YouSaid · the spoken record

Jim Millstein

lines on the record: 103
first: 2018-10-26
most recent: 2018-10-26
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Yeah. Well, Tim had his own qualifications, right? He had lived through, I mean, people thought he had worked at Goldman Sachs or something. He'd been a long-term treasury. And New York said, and he had gone through the Thai bot crisis, he had seen the crisis in Latin America in the 80s when he was a young man. I think he came to the crisis, this crisis, with some background and experience and understood the tools and the importance.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, no, I think there are lots of problems with this. But the biggest problem, the biggest problem with any currency, a fiat currency, is whether it's legal tender. And so, you know, until it's accepted as a form of payment by the federal government, it's really just a speculative tool.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“They might implement it via blockchain, but right now the implementation itself is quite expensive in blockchain. The processing costs far exceed what the antiquated networks of Visa and MasterCard.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“But still. Okay. But in effect, the Fed could issue a digital currency. You have a trusted agent issuing a digital currency that allows individuals to, in effect, transact. in electronic form as opposed to just allowing”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Savings to be if they want to encourage savings and reduce the money supply, they would increase the interest rate on your deposit account. If they want to encourage investment and spending, they would reduce the interest rate, maybe even have a negative interest rate to force your money out. But the point is that it would disintermediate the banks. And banks arguably would have to go find other sources of funding other than subsidized deposits from the federal government.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Maybe that wouldn't come with your deposit. Oh, okay. But the facility with which monetary policy could then be conducted is extraordinary, right? Because if they want to encourage”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“To meet your ordinary immediate spending needs, it's safe because it's guaranteed by the federal government. The banks in turn take your deposits and deposit them their excess reserves at the Fed, and the Fed is now paying them $75 basis points for the privilege of having those excess reserves on deposited the Fed. The Fed is basically a clearinghouse among all the banks. Well, what if you, Barry Ritholtz, could have a deposit account at the Fed? You could get $75 basis points, and you could direct the Fed to transfer your money to your mutual fund, to your utility bill, to wherever you wanted it to go. In other words, what if you had a bank account at the Fed?”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Right. But these companies are rolling up potential threats to their competition. And it's a great exit for a venture capitalist and for an entrepreneur who has a great idea to sell yourself to Google, to Amazon, to Apple, to Facebook. And the big banks are doing the same thing in FinTech. There have been a multitude of startups in and around the financial services space. So they're doing a lot of in-house R&D, but they're also acquiring. A lot of the new startups. And so government policy will really make a difference. And here's the thought experiment that I urge you and your listeners to think about. So today we have a bank-centric deposit system, right? If you want to store your money, have immediate access to your cash liquidity, right? If a trade-off from liquidity versus return, you're going to have a deposit account in a bank.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“The answer to that is it's going to depend on government policy. Because what is going on with the financials in FinTech is similar to what's going on with Facebook and Snapchat and Google and every other high-flying startup technology company”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Look what a mess they made over there. And when they leave, they take their tax revenues and property taxes and income taxes with them, and it becomes an adverse feedback loop. Fewer and fewer number of citizens are supporting a greater and growing liability for legacy costs. And so, you know, this is, there's going to have to be a reckoning here. That's the name of...”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“You know, it seems unlikely. Really? Yeah, there's a three and a half trillion dollar deficiency in the funding of state employee pensions nationwide, three and a half trillion dollars. And the problem for these public employees is that at least today, even in Trump's America, there are no walls built between the boundaries of different states. So if a state starts overtaxing compared to other states, it's It's citizens and underserving them in terms of the provision of current services in the form of good infrastructure, good schools.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, they're still one of the welfare states in the country. The problem is that their economy is growing slower than the rest of the surrounding states, and they've levered themselves up and deferred pension contributions for 20 years.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Right. And lots of people did and have. And so in any event, so countries are much more complex. And we're seeing, frankly, we're doing a lot of work now in the United States because you have a series of states that don't look all that much better than Puerto Rico did in 2015. Illinois.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Doesn't matter. But if you can't roll it over because suddenly you're borrowing the debt you would incur at 2% in the muni market, you're now having to pay 8% tax-free. It just makes it unsustainable”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“A decade plus later. And they financed the decline in tax revenues with debt. Lots of it. So by the time they got to us, Millstein and Company then in 2014, they had $75 billion of debt for an island of three and a half million people. They had pension systems that were underfunded to the tune of $30 or $40 billion and a real inability to pay their debts when due, and particularly as the capital markets shut to them.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And so Puerto Rico went into a recession in 2006 as a result of change in federal law that had formally subsidized pharmaceutical production on the island. They had had a 20 year tax break that encouraged pharmaceuticals to do their final packaging on the island and created 350,000 jobs and lots of tax revenues. And that expired in 2006. Puerto Rico went into a recession that they still have not come out of a decade.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“That's right. But municipal bankers, of which I do not count myself as one, have found lots of ways to Fit around those rules? Well, to find ways to finance deficits that are not completely transparent.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, so Puerto I mean, Puerto Rico, the capital markets were open. And as long as they were open, you could do deficit financing. Right.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“The size of Boston Just nuts. Well, they were a product of open capital, no capital controls and swishing through the system.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Real world apparently, yeah. You know, in the case of countries, It's some combination of investor enthusiasm, misplaced enthusiasm for sovereign debt, and a failure to really look at the underlying dynamics of a country's.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, so Tolstoy and Anna Karena says that all happy families are alike and each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. And each restructuring is unique in its own way. Sometimes it's management that just went off on a frolicking detour, spent too much money levered up on a mistaken strategy. Other times it's a change in the business cycle. And a highly levered balance sheet that takes a perfectly good company that in ordinary times to generate, even in bad times of generating cash flow, but it's just got the wrong balance sheet for the kinds of cash capable of generating through a cycle. And so you're doing a balance sheet restructuring of a good business. And other times it's a business that whose time has come, whose mission has long since passed.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Is the bottom is the lowest investment grade ranking and the non-investment grade debt now constitutes more than half. Of all debt on the corporate sector in the United States. So you have a highly leveraged sector with very low credit quality and you have a Fed raising interest rates, the federal government borrowing like a drunken sailor on leave.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Now Exactly. So with a very highly levered corporate sector, and if you look at credit quality, Barry, I mean, I'm sure you know these stats, you know, 50% of the so-called investment grade debt.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And if you're in a rising interest rate environment, forget about floating rate. A lot of bank debt is floating rate, but that's at a leverage level. It is generally two to three times, so it's not going to sink a company even in a declining cash flow environment. The real risk is refinancing risk which is exactly what we saw during the financial crisis with the financial institutions. In other words, they have to have”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“It is until process. But there are two sides of that, right? You know, if your cash flows decline because of a recession, suddenly your leverage goes from manageable to unmanageable.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, let's do some stats. You know, corporate debt to GDP is the highest it's been in American history ever. So we have a very levered corporate sector. And part of that is the financial re-engineering of their own balance sheet, stock buybacks funded with debt. Part of that is the buyout waves and leveraging generally. And part of that is just the general tend to the credit has been so cheap that corporations have re-engineered their own. So that was the cash flows.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And really one of the most widely respected bankers, investment bankers in the United States. I mean, he's Disney's banker, Verizon's banker. He's a very well-respected boardroom banker. Tactician and strategist. So, and he and I had become friends after the crisis. And so it became it was a natural fit. They have 400 bankers who do tech media telecom, power and energy, real estate, and the whole landscape waterfront, as well as sales and trading. So they're kind of what Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were back in the early 90s. They've built an independent investment bank.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And we really could use the leverage of a larger firm with arms and legs in various industries with real industry expertise as opposed to our sort of product specialty called restructuring on the one hand. And the other strategic challenge was, you know, we've built a franchise and I'm not getting any younger. So eventually we concluded that merging with a larger financial services firm made sense. Alan Schorts and I had been talking for three or four years.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Seven years into this, we ended up with 35 people doing corporate and sovereign restructuring and 15 people doing investing And we had raised some third party funds. And, you know, I'm not getting any younger. I'm 63 years old. And the people who had joined me were all in their 30s and 40s. And, you know, I turned to them and said, We have a strategic problem, two strategic problems. One, we're a small boutique entering what I think will be a tsunami of restructuring to come.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I mean, one thing working in the government cares you of is the desire to have a boss. So I decided I would set up my own shop. I really had no grand plans. We went from one answering another call to another call to another call. And before I knew it, I had offices in New York and Washington and we were working on large corporate restructurings and sovereign restructurings again. And also reinvesting the profits of the business, the partners, the guys who joined me and gals and gals who joined me. We all agreed that the advisory business is a business that goes up and down and revenue is volatile, whereas if we could actually make some solid investments, we might be able to provide ourselves with the... A little more secure income in a manner and to generate wealth, particularly for the young kids who were working for me. So anyway.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Right. And so, you know, the whole script of the rescue from the beginning with Bear Stearns to the opening of the FX lines to make sure that the European banks didn't default against their own debt and therefore default on their American counterparties, which would have created a liquidity crisis here to the... Putting a Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship, the saving of AIG, the series of emergency, the alphabet soup of emergency lending programs the Fed instituted, the prime dealer credit facility, the TALF, the TAF, the commercial paper facility. I mean, every market that had frozen up, they intervened in and tried to restart. In order to provide liquidity to the system. And so the question is, in the midst of that just tsunami of credit support and liquidity, you decide to take one company down.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We could have achieved the kind of anti-moral hazard problem with bailouts potentially in the way we structured a loan to the broker dealer so as to avoid the kind of adverse impacts that, I mean, the filing of Lehman Brothers created a panic.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah. Okay. So that was the conclusion the Fed raised. And they concluded that they really didn't have a statutory basis on which to be able to fund. Provide emergency lending to Lehman. You know, I think in retrospect, given the fallout that immediately occurred upon the filing of that bankruptcy, maybe we should have been more creative. We could have foisted losses on the shareholders. We could have foisted losses. Well, we did. Right. Well, we had a bankruptcy.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Fabricated, completely fabricated. Well, who knows where there's fabricated? The market was going to collapse if you could have held on to it.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Actually, pretty good. So, in the case of Lehman, right? So you have Lehman Weekend, you know, this story has been told many times, but the Fed at the New York Fed, they're trying to figure out if they can broker a marriage between Lehman and Barclays or Lehman and Bank of America. And each of those institutions, the prospective buyers, is doing diligence as fast as they can. And in particular, B of A has done as good a job as could be done in the circumstances, an analysis of Lehman's real estate portfolio. And they conclude that the marks that the last marks on the portfolio vastly overstate the value.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“If you took a snapshot of the balance sheets of any of the major financial institutions in the United States on september 9th and said, mark this all to market right now. Anything is trading. I dare say on a balance sheet basis, they'd all look insolvent. And that was sort of the thing there's a relationship between your ability to maintain a position and your solvency. So, you know, Keynes famously said the markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent. But if you can stay solvent, that is liquid through a downturn.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Fair statement Well, so if you took a snapshot, I would venture to say, if you took a snapshot and marked to market the balance sheets of any of the major financial institutions, particularly the broker dealers, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Meryl Lynch. On September 1st. Maybe make it September 9th, the day after Fanny and Freddie are taken into conservatorship and panic runs through the entire conventional and subprime, who've already run through the... Subprime market, but now you take the largest mortgage players, and you put them in a conservatorship on the theory that either they're illiquid and need the government support or they're insolvent and need the government's balance sheet to back them.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, no, no. There was a very seamless transition. And, you know, sometimes you get lucky as a country, right? We have the leading economic historian of the Great Depression singing as the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He may not have had a playbook as to what to do, but he knew what the Fed did wrong in the 30s. And he was dedicated not to doing that again.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, an insolvency expert would say there are two definitions in insolvency. There's a balance sheet insolvency where your liabilities exceed your fair market value of your assets. And then there's illiquidity, your inability to pay your debts due. It was clear at the time that none of these companies could pay their debts when due. They needed, in effect, what the Fed was established to do, to be a lender of last resort, an emergency provider of liquidity when the markets freeze up and there are panics. And the Fed and the FDIC and the Treasury Department did this to a fairly well during the Bush administration under the leadership of Secretary Paulson and Ben Bernanke at the Fed. So by the time we get there in late 2008, we haven't yet assumed the powers, but there's a transition going on, a baton passing exercise going on between the Pulse and Treasury Department and the Geithner Treasury Department.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I mean, by the time I got there, AIG had already borrowed from the Fed in one pocket or another $132 billion. So that was an over the course of eight weeks. Between September 18th, when the first loan was inked to the time, the transition team was in place and we were now trying to figure out what was going on. They had borrowed $132 billion. And that's when the restructuring first began, right? In most cases, with the exception of Lehman Brothers, what the federal government, the Fed, the Treasury, and the FDIC did during the... Course of 2008 was just refinanced the balance sheets, the short term debt coming due on the balance sheets of all of these companies.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“and some of the biggest ones New Century, American Home Mortgage, showed up at our doors as our clients. We presided over and helped them liquidate themselves in effect. So my antenna went up. I got smart about the subprime crisis and the leveraging of the financial system and how they were levering themselves around these products and others. So when this call came, you know, having become a student of what had gone on in the American financial industry between 2000 and 2008, my curiosity alone drove me to Washington.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Mortgage originators and distributors coming through. I mean, they were the first to fail, right? The front end of the system was the first to fail, and that was in 07. And, you know, I'm a curious fellow, and there was a plethora of these companies coming in. And it was like, what's going on?”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, that's what I do for a living. Pretty thankless roles. But I think I might be able to make a modest contribution given my background. And I had been... A student of the financial crisis as it was unfolding, we at Lazard were running the leading restructuring practice. We had a lot of the front end of the subprime crisis running and coming through our doors.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, no, when I was a graduate student out of Berkeley and I was writing things on industrial policy and he was reading them and Helping promote them across the Carter administration. And anyway, I picked up shortly after the election, like 10 minutes after the election of President Obama, then to be President Obama. I got a call from him and he said, you might have noticed we're doing a couple of restructurings down here. The new administration could use someone with your background. Would you be willing to come? And, you know, I always had an interest in who would have believed that the country needed my expertise in particular. But there it was.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Answered the phone is basically the You know, Tony How the World Works. I had a friend, a guy I had worked with when he was a young policy analyst in the Carter administration when I was a young whippers now.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“What can go wrong with that? And they had borrowed $60 billion all over God's Green Earth and fell on hard times as a result of the Thai Bach crisis, which became the Korean won crisis in the late 90s. So they hired Cleary, and I was in charge of that. And I hired Lazard to help me with it because they had restructuring and they had presence all over God's Green Earth where we had to restructure various deads. So I got to know the guys running that practice very well. At the end of it, they leaned over across the aisle from some god awful flight from Tokyo to New York and said, you know, you're in the wrong business. And I said, I've heard this before. From you guys, right? Yeah. So this time I succumbed to”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Giant company, again, one of the Korean Kyretsu with their version. And, you know, trading company, a steel company, electronics company, textile company. Finance real estate, finance real estate, the whole line yards, 10% of the Korean economy in one company under one roof.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“At the end of the case, Felix wrote and called me and said, You're in the wrong business. You really should be a banker. And I resisted then. That was like 1992 or 1994. I resisted changing my career. Then, but in 1999 they came calling again, and after I was working on a large restructuring in Korea called Daw”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, I had been working on the Lazard and Cleary shared a client called Pen American Airways, which was the dominant international carrier in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. United side, Pen Am. Disappeared into the dustbin of history, but in the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s, it was the dominant international carrier for the United States. It fell on hard times as markets were deregulated and they found themselves subject to competition they really couldn't handle because they were a product of a regulated industry. And they ultimately went bankrupt. Lazard and Cleary shared it. It was my first big debtor case as a lawyer running in effect an orderly liquidation of Pan Am, selling its roots off to United and to American and hither and yon.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Officials in Paris and Washington simultaneously, and they help create the iron and steel union, which was the precursor of the EU.”
2018-10-26 · Masters in Business · Jim Millstein on the Fed and AIG’s Restructuring (Podcast) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source