've been talking about, and how that widened in 2007 and really blew out in 2008. And that highlights stress, of course, that no longer exists because we don't have the euro dollar futures market anymore. It's now so for futures, basically from reading your book and what you said, it's We can gather that the real rate if it was if everyone was completely honest would have been the real chart of the TED spread would have been much, much wider”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Who's defended his case? He's been convicted by a jury, but he's always maintained his innocence. Another person convicted by a jury, Carlo Palumbo, convicted for rigging Eurobores joining the same case. And in March, the Court of Appeal here will decide whether or not to overturn their convictions. If not, they'll probably go to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, you've got politicians saying there should be a public inquiry where we can find out about what really happened in the low balling during the crisis. hold people accountable, not necessarily criminally accountable, but somebody perhaps should answer as to why this has been kept from parliament and Congress.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“2024. Well, we have the Court of Appeal coming up in the UK. In early 22, the US courts decided that the people who had been prosecuted stateside for this should all be acquitted and that the case against them didn't show that they'd broken any rules or any laws. That partially led the Criminal Cases Review Commission in the UK to refer back the case of Tom Hayes, which it had initially said shouldn't be referred back. But it saw a lot happened in the States where they said there were no false statements that the traders made. And so they've referred it back on that basis. In March, we'll have a crucial court of appeal hearing where two people in the book, Tom Hayes and Asperger's sufferer, a bit of a rain man, if you like, some people have said, somebody who is easy to prosecute arguably.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“What is arguably a confected wrong in order to deflect the blame for the real scandal away from the top and onto traders below? That's what they would argue has happened.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Involvement of the banks in low balling, and no board member has ever been prosecuted of any of the banks who've been fined. And in the notices, the published notices that were given, for example, about Barclays, it was cleverly avoided implicating the boardroom. So I suppose if there is a crime to be prosecuted, it's lowballing. And then you decide, well, given the circumstances of the time, are they mitigating circumstances that say, well, this person shouldn't have been prosecuted? Could Barclays say, well, you can't prosecute us? We were told to do this by the Bank of England, which they might have been inclined to say. Then it gets very complicated. And yes, people have to do difficult things in crises. People have to order military strikes. Bad things happen. There's a reason that you have presidential immunity as well. So, you know, I mean, I'm not arguing for all those things to be overturned. But if there is a wrong, prosecute the big wrong that harms people rather than creating”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“That's right, Jack. I mean, if you're asking who should really be prosecuted, should people just get away with it? Should there be no prosecutions? I don't know. Probably not. Probably not. There probably should be some prosecutions over the fraud. Who they be? I don't know. But we certainly have some strong evidence pointing to balldom involvement. And the regulators had that. And that evidence.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Right. I guess in the same way, you know, if the president of the US or Prime Minister does something in their capacity as a national leader and politician or a member of Congress, member of parliament does something and it's wrong, but it is not to benefit themselves. It is their, you know, let's do this. Let's do that. You could say, oh, well, they were acting in their official capacity. In other words, it's impossible to send the president to jail for doing something, something like that in their official capacity. I suppose you could say like how can you send the Federal Reserve to jail? How can you send the Bank of England? They basically set the rules, but that goes into a can of worms of, oh, person A is in jail when actually person B and C should be in jail. And there's not a lot of profit intellectual stuff to be gained by playing that game. I think what's important is that just that you are sharing the story and finally revealing many years later what actually happened.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“That's right, and that's actually how it works. But this fiction was created for the sake of prosecuting LIBOR. But banks are very hierarchical institutions and lawyers know everything. You wouldn't dare to do anything remotely Neither are the directors of the bank”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Explained about the instructions coming from the top in the book. There's a transcript of an interview led by the FBI where that lays all out. And there was a CFTC member there. I'd be really surprised, wouldn't you, if a CFTC person had turned up to an interview with someone who'd received an instruction from the UK government to falsely manipulate LIBOR and that wasn't relayed back to the boss?”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, well, look, I mean, I know that Gensler was presented with a key tape. And I also know that the CFTC had lots of this evidence. How much of that he paid attention to? Be for somebody else to prove, but he knew about the key piece of evidence, really strong evidence indicating involvement from the Bank of England and the UK government. And he would have known because it came out in public in 2012 and the CFTC was watching very closely that the Bank of England had been involved. So therefore he had two matching pieces of evidence, one from 2012, Bob Diamond conversation with Paul Tucker saying Whitehall wants you to get your LIBORs down and From the same day a piece of audio dug up separately. And he also had the evidence of Mark Delav, who the DOJ investigated, who made it clear that there'd been another instruction from the Bank of England earlier that month. And there are other bits and bobs of evidence which are laid out in the book, which the CFTC will have had. The CFTC was also present at interviews with Peter Johnson, where he laid out to them about this tape and explained the tape and the context of it.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Off in the States, if you've got evidence of a controlling mind new about something that the regulators have said was a fraud. So Barclays was able to negotiate in such a way that there isn't any clear evidence in the fines for it pointing to the boardroom. But the audio evidence I've got hold of does point to the boardroom suggesting that the authorities agreed in those negotiations to cover it up and also the evidence that pointed to the Bank of England and the government it wasn't identified in those press releases since the Bank of England and the government. I've had to match that up subsequently.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“In the fines that the CFTC made for Barclays and the DOJ and the Financial Services Authority made for Barclays in June 2012, they have some paragraphs which indicate that where instructions coming from above, but they're very elliptical about where they were coming from. And when you match that up with the evidence in the timeline, and it's set out in the book here, you can see that that's very clearly referring to instructions from the top. So it was kept very vague in the Barclays notice about whether it's coming from the board. And this unfortunately indicates how these things are negotiated. Whenever you hear a settlement of a bank paying a fine, beware that that's the outcome of months of negotiation where lawyers for the bank have sat down with lawyers for the prosecutors and the bank's done their best to make sure there's nothing pointing to the top. Because if there is, it can mean corporate civil liability. You can get your ass.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Which indicates involvement, well indicate involvement of the boards of banks. And lots of evidence worth pursuing further, which points to involvement of central banks and governments.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“No, that person isn't thankful in the introduction to the book, but it's an insider who knows all about it. Let me just say that. Though I have evidence both from public sources and non-public sources, and also audio recordings and documents, which are all set out in the timeline that I published, you can read them and listen to them for yourself, which indicate that Gary Gensler knew about this tape and that the tape was used as the basis for criminal prosecution. He also refers to it in his Wikipedia entry. He refers to how he heard a call, which sounds a lot like the DLRPJ call between two Barclays employees agreeing to lie. So that all matches with the timeline of the CFTC finding out about it and the tape going to him as related in the fix and in the non-published accounts I've heard. And I've also written to him and there's never been a denial that he knew about that tape. So I think it's fairly solid, although obviously it'd be nice to have it, did you or did you not hear that tape? It's not just that tape, it's all the other evidence that would have come to the CFTC. Thousands of pages of documents.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, we know that he heard the tape. The evidence for that is not only in my book, it's in another book called The Fix by two journalists who interviewed the CFTC directly, Liam Vaughan and Gavin Finch. And in that, they relate this call and how the call came to the CFTC, the DLRF PJ call, where he's told to lower his libels on instructions from above. And I've also spoken to some I did. I can't give his name, but someone high up in the DOJ investigation. who confirmed that the criminal investigation was started because of that tape that Gary Gensler heard.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, I don't mean a big Democrat. I'm not being partisan here. I just mean. Live in a democracy, we deserve to know the truth about what happened in our financial crisis.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, I mean, I tried lots of times to get hold of the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Paul Tucker, hoping that you might make precisely those points, you know, say, look, okay, yeah, we did ask Barclays to lower their libel, we did ask all the other banks. Maybe even Gordon Brown, who led a lot of the bailout efforts, would take this view too. I don't know. He's never granted me an interview, so I couldn't say. I put all these questions to him. Maybe he'd also say, look, we did ask for libel to be lower. Maybe he'd say we didn't think it was false. We had no idea. No one told us. We just wanted to try to manage the crisis. But you never have that open, honest conversation with either parliament or congress because instead the authorities, the CFTC, Gary Gensler, the DOJ, the Serious Fraud Office, and the financial services authority have all fined banks billions and sat on all this evidence pointing to the top. And that's what I think as a Democrat. They should be telling the truth about what happened there for the sake of accurate history.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“I was going to bring that up. So the argument that the central banks in power, they said, okay, I mean, it is manipulating LIBOR and we are turning it into a lie, but it is necessary in order to prevent a great depression. I mean, if you believe that, I would imagine you stop at nothing.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And therefore, I think they probably say that what the Fed did was fair enough as well. But we still have this situation in the UK where a bunch of people have been prosecuted. Americans too, French people, British people, all been prosecuted on the basis of something which is only now a crime in the UK and which the courts now have their doubts about.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“I don't have any problem with the sentiment that people in the crisis were innocent people doing a very difficult job, an almost impossible job in the middle of the worst financial crisis in 80 years. And that's the defense. And he accepts that point, but he says, but then in that case, don't make one rule for them and another rule for me. You know, it's what the central banks were doing was a hundred times bigger or more than anything I could have hoped to move LIBOR by and there's no proof anyway that he did so it's the question of a double standard and universal standards of application of the law i don't really wish to condemn people in the government who are trying to manage a crisis or people in central banks but i think if a law is going to be created by the courts they need to make sure it's of universal application or it shouldn't apply you know and and what the”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, I mean, I think if you look at the evidence trail, the evidence of low balling and the evidence that it was ordered from the top is really powerful. It was just never pursued. And, you know, prosecutors and regulators have a duty to, you know, to pursue all relevant leads. So I think it's not quite, I think the analogy starts to break down about, you know, the boss of the kingpin who keeps himself clear of things. I don't think the central bank has even tried to keep themselves clear of things. I don't think they thought they were doing anything wrong. And one central banker explained to me, and it's fair to give them credit for that. As I say, it's the fact that the law has been made retrospectively. Arguably, the law is completely misconceived. And it shouldn't have condemned this. But if there was a fraud resulting perhaps inadvertently, unintentionally from crisis measures, then it was lowballing, not the trader's requests. And I think the traders would say, look, okay, fair enough. And Tom Hayes, who went to jail, has said this. Look.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Hands in this affair, but it was impossible to prove in a legalistic way in the same way that, okay, yes, the guys on the street who are selling drugs, it's very easy to get them very easy to convict them. It's much harder to get the bosses. And that's just an unfortunate way. The justice system works.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“I think the standard of proof that you as a journalist have is very high. And I mean, I find it very convincing that folks at the very top of central banks, I mean, in some cases the government, the prime minister had their hands in this affair. But as you know, the justice system has a much, I mean, there's things that you and I would agree to be true about so-and-so person did this, that, you know, we can have a 98% confidence in it. But a judge would not sentence that person to jail unless they have beyond a reasonable doubt, beyond a shadowable doubt. Is it arguable to say that the judge, you know, the high journalistic standard and what we in our everyday life agree upon as fact would argue, okay, yes, they had.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Drugs context to sentence the logis on the totem pole while the top guys go free. And in a way she there in that quote she sums up the essence from the trader's point of view of what they think has gone wrong, namely that they're four guys, they're scapegoats and they're the victims of a campaign of manipulation. Now the authorities obviously wouldn't agree with that, but that's maybe why there's got to be more hearings for the authorities to give their views and for politicians to question them on those.”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Eventually acquitted in that trial argues that the DOJ has so much power, is really more powerful than the judges. He's written his own book about it called Target, what it's like to be a scapegoat in the federal justice system. And he sets out in that and in my book how the game seems loaded for the prosecutors that if you're innocent and you're faced with this, you don't have much chance. And it's only by dint of him making a huge stink about it and evidence coming out in the press like the stuff in my book that the US authorities, I mean actually the judge in his trial said, look, we've got to think about who's not at this trial. We've got to think about the other senior bankers who are not in this trial. There's evidence that the Bank of England was involved in this, says the judge. So clearly the judge saw and she came out with this great quote. I'm always reluctant when I'm asked, and it usually happens in the”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Sort of six, seven years, you've got a huge fine, for example, for Deutsche Bank. It goes through all that, and what you hear is all the trials and all the personal stories of the traders. And you hear their conversations and you hear about exchanges in the trials, including that of an American, Matt Connolly, his trial, which is set out in a chapter called The Price of Honesty. And I've called it that, sorry, the price of dishonesty. I've called it that because there's evidence that came out in that trial, not only that the Department of Justice put in false statements for use by the court and encouraged a government witness to make false statements, that was said by a judge at the time. But it also did a deal behind the judge's back to allow one of the cooperating witnesses to keep $9 million that he otherwise would not have kept. And Matt Connolly, who's the guy who”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yes, that's right. So 2007, 2008, you have lowball in the crisis. Then the CFTC comes along, Gary Gensler and Co. say, can you please review LIBOR? Because they've heard about how LIBOR was false. 2010, this tape bubbles up, the key tape, the crucial tape, showing, indicating that there were orders from the top to rig LIBOR. That energizes the US authorities. They order criminal prosecutions. And then the book traces through the timeline since then. 2012, the regulators bring their fines down on Barclays. That triggers an explosion of fury in the UK against the banks. And then there are further fines. And for political reasons rather than arguably rather than evidential ones, the authorities then start going after finding the banks a lot more. And this includes the European Union, etc., for what is arguably only commercial practice rather than anything criminal. And that goes on for the next”
2024-01-16 · Forward Guidance · Andy Verity on LIE-BOR: Shocking New Evidence Suggest Interest Rate Scandal Is Much, Much, Bigger Than Originally Reported · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT