YouSaid · the spoken record

Bill Gross

lines on the record: 94
first: 2022-04-01
most recent: 2022-04-01
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“That low fees were something we owed to clients and we weren't hedge fund managers. And so ultimately, I think the executive committee, which was formed with eight people, three of which were portfolio managers, one Ivison, who eventually led the coup, as I called it. in the direction of high fees as opposed to At 77 as you were at 72. So maybe there was some of that, and I understand some of that. I just still don't understand the exit and why they had to do it that way.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“But there had been two or three people that our lawyers eventually discovered that we're leaking information to the press in favoring Muhammad, supposed to me, in terms of why he left. And I didn't think that was nice and so that ultimately, and to be fair, as I wrote in my book, one of the main reasons I think that they fired me was I was in favor of low fees and they were in favor of high fees. You know, Dan Iveson and the mortgage department had created products that had two and twenty hedge fund types of fees. And we were making a lot of money. I was making some of it. It just seemed to me in terms of fiduciary responsibility.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, it wasn't good. I guess like in a divorce, and this was a divorce, both sides start picking at each other, you know, War of the Roses type of thing. So I didn't enjoy what they were leaking to the press. I never talked to the press, by the way, but I didn't enjoy that they said the performance was bad. I was erratic, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. I was always somewhat, not erratic, but always quirky. Somewhat of a quirky character, and I don't think that had changed.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“to turn down an offer to let me manage a few small portfolios and maybe write some investment outlets I couldn't believe it. I made a quick call to Janice with Dick Weil who was heading that up and had been COO at PEMCO a few years before and he said sure come over and so I didn't want to walk the plank. I didn't want to go into that committee and be fired and so I left that night, walked down the 20 floor stairs for the last time and the next morning I was off to Denver. I just didn't think it was the way you should treat somebody that was a founder and responsible for much of their success.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“You know, I decided I'm not walking that plank, that I deserve better than this. I even asked in the last week or two when I knew that the inevitable was coming up that Friday afternoon. I said, why don't you just let me manage a small portfolio, a closed-in fund, just so I can stay in it? I said, I'll even work in another building if you want. And I looked at me, they said, it's not going to happen. And so at the time, I couldn't understand that. Now I sort of do. When you kill the king, you better make sure he's dead. I objectively understand that.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, it was traumatic. I mean, I was one of the founders. I was one of the leaders of the chief investment officer. The performance was flat for 12 months, but nothing tragic. The executive committee, which was going to fire me on Friday afternoon because they thought I was unsettling in terms of my pursuit of insiders talking to the press in any case.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Strategic brilliance as well. I guess Jim Muzzy and early on Bill Podlek, the original partners, simply thought that we should keep expenses and people low, that we could manage without a lot of people. And so, you know, that generated huge bonuses. Were we worth it? I simply said that I don't think anybody's worth that type of money. Maybe Bezos and Elon Musk in terms of their creativity, but it was too much money. As I left Pimco, our executive secretary were making $500 million. Our head corporate lawyer, the GE lawyer was making $1 or $2 million. Our lawyer was making $10 to $12 million. We didn't know we had so much money we didn't know. What they were making.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, there's a certain logic of that. I mean, our fees weren't excessive. We were charging 35 basis points on average. We just grew and grew and grew and grew and grew. And one of the beauties of working at PIMCO was that it was small. We kept our expenses down and our people low. Companies like Bank of America had 250,000 people. We had 2,500. We were 100th of their size with profits about the same size. And so that was part of our...”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“A certain amount of B shares, and that the value of those shares, five, ten years forward when they could be cashed in, would be based upon multiples 10, 12, 14, 16 time multiples of existing earnings. And basically, when I say he skinned them, Allianz had no idea that what they would be paying in terms of those multiples and in terms of the performance that were anywhere close to what eventually occurred. It was a brilliant idea. He pulled the wool over their eyes. They were, I guess, starstruck with buying Pimco and looking forward to wonderful publicity. But it was really that B-share plan that made me more men. And made partners more money than the existing 33% profit pool. It totaled billions and billions of dollars in terms of B share payouts.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Would suggest to him, and yes, we were very ruthless from the standpoint of trying to strike a very good deal if we were ever going to sell part of the company. Poofy will always tell them, and I would participate in the discussions, that these people needed to be incentivized, not that 33% of the profit pool wasn't incentive enough, but Pooie would say, you know, these partners will be, they're 25 now, they'll be 50, they'll be 75, there'll be 100, this won't be enough to keep incentivizing the existing partners and to bring in new partners. So he devised what he called a B share sort of a fake equity type of plan where partners would begin.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“So much so, and Ken Povey is no longer with us, but he was brilliant. He was a leader in terms of negotiating with alliances. By the way, Allianz, when they bought Pimco, they only bought 50% of it, Pacific Mutual held on to 50% of it for a year or two. left with us the people, the partners, 33% of the profits going forward, which still exists. And so that basically meant that what they were paying for was about a sixth of PIMCO in terms of the ongoing revenue stream. But to talk about Poovy and what he did, he basically suggested to them.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“As in Time heals all wounds, had healed pretty much and the scars had turned from red to white. And so I thought I could write an objective book about the pluses and the minuses, each argument, Pimco's argument, my argument why I left, and why I wasn't necessarily the Bond King company was full of Bond kings and bond queens for a long, long time.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I get up at six in the morning and I manage my portfolios for five or six hours. And I had time, and so I just started writing in order to say that I'm still standing. I haven't lost everything. The ruthless part, I'm not sure what she was referring to. I called her up and I said, Mary, I don't get the ruthless part. And I think she decided to take it off the cover. I haven't read the book, of course, because I'm too sensitive to criticism, and I know there's criticism in it, but the ruthless part, I just went overboard, and that's what set me off and said, write your own book. Tell your own story. And hopefully after five or six years, the wound.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, I'd written a book 20 years ago, and I didn't really think at the time that I had another book in me, sort of like writing novels, I guess, after the first one, it's all downhill. But I was in touch with Mary Childs for five or six years, certainly after I left Pimco. We were not good friends, but she would interview me occasionally. So I was alerted to the fact, or I read something on Apple Books, a book by Mary Childs was coming 12 months in the future, and it had a respective cover on it and described me on the cover as ruthless and having a Lost everything. And I said to myself, that's not who I am as a look in the mirror. Rather than thinking about a lawsuit or any of that, I said, well, the best way to counter that and to give your impression of Pimco and its years and your...”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“It certainly is. And one interesting sidelight, I mean, during the crisis, as Congress was voting, I guess for their $900 billion package bailout package. Warren Buffett called me up and told me about a plan he had to contribute $100 million in $100. And to basically buy subprime mortgages from the banks, in other words, to take the load off their shoulders, obviously to buy them at the right price. And within 30 minutes after checking with our executive committee, I said, fine, we'll do it. The next day, however, Treasury Secretary decided to go the other way, and that's when they decided to ask banks to issue preferred stock and the bailout took another form. But that's about the only potential connection we had with the Treasury. And as I say, it never came to fruition. It was like a 48-hour idea.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I think so. You know, we had a lot of money. We bought a lot of bonds, and that helped our performance. But bullies, no, you can't be a bully if you don't pick up a phone”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Exactly. I mean, how could we belay our badger if I guess Mohammed didn't pick up the phone and badger and bully. First of all, we were bullies in the trading room, but we weren't bullies from the standpoint of treasury strategy.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Call, they called us and said, can we help manage a portfolio of mortgages for them? And we said, sure. And that was basically it. You know, there was a rumor that we badgered them into guaranteeing Fanny and Freddie mortgages. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nobody made a phone call to Badger or to influence in any way. What we did see is that of all the mortgages that Fannie and Freddie were the highest quality and that they were yielding astronomical yields relative to treasuries and much wider spreads than had ever occurred. And so that was the fascination with Fanny and Fred. We did well with mortgages and we did well during the crisis and after the crisis FIMFO went from $1 trillion to $2 trillion because we had protected their money.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well I guess this sounds delicate, but it shouldn't be. You know, almost all of us weren't in touch with the Treasury. I mean, I talked to Timothy Geithner once over the phone on a Sunday evening when he called me up after I'd had a few beers and wanted to know what was happening in the economy. But that's the only time I can ever remember talking to the Treasury. We weren't like BlackRock and Larry Fink. There's nothing wrong with that, but we were a company on the West Coast that basically did our own research and weren't in touch with Treasury officials unless they were Fed officials that had retired, like Bernanke and Paul Volcker and others. I don't really know how it developed. It certainly wasn't a phone.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And said, hey, this stuff is dangerous. These subprime mortgages, et cetera, et cetera. And so we were wise to this early on. We voided portfolios of subprime mortgages and high yield bonds in general, anticipating a crisis at some point. So I think our investment committee, and again, Paul McCulley was the leader in this regard, really helped in terms of anticipating what might happen at some point. It did happen.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, but he was an economist at heart and he was a permanent member of the investment committee and he would speak about Hyman Minsky and his theory about stability turning into instability and then as the housing market roared and peaked, we became sensitive to the potential for instability. I had a brother-in-law who was a mortgage banker on a small scale and we would have dinner sometimes. He would tell me about no docs and liar loans and so on before anyone at the Fed knew anything about that. And so I decided to take 10 of our credit analysts and send them out throughout the country and pretend that they were buying houses and to see what was going on. They came back.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, I give most of the credit in this case to Paul McCully and Paul's still around. He's on TV. He's got that long hair and that southern draw. At least he got rid of the beat.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And certainly in the summertime, I could just go across the street and hit some balls and play golf too. So it wasn't a one-way horse rider, I guess. I could do a lot of things, but managing money and investing and talking about it, writing about it was something I truly enjoyed.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I think it was because I loved it. And, you know, the standard idea that you should do what you love is fine. It can't really apply to billions of people throughout the world. They all can't find jobs that they love. They can't all paint. They can't all write music. But this was an area that I loved in terms of buying and selling and competing and making money and becoming famous, of course. And so I think I stuck around for that long until I was 72 at Pimco or 71 simply because I loved coming in. It made my week. And Pimco, we would have an investment committee until from 12 to 3 every day.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And Scott Simon that I mentioned were really smart in their performance in mortgages through the years in terms of their own portfolios just flowed over into the total return fund. So all of these people, and there are a lot of other ones, you know, we were a team and the term Bon King was, I guess, more of a PR acceptance than anything else. I don't think there was a king. I was a leader and certainly a leader of the investment committee in terms of accepting a standard portfolio for those to manage, but lots of smart people. And I think it bared acknowledgement in my book.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Market, but he was one, and then there was another gentleman, Chang Hong Zu, that came to us from Wells Fargo in San Francisco. He ultimately left after 10 years to go back to China with his family and head up a key position in the Chinese central bank, I think. He was perhaps the smartest guy on the floor, including me. So I think a lot of the strategies are due to his suggestions. You know, there was a high yield gentleman, Ben Trotsky, who was really a master of that. All of our mortgage people, Bill Powers and John Hayes.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, we hired some really smart people and really aggressive people, obsessive people that really love to do what they're doing. Chris Dianis was one of the first. He was my co-portfolio manager, so to speak, from the early 80s. He wanted to be a baseball player for the Angels, but decided to take our $20,000 offer. And he came, and he had gone to the University of Chicago and studied there about options and so on and ultimately became instrumental in terms of bringing financial futures to the portfolios and suggesting some very creative ideas in terms of Jenny May futures, which some say we broke.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Function of how No, well, it was both. You know, I remember that Scott Simon sat to the left of me and... Bill Powers, and I don't think Chris Dallen has ever sat next to me. He was content to be on the wing, so to speak, and do his own thing. But usually it would be determined as well by who would be quiet as opposed to loud. I liked quiet to be able to think myself and somebody with a loud voice talking to brokers or calling up their spouse. It just wasn't working for me in terms of retreating day. So it's quiet and function and seniority all sort of fit in and I didn't deck somebody else picked and I just went along with it until the noise got too loud and then they were out and somebody else was in.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, I thought it was pretty simple, and I don't really remember the horseshoe. But, you know, I was positioned in the middle, certainly, and the traitors of which they eventually grew to 20, 30, 40, 50 were basically positioned in pods, the mortgage people, the high-yield people, the global people, etc. And they would work together and almost independently day to day. But I would check and others would check in terms of what they were doing, make suggestions and so on as we walked around the floor. So it made a lot of sense. It was big trading room with, I don't know how many square feet, but I think functionally it really worked for us.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, and basically it involved forecasting interest rates. And to be fair, throughout the period of time that the secular outlook for interest rates was down, down, down, and during our annual secular forums that we had where we brought in outside speakers and basically set the tone for the next 12 months, you know, for the most part, it was a bullish forecast, which turned out to be true. If we'd had a forecast that went the other way for the long term, for the next three to five years, obviously the company would have disappeared. But focusing on that, forgetting about the day or the week or the month, I think it became very successful in terms of positioning a portfolio duration-wise and volatility. And credit wise.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Into later into global tips and so on. So the innovation was key, I think, to alpha generation. The biggest key was the thrust of what we called secular forecasting, secular outlooks. And I wrote a book early on just after I joined. Called Investing for the Long Term. I forget who wrote it, but it focused me on the dangers of trading for the short term because fear and greed on the other side get involved and you tend to make that decisions. And so we approached it from the standpoint of three to five years in terms of an outlook we brought in speakers that spoke to that many of them Fed officials or ex-Fed officials, et cetera. So I think that really helped us to avoid the bad month or the bad quarter by looking at three to five years. So those were several of the keys.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, I think, Barry, I mean, a lot of bond managers were and probably still are very conservative. That's their job to protect principal and therefore on the sales side, on the Wall Street side, they were facing a clientele that didn't really want to accept any of their suggestions, whatever they were. It was just the other way for me and for PIMCO. We were very innovative from the standpoint of new products. We were one of the first to buy financial futures. We were one of the first to buy mortgages, a fannie-made mortgage. I mean, most bond managers didn't want to go through the problem of segregating principal and interest and determining performance. It took a long time and a separate staff. And so we did that.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, I never enjoyed my power and I've enjoyed some of the money, but after a certain point, if not that productive, unless you give it away. And so I think ultimately if those are the three choices, and I did offer those to potential recruits who, by the way, would never answer the question because they were afraid that any of the answers would be viewed negatively. I'm certain I would choose fame again. I was cognizant at the time that Fame can turn into infamy that you could fly too close to the sun, et cetera, et cetera, from an objective standpoint. But I must say I didn't think it could happen to me because I was always on the up and out, always honest, always open. And why would anybody? And I think ultimately that was eye-opening to me, but I do it again.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, of course not. At some point I did. When we were $990 billion. No, my objective was to grow the company, to have a fiduciary responsibility to clients in terms of products and not Not charging them too much or inventing products that rip them off. But I also want to or wanted to be famous. I mean, that's in my book and the other child's book as well. And growing into a trillion and ultimately into two trillion was very productive in terms of being famous and I guess ultimately infamous.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I think so. And one of my positive attributes is that I wasn't afraid to take risks and to take chances. And so there were those at PIMCO and marketing and so on that would suggest that you can't do that because people will just jump on your ideas and front run. I'm paranoid in a lot of things, but it wasn't paranoid in that in terms of thinking that no one really cared. So why not? Why not tell people what I thought? And I think it worked.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Of the things that I wrote at the beginning of my book, a quote that said that talent is helpful in writing, but guts are absolutely necessary. And so I decided to have a few guts and open myself up to people and some like that and some didn't. But the reputation grew.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, it was very unusual. And I thought about it from a business context. And I said, you know, if I want to be successful at PIMCO, if we want to grow as a company, you've got to say hello. And the best way to say hello is to write these investment outlooks. I mean, there are a few. There was a famous guy, you know, Barton Biggs, Morgan Stanley, that was a real good writer, and I don't think Jim Grant had started yet, but he was an excellent writer in the time. So I wasn't the only one. But I thought that if I could inject some personal vignettes into my forecast for the bond market, the people would read it because they didn't really read these things that came out of First Boston and Solomon Brothers and so on. I decided to take a little risk.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Basically mandated that pension managers had to diversify and not just diversify between the obvious but also diversify between East Coast and West Coast. And so this little company called AT&T, the biggest in the world, came according late in the 70s and like what they saw and they hired Pimco and that really was the beginning of it all. I mean who wouldn't open the door to a person or to a company that had just been hired by AT&T?”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Okay, and so you're right. We started at a great time, not in the 70s because the bear market didn't really end until 81, 82, 83, depending upon the maturity of the bond. But it set up the premise for total return in bonds where you could not only get a coupon, get an interest payment, but get a capital gain. When you're starting at close to 15% for a third-year treasury, it was fairly easy ultimately to get a capital gain. And so that helped us. We were also helped by legislation from the Congress, a bill that legislated ERISA, which...”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I think that's true because back then stocks were the vehicle to trade and even then they weren't traded that actively. Bonds were basically bought and ultimately matured, I guess at the big banks in the east and New York and Boston and Chicago. And so bond trading was an afterthought. No one thought that you could. Sell one bond by another and make some money. And so it was innovative and I was glad to be part of it.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Probably just a little there was this gentleman, I forget his name, McGock said that a life insurance in LA that was doing some of that. There was a Jim Guy from Lehman who later died that was doing some of that, but I was certainly one of the first and I was certainly one that pursued it and convinced at least the executives of Pacific Mutual that this could be turned into a business.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Trading some bonds from boxes in those days, as you know, there weren't any computers. There were IBM 360s, but we only had one. You couldn't really buy and sell on the wire, and so it was very difficult to trade, but I convinced him to let me use $5 million of their bonds and set up an active trading account. And that was the beginning of Pimco.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We'll let me add to that quickly. I could only clip coupons for half of the day. I guess the other half I was off making private placement loans to fledgling companies such as Berkshire Hathaway and Walmart. I visited Sam Walton with his two kids and his dog. I struck. They had two Walmarts in Bentonville, Arkansas, and same thing with Buffett and Charlie Munger. So I was doing some of that. But just to make the transition, I guess, to managing money, I did a master's thesis at UCLA and I just graduated and was about convertible bonds but also about warrants and option related vehicles. So I was interested in the bond market even though I wanted to get into stocks and Pacific Mutual in downtown LA had a billion dollars worth of bonds and a broker from Whedon& Company Howard Raykoff decided to visit and tell me that somebody else in town was”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Thank you, Barry. Actually, I'm sitting talking to you, but I'm standing in life, so that's why the title applies, I think. But it's good to be here.”
2022-04-01 · Masters in Business · Bill Gross on Institutional Bond Trading (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source