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Darren Farber

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2025-04-01
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2025-04-01
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  1. Yeah, it was the nation state activity after China can bomb Taiwan into oblivion. But if they want to take it over and they want the vast majority of people to stay alive, well, the terrain of Taiwan is spectacular for insurgency. And one of the most compelling plans I saw was the Taiwanese look at America and go, America can never be overtaken because there's anywhere from $300 to $600 million in the country. How would you take over the country functionally? And the Taiwanese have a very good healthcare system and safety net to prevent deranged people from getting firearms. And my view is that Firearm culture there may be already taking hold. And if every adult had

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  2. Interesting because I wonder if it's the case because people think we can't win. We can't win in a conventional sense. And if it was a cakewalk for us to win, would we just do it? I happen to believe the latter. If everyone believed that we had the ability to stop the PLA from crossing the Taiwanese Strait, it was a Nothing burger for us. We'd do it. Of course, we'd have the will because it's an easy win. And it's the tough win. It would just be too hard for us relative to the quantum of capability that they've been stockpiling for the express purpose. But we've learnt a lot in counterinsurgency over the years. How long did the Afghan contingency take for us to win the war part? Two weeks? What was the Iraq part? One week?

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  3. I think it's going to be extremely hard for us to stop the Chinese from a Taiwanese invasion. And I asked a former secretary of defense probably two or three months ago. I said, do we have a moral obligation to defend Taiwan? Not. Can we do it, tactically? Because that's always an engineering problem and a massing problem and a planning problem. And ultimately, we can run the simulations. And maybe there are these outcomes where we can make a dent in it. And I believe that the moral will of the country actually drives all that other activity. I'm not giving it away because it's only been male secretary defenses, but his answer was, I don't know. And I was flabbergasted by it because I thought I understood his politics. What it tells me is that I think the vast majority of both sides of the aisle don't view it as the moral obligation of the United States to protect Taiwan.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  4. When there's low trust and command and control. So the flip side to that is I could see a scenario where the Chinese hand over command and control to an AI to overcome the institutional resistance and the lack of trust up and down and across the branches of services because that thing would be dispassionate and would start tasking it. And I actually think that they have a much stronger incentive to push the bleeding edge there of adaptation, of planning the war with AI because they're fundamentally less joint. They're not trained in a joint way because they have to rely on it more. That adaptation may happen faster. Whereas we have a very successful joint capability. And so maybe we'll be less inclined to change. That's what I worry about now is this new capability of a thinking machine. Like maybe it can overcome the institutional weakness of their military.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  5. Everywhere we fight is joint in that it's all the services together, integrated working together. And it's widely regarded that the PLA and their setup, there's an enormous lack of trust up and down the chain of command. There's a worry about corruption. And so even in the vertical of the individual chain of command, let's say, in their army or in their Air Force, it becomes even harder when you have to have a joint operation. And we went through this here in the United States. We had this thing called Goldwater Nichols, which said, if you're going to be a commander in the military, 06 or above, you're going to get a joint assignment. We're going to make this service joint so we can fully project the power of each branch of the service and we work in concert together. We're not competing with each other. The Chinese have never fought a joint war. They have these branches of services. They've built all this technological capability. But their ability necessarily to exercise in this joint concept is very unclear.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  6. Is the edge and that we can tap into private markets and the commercial market in order to do adaptation of these technologies and then also we're creating a profit incentive for people. Look at all the Chinese generals that have gone to jail over and over again because they check the ICBMs and they're filled with water because no one in that industrial complex has a financial incentive in the same way. And what's interesting is I was with a prominent Chinese businessman a few weeks ago and I asked him, I said, there's been this shift here in the US where young people want to go into defense technology outside of the five-sided building, as we call it. Is there an analog in China? He goes, oh no. He goes, Chinese entrepreneurs want to tap into the American market. They want to be able to sell their product. It's so funny. The young people there are just as capitalistic. But the incentive structure in the PLA is not there. And so I think that's a huge edge for us.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  7. Yeah, massing is just the quantum you can produce in order to win the war. And so America won World War II by virtue of its enormous industrial capacity. And so I always think if America galvanizes on something, it's unbelievable to me what it can produce. But China has built a stockpile of conventional weapons that it would take us decades of production in order to build. They have 250 times our naval capability in construction today. You're not possibly going to catch up in any legitimate timeframe. And so I think we're going to win through technology. I also think that capitalism is this huge advantage that we have here in America because we call on the capitalistic system in order to deliver the goods to the department. The department really doesn't make anything. It's buying it from companies. And so the dynamism in the American capitalistic system.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  8. I see the Europeans doing a lot there because they can manage the full life cycle of that nuclear subs a huge effort, but look, the Brits have nuclear capability. The French have nuclear capability. But until they actually have a cooperative agreement for how they're going to run a joint military, I think it's hard to pinpoint. They can build tanks, small caliber munition. Look, all the sidearms for the U.S. Army historically were European guns, Beretta, Six Sour. They weren't even American guns. So the Europeans on a per unit basis will do a lot. I just think when the system becomes very pristine and big, it's clear that if it's still needed in the doctrine of force structure, that we're probably going to have to do it.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  9. So, look, aircraft carriers, nuclear subs, the three-pronged nuclear deterrent, those things take a long time. I suspect we're going to keep a lot of that capability. But smaller stuff, like anything autonomous in the water, hypersonics, these kinds of things that have a new development tail where the per

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  10. A really wonderful question. It's really a function of what our allies will be able to construct and build. We have a line of sight to this in the AUCUS partnership that we have with Australia and New Zealand. We're going to maintain an entire nuclear capability in Australia, and it's clear that that's the bug out point for a war with China. It's not going to be Guam. I was in an unclassed briefing the other day in the Pentagon. The stockpiles that China has, Guam is not the It's insufficient standoff in order to be protected. We can't project enough force from there. And so Australia becomes the new jump off point. And the battle plans have been set and we've given the Australians this huge capability. And we expect them to start spending. And we're sending our subs there and they're going to maintain them. And so part of it can be maintenance of a capability we already have. And then they contribute to that activity. And the other part is de novo capability.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  11. Larges is expected at infinitum. And it's a very difficult moment. And I view it as a very necessary moment. And I think a lot of people have problems with the form, but the substance is absolutely meritorious. You just can't argue with it because I live in suburban Washington. I'm blown away how the narrative of government's inefficient has totally captured the zeitgeist of the entire beltway. And six months ago, no one was talking about it. No one. No one was talking about the general inefficiency of government. And now both sides of the aisle agree that the broader government's extremely inefficient. And so that's amazing to me how the social zeitgeist can just change and move in this direction. But I think these are very necessary events. I think it's a good thing.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  12. Signed. At what point is it no longer the US's obligation or to maintain stability? There's a classical thinking in Washington that if we don't lead what fills the void could be complete chaos. And it's totally possible, but we've reached a guns and butter moment in terms of how big the deficit is. And so you have this perfect storm of you have an executive that's tired of freeloading plus a balance sheet that can't afford to do it in the same way anymore and a technological shift, which is actually the perfect opportunity for these people to go ahead and give it a try and take responsibility for their own backyard. I mean, the aid that the Europeans have provided to Ukraine, don't get me wrong, is very important. It is peer or near peer to the United States. The United States Defense Complex has gotten a huge benefit from it because they've been buying mostly American gear. But the Europeans gave a loan guarantee. They expect to get paid back. We gave the money no strings attached.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  13. Well, doctrine would say it was our ability to fight two continuous wars at the same time of near Pierce, all over the globe, and maintain world order. And look, it largely worked. It's an amazing run at enormous expense to the US taxpayer. Enormous expense. If you look at the rest of the G twenty and you add up their contributions, and then you look at what the United States spent in order to protect the free world, which is really what it did. And the G20 got a huge piece dividend. What's the peace dividend? Well, outside of the United States, in the G nineteen, education is largely free and healthcare is largely free. And you can do that when you don't have to protect the free world. And I believe the American taxpayer funded all of that peace dividend to enormous effect for these countries. And look, they didn't live up to the contract that they.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  14. Contract that I would sign would be LPTA, lowest price technically acceptable. So in a budget so big, when the buffet is so big, it's very easy to point to these sides and say how inefficient it is. And there's a ton of inefficiency. And this effort by Doge is extremely meritorious, and it happens in defense about every 20 years. So for people to say, oh, this is unprecedented, it's bunk. There's precedent everywhere in the department. It's a necessary extinction event. We also have to be able to manage these other contingent activities and we need to modernize. And this happens over and over again. And so it's just more exposed this time. There are tweet storms about it. The form is unusual, but the substance is not at all.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  15. This is too tough. I don't want to take the risk on balance sheet. And so that's how we came up with cost plus. We said, look, you're going to take this kind of risk and I'm going to find a way to make a good enough business for you that you don't want to abandon the effort. Cost plus. And cost plus by contract volume was only 15% of the department. It's about 30% of the budget now because we have programs moving into something called LRIP. That's when a program grows up and pushes out. And then as it crosses into this mainstream production line, we go to firm fix. Sometimes the artifact stays too long because we're constantly pushing the envelope of the technology and so you leave cost plus in to make it meritorious for a business. But I think a lot of people think the budget's 100% cost plus. This is not true. And the supermajority of contract volume is lowest price technically acceptable. And so I work for a lot of people who drilled it into my brain of every

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  16. The cost of logistics and these things need to get better over time. But these are actually very well run businesses. And if we work to change the incentives for these companies, which I think is very important, then you'll see fundamentally a change. The CEO of Lockheed Martin is a world-class capital allocator. I don't know if we've ever talked about it before, but Jim was the CEO of American Tower. It had like a $2 billion market cap. When he left, it was $100 billion. 10 years, 50x. This is not someone who doesn't understand capital allocation or return. But when the incentive structure is to let the department figure out what they want and then give you a very complicated requirements document. And then in the requirements document, they're asking you to push the limits of engineering. Then what's the most appropriate way to compensate someone that's pushing the envelope of physics or technology? Historically, you had businesses that would leave the ecosystem because they're like,

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  17. Of Iran's aerial defense. That was five pilots. That's a pretty mission-capable plane. And I know that the autonomous logistics and the cost of the aircraft hasn't been great, but also the way detractors have marketed that. It's not totally fair. It's a joint strike fighter by definition. So what does it mean joint? Is that if you're the Navy and I'm the Air Force, we all have one strike fighter now. It's joints, it's F-35. And so it's taking away many other programs. That's why the program volume is so high. But we have it to sub 110 million a copy. And when a Gulf Stream 800 is 85 million a copy, you say to yourself, okay, this is getting reasonable. There's some convergence here, but...

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  18. Force exclusively to fight a near pier in China or something like that. And so it's just a big world with a lot of different kinds of threats. And I'm not as convinced that I need to just get rid of every enterprise class carrier, every submarine, every frigate. There are true failures like the Littoral Combat ship, and we should turn it off and they're doing it. These enterprise carriers are $11 billion and they take forever to build. And so we're going to need a better paradigm there. So to be responsive to your question, one is process of how we get the stuff out. That needs to be improved. And then the other thing is curating the portfolio. It's both. But I wouldn't say exclusively. It may sound like I'm dodging the question to a certain extent, but do we still need enterprise carriers? I would suggest we do. What the Israelis did with five F-35s was pretty much knock out 100.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  19. Old technology. And so My concern is I think we're over indexing to a near peer threat, maybe, and not thinking about some of the capabilities we may need in, let's say, a nonlinear kind of threat. Like, what do I worry about? I worry about the ability for people to make fissile material now with lasers and they don't require centrifuges. And a non-state actor can actually build a nuclear capability. That's pretty concerning. It was usually, oh, you needed these pristine alloys, you needed access to the molecule. That just made it so hard and it was exclusively the provenceration states. Now you can have someone that's sufficiently capitalized with an alternative form of technology actually building a small tactical nuclear weapon. I'm not saying it's super easy, but the march of technology makes things easier. And so what's going to happen when a non-state actor choose your flavor of the month gets access to these kinds of things? And we've been building

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  20. So tough. This is a very tough question because in your mind's eye, you can say, I think this is where the world's going to go. But the department functions off of these plans, these operational views of how we integrate the force. So they're called OV1s. And to visual concept of planning of how we plan the force, we haven't come to grips with what we do or don't really need for next generation warfare. The kind of nonlinear warfare may still require a lot of the old stuff, John Spencer at West Point talks about war is really a combination of old and new. It's never all new and it's never all old. And if you think about the Ukrainian contingency, there are many World War II-esque like components of this, 155 millimeter shells, small caliber munitions, bicycle bombs, mines, the minefield in Ukraine is about twice the size of the state of Florida now, landmines. We're talking about

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  21. off the shelf, then you must try that first. And at a minimum, if you decide not to use it or if you use it in some capacity, you can't treat it like a military system in demand P invisibility into cost and pricing and all these other things because it's commercially available. And I believe that piece of legislation was enormously helpful to Palantir because it was commercially available, although it didn't have the size of commercial business today. And the army was creating a program at 5x the funding of Palantir to do it their own way. And they were attempting to literally just turn off Palantir, which would have been a huge cost to the government, and I'm sure the system wouldn't have as been as effective.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  22. Then there are instances where in the palanteers where they've crossed into the commercial domain, and this is wonderful for the department because you're getting more reps. So I happen to think a lot of the autonomy in the commercial world will ultimately be adapted into the defense department. What am I talking about? Joby and Waymo and Tesla. That commercial adaptation is going to be very helpful for a defense application. So I think there's huge benefit where we should be cutting off of the commercial side of industry. By the way, there's legislation to this. And so I was intimately involved in it because we owned a business that benefited from the real legislation and we advocated for it. But Palantir, it really turbocharged Palantir as a business. And so this was the National Defense Appropriation Act where there was a line put in at a bunch of our behests to say commercial off the shelf first if it already exists. That was a new feature a lot. And it said, look, if the capability exists.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  23. Solution because it could bring so much demand. I'm 47. I never contemplated trillion dollar balance sheet corporations that had in the iPhone 90% global market share or something crazy for a phone above a thousand bucks. And so the technology in it, we do so much better doing adaptation of something commercial. And I happen to think that's what's going to happen in a lot of these new emerging technologies. The department didn't come up with its own flat panel TV. It bought it commercially. If you go on the high side for all the cleared information, it's showing it on a cinemadel screen. Yeah, it's not a custom screen that we made for ourselves.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  24. I remember the field ordering officer. I said, What's this? So our general lack of visibility financially, I love to have some compute because for them to trace this route back to base, it's crazy dangerous. And they're only coming back to meet the general obligation of how we need to clear these tickets in order to give them more cash. So maybe I can do a digitally over the air. And so we built this huge thing. It hung off your belt. It had a huge expensive battery on it. It had a thermal printer. It lasted two hours. It was horrible. And then over a weekend, the first version of the iPhone comes out. A marine builds an entire app over the weekend. Why don't we use this? Of course, it's so much better. But you have to remember the largest organization of its kind on Earth. And for many years, it was the largest organization. The Army is still the largest operator of golf courses in the world. So the U.S. Army, everything it does is at the limit of size. And so it always thought that its internal requirements would drive the best.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  25. If there's an adjacent commercial development, what's like a quintessential example of that playing out commercial to modified? I mean, I was part of a program in Afghanistan where we were trying to create handheld computing for the purposes of contracting officers being able to go outside the wire to be able to conduct commerce on the economy and do our counterinsurgency missions. So that's we use this little parking ticket. It's called a standard Form 44. It looks like a parking ticket. It's like in triplicate and there's a carbon copy. It's exactly what you grew up with a parking ticket. And that's how we give money and we procure resources on the economy in a theater or war. And so there's a special limit that we raise to a few million dollars. And one of my jobs was to clear these tickets into the accounting system in Kandahar.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  26. Security Council looking at a Ukrainian drone that was printed in their AOR, in their theater of war. And they were doing it for $150. And so I view a lot of what's happening in drone warfare as the arc of flat panel TVs is like they're very expensive and they just keep on dropping in price. And the low cost benefactor is the leader today. It's why Walmart bought Visio. And so I see a lot of that in the drone into the back end will be more important, like the software that coordinates it. The shape charge will be more important. I just like modifying a grenade. But it's not clear to me that making the drone will be this fabulous profit center. And so I think the department does best when it lets dual use commercial technology advance so it can adapt it and pull it in internally as opposed to trying to develop a technology exclusively for defense.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  27. Parts through the front office and the back office. This is the best way to think about it in my mind. What's the front office? It's warfighting. That is lethality. It's projecting force. The back office is called the business missionary. It's everything except warfighting. And so in the business mission area, the ball has moved forward, but not nearly enough in terms of where it needs to go, in terms of the general efficiency of how we run the back office of the building. And in the front office, we have very pristine, exquisite weapon systems, but some of the massing on the battlefield is going to be this very inexpensive, very permissive, autonomous capability that we're watching unfold in a live contingency in the Ukrainian theater. It's ironic because I had a whole series of dinners with Baltic ministers of defense, and they weren't asking me for drone technology from America. I was at the National Security

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  28. Capability is limited to ICBMs, which is really end of the world. Nuclear weaponry. There's nothing tactical in that. That's only good when whatever video game scenario, it's the end of the world. In terms of the projection of force, Europe really doesn't have a lot. It exclusively relied on the United States. And now I think they're having this moment where they realize, okay, maybe we exhausted the good offices here and we need to power up and have our own capability. And it's going to take them a while. It's not going to happen overnight. Maybe another perspective to offer you spent a lot of time in the Pentagon. There's the whatever, $870 some odd billion dollar annual defense budget. Talk about the shifting nature of that thing, that dollar amount that gets outlaid, what it's gone to historically that's been most important, how what is most important is shifting and whether or not the Pentagon is good at keeping up with a shifting landscape in the way it spends its money. I think a good frame for me to understand the building has been there are two

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  29. We're going through it. And so let's say you and I have a contract. I'm going to mow your lawn for the next 80 years and you're never going to pay me. Or you're going to pay me sporadically. So if you don't pay into the system, then who's invalidated the contract? Should I have the reasonable expectation that you're going to honor your obligations if I refuse to pay into the system? And you have an administration that views that kind of contractual compact as meaningful. These are deal people fundamentally. They come from business. And so they view themselves as completely justified. You're breaking the contract. And so what's my general obligation to you? And I don't think they're incorrect. And so it leads to this real, very serious moment that we're experiencing right now. And so now the question becomes the Europeans' defense capability is extremely limited.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  30. America's greatest advantage. Please enjoy this incredible discussion with Darren Farber. Maybe the fun place to begin is for you to describe with defense investing being so incredibly popular, your State of the Union of defense in general. You've been in and around this world for a long time. There's some active wars in the world right now in a way that it wasn't many years ago. Just describe how you see the landscape overall. And then we're going to dig into each element of it. We're at a very topical moment right now, just by virtue of what appears to be this decoupling from this ultra-longstanding relationship that's existed since immediately after World War II, which is to say borders did not change in the Western world through force for the last 80 years. And we're seeing that paradigm change. And so that's a pretty big change. But I completely understand.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  31. Guest today is Darren Farber. Darren is the managing partner of Albion River, a private direct investment firm focused on acquiring companies that produce highly technical defense products and services. He is a former special advisor to the deputy Undersecretary of Defense, a former member of U.S. Department of Defense task force for business and stability operations, and the list goes on and on. Darren is a wealth of knowledge in this space, and someone I am grateful to have in the U.S. corner. He shares his perspective on the changing role of the U.S. in global defense and how recent conflicts have shaped military technology and strategy. Darren explains his investment approach at Albion, focusing on finding one of one suppliers and getting as close to what he calls the fundamental molecules as possible in defense technology. We discuss insights on evaluating the Taiwan situation, lessons from Ukraine, how the defense budget is allocated, what investors can learn from defense primes, and why technological superiority remains

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  32. Hello and welcome everyone. I'm Patrick O'Shaughnessy, and this is Invest Like the Best. This show is an open-ended exploration of markets, ideas, stories, and strategies that will help you better invest both your time and your money. If you enjoy these conversations and want to go deeper, check out Colossus Review, our quarterly publication with in-depth profiles of the people shaping business and investing. You can find Colossus Review along with all of our podcasts at JoinColos.com.

    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

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    2025-04-01 · Invest Like the Best · Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417] · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source