YouSaid · the spoken record

Nathan Tankus

lines on the record: 88
first: 2023-04-25
most recent: 2023-04-25
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

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“Improvement actually cover all deposits. They looked at that option and were really against it. That option, as I was just saying, requires a lot of asset side regulation, which was not the vibe of the Reagan George H.W. Bush years. It means a lot of really actually being very restrictive on what banks can buy, what banks and the growth of bank balance sheets on the asset side. They did the other option, the option that taxpayer, you know, that poisonous term tries to avoid having all sorts of public money involved and how they do it was to try to make uninsured deposits eat it as much as possible. You know, you'd set up a bridge bank, you'd find someone other bank to buy, you only cover deposits.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“And that's actually where too big to fail start, and that's where this whole thing about uninsured deposits really got started. There was a bank called Continental Illinois. It was like the 14th largest bank, it was the largest bank in the Midwest. They were worried about their financial stability concerns. So the Fed and the FDIC again stepped in 39 years ago, 1984, to rescue that bank. And the FDIC covered all uninsured deposits. Obviously, there was more with the savings and loan crisis that happened over the following years. Many people were very upset about this about that continental Illinois where the term too big to fail originally comes from. It's not from 2007-2008. It's from Continental Illinois. And after many years of debate, we had the FDIC improvement act in 1991. And what was the FDIC?”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Work. I think Bill Black's book The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to own one is very illustrative of, yeah, it's a great title. It's very illustrative of how liability side regulation didn't work and the only way that they were able to crack down on the tremendous frauds that were happening was a regulator going against the grain and actually regulating when that wasn't the mood in the Reagan administration at the time.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Well, I think a classic example of liability side regulation that didn't work is the savings and loans crisis. A lot of people attribute the savings crisis to deposit insurance, but many of the savings and loans involved didn't have access to deposit insurance. And even when they did, a lot of them were issuing bonds. I mean, the junk bonds were got their start in 1980s. A lot of them got their start in funding saving in loans. And there's no insurance on a bond. There's no insurance on a junk bond. There were people, some who were just, you know, little old ladies who were defrauded, some who were more serious larger institutional investors who still manage to lose money. That's a crisis where liability side regulation didn't.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, exactly. Yeah, I don't, and yeah. And to comment also on the Moral Hazard thing, yeah, I'm not a huge moral hazard person not to think that I don't think that you need accountability, but accountability needs to be on the asset side regulation side. It needs to be due on taking financial institutions and what are they doing, what kind of how responsible they're being. And there are certain actors who I don't think that”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Right. So 2008, what the Fed did there and 2020, what the Fed did with all the facilities, that was an expansion of its powers, unprecedented, something it didn't do before. However, it was a genuine crisis. In 2008, the financial world globally was on fire. And in 2020, you're having millions and millions of people being laid off pretty much every single day. So they broke the glass, but there was a reason to break the glass. This time you're saying it was a regional bank crisis. There's not enough evidence for systemic. So you're a little taken aback.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Not so much the use of the powers, but the selective use. If it's something that you can use just anytime, then we need a much broader social conversation about what we think the Fed should be doing and what we think the Fed shouldn't be doing and what kind of things that we think need to be supported and what kind of things we don't think need to be supported. Because as much as I'm a full deposit insurance, let's abandon liability side discipline type person, especially uninsured bank deposits as the liability type person. That's not necessarily my first priority with the 13.3 facility if we're just doing it for anything and it's not specifically a crisis facility.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Tool that you use when you need, quote, a little more flexibility, which I felt was totally shocking quote. Because if it's just a tool that used to need a little more flexibility, well, there's a lot of things that I think the Fed could use a little more flexibility on. You know, for example, backing state and local governments and backstopping them who've gone through a lot of turmoil. There's still a lot of hospital systems that are badly understaffed and overworked and could use more resources. And you can tighten economic conditions more broadly without necessarily tightening it on the actors who are still in the front lines of dealing with it. At the very least with the aftermath, the fallout from COVID. So I'm taken aback by this and concerned.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“I wrote this seven part series back in 2020. It was all about the different facilities that the Fed was launching, all the big and little ways that the Fed responded. And I knew a ton about 2007-2008 crisis facilities that I could draw on that knowledge. This felt like something different. Like they're doing it for this regional bank situation. It's not the broader financial system. It's just the banking system, which, you know, the discount window can and should be set up to manage. I was taken aback by their use of this tool. And it opens the question of what is this power? What does it mean? Is this like a when emergency break glass power? Or is it as Powell said in the press FOMC press conference that happened after? Is it a”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Was you can get a loan equivalent to their face value at this specified interest rate from us and up to a year maturity. And the reason why, and so one thing is this is kind of amazing that they were using a crisis facility, which is traditionally associated with recessions and depressions at a time of elevated inflation, as we subsequently saw, and I think a lot of us thought would happen, there was an interest rate hike in the next meeting. It's very unusual to be activating 13.3 and be hiking interest rates at the same time. Unemployment is low, it's still low. Unemployment was low, it's still low, inflation is still above target. And so it took people by surprise, and I, as a commentator on 13.3 and its use.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Response was the FDIC decided to use its systemic risk exemption to cover all uninsured deposits, and the Fed activated what's traditionally seen as its crisis powers, and we can talk about that a little bit. It's 13.3 unusual and exigent circumstances powers to create the bank term funding program. And what essentially was that was it was just for charter bank institutions. It wasn't a wider program like a lot of 2007, 2008, and 2020 programs, which were essentially aimed at the shadow banking system. This specifically was for the banking system. And what they did was say you can will take in at our collateral window, we'll accept Treasury securities at their face value so that whatever their face value”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, well, what essentially gave me pause, and things have happened since then, which put this a little bit more into question than how it looked on the weekend. But nonetheless, I think I still think I kind of basically stick by it is this feels like a very regional niche issue, an issue that could have been handled with the discount window. I was so think back, and we'll talk about the FDIC bit in a bit, there was a joint announcement Sunday night. There was the bank run on Thursday, Friday morning, the FDIC took over Silicon Valley Bank over the weekend, whole debate about what the crisis response was going to be or what the Fed response to this whole situation was going to be, what the FDC was.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“That we need an alternative system rather than pretending. And we can talk about how the actions of the Fed and their 13.3 program and the FDIC played a role in this kind of pretending thing.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Of where, you know, is this something that we can realistically rely on? And I think the history we have is recurrently that that is not the case. Recurrently, whether it's the savings and loan crisis, I mean, any of these crises, and Bill English, who's a former head of the monetary department at the Federal Reserve, Monetary Affairs Department of the Federal Reserve said market discipline doesn't work and when it comes, it comes too sharply and too quickly. You either having a bank run or you're not having a bank run, essentially. And in that circumstance, this reliance on what's called liability side discipline just doesn't work. So we need an alternative system and full deposit insurance or full deposit guarantees is the first step to admitting to ourselves.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Engage in credit analysis of an entire complex bank's balance sheet. No, I mean, if we're focusing on incentives, and economists love to talk about incentives and how everything is driven incentive, the incentive you have as a large uninsured depositor is to turn to the shadow bank tools, whether it's cash weep, whether it is repo, whether it is not even shadow money necessarily, just a certain form of money, treasury bills, whether it is money market mutual funds, they have this very, very big incentive to just engage the shadow banking system and seek out collateral rather than do credit analysis in order to feel confident in their uninsured deposit. I mean, you know, people have billion dollar deposits that they're not doing credit analysis.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Credit risk analysis basically becoming private bank regulators where they are keeping close watch on a bank's balance sheet to making sure they're acting prudentially. And then they will leave individual uninsured deposits will leave when they notice something, but it's not just going to only happen in one big moment of a bank run. That vision, that dream, I think what I might have called in certain places that utopian dream, I just think is not a reality. And I think that this cash, the insured cash sweep fintech solution illustrates that as a sort of reductio ad absurdum. Credit analysis is hard. Banks don't even like engaging in credit analysis. They prefer relying on collateral worthiness rather than credit worthiness, but we're going to expect uninsured depositors who are going to”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, exactly. I mean, I think in practice, there are probably limits to how feasible they can organize these cash suite programs, especially with how concentrated the U.S. banking system is. That's literally a limit. How many banks can you get participate in the program? 600 times 250,000, I think is like 500 million. So that's, you just have an operational limit from how many banks are in the United States of how large and uninsured deposit you can make into an insured deposit. And so that's very question begging for how that system is going to work. But the point of that kind of illustrates very sharply what I think is in general true about shadow banking is the traditional theory that you have uninsured deposits, forces uninsured depositors to engage in”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Nathan, you think that in a world where we have these sweep programs where 250 here, 250 here, 250 here, that just creates a system where everything is insured, but companies are doing it and benefiting it. So why not? Your argument goes extend the FTIC, remove entirely the FDIC insurance cap.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Bank runs to simply shadow bank runs emerging from this mismatch between the deposit insurance limit and the needs of institutional investors.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“The undesirability of having all these kind of activities that are getting financed outside of the financial system cause a financial crisis, which then the Fed steps in without having this activities brought into the regulatory umbrella that kind of what's happening now where we're having an escalation of, well, fears about uninsured deposits show shows that the role that uninsured deposits are supposed to be playing, which is supposed to be disciplining banks, you know, hey, you do something wrong, we'll run away, that's not really working. And on the flip side, it's causing all these other problems, which we want to deal with. And I wanted to bring that out and highlight that from Pozar's original work because, you know, for a while now, he's been talking about our increasingly recurrent.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“In some ways, the thing that you were describing in terms of paying in one of these cash suite programs to fide up in an uninsured deposit into up to 600 insured deposits, that's kind of one of the more harmless ones, but it also shows the kind of silliness of the whole enterprise where we have private sector actors who are collecting a fee to basically synthetically create deposit insurance greater than 250,000 dollars and you could skip the whole rigor roll by just having full deposit insurance. And then on the other side with our increasing shadow bank runs, which have been happening more and more recurrently since 2008. And simply.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, exactly. That's exactly the point. And so this has been a part of this conversation of, well, these people were simply irresponsible managing their money. They should lose it all, which of course, you know, I'm not so aggressively arguing the other side of that case. I understand why people who get lectures from tech CEOs all the time about their supposed irresponsibility, you know, feels like people who have that sort of basic irresponsibility and are constantly lecturing others should eat some of their own medicine. But part of the point that I was driving, especially with this Pozar piece, is there's a dark side to those sophisticated cash management tools.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Responsible Treasury Management would be you do some sort of sweep program where they seeded out to all the other banks, so we're going to quarter million dollars here, 250 million, 250,000 here, 250 there. And that way it's almost entirely insured. And you also could put it into a money market account, which invests in repo. So you're limiting, if not entirely eliminating the amount of money that you have an uninsured account. Needless to say, many depositors at Silicon Valley Bank did not do that. Sorry, back to you.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Especially also with rich people who don't necessarily know about these kinds of things and don't hire a treasury manager. And people had literally billions of dollars in the bank. I think the top 10 balances was on average had 3.3 billion, which is a staggering amount of uninsured deposits, especially to have in a mid-size regional bank.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“We kind of have the opposite problem. We have these big shortages of large denomination money, and the private sector tries to innovate, tries to synthetically create large denomination money, sort of like the private sector tried to make these small denomination monies alternatives way back when, and they both kind of have similar problems of fragility. And so this latest crisis, what's interesting about this latest crisis is, you know, as you're pointing out, like, you know, there were a number of entities at Silicon Valley Bank, which basically didn't have the kind of setup that these larger institutions have that make sure that Treasury management happens, that there is fiduciary trust, a responsibility to make sure that you run your cash safely.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Lot of position and shrink when they're trying to buy into another position, they can't rely on uninsured bank deposits and what they can rely on, what's better is fragile. They can also rely on short maturity treasury securities, but the government doesn't issue enough of them because they don't, they see them as a financing tool. They don't see them as a monetary policy tool. The treasury doesn't. The Fed does, but the Treasury doesn't. That's like a constant conflict between Treasuries and central banks. And so they don't issue enough of them. So when that's not a solution to this lack of safe assets, this lack of essentially like what I've called in certain other work a shortage of large denomination money in the 19th century there were lots of problems with shortages of small denomination money”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Between what happened with them versus what happened with what were called collateralized debt obligations or the lower tranches of mortgage-backed securities. But anyway, regardless of what ultimately happens with AAA, mortgage-backed securities, they were very difficult to value, meaning they didn't have good collateral prices, meaning that they were no longer the solid protection behind repo liabilities that they were seen to be. And the point is, is as you have these growing, growing pools, in institutional cash pools, financial net worth pulls is the terminology I've used in my work, you have these growing pools of money that need to have some cash balances. They need some safe part of their money that they can grow when they're trying to sell.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“That are backing these deposits, and it's so fine. And that works until it doesn't. In the 2008, 2007, 2008, we had essentially a shadow bank run where there was a drying up of liquidity, obviously also focused on private sector mortgage-backed securities, ones that were rated AAA and suddenly you didn't know how to price it. If you didn't know how to price it, what is its collateral value? What is its collateral price? And there was a quote unquote run where people didn't want to keep on renewing, engaging in repo agreements around AAA securities. And suddenly trillions of dollars of what was seen as safe assets evaporated. Now, ultimately, those AAA mortgage-backed securities actually paid off. I'm going to post a piece in 2020 about this sometimes confused.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“You don't at least formally have the protection of the Fed, but you can always sell the collateral, and that'll cover you even if it's defaulted. So, you know, these are your repurchase agreements. The idea being that you hold as collateral that this Treasury security or this other security potentially, and you also hurled this liability, this obligation of someone else to buy the Treasury back at a higher price. they could default on that liability, in which case you just keep the Treasury and sell it yourself. You know, there are all sorts of other kind of similar devices, you know, shadow monies, quote unquote, that operate in a similar fashion. And that is, it's essentially how all of them usually work in our modern financial system is that there's this idea that we have some collateralization that are back.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Kind of attitude. So as a result, there's sort of just an institutional legal compulsion to compel all sorts of institutional investors, your pension funds, your university endowment, bank trust department on behalf of rich clientele, so on and so forth, you know, sovereign wealth fund where that's not going to hold water and you have to fumb with all some of kind of alternatives. And the alternatives that the broader financial system has come up with, it's essentially a service industry. So it comes up with services as people need them, it comes up with new products, has been essentially all forms of collateralized monies. So the idea being, okay, you don't have the protection of the FDIC.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, and we'll get to that. But the core issue that Pozar was talking about is, well, typically these uninsured deposits, there is a risk. Now, also, frankly, especially with too big to fail, you might think, oh, you can just put it in too big to fail bank. There's not, then it's not a problem. Something they really emphasize, which kind of gets undercovered, it's often the reason that that isn't satisfactory is because come on, too big to fail the bank is going to get bailed out doesn't hold up to scrutiny for fiduciary responsibilities for fiduciary responsibilities, trust responsibilities. You can't write that in a legal filing for why you're taking on all this uninsured bank deposit risk. You have to go seek out, formally safer alternatives, even if you have the sort of, come on, it's, you know, it's too big to fail bank. We're fine.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah, that limit is up to $250,000. So if you have $251,000 in the bank, the first $250,000 is insured. The $1,000 on top of that is not and everything on top of that is also not for Silicon Valley Bank, the FDIC did insure all uninsured depositors. So, you know, if Roku had billions of dollars of uninsured deposits.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Or FDIC insurance, or any of these kind of special things that backstop the chartered bank money. And he looked at that from the demand side. Why were they these entities that were willing to hold this stuff? And he identified the core factor is, well, bank deposits themselves were falling behind as money. They were not the great money from the point of view of these large entities. It's very weird to think because, you know, money in the bank, like we as households, we can't imagine having most people, and maybe some of your audience can imagine, but most people can imagine having more than 250,000 dollars in a checking account. It's crazy or even a savings account or anything. You can't imagine where that would even be an issue that comes up. So you don't really think about it. FDIC insurance, good enough for you.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Lender of last resort powers of the Federal Reserve. These are dangerous monies. They are things that are fragile. They can break apart. They are pro-cyclical in the sense that they're seen as safe when times are good and they're not seen as safe when times are bad. And that's, you know, that's a huge problem. And that's exactly what you were talking about. Part of the point of bank deposit insurance was getting rid of the pro cyclicality of money and with shadow monies, the pro-cyclicality of money is reintroduced. And, you know, money isn't there when you really, really need it to be there in terms of its, you know, ideal liquidity and other sorts of properties. Now, what Pozar did, the brilliance of Pozar's work is he hammered that inherent connection between, well, why is the banking, why are these non-bank entities able to issue?”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Yeah. I mean, there's different ways you could define shadow money. The definition I kind of run with is basically some sort of Something that serves as a store of value, as either a conserved as payments role itself or can be converted at par into something that can make payments. So for example, you can convert shadow money into bank deposits and then make payments with bank deposits. But what's unique about them is that they're not issued within the banking system or any other sort of kind of money franchise that you could kind of come up with. So they're issuing something that's like a bank deposit, but it's not a chartered bank that's issuing it or not at least the chartered bank subsidiary that is issuing it. And the importance of that is that without direct connections to the FDIC backing or the Federal Reserve directly accessing”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Honestly, about financial stresses. And so since he was gone, I wrote a piece called The Night They Reread Pozar in his absence. It's a reference to a Krugman blog post from 2009 where he says the night they reread Minsky, which is in turn referencing an even older movie. And so I won't decided since he isn't around to write about his kind of core themes and the core takeaways from his scholarships, which are very relevant to this crisis. I mean, this is, you know, as I say in the piece is a classic, you know, if 2008 was a Minsky moment, then this is a Pozar moment. And I wanted to really highlight his intellectual contribution since he can't do that himself.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“Scholar on how the banking system works, and particularly shadow banking and the driving forces behind shadow banking. And he's really, you know, there's a lot before him, there was a lot of focus on the supply side. Why people were looking to issue shadow monies. But what Zoltan really put into focus is why there was a kind of need in the financial system for shadow monies. What purpose did shadow monies serve and what the implications of shadow monies and their proliferation were on the broader financial system? And so he's absolutely an essential person, but because of more recent goings-ons has not been available as a writer because what he would say would have material impact on the success of his institution. You can't be at a financially stressed institution.”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT
“So that's Zolta and Pozar, doing a little bit of cheeky thing, having him as my background. And he, you know, former Fed person, senior advisor to the Treasury under Obama. And has been a long time managing director of Credits Weiss. Now Credits Suisse UBS. maybe first Boston, you know, we'll see what names ultimately reemerge as we get more global money notes from Zoltan, but he's a kind of, you know, he's on one hand, you know, been working in the private sector for a while and never been an academic. But on the other hand, has written a lot of academic papers and is seen as a really important”
2023-04-25 · Forward Guidance · Nathan Tankus on The "Pozsar Moment" In Shadow Banking · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT