YouSaid · the spoken record

Gönül Tol

lines on the record: 50
first: 2022-09-23
most recent: 2022-09-23
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“It's not just about a matter, lack of time. I think he genuinely believes that first he's really helping the people around him. The people in his client holistic network. And I don't think he's willing to carry out any reform. So there's a lack of willingness there.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It's certainly not helping Turkey, but it's helping his cronies around him. And I think that's the reason why he insists on those very unorthodox policies. And another problem is that he really doesn't have people who take knockouts or real experts around him. He's surrounded by yes man and his economic team. Similarly, they cannot talk truth to power. And I think that's the real problem here. And I'll end with this. I think right now just this morning I've heard people talk about, oh, well, maybe Erdogan before the elections, he's so desperate that he'll actually come to his senses and he'll implement real economic, meaningful economic policies. I really do not see that happening anytime soon. And that's why I think his way out is basically implementing cosmetic things before the elections, but not any meaningful economic reforms.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Exactly, Carl, and I referred to a recent public opinion survey conducted in Turkey among the country's youth. So according to the survey results, an increasing number of young people in Turkey, they are against this personality cult. They know nothing other than Erdogan. They were born, I'm talking about people who are born.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Happen will Erdogan just accept defeat? I think if the opposition wins by a large margin, and I'm talking about maybe four or five points, less than that, it gets tricky because he can always add on, can always win the elections if it's less than four points. But a bigger margin, I think you'll have to accept defeat. Now, does that mean it's going to be peaceful? No. I mean, so many people are talking about these groups, nationalistic groups, paramilitary groups around Erdogan, and some of them we've seen on the streets, on the night of the failed coup. Many people actually fear that he will unleash them on the night of the elections if he loses.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Society can still do wonders. But you write institutions, as we know them, are not there anymore. It's become a country where one man makes all the decisions from when a soccer club is going to play the game to the country's foreign policy. Every decision is made from the top. And that's one of the reasons why political scientists call Turkey not an illiberal democracy anymore, but a competitive authoritarian regime where it's competitive because there are still elections, but it's authoritarian because the playing field is skewed. It's not even. Which brings me to your question, Carl, is are the elections free and fair no? But I still have hope, again, because of what the opposition and Turkish civil society did in 2019. And I think it all comes down to that, the question of what's going on.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, Carl, if you ask me that question before 2019, my answer would be no, we've passed that point. Elections in Erdogan's New Turkey do not matter anymore because we had a terrible experience in 2018, a presidential elections where anyone before that in 2017 referendum to switch to the presidential system where there were a lot of irregularities. There was a really small, he won by a razor thin margin and a lot of irregularities there. So many people thought this is it. Elections do not matter. He's never going to walk away. He's going to be around forever. But then we saw 2019 local elections where the opposition parties mobilized their base, mobilized civil society, protected the ballot box. So that gave me hope that Turkish democracy actually has a pulse. And Turkish civil society”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Refugees back to Syria is actually to work and ally with the Assad regime. And that puts a lot of pressure on Erdogan. And that's why we're hearing these things about normalizing ties with Assad.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Gains in the region. So toppling the regime took a back seat to that goal. But the steps are done within the framework Astana, for instance. Erdogan worked very closely with Putin and the Assad regime to consolidate Assad's military gains on the ground so that the Assad regime would look the other way when Erdogan attacked the Kurds. So he's been doing that on the ground anyway, but only now we're hearing Turkish officials talking about the need to start talking to Assad again. So I don't think it's a distant picture where we see Erdogan and Assad together. And one more thing and I'll end there is the increasing pressure from Turkish opposition to ment ties with the Assad regime because the opposition makes the argument that the only way to send the millions of”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, we already started hearing the word normalization with the Assad regime in Turkey, and that was unthinkable only a few years ago. But I think for a while, that's been on the horizon. And in fact, I would say since 2015, the official narrative has always been, I mean, Erdogan's official narrative, we want to topple this regime. We don't want to work with Assad. But unofficially, since 2015 and 2016, all the steps that Turkey was taking in Syria actually strengthened Erdogan's hand. Because after Erdogan changed his domestic strategy to stay in power after 2015, he changed his Syrian strategy as well. So when the uprising in Syria started in 2011, Erdogan's number one goal was toppling the Assad regime. But in 2015, from 2015 onwards, he shifted his priority to curbing the current”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Very militaristic, very aggressive foreign policy agenda. And I think at some point he realized that that's not working. He really needs to, I mean, EU is Turkey's biggest trading partner. He really needs to work with the West. Wants to resolve, it really kind of opens the door for Erdogan to Western capitals. So can pitch himself as a very useful ally because starting from 2015 particularly, he was seen as the Trojan horse in NATO. So he wanted to change, he wants to change that narrative and pitch himself and Turkey as a valuable NATO partner, a partner that the West has to work with. So I think that was partly why Erdogan was so keen on mediating the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Which is the northern Syrian town. And if the regime captures Idlib, for instance, there will be millions of people moving towards Turkish border. And that's a nightmare scenario for Erdogan, particularly right before the elections. So that means he really Russia calls the shots in Syria, and that means Ardena really needs to cooperate work with Russia. Because of all these reasons, and there is also the trade partnership, energy partnership, so because of all those reasons, Arden can't really afford to lose Putin either. So mediating is the optimum is his best shot. But there's also another reason for why Erdogan is mediating, and that is especially after Erdogan cultivated this partnership with the nationalists in 2015. He pursued a very anti-Western, anti-American...”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Has a very complicated partnership with Russia as well. And I'm not just talking about the defense partnership recently purchased the Russian Made S-400s. And now considering purchasing Russian jets if the US fails to deliver F-16s. So there is a strong defense partnership between Turkey and Russia, but that's not it. Putin and I are very close. For instance, Putin recently channeled billions of dollars into Turkish economy cash, which Erdogan desperately needs cash ahead of elections. Russia is building Turkey's first nuclear reactor, but more importantly in Syria, Russian cooperation is quite important to Erdogan, because Erdogan's nightmare is another refugee flaw emanating from Syria. And right now there is it.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Exactly. But not just that. That's good for Ukraine, good for Turkey too, but I think there's another important component that we don't talk about. And that is the Western sanctions on Turkey, on the defense sector particularly. It's really hurt Turkish defense sector. Turkey cannot produce engines like jet engines, for instance, which is a huge problem for a country that is striving to become a independent country in the defense on defense front. So Turkey, Erdogan, before the crisis in Ukraine started, Erdogan solved that problem somewhat by signing an agreement with Ukraine. According to the agreement, Ukraine was going to help Turkey produce those engines. So Ukraine and Turkey defense ties became very strong. On the other hand,”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“While several things first, he doesn't have that many options. He cannot really take thighs. He can't do anything but to mediate in the conflict. And the reason is Turkey has cultivated strong ties, particularly strong defense ties with Ukraine. And a few things are...”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And the second thing is economy. He has to do something to improve economy. Whether he can do it, it's a question mark, but he can try with cosmetic things right before elections can take cosmetic steps to appeal to the voters. And the third thing that will really impact his chances in the polls is which candidate the opposition parties filled? If it's a weak candidate, despite all the problems he's facing, Erdogan still has a chance to win the elections.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Is more fragmented and that can undermine Erdogan. So what can Erdogan do in this context? I don't think a tension on the foreign policy front is going to win him elections. I think there are three things that he can do to improve his chances. Another Kurdish opening, I think, would help because there are millions of Kurds living in Turkey and they could actually be kingmakers in the next elections. The pro-Kurdish party has around 6 million votes. So Turkey is a country of over 80 million people. So 6 million votes is important. So he could again engage the Kurds and launch another Kurdish opening. That's one possibility and something that he could do to improve his chances.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“We realized that despite his alliance with the nationalists, he lost elections. So I think the one of the key reasons for his election loss was obviously economy number one reason, but the number two reason was the presence of millions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. There are officially around 4 million, the unofficial counties, I think, is much bigger. So there is now a big nationalist backlash against Syrian refugees. Which makes me to this point. Nationalism is not working for Erdogan anymore because now there is a growing nationalist opposition to Erdogan. And that's his own making. It's mainly because there are several reasons why today the nationalist field in Turkey is very fragmented. In 2015, the nationalist space was very uniform and they all, through their support,”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Great question, Carl. So, for many years, nationalism did wonders for Erdogan, starting from 2015. I think nationalism helped him consolidate his power. He could be able to win elections. He could be able to establish the presidential system that he had been dreaming about, thanks to nationalism. So Turkish nationalism did wonders for Erdogan. But we found out in 2019 that nationalism was not doing the trick anymore. And 2019 is another turning point in the sense that Turkey held local elections that year, and Erdogan's party lost almost all major cities. And that's a big deal. I can hear people asking, why do we care about local elections? Holding municipalities was key to Erdogan's light historic network.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And very few people would question whether that's genuine or not. And that is because these ideologies in the Turkish context can be very fluid. Turkish Islamists, for instance, they can be nationalists, strong nationalists. Turkish socialists can be strong nationalists. So that fluid atmosphere in the country because of the historic background, I think that explains why Erdogan was able to utilize those different ideologies pretty effectively to stay in power.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And if I may say the sins of the Republican elite, the way how they imagined Turkish society is a homogeneous society and all the complications that has created divisions that has created in Turkish politics and society, those things allowed Erdogan to leap from one ideology to another. Because if it was in another context, sure, populists use ideology as an instrument, right? That's a known fact because populism itself is not an ideology. It doesn't offer a solution to major problems. So they usually pair populism with an ideology. That's what they do. But for Erdogan, he could easily become a conservative Democrat and an Islamist and later an”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“That's right. That's right. Everything is about Erdogan wanting to stay in power. And that's why when I'm asked whether ideology has played a role in Erdogan's policies, my first question is which ideology? Yes, ideology has certainly played a role, but different ideologies play different roles in Ardo's survival strategy. But what's important to underline here is the fact that what allowed Erdogan to leap from one ideology to another is the historical grievances, historical divisions in the country. There has always been a historical division between the conservatives and the secularists. And you have the Sunni Muslim majority on the one hand, and then you have ethnic Kurdish minority on the other hand, and you have a religious minority on the other hand. So this very complicated structure of Turkish society.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“With organizations like Kulenis, for instance, that sell apart. So he realized there were cracks in his conservative coalition. The Kurdish opening didn't work in his favor. So he wanted to abandon that Islamist strategy in favor of a nationalist strategy because he realized that for me to be able to win back elections, I need to ally with the Turkish nationalists. That was the decision he made after he lost the elections in 2015. And since then, there's been an alliance between Erdogan and the Turkish nationalists, and that's had a huge impact on Turkish domestic scene as well as the steps that Erdogan has taken on the foreign policy front.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“I'm your leader too. We are in this together. Let's establish a presidential system that will make Turkey stronger and there is something in it for every one of you to the conservatives. You'll get a more religious society. You'll see Islam more visible in the country to the Kurds. You are part of this ummah, this Muslim nation. And I'll sit down with you and talk about granting more rights. And that was when Erdogan launched the Kurdish opening. So this happened before 2015. But by 2015, June elections, he realized that that strategy didn't work, that Islamism didn't do the trick because Kurds, his opening Kurdish opening ended up costing him votes. It ended up strengthening the Turkish nationalists. And the conservative coalition that he had”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“But by 2015, he realized that that was not going to work. In 2015, June of 2015, Turkey held elections, and Erdogan's party for the first time since 2002 lost its parliamentary majority. And that was a turning point because Erdogan understood that using Islamism to establish a presidential system was not going to work. And part of that Islamization strategy was reaching out to the Kurds. The way he defined the Kurds was different from the way Kemalists defined the Kurds. The way Erdogan defined the Kurds was you are part of the Muslim nation. So he, in a way, used the joint Muslim identity that the Turks and Kurds share as a glue to appeal to the Kurds and say,”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“No, because something else happened along the way. So from 2011 to 2015, both in domestic politics and foreign policy, Islamism became a very important tool for him because he now set his eyes on a new goal. Remember, in 2002, his goal was to sideline the secularists, and he had achieved that by 2011. And in 2011, he had a new goal, and that was to establish a presidential system, a Turkish-style presidential system that would grant him unprecedented powers. And he realized to be able to realize that goal he needed to rely on the conservative segments of the country, including the Kurds. So at home, part of the reason why he embarked on that Islamization project was to appeal to those conservative segments of the country so he could secure their buying for the presidentialism project.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“When he was referring to policymaking, to governments, to foreign policy. So those symbolic gestures, they were part of his attempt to Islamize society. And he needed that because he needed to legitimize his role and he needed to create a new victim, a victimhood narrative. And that's what it did for him. So on the foreign policy front, that narrative of Islamization had implications because by 2011 another important turning point was taking place in the region, which was the Arab uprisings. So the Arab uprisings came at the perfect time for Erdogan because he could use the uprisings to pursue his domestic goals and to strengthen his efforts to Islamicize the society at home.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“On a project of Islamization at home and Islamization on the foreign policy front. And when I say Islamization, I want to underline something here. I'm not talking about Erdogan wanting to establish a Sharia and Iran type state. He embarked on this Islamization project through very symbolic means, I think. There's the secular nature of the state still remain intact, although the visible signs of secularism was not there anymore, but the relationship between state and secularism religion still was pretty much intact, but he injected Islam into public sphere. For instance, you could see Islam more visible in the public sphere. And he would use Islam as a reference more often.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“The establishment yourself, right? But he still needed that victimhood narrative. And the way he created that victimhood narrative was by referring to Islam. So he framed himself, and you'll see that in his victory speech that he delivered after he won 2011 elections. He framed himself as the leader of the oppressed Muslim masses. So now he switched from a democratizing force representing marginalized masses. Now he became the leader of the Ummah, the Muslim nation that was not just in Turkey, but beyond Turkey. And the corrupt elite was the Western world. So you can clearly see that change in strategy starting from 2011 where”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“His presence when he came to power in 2002, for instance, he used this victimization rhetoric, which is something that Putin refers to all the time. So these are populist leaders. And one thing that populist leaders are good at is that they create this narrative of victimhood. The victims of the elite, corrupt elite, they are the victims of rich people. So there's always this narrative of victimhood. And Erdogan did that when he came to power in 2002. He framed the communist elite as the corrupt elite and the large masses as the victims, the conservatives, the Kurds, religious minorities, everyone else that the Kemalists had discriminated against. But by 2011, imagine you are a populist and you've been in power for what, like nine years, and by the time you have become...”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Like Syria, he made sure that the communists were okay with it. He made sure the cooperation that he had secured the cooperation of these countries against the PKK. He made sure that the relations that he was cultivating had nothing to do with culture, with religion. It was pure business and investment. So that was his way of playing cautiously. And he did that because he knew that the military was still very strong. But then came 2011.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“The communist leaders wanted to stay away from the region. They did not want to be a statistical power. They didn't want to interfere in regional countries' affairs because the Kamali's thinking was that this is a troubled region and we should be our prime focus should be the West. That was the thinking. So when I came to power, Kamalists thought that, well, will he change Turkey's foreign policy access? Are we going to see a Turkey that's more involved in Middle Eastern affairs? Because at the end of the day, the thinking went, he's an Islamist. That didn't really happen before 2011. Erdogan pursued a very cautious policy and the very pragmatic policy. He did not cross the Kemwanese red lines in the Middle East, which was Islamism and the Kurdish separatism. For instance, when he cultivated close ties with Iran or with countries.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“While 2015 I think was the turning point. So from 2002 to 2011, I think he was still quite vulnerable to the secularist establishment's actions because until 2011 he kept winning elections after elections and yet the secularist establishment and the military still called the shots. They were still quite strong. So that's why Erdogan decided to thread carefully. He pursued a very sophisticated strategy. On the one hand, he was defensive vis- ⁇-vis the military in the sense that he didn't want to touch on contentious issues. For instance, where Turkey engaged with the Middle East before 2011 and Middle East is a region where”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Saw Turkey's EU membership. And of course, there were domestic dynamics involved too when Turkey did not get what it wanted from the EU, when Cyprus was granted membership, for instance. There was a nationalist backlash at home, which really strengthened the opposition nationalist party. And Erdogan thought, okay, I mean, I gave so many concessions on the Cyprus question to Europeans. I didn't get anything. They're still talking about a privileged partnership. And I'm also bleeding at home. I'm losing votes to the nationalists. So that's when he changed his tune. Now, the question, going back to your question, so at that critical moment, if the Europeans, if the EU acted differently, would that change Erdogan's calculations? Maybe. I don't know. Maybe for a few years, or maybe he would ultimately go back to his...”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Turkish leader like this before he comes up with questions he helps the international community to reunify the island because for Erdogan that was his ticket compromising on the Cyprus question was his ticket to the EU to get EU's approval or Turkey's membership and he was desperate for EU membership because he thought that that was the most effective way of sidelining Turkish military. So others are saying that if When Erdogan was so enthusiastic, we've heard countries like Germany or France talk about a privileged partnership which was short of a full membership. And that was a turning point, another turning point in the way Erdogan saw EU and the Western world was when the EU granted membership to Cyprus. So several I think there were several incidents which really changed the way Erdogan”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Agenda. And he did everything in his power, and he took a considerable risk, especially on Cyprus. And Cyprus is a very important topic here, particularly for the secularist establishment. It's considered to be a taboo. The military and the secularist establishment are always opposed to international efforts to reunify the island. They considered Cyprus question as a national cause. They never wanted to give in to Western demands. Whereas Erdogan, even when he was vulnerable to the military's actions, I'm talking about early 2000s, Erdogan really pushed ahead. He really took a considerable political risk to give concessions on the Cyprus questions to the extent that he was once adored by Greek leaders. Some Greek leaders said we've never seen a”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“See, that's a very difficult question to answer, Carl, because one school of thought argues that in fact he was an authoritarian all along. He was always an Islamist. He always had this urge to centralize power. He was a power hungry leader who would never allow democratization to curb his own power. So that's one school of thought, things. And the other, so they argued that, well, he was never genuine about getting Turkey into the EU. It was just an instrument. But others argue that, well, in fact, that is possible. But on the other hand, maybe there was a role not taken. Maybe if the EU acted in a different way, could that change Erdogan's calculations? For instance, Erdogan was, again, as I said before, he ran on a pro-Europe.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“No, it is definitely. And I really like the way you laid out the similarities, how they started as Putin, when he came to power, he was not a leader that opposed Russian integration with the rest of Europe. In fact, he defined Russia as part of Europe. And he wanted to be part of that European club, just like Erdogan when he first came to power. He desperately wanted to get Turkey into the EU.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Came this became a music to ears, to many who were striving for a more democratic and stable country. So many people who would traditionally not vote for an Islamist rooted leader voted for him, including liberals, because they thought that, so this is it for Turkey. We really need a leader who can normalize the presence of religion in public, who can deliver on the promise of a consolidated Turkish democracy. And his pro-EU and pro-reform agenda, really, it was welcomed by a large majority of the country. But now looking back in retrospect, what I think is that he used that proform and pro-EU agenda to paved the way to realize his authoritarian goals. And that was sidelining the military, sidelining the secularist establishment so he could be able to centralize power.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“by the Republican elite. So we will give power to those marginalized masses. We are the people. We are the real people. For so long, a small elite captured the levers of power, held levers of power, and kept us out of the system. So we are here to reverse that. And I'm going to make sure that Turkey becomes a consolidated democracy. So that was his promise. And he said, the only way for Turkey to become a consolidated democracy is if Turkey becomes an EU member. And that was a great promise because I just told you about the 1990s where people were tired of instability, erosions and democratic institutions.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Find his newly established party as a conservative democratic party. So that was his way of easing concerns on the secularist front that I'm not a danger to you or the secularist foundations of the republic. So even that mindset, this enlightened mindset, was reflected on the party program, which underlined the importance of secularism. So he came on a platform that promised to make Turkey a real democracy. So he did not come to power promising an Islamist government. He did not come to power claiming to be the continuation of former Islamist parties. He came to power promising Turkey has never been a real democracy. There are large masses that have been stripped of power.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Place to shut down Islamist parties in the past. So he learned a lesson from that, both himself and the people around him, the founding elite of the Justice and Development Party, the ATP. The hard lesson that they drew from the experience of the past Islamist parties was that if you want to survive in Turkish politics, it doesn't matter how many votes you secure, it doesn't matter whether you have a, you command a large majority in the parliament. You just cannot go against the military directly. You have to be smarter than that. And the smart strategy that they came up with was promoting Turkey's EU membership. Now, Erdogan, when he came to power, he constantly identified his party not as an Islamist or an Islamist rooted party.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“They'd say exactly right, and the trainee called for a very sophisticated strategy, and Erdogan designed that very sophisticated strategy, not only to be able to survive in Turkish politics, but to thrive, actually. So when he came to power, that was in 2002, he identified the military as his chief competitor. Again, given the fact that these chemicalist institutions, including the military and the judiciary, which was never independent even before Erdogan came to power, judiciary, the military, these were the institutions that were entrusted with protecting the Kemalist ideology. He understood that the secularist establishment used these institutions and the regulations in”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“The real battle was against the secularist establishment. So he understood that for him to be able to survive in Turkish politics, he had to sideline the Kemalist ideology and the chief guardian of that ideology, which is basically the military among others.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“So, the military in many ways was the guardian of the Kemalist ideology and the secular nature of the republic. So that's why Erdogan, when he came to power, although we'll talk about this later, he didn't come to power promising a good fight against the Kemalists because he was smart enough and not to go against the military directly. Instead, he used an agenda of reform, a pro-EU reform agenda both at home and on the foreign policy front to sideline the military. But when he came to power, that was, I think, his number one goal because he understood that as someone who came from an Islamist background, and remember he captured a significant 34% of the vote, but he understood that even though he captured the vote,”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“That's right. So humanism is the founding ideology of the republic and it was an ideology based on Turkish nationalism and the radical understanding of secularism. It was modeled after the French laicite where the founding elite sought to wanted to design a system which in which religion and state was not separate but state actually controlled the religious sphere. Religion was considered to be confined to the individual sphere and public expression of religion was not allowed and that radical interpretation of secularism was a dividing issue for the conservative, the large conservative segments of the country and particularly People like Erdogan and the school of thought that he came from. And Kembalism was guarded by the institutions that were entrusted”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It was 1990s were pretty chaotic years and that gave rise to a very strong demand from the people for a more stable country, both in terms of economy, but also in terms of politics. So people in many ways strived for a one-party government that was stable, that could fix the country's pressing problems and Erdogan came against that background”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Or Kurdish nationalists to express themselves more and that led to a clash and further divisions in Turkish politics. The 1990s were also notable because the Kurdish separatism became a more significant security threat in many ways. That's how it was conceived by the establishment, by the government and by a large majority of the country Turkey has a sizable Kurdish minority and in the 1980s the PTAK which is the militant organization that's considered to be a terrorist organization by Turkey and others in the West. So they launched their first attack in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s became the years when the PKK terrorism picked.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, before Edwin came to power, I think the most significant decade was the 1990s, which in many ways gave way to the rise of Erdogan. The 1990s were difficult years for Turkey because there were coalition governments which made Turkish domestic politics and governance very unstable. Turkish economy was struggling. There were cultural divisions in the country 1990s were the years that followed liberalization reforms of the 1980s, neoliberal reforms of 1980s. And those reforms paved the way for the emergence of not the emergence maybe, but paved the way for different cultural groups, for instance conservative Turks.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“It's part of Europe, it's an Asian country, it's a Middle Eastern country, and the historic divisions in the country make its domestic politics even more interesting. And those divisions inside the country have become the main driver of the country's foreign policy. So that's why if you're not an area specialist, you find Turkey an interesting country to watch, both in terms of domestic politics and its foreign policies.”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, it's an interesting country, and I think the most interesting part is that we don't know what it is. Is it a Middle Eastern country? Is it a European country? Is it an Asian country? For some, maybe it's all of it, or maybe it's none of those things. So if you talk to a European, Turkey is not European enough. You talk to a Middle Eastern or you will feel like Turkey is way too Western because of the secularization, the radical secularization reforms carried out by the founding fathers of the modern Turkish Republic. So it's an interesting country. It's culturally, even Turkish people themselves struggle with that identity. They don't know how to define themselves. But I would say what makes it interesting in terms of international affairs, it's all of those things, even from a geographical point of view too, but culturally it's...”
2022-09-23 · Intelligence Squared · Erdoğan’s War: The Quest for Power at Home and in Syria, with Gönül Tol · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT