YouSaid · the spoken record

David Enrich

lines on the record: 99
first: 2018-03-29
most recent: 2018-03-29
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

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“And in this case, and I think part of the issue is that these are complicated cases. It takes a lot to bring a case, but there is enormous resistance in the financial world. And a lot of these prosecutors, they really don't want to lose. And to me, the power that the prosecutors have here is the simple act of staging a perp walk, of going and arresting a senior executive at a bank or another big company. Or a dozen.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, there are a lot of people who are caught up in this. And to me, first of all, I love Jesse Isinger's book. Everyone should read it. I think it's a perfect compliment to the Spider Network in the sense that the Spider Network show is one of these cases where there was all this evidence that most of it just didn't get used. And Jesse's book does a really good job of explaining some of the dynamics inside the Justice Department for why prosecutors are sometimes kind of cowardly.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“You know, this is mystifying and a little bit frustrating to me because there is as much evidence as there is against Tom Hayes, there's also a lot of evidence that shows Hayes' bosses and his boss's bosses and his boss's boss's bosses not only knowing about and condoning what he was doing at the time, but in some cases participating alongside him. And were they doing it as extensively and as aggressively as Hayes and as blatantly as Hayes? Absolutely not. But these are people who should have known better. And the regulars and prosecutors, I think, most of these are smart, ambitious people. And they should recognize how the actions that they take going after certain people in the industry, those have the potential to be very powerful deterrent messages. And it's just a huge missed opportunity. I think they could have brought a lot more cases than they did.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, the second reason is that prosecutors and regulators are a little bit lazy. They wanted to nail some people, but they don't really want to take risks. They want to go after the sure thing. And the sure thing in this case was Tom Hayes. This is, I think, probably an unlusable case for them. And they went after him. And what's mystifying to me is what happened next, which is that they did, they criminally charged a small handful of other people of his Confederates, all of whom got acquitted, but they really didn't go after anyone higher up.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Away scot free. I mean, there are two basic reasons, two literal reasons to that. One is that Hayes was stupid and naive, and he did everything in writing. So there's this rich trove of documentary evidence that showed Hayes in text messages or chat rooms or sometimes on recorded phone lines saying, please move LIBOR up for me. I have a lot of money writing on this over and over and over again thousands of times. So there's no way.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“What seemed like the majority of my waking hours, either with him or on the phone with him, and eventually his wife as well. And they just let me inside their life for a pretty substantial period of time, from early 2013 until mid-2015 when Tom Hayes eventually went on trial for manipulating LIBOR. And so that was the basis for this Walser Journal series, the unraveling of Tom Hayes, is that I watched this guy who had become kind of this unlikely public face of financial crime. And I watched him his life disintegrate. It was fascinating and kind of upsetting.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And unfortunately, he canceled the next morning because his wife had found his phone and realized he was off to meet a journalist. And his wife is a lawyer and decided that was not a wise thing to do. But that was the start of what became a years-long relationship I had with Tom Hayes that initially started over text messages, but ultimately I was spending.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And I convinced her to pass on my phone number to Tom Hayes. And she said, Of course, there's no way he's going to call you. His lawyers won't let him, blah, blah, blah. And I was sitting at home that night on the sofa watching TV with my wife, and I got a text message from an unknown number. And it said, this goes much, much higher than me, not even the Justice Department knows the full story. And it was Tom Hayes, and I could not believe it. He agreed then to meet me the next day. He said, I'll meet you if I can trust you. And I said, of course you can trust me. I'm a journalist. And he told me he'd be standing in Victoria Station, which is a big, busy train station in London outside the Burger King wearing a brown leather jacket. And of course, no one even knows what this guy looks like at this point. And as you can imagine, was pretty excited about that. I kind of pictured myself as Bob Woodward all of a sudden.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Stupid, seemingly damning stuff in instant messages. And this woman, though, painted a much more interesting nuanced picture of Tom as someone who was mildly autistic, who was a nerd. He was just doing what everyone else was doing, it seemed like.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Widespread common issues. This is in 2013, at the very end of 2012, for the first time a guy was actually an individual, a person, was held accountable for this. And that guy was Tom Hayes. He was arrested in the UK and he was criminally charged here in the US. In the US, I remember this. He was the first person to be charged. My boss at the time, a guy named Bruce Orwell, who's a great editor at the Wall Street Journal, wanted me to write a profile of Tom Hayes. And of course, that seemed like a thankless task. Hayes had been, you know, he'd been criminally charged. This guy's not going to talk. And so after much to-ing and fro-ing, I agreed to do this and found a woman who was his former business school classmate and got her to talk to me. And I started painting this picture. Nothing was known about Tom Hayes at this point. Other than that, he was a very successful trader who had said some really...”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, ultimately, it was more than a dozen banks and probably five or six or seven or eight or nine or ten billion dollars in penalties a lot.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“It was actually the late 2000s. In the financial crisis here in the US had ended, banks were going back to normal, more or less boring stuff. But a financial crisis was just dawning in Europe. I'd never lived overseas and was eager for an adventure. And London seemed like an adventure.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, it was standard practice to be manipulating Live or Hayes was a really clever guy and a really relentless guy and took this to a new level. So the introduction of the brokers was something that Hayes pioneered. And that was really his innovation. That was the way that he got an edge. And everyone always talked about getting an edge on the trading floor. And Hayes had found one.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Routinely going out into the market and telling all of their contacts at all these other banks move LIBOR up or down. And it was basically to benefit Tom Hayes' trading positions and the trading positions of Tom Hayes' colleagues.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“With these clerks. So, the brokers' role is that they, Tom Hayes can tell the guy at UBS, his colleague to move live or up or down. Well, Tom Hayes can't do quite as easily is call Citigroup or JP Morrigan or Royal Bank of Scotland. The other 10 banks. The other 10 banks doesn't know these guys. And why would they listen to him anyway? But he can call in a favor with the brokers. And so he had brokers at ICAP, which is the biggest and some other firms as well. Just every single day.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Naked, it was that raw. It was that very explicit. People are very open about it. They were encouraged to do it. This was under the umbrella at the time of banks trying to improve the coordination of different parts of the bank, working together, all pulling in the same direction.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“By themselves. Tom Hayes works at One Bank, and so Tom Hayes, as was standard industry practice at the time, the traders who are making wagers based on the direction of interest rates would call up the little clerk in the bowels of the bank and say, hey, mate, I need LIBOR up today. Can you please move UBS's submission up as much as you can, or move it down by as much as you can, depending on the way?”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Tom Hayes not only would notice but care deeply about why we're moving in these tiny little increments. And so that's where the brokers came in for Tom Hayes. He realized, and the brokers realized that LIBORES at this time worked at UBS, the beat Swiss.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Tom Hayes was not a guy who liked going to strip clubs. He was not a big drinker. His idea of a fun night out was going to KFC, getting a bucket of fried chicken, sitting at home eating it while watching Seinfeld reruns. And so this is not a guy who you can easily, he's a huge trader, but it was very hard, and the brokers were dying to do business with him because of the huge volumes he was doing. But this is not someone who is very easy to spend your 10% of the commissions on. And so the brokers found another way to reward him, which was that Tom Hayes was making huge, huge bets on the direction of interest rates, which meant that he had a huge, huge stake in the direction of LIBOR every day. And Tom Hayes on a given day would have millions and millions of dollars riding on whether LIBOR went up or down by a basis point, which is a 100th of a percentage point. So a tiny little move that no one would ever notice.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“No, so they No, they get creative. They get very creative about ways to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars a year on a particular person. And so what does that mean? That means drugs. It means women. It means trips to various places. It means just all sorts of ludicrous misbehavior. And this is something that, again, is the book singles out a number of individuals for being involved in this, but this is widespread industry practice at the time. And...”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And if you've got some of these traders who are generating millions and millions of dollars a year in brokerage fees, spending 10% of that on steak dinners and nice drinks is very hard.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, so the brokers serve this role as the great middleman in the banking industry. And when two traders, when a trader Bank A and a trader bank B both want to do a transaction, they're often not talking to each other. They're talking to a broker who's in the middle and realizes that trader Bank A wants to buy something and Trader Bank B is looking to sell the same thing. And so they'll serve as the middleman for that service. They take a cut of the value of the transaction. And that's fine. The Brogers serve another role though, which is information brokers, essentially. And they pedal gossip. And they are paid in large part to develop relationships with these traders. And the way they do that, I love this thing. It's that they have, there's a ratio of percentage of the revenue that each trader generates you are supposed to as a broker recycle that back to the trader.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“He was a genius, and he was one of the best traders that a lot of his colleagues had ever seen. He also was someone who was very well trained to do what traders do best, especially in a decade ago, which was to look for tiny little inefficiencies and find ways to exploit them. And that could mean having a faster trading system. It could mean having better intelligence. It could mean having stupider clients. It could mean finding ways to manipulate something that you are... On the outcome of”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“So Tom Hayes is a mildly autistic mathematician. He was a trader at some of the world's biggest banks. He was a guy who, like most mathematicians who are mildly autistic and get into banking, was very good at creating models, detecting patterns, things like that. Not very good.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Incentives matter, and they explain that we see. And I think that's why, to me, when the next crisis inevitably happens and the next scandal inevitably unrupts, it will. It's a question of when and where. But when it does, I think we're going to look back and see that a lot of the lessons we should have learned from the financial crisis in terms of shaping incentives in a way to encourage sober”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I mean, one of the revelations to me in writing this book is that most of the things on Wall Street and in the financial world, and I think in politics too, it boils down to incentives. Of course. People are actually pretty rational actors. If you can figure out what's motivating them to do what they're doing. And so you see this anywhere from a low-level trader starting out on Wall Street to someone at the upper echelons of a bank like Gary Gensler or Bob Rubin, or if you put them in government service, the same thing. So if they're responding to the incentives, whether it's compensation incentives or feedback or just approval ratings or things like that, and everyone...”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“No, it's totally true. We had a lot of the same old characters coming in, and a lot of them, Geithner's an exception to this, I think, but a lot of them hailed from Wall Street. And these are the same guys who had not only not stocked the financial crisis, but in a number of cases either worsened it or profited from it. And take your pick. I don't know which of those is worse. Again, in fairness to people like Summers and Gensler, I think there is a human capacity to learn from one's mistakes and arguably the experience of having screwed up royally and watching the financial world burn as a result in part of your mistakes is probably a pretty sobering educational moment. And look, everyone got it wrong. It's not just these guys, right? The media got it wrong.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And to his credit, unlike most politicians, he admitted that he had been catastrophically wrong in the Clinton administration, in the Clinton era, and he had just gotten it wrong. He said he had learned a lesson and was embracing very enthusiastically this pro-regulation, pro-government view of the financial world. And so he came into the CFDC, which at the time was this kind of scrappy, underfunded backwater of an agency in Washington and did everything he could to He wants scalps. He wanted to see the CFTC developing a reputation for being one of the toughest, scariest gunslingers on Wall Street. And what became this investigation into LIBOR, that became the perfect vehicle for him.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Travelers and City Corp. And then, lo and behold, after leaving, immediately gets hired on a very lucrative contract to do not a whole lot at Citigroup. So in any case, Gensler in the Treasury Tournament in the Clinton administration was one of the proponents of essentially neutering the CFDC, not having it be a powerful force for the regulation of derivatives. He then, in the Obama era, is eager to, he sees the winds shifting. We've just had a financial crisis. He's eager for a senior administration position. And the opposition to him on Capitol Hill was intense because he was so deeply embedded with the Reuben wing of the Democratic Party. And he underwent a remarkable makeover. And Bernie Sanders was one guy on the hill who had been a vigorous opponent of Gensler getting any powerful position. And Gensler just pulled this remarkable...”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“He ended up at City Group. City, right? So he oversaw the repeal of Glest-Steagall, which paved the way for the creation of the modern citroup, which was tragic.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Right. Test the Senate 93 1. There was a consensus in both parties at the time that the key, one of the keys to economic growth and to kind of economic growth spreading globally and the U.S. maintaining its competitive advantage when it came to financial services was to embrace a really aggressive laissez-faire attitude toward all walks of financial life. Look, it's clearly not only the Clinton administration. But the administration empowered any given year wields a tremendous amount of clout on these things. And if Bob Rubin, a guy who is coming from the upper echelons of Goldman Sachs, wasn't a cheerleader of this, it wouldn't have happened. And Gary Gensler as well, another Goldman Sachs guy.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, and this started in the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration oversaw one of the great regulatory rollbacks of the 20th century. And it was Bob Rubin and Gary Gensler who were leading that charge.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, the regulatory pendulum has swung so wildly, and I think it's a common misconception right now in 2018 to look at this as a product of Democrats versus Republicans or Barack Obama versus Donald Trump. And that's just not what it is.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, exactly. And so this is something. The big problem wasn't the introduction of LIBOR into the mortgage market. It was the introduction of LIBOR into the derivatives market. And that happened in the mid-90s. And that was something that at the time the commodity futures trading commission had to approve this because it was the Chicago mercantile exchange that was looking to kind of have LIBOR embedded as a mechanism in interest rate swaps. It was seen as a way to make the swaps market much more accessible and much more efficient and much more liquid. But at the time, a number of traders warned the CFTC that if you do this, you are inviting disaster because traders at the big banks know how LIBOR works. It's completely unregulated by central banks or by financial regulators. And it's very easy. If you give banks a huge profit incentive to manipulate something, guess what? They're going to manipulate it.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, or maybe it was the Fed funds rate or something like that that was, but then again, since that is going to change less frequently than lib or would, you then, the banks were then adding an additional buffer. So instead of maybe LIBOR plus two per point, it would be Fed funds plus three points.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Originally not really. And originally, this was seen as, and keep in mind that the alternative to this is that just banks are arbitrarily setting loans. It's not something that is replacing a heavily regulated kind of government-imposed rate. Pre”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“U.S. mortgages. In the early 90s, and that was partly a product of at the time was viewed as a very reliable way for banks to estimate their funding costs. And again, that's something that in theory, if it works properly, is very good for everyone. It's good for the banks. It's also good for the consumers because it's an efficient way. It relieves the banks of any anxiety they might have that if they price a loan at a low interest rate that they're going to get burned a year or five years later. This allows them to, it relieves them of all that anxiety. And that allows them theoretically to loan money at a lower interest rate.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I mean, this is like so many other problems in the financial arena. This is something that had fairly benign origin. And this is something that really was meant to be to simplify and increase the efficiency of very complicated and cumbersome lending process. And gradually, over a period of a decade or two, this rate, first of all, became embedded in hundreds of billions of dollars worth of American mortgages. And it didn't start out that way.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I mean, it's funny because I've been covering this at this point for eight years, I would say, and that is such a fundamental question. And it's true. It's such a deeply embedded conflict of interest that it's just completely inappropriate.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Hundreds of trillions. Hundreds of trillions. This is kind of like asking how hot is the sun, right? The actual temperature in degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius doesn't make any difference. The number is so astronomically large. Literally astronomers.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And that's how this number gets assembled. Yeah, well, and the joke is that the reason I wrote a book on this and there's been so much media coverage on this is because it got to the point where they weren't even really making calls. This became a number that was being pulled more or less out of thin air by bankers at a low level. And why were they pulling it out of thin air? They were doing it because their traders asked them to, because the traders had, especially by the 1990s and early aughts, had huge amounts of money that they were wagering on whether LIBOR was going to go up or down by very tiny increments.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, it was kind of a halftime job, I would say. And it was, again, this is someone who was. Usually, a clerk, an entry-level job, an aspiring trader would also do this.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Because this was developed in a pre computer era. It was the mid-1980s. And to determine how much a bank it cost a bank to borrow money, you needed to check with various parts of the bank. So someone, this is usually a pretty low-level person kind of in the bowels of the bank. And he would come in in the morning and start making phone calls to different parts of the bank to try and assess how much it cost them to borrow money. And remember, this isn't one phone call because this is most of these banks are global at this point. They have operations all over the world. And so this guy has to call the treasury desk in Tokyo or Singapore in New York.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, so in the mid 1980s, the British Bankers Association, which was a trade organization, basically a lobbying group, BBA. Yeah, the BBA for not only the big British banks, but for many of the biggest banks in the world that had set up shop in London, they got together with the Bank of England, the central bank there, and they decided the use of derivatives was really booming.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“You know, if their funding costs go up, you could be locked into a loan that is deeply unprofitable for the bank. And so the innovation here was that they would have a mechanism where the interest rate would fluctuate over time based on the bank's funding costs.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Which becomes a prophet. Yeah, exactly. And so obviously the banks need to have a profit. And so they eventually, normally that would be simple if it's just one bank making a loan. But the history of this is that at the kind of dawn of the era where big loans were being syndicated, you had a big group of banks getting together to team up to make big loans. In this case, it was a loan, an $80 million loan to the Shah of Iran at the time. And if different banks of different funding costs, how do you determine the interest rate? And so the innovation here was that you can come up with an average, basically, and you can look at how much does it, if you've got 10 banks on it, you take their average funding cost, and that can be the interest rate plus a little bit. The challenge, though, is that funding costs change. And if you're making a 20-year loan, your funding costs at year one could be very different from your funding costs at year 10 or 20. And that is a very scary thing for the banks because”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, that is right. And this is, I really like history. And so researching this was just fascinating for me. Originally, if you think about how does an interest rate come into being, when a bank offers a loan to someone, how do they determine what they're going to pay? And the general rule of thumb was that they are going to base the interest rate they're putting on a loan based on how much it costs the bank to borrow money.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And the biggest part is not just normal debt, it's derivatives that are originally companies or investors were using them to protect themselves, to hedge against possible fluctuations in interest rates. And later, as often happens in the financial world, they became a playground for speculators and traders.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“It sets interest rates on all sorts of debt all over the world. So if you have an adjustable rate mortgage, the interest rate is based on LIBOR. If you have a credit card, a student loan, an auto loan, it's likely based on LIBOR. If you are a big company and are issuing debt, the interest rate might be based on LIBOR. Same if you're a town or a city. There are trillions and trillions of dollars of this stuff.”
2018-03-29 · Masters in Business · David Enrich Discusses the Libor Scandal · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source