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Mohamed El-Erian

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2016-02-13
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2016-02-13
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  1. So I wish I had questioned earlier on the conventional wisdom that cash has no role to play in asset allocation. Is a conventional wisdom Cash has absolutely no role to play. But when you enter into artificial world where central banks are not just your referee, but they're also on the field, cash gives you three things that are most valuable. One, resilience. You can afford to make mistakes elsewhere. You will not be forced out of positions that quickly. Second gives you optionality. You can change your mind. With liquidity diminishing, optionality becomes really important. And thirdly, it gives you agility because when you get volatility, you get price contagion, you get price overshoots and good companies get hammered by what's happening to bad companies. So the one thing I would say, and I would say today, is this conventional wisdom that cash has no part to play in an asset allocation should be revisited. And I wish I had.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  2. Tell them to sequence your career correctly. Take risks early on because as you get older, you'll find it harder to take risks. Be willing to join startups. There's a lot of exciting things happening. Be willing to fail because most of the people who have succeeded in life did that after failing. And don't go into a conventional career too early.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  3. Mohammed, just because it's published, it doesn't mean it's right. And then I realize it's not what you think but how you think. And for me, that was a really important moment.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  4. I was panicking. At that point, I pivoted completely from what we were talking about and said, oh, this reminds me of the book. I was being interviewed by two people, one person who had been taking notes and the other person who had been asking the question. Suddenly the person taking notes smiled, and I should have realized that there was a warning sign, put down his note and asked me, tell me about the book. And I went barry into a perfectly prepared monologue. And my confidence was rising, and I finished thinking this is great. I've nailed it. And then he asked me a single question that demolished the whole thesis of the book, and I was speechless. He then got up, it was his room, went to his bookshelf, pulled off an off print, and gave it to me. It was his review of the book, and he said to me.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  5. So let me give you my wake up call. I was asked for an interview at Cambridge and my teacher at school gave me a book that had just come out and said read this book and I don't care what you do but mention it in the interview because they're going to be really impressed that you read it. I knew my interview was 45 minutes. I went up there in minute 42 I hadn't had an opportunity to mention the book.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  6. No, right. We all went to the library and went to the original work. I read Kane's off, so that has had a huge influence on me. And chapter 22 and chapter 12, as we mentioned before. In particular, John Robinson has had a huge influence on me. Herod and the various biographies of Keynes have had a huge influence on me. So I put that. But I wouldn't recommend that necessarily to young people Recommend, for example, the book How Music Got Free. Again, encourage people to think differently. Be willing to question conventional wisdom because we're going through massive transformations.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  7. So I would, the one book I would mention in particular is The Disruptive Role of Robots. It's by Martin Ford. It is a very provocative book. You may or may not agree with his policy recommendations, but you better realize that we are in the next phase of a transformation. Machine learning is an incredibly powerful disruptor.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  8. Airbnb didn't build a single hotel. They don't manage a single hotel. And they do it with 600 people. Look what Uber has done to that. I am fascinated by these disruptions, and there's been a number of books written about the disruptors, especially in the music industry. The music industry has been disrupted beyond anything.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  9. So, my own are not favorites. In fact, I do not read what I've written. Neither will I listen to this podcast, believe it or not, nor do I really don't enjoy doing that at all. You know, I've been influenced by lots and lots of books, and I've been lucky for the last few years to be on the Financial Time Jewry for Book of the Year, which exposes me to books that I don't have the discipline to read otherwise. That's why I keep on doing it. I'm very struck recently by books that talk about fundamental transformations, about the ability of disruptors to disrupt you even though they don't know much about your sector. Airbnb, I'll give you a simple statistic Berry. It took Hilton a hundred years to provide 700,000 rooms to its clients. It took Airbnb six years to provide a million rooms

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  10. Lamond, what else? We got Le Monde, Le Figarot, we got Francois, and then we got one from the right, which will come back to me in a second. Oh no, we got lumanit ⁇ The left, and I asked him why it is that we need these four newspapers. After all, news is news, news reporting is news reporting, why are we wasting our money on four newspapers? And he said to me, you've got to understand that people interpret things And you've got to be open to different interpretations. No one has a monopoly over the right interpretation. And by encouraging you to read four different newspapers every day, you will realize that different people interpret the same facts differently. And you've got understand that. And that for me was very influential. And it has helped me keep an open mind at a time when it's been very easy to slip back into the familiar

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  11. So my father played a very important role, and there was a particular moment we were in Paris, and I questioned why it is that we got four different newspapers every day. I thought that that was a complete waste of money. And why did we get four papers?

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  12. But we have switched regimes, and it's interesting to see how long we switch regimes. Now that there's question marks about the effectiveness of central bank policies, we are seeing currencies start to reflect more fundamentals. So look at the yen. The yen has strengthened notably against the dollar in February. Why? Because people have stopped worrying about negative interest rates in Japan and about QE and have started looking at the balance sheet of Japan very strong about the ability of the private sector to repatriate capital and a pretty good current account situation. So we are on the cusp of a transition in paradigms. And the question is going to be whether that continues or not.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  13. So we are going through an important transition in currencies. Up to The beginning of February, currency was basically Reflecting differential monetary policy. So when the US embarked on its QE first, the dollar weakened, the euro strengthened, and then when The Eurozone and Japan embarked on their QE, the opposite happened. And as you point out, the dollar strengthened.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  14. Yes, it does. And also policy makers become more complacent. And I think we saw this go back to the mid-90s to mid-2000s when policymakers became convinced that We no longer had cycles, the grade moderation. It was Goldilocks and that the financial system could regulate itself.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  15. So I think we both influenced each other. Paul has had a huge influence on me and his friendship is something that I have valued enormously. You know, Paul has this ability to translate complex issues into simple phrases that are very powerful. The Minsky moment is Paul's, the shadow banking system is Paul. And both of us love a particular chapter in Keynes' general theory. And that is chapter 12. Chapter 12 is very different from the rest of the general theory, as is chapter 22, because it speaks about human behavior. It speaks about what tends to happen and this whole concept of animal spirits and overshoots. And that was really at the origin of Minsky and this notion that you can get instability from stability

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  16. Because it is an immediate tax cut. It leaves cash in the pocket of people. And it is particularly beneficial for lower income people who have a higher marginal propensity to consume. But ironically, the low oil price is viewed as a negative thing. It has gone from a blessing to a curse. Why? The only good reason is because the U.S. now also produces energy. The bad reason is that oil market volatility is being blamed as a cause for equity market volatility. People don't realize that the two are due to something much bigger, which is this change in the perfect storm that we talked about earlier. But it is ironic that the biggest tax cut is being viewed as a curse and not a blessing.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  17. It's a supply issue, it's a demand issue, and what has caused the overshoot, in other words, I'm saying that oil prices today cannot be justified by just supply. Operating modalities. It no longer can rely on OPEC as a swing producer on the downside. And the minute you take the safety net away, oil will overshoot. And we are right now overshooting on the downside and it's going to take time for the oil market to find its footing because it has lost its swing producer. The irony we talk about improbables. If I was sitting with you two years ago and told you oil prices would collapse, you would say to me and I would have said to you, that's great for the economy.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  18. So I think it can if Europe is willing to give up some of its historical entitlements, particularly when it comes to voting power and representation on the board and provide that to the emerging world. Until that happens, countries like China will build little pipes around the IMF and the World Bank. We've seen them do this with the Asian infrastructure investment bank and with various bilateral swap arrangements. So you really do need to deal with governance issues.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  19. It should be the IMF for both positive and negative reasons. The positive reason is that it has universal membership, 188 countries. It has amazing staff, very high expertise, and it has the mechanism to consult with different countries. The negative reason is that nothing else works. The G7 is no longer representative of the global economy. G20 doesn't have a permanent secretariat, and the G1, the United States, has been so inward focused because of our dysfunctional politics that it's not playing the role of conductors. So for both positive and negative reason, it needs to be the IMF. But for that to happen, you need to deal with some pretty legitimate IMF credibility and governance issues.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  20. So, let me give you the image of an orchestra. You have the different sections in the orchestra. They have music. And they decide to play from different parts of the music. And then they look up and there isn't a conductor. On a standalone basis, each section will sound okay, but you're not listening to it on a standalone basis. You're listening to the whole orchestra. And the whole orchestra is incoherent. And that's why earlier in our discussions, I said, I've never seen such low level of global policy coordination. So yes, it's true that it's been sequential. It's true that every country has responded to domestic conditions. The problem is that we live in a world that's very interconnected and interdependent. So it has to add up and it's not adding up.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  21. So you're absolutely right about the sequencing. Absolutely right. And you're absolutely right that each country was pursuing its domestic objectives, taking into account its domestic conditions. The problem is we live in an interdependent world.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  22. Context is very different from what we've had before and it has raised doubts about the effectiveness of central banks in repressing volatility. And then the third element is the lack of patient capital. There is no big balance sheet with, quote, permanent capital that can step in now and act counter-cyclically. In fact, liquidity is challenged because a broker dealer's appetite for counter-cyclical risk has been reduced. So put these three things together and you get this volatility, enormous volatility that then causes its own dynamic. Now the good news, Barry, is that so far this has been a financial event. It hasn't contaminated the real economy. And that is the major call for 2016. Will this continued financial volatility contaminate the wheel economy or is the real economy resilient enough to be able to

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  23. Reasons for that. One is we have divergent monetary policies now. Central banks are no longer on the same side. We have the Fed that has exited QE and that has started hiking interest rates. So it is taking its foot off the accelerator. Meanwhile, the ECB, the People's Bank of China, and the Bank of Japan are going the other way. This divergent central bank

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  24. Because of the perfect storm. You know, this notion of a perfect storm is three things come together. And what you get is not just volatility, but you get the improbable as well. So what has been the perfect storm, the elements of the perfect storm? First, we are questioning like never before global economic fundamentals. We are worried about China. We are worried about the slowdown that's happening around the emerging world. Europe has cut its growth forecast. There's even talk of the possibility of a recession in the US. So suddenly, the first element of the perfect storm is concerns about fundamentals. The second element of the perfect storm is the loss of trust in central bank effectiveness.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  25. Correct for quite a while. By increasing the demand and by changing risk preferences. And that's what central banks have done. Now, this is a bet that makes sense if you also manage to trigger better fundamentals so that ultimately the fundamentals validate the asset prices. If you don't, you cannot maintain forever this wedge between artificially high financial assets and sluggish fundamentals.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  26. Very simple. If you have a printing press in the basement and you're willing to use it and you're willing to engage in asset purchases, you can have an immediate influence on asset prices. It's that simple.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  27. So I think it tells you something much bigger. And I ended up by going along and looking at behavioral science to understand decision making and why it is that we tend to frame things in a backward-looking manner, because that's what the Fed did. It tells you it's very hard to pivot your thinking from what you're comfortable with to what is happening and is new. And it's understandable. We don't like doing it. We as humans don't like doing it. an inclination to always go back to comforting things. So either we are in denial, the so-called blind spots, or we reframe issues so that we are more comfortable. And that's what the Fed was doing.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  28. those who are over indebted, but it stops new capital from coming in. You get new oxygen, fresh oxygen into the system. And then finally, we forgot how in the dependent the world we live in is. And we didn't step up with global policy coordination except for one instant in April 2009 at the London G20. The problem is that while we had a stimulus, it wasn't big enough and most critically it wasn't accompanied by these three other things. And therefore, the handoff never occurred, which pulled central banks deeper and deeper into taking on too many policy obligations with too few instruments.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  29. First, we invested in the wrong growth models. Go back 10 to 15 years, we somehow fell in love with finance and believed that it could promote economic growth. We even changed the name. We used to call it the financial service industry because we had this notion that it served the real economy. But then 10 to 15 years ago, we changed this notion and it became a standalone. I remember people talking that it was the next level of capitalism, agricultural, industry, manufacturing, services. And if you're really lucky, you get to financial services. So we invested in the wrong growth model and we stopped investing in infrastructure, in pro-growth tax reforms, in labor retooling. The second problem is we didn't deal with the lessons of past debt crises. You mentioned Reinhardt and Rogoff earlier. They point out that when you start with excessive indebtedness, if you don't deal with it quickly, not only does it crush

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  30. So it happened, but it didn't happen big enough and most importantly it happened isolation of three other things that needed to happen. And therefore, it was not as effective and you didn't get the handoff that you're talking about. So what was missing?

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  31. Yes they are, as is the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the People's Bank of China, the list is long. Central banks have taken on enormous responsibility. The first phase made sense where they had to step in and normalize very dysfunctional financial markets, but then starting in 2010 in the case of the Fed and 2014 in the case of the ECV, they took on the responsibility for delivering macroeconomic outcomes. And they did so not by choice, but by necessity, because other policymakers weren't stepping up to the plate.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  32. And we see it in Europe with the emergence of UKIP, with the emergence of the various parties in Germany, and of course the National Front in France. Who would have predicted that we'd have a lot of risk-taking in finance? Corporations are still sitting on a massive amount of cash, even though it's earning zero, and now they're being forced to give it back rather than invest it. Who would have thought that we'd have this big divergence? And yet we have the list of unthinkables. Who would have thought we would have such a worsening in income, wealth, inequality, so that it leads to an inequality of opportunity? I can give you the whole list of unthinkables and improbables that have occurred because we've been living this artificial world. But I stress it's coming to an end

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  33. None of that came through. Who would have predicted that this frustration with low growth would lead to the emergence of non establishment and an anti-establishment, non-traditional political forces on both sides of the Atlantic? And that we see it. We see it in America.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  34. Oh, I can give you a whole list of improbables, and unthinkables. I mean, think of the fact that we have negative nominal interest rates. How many people would have predicted that we'd have negative nominal interest rates?

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  35. So part of it is there certainly are demographic elements to it and there are also political elements, but there's lots of economics elements to it. I think the major issue, Barry, for anybody retiring or anybody at all is that part of the response to the new normal has been to borrow growth from the future and borrow financial returns from the future. As a result, As you point out, equity markets have done very well while fundamentals haven't. So we have a big gap. And the big question facing us today is, do fundamentals improve and validate asset prices and push them higher, or alternatively to asset prices come down towards fundamentals and overshoot and pull the fundamentals down. That is the T junction facing us today as we Navigate the consequences of having relied too much on financial repression.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  36. A huge part. And there's two elements to it one as Reinhard and Rogoff pointed out when you have a massive balance sheet issue, it takes you time to work through it. And you basically have four choices. You can either default Which is very, very costly. You can grow your way out of it. Well, that's really difficult. You can try and have a voluntary restructuring or alternatively you can go through financial repression. And that is central banks pushing interest rates down in order to tax creditors and subsidized debtors. And that's what we've had. We've had financial repression. We've had central banks use both interest rates and their balance sheets to push down interest costs and try and promote risk taking in order to recapitalize the system.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  37. And then Larry Summers came up with the phrase, this is secular stagnation, but it speaks to the same thing, which is a prolonged period of low growth. The irony Barry is that now the conventional wisdom has gotten to the new normal, as I argue with my book, I don't think it's anymore a powerful concept for describing what's ahead of us. I think we're going to tip one way or the other.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  38. With time when it became evident that we were having difficulty growing, when it became evident that the forecasts were all being revised one side downwards, this notion started to gain acceptance. In 2014, the IMF called it the new mediocre.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  39. No, it's very much the same thing. I mean, the irony here, Barry, is that when we went public with it in May of 2009, it got very little traction. In fact, I remember a policymaker telling me it was an idiotic concept that the West lives cyclically and is the emerging world that lives secularly and structurally.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  40. So, the context was coming out of the crisis. Pimco was in a much better position than others because we had navigated the crisis relatively well and had protected our clients' assets. And we could look forward and ask the question, what comes next? And starting in January, we realized that this was not your typical cyclical crisis. This wasn't like an elastic band, you stretch it and comes back, that this was a structural and secular phenomenon. And we debated how best to communicate to people and to the outside world that this is not business as usual, that we have to think differently. And after lots of different permutation, we came up with the concept of the new normal as a way of signaling that it would not be a cyclical recovery, but instead we would face a prolonged period of low growth and structural challenges.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  41. And that financial asset manager said something that was very surprising to me. He said, I sold Chile. Now, as the economist in me, I thought, what does city think to do? Why would you ever sell chili? Chili is the well-managed economy out there. It is not Venezuela. It is not Argentina. You keep Chile. And I said, So my react is, why would you do that, thinking, wow, here are irrational markets? And he explained it in a way that makes total sense to me now, having seen the market side, which is that he expected redemptions from his Latin American funds because the Mexico news would lead to redemption. He needs to sell across the board and what hadn't been hit hard as yet was chili. So he sold chili. And for me, that was a realization that economists needed to understand the financial markets much better.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  42. So, what amazed me in the beginning is how misunderstood financial markets were. So I'll give an example. This is the mid-80s. Mexico had almost declared bankruptcy. Latin America was hit. And they decide to send a team of us to New York to talk to Financial sector. And believe it or not, at the time, that was very, very unusual. So a group of us went and we went to see an asset manager. And we asked the question, what's the first thing you did when you heard that Mexico

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  43. Correct. And you don't want to get there. So the whole point of the IMF is to make sure that you don't get there and you don't get there by having an annual checkup. It's called the Article 4 surveillance. But at some point, quite a few countries get there. And I was there when there were all sorts of crises going on. And I was lucky enough to have a front row seat in that. And you learn very quickly that you have to make compromises that a lot of the time policymakers are making decisions with incomplete information and they don't control the politics of it. So for me, it was an amazing eye-opener because I came from the academic world and I realized it's much more complicated in practice.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  44. So, the amazing thing about the IMF is that at a very young age, you get exposed to policymaking. You're part of discussions. In crisis economies, countries facing crises, and they have to make really difficult policy choices. And you realize very early on how difficult that is.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  45. So that's why I started in terms of the International Monetary Fund. It was global. It was policy oriented. It was based on economics. And when I was turning 40, I realized that I had never tried the private sector, that I had spent 15 years at the IMF, that I had never tried the private sector. So I took a two-year leave from the IMF and I joined what was at the time Solomon Brothers. That then became Solomon Smith Bonney, then became City. And I wanted a taste of the private sector. And I can tell you, Buried was quite a change.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  46. I speak some, but I tell you as I got older, I found it harder and I asked my father ultimately to send me to boarding school because I couldn't change countries and languages and friends every two to three years.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source

  47. It had a very important influence on me because I got exposed to different cultures at a very early age. It wasn't easy changing not just friends and schools, but countries and languages was quite hard.

    2016-02-13 · Masters in Business · Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source