YouSaid · the spoken record

Nick Carter

lines on the record: 48
first: 2021-10-01
most recent: 2021-10-01
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I think you have to look back at what our principal function is. We have avoided war. And I think that ultimately that is what we are here to do. And I often say to the chiefs of staff, you know, we need to think really hard about how we prepare to fight the war we might have to fight because that, of course, will prevent that war from ever happening. And ultimately, that is our principal task. And I do hope that when people think about writing bruising obituaries, they do recognize that from the day I became the chief of defence staff on the eleventh of june twenty eighteen, a week later I was in front of Prime Minister May, to make the case for more resources. And the fact that we achieved that effect in November last year when the Prime Minister gave us an extra twenty four or so billion pounds over the spending review period is something I shall look back on with a degree of pride.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I'm not sure I would change anything, and I think where the military career is very good is it gives you a huge amount of different experiences as you move up through the system. I never imagined until I became the chief of the defence staff that I would ever be the chief of the defence staff. You know, I often joke it's last man standing and I think in my case it probably was. But the reality is that you're quite well prepared for it during the military career. And I've had some extraordinary opportunities command in Afghanistan, command in Iraq, the opportunity to modernize the army. I mean, these are opportunities where one's been able to do things that one might never have imagined at the beginning you'd ever have the chance to do. And it's been a great privilege to do it. I've made mistakes. Of course I have. I hope I've learned from those mistakes and I hope that I've continued to have the humility to be able to listen and to learn.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And at the end of the day, I serve the Prime Minister and fundamentally we live in a democracy and I wouldn't have it any other way.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I think that I have found sitting around the National Security Council table that the system's not bad. I think that the people who sit around that table obviously come at things from different perspectives, not least recognising the different departments that they front up to. I think they're very well advised. I think we still produce very good national security experts and professionals. I think our intelligence services are world class. So the answer is I think that provided politicians are prepared to listen and to take the advice that they're given and then obviously to apply the politics to the advice they're given, then I think we'll be fine.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, it's complicated, isn't it? The armed forces have probably never been more popular emerging from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that popularity has been entirely based upon sympathy and not on empathy. So the opportunities to do the Olympics or to support the government in COVID, or to drive tankers in a fuel crisis, these are opportunities for us to show ourselves off and to show the qualities and the values that we stand for. So the answer is on the one hand I'm clearly see this as a positive opportunity and of course it's what we do and it's why the government gave us a massive uplift in funding in November last year. But equally we have to recognise what our proper role is and that of course is to deter these opponents that were up against in the global environment from fighting us.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I mean, I think it's worth reflecting on what you've all known Harare who wrote Sapien said at the beginning of the COVID problem back in February last year in an article in the Financial Times. He said that we will be confronted with two stark choices. And one of those choices was between a world in which there was totalitarian surveillance or community empowerment, citizen empowerment. And the answer is that if we're not careful, we'll end up in a world with totalitarian surveillance, and we'll end up in a world where the sorts of values that we don't aspire will be imposed upon us through that technology. And that's why I think we need to recognize that if we want to stand up for the free and open way of life that we have, we are not going to be able to put ourselves back into national stovepipes. We have to become part of the global enterprise. And that's why we need to be involved.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“They may say that, but of course it depends what sort of world they want to live in. And we've never had a more interconnected world. And if we are not prepared to compete in that interconnected world, then we'll discover that it might not be a world that we want to live in.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, because at the end of the day, our authoritarian rivals, whether that's Russia or perhaps to a degree China, they are trying to achieve their objectives short of bringing on a hot war. But of course, around the world, whether our strategic vacuums, they will get filled by these authoritarian rivals. And therefore it is logical for us to want to engage with those countries who are naturally more likely to be allied with us, whether those are Commonwealth countries or people who are going to help us with the broader stability of the world. It's complex, though, because it has to be linked to cyber, it has to be linked to what we might be doing in space. And therefore, what we are finding is that our business has increasingly become a much more dynamic and complex business than perhaps it was when I was growing up.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, and of course, you know, some of the challenges we're having with tanker drivers and things at the moment would absolutely explain why you still need to have a force of, if you like, national resilience. But the bottom line is that we've already learnt a lot of lessons from the Afghan campaign. And we know very well that if you are going to get involved in these sorts of environments again, you need to have the basic insight and understanding in order to be able to have an effect. And if you go in there absent that insight and understanding, you are going to fail. And we've already begun to get the army in particular to be restructured and reconfigured, to be better able to be engaged with indigenous forces in areas that potentially can become failed states in order to help build the capacity of those local forces to be able to take the problems on for themselves.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I mean, we'll get criticized. The plain fact is that one of the qualities that really matter in strategic leaders is the humility to listen. And one of the things that I hope I have done throughout my career is to listen, to learn, and then change the plan when it's self-evidently going wrong”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Up. And of course, it is the problem, as you know better than anybody, about modern media. It's very easy for people to take snippets out of a conversation without looking at the whole. So I would commend to your audience to have a look at the whole interview, and they will then realize what one is trying to achieve. And the responsibility that comes with command.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“What press and Karzai was saying is you need to understand that the Taliban are country boys. They've emerged from the country. They live by a code of honour that they call Pashtun Wally and that actually one of the things that Pashtun Wali definitely has no respect for is kleptocracy and corruption and everything associated with it and they will want a government that is not like that. So I was quoting President Kaza but equally at the time as a leader I had a thousand troops deployed on the ground we were trying to evacuate a whole load of Afghans and I was hardly likely to want to upset the Taliban who we were going to have to collaborate with to a degree in order to get those things to work and in order not to get our soldiers to be attacked by the Taliban.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Because, of course, what I was doing, first of all, I was quoting President Karzai. These were not my words. I was quoting President Karzai, who I think is an Afghan who understands his country better than perhaps any Brit will ever understand.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“With some audiences, it went down badly, but it went down particularly well with the audience in South Asia. And of course, what I was doing”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“bin Laden and people like and the al-Qaeda more generally. But of course once that had happened it was then very difficult to start nation building when of course you actually needed to be working from the ground upwards. And of course I think when people look back at that they can see that the campaign evolved but by then we probably made a misstep before.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, you will remember when we met each other with David Cameron in twenty thirteen when he came to Helmand, that I was in a certain amount of trouble because the day before I had given an interview to the Guardian newspaper, to Emma Graham Harrison, in which I had said we should speak to the Taliban, and David Cameron was not impressed with this, not least because it was against policy, but also because it stole all the headlines. And you will also recall, I suspect, that we went back up to Kabul, where we were given an audience with President Karzai, who turned to David Cameron and said, you must promote this general, because he has said what generals should have been saying since 2002. And the answer is that you are never going to solve this problem unless you bring everybody into the tent. And of course, if you look back at the Afghan mission, at the very beginning, it was not a mission that was about nation building. It was about bear hunting. And therefore, it was entirely appropriate for them to work with some interesting characters, a whole load of warlords and those sorts of people to do the bear hunting.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, again, I don't think it was a bailout in Helmand. I think it was a different approach in terms of the mission. But I think. In your own country in Northern Ireland was not something it was going to work against the sorts of threats that we were confronted with in Iraq and then obviously in Afghanistan. And I think to be fair to the Americans, they gave a Brit the opportunity to command forty five thousand Americans. The most Americans that have been commanded by a foreigner ever. Now they wouldn't give that to Brit if they genuinely thought that the answer to your question was that we were completely useless.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Um yes, I mean, I think that if you look at southern Afghanistan as a whole, and it's not just Helmand, it was Kandahar as well, and Kandahar in many ways was the centre of gravity of southern Afghanistan, it's of course where the Taliban emerged from back in the nineties. I mean, the answer is that if you're going to adopt what became described as a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency, you're going to need a lot of troops. And at the beginning, I think people were not trying to do that. The mission began to change over time. And by the time I was there in 2009, President Obama had signed up to the so-called surge, and that's why so many troops arrived. And our job was a very different job to the one that people had at the very beginning.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Now I do remember all of that and that happened three or four years after I served there. And the answer is I think that the people who were involved at the time, they thought that they had come to an accommodation with the forces of the Iraqi military on the ground and they thought that it was going to prevail. I mean, the plain fact is that, of course, Basra became very much a target of the insurgency and it became a target, I think, of outside influences from Iran as well. And the upshot of all of that was it took the forces of the coalition as a whole to resolve it.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I think we were very worried about how this would work out. And indeed, all of that was revealed during the Chilcott experience.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Indeed, and these were things that I think some of us had some questions to ask about. And indeed, of course, we well know that this was comprehensively covered by the Chilcott Inquiry.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I was. I mean, in 2002, I did my first tour in Afghanistan, and I got very involved in nation building, if we could put it like that. And I designed things called provincial reconstruction teams. And I got a bit of a reputation for understanding how one might rebuild states after they had collapsed. So I was brought into a joint team in the foreign office, which was essentially about aftermath planning. And our job really was to try and encourage the coalition, led by the Americans, to think the thing through to the finish, and to think hard about what might happen once Iraq was essentially defeated militarily, how would you then put it back together again? And it was a very interesting job to be doing.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I personally think so because I think the Taliban would have gone on the offensive against us and you'd have had all of those green on blue casualties we saw and all the IDs back again and I think we'd have had to have markedly reinforced our presence on the ground.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I don't think it was a failure of intelligence. I mean, intelligence gives you certain facts. What you then have to do is to assess those facts and then make judgments. So I think the bottom line is it was a failure of judgment. And of course, what's really interesting about this, it was a failure of judgment across the piece, you know, not even the Taliban expected President Ghani's government to collapse as quickly as it did. And indeed, I don't think any of us expected President Ghani to depart from his palace in such short order and fly off to Uzbekistan that Sunday morning when Kabul ended up collapsing”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, of course, one needs to remember it's a NATO mission as well, so there are another 28 nations beyond ourselves in the Americans involved in this. But there was an expectation that there was going to be a peace agreement. There was an expectation that the Afghan government would enter into talks with the Taliban. And we were all assured this by Zal Khali al-Zad, who was the envoy for the US government that that would happen. And I think we expected that to take place. I mean, now looking back, of course, there's a realization that the Taliban didn't appear to be faithful to that agreement. And there are rightly questions being asked about all of that. But I think most people thought that would happen.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“The Taliban. The die was then cast, you know, although May this year was set as a deadline and it was subsequently extended to August. The die was cast at that point.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I don't think anybody was surprised by the decision at President Biden took. I think I'm on the record of saying that it wasn't necessarily the decision we hoped for. But I think the die was cast in February of 2020 when President Trump signed that deal. I mean, the die was then with the...”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And that bloodletting perhaps will lead in a few more years to a recognition that they've got to form amongst Afghans a government that can govern all Afghans. And I think that because 60% of Afghans have been born since 2001, they don't want to return to the Middle Ages. I think they perhaps will encourage their country to think more inclusively about how it should be governed. And that's where I have hope, Claude.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I mean, I think, again, what has to be really clear about the makeup of Afghanistan? And Afghanistan is made up of different ethnicities, Pashtuns, Tajik, Uzbeks, etc. And of course, within the Pashtun, 40% of the population, there are a whole mix of tribes and different interests and entities and agendas. And Afghanistan has really only been governed inclusively, probably last time was probably in the 1960s and early 1970s. Since then, it's never really had an inclusive government. And of course, what you now see is one gang of Pashtuns coming in who have a different view on everything. And the answer is that they are not going to succeed in the way they are going to govern, because they are governing in an exclusive.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I mean, I, in my time as the Chief of Defence Staff, which is probably the only time that I've had the opportunity to advise policymakers on these big decisions, I've obviously been confronted with COVID, and I've been confronted with the withdrawal from Afghanistan. And through both of those sets of experiences, I have been very firm with policymakers about what the armed forces can do and what is the right thing for the armed forces to do. And there would undoubtedly be questions about whether we could have stayed on in Afghanistan, undoubtedly questions about whether we could have taken on more with COVID. But the answer is throughout that process, I've always been straightforward in declaring what I think is the appropriate thing for us to be doing and indeed what we can achieve.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I mean, I think there is definitely something about the importance of being positive in leadership, because if you're asking people to do difficult things, dangerous things, and often things where they could lose their life, you're hardly likely to get them to do it if you're not positive in your approach. But, of course, you have to be realistic and you have to be pragmatic. And you said something earlier about me be perhaps being political in my approach. The answer is I'm fundamentally not political in my approach. And behind closed doors, I'm very clear with policymakers about what we can and cannot achieve. In public, though, I'm not necessarily going to reveal my advice because I don't think that's my constitutional position. Rather, I think I'm obviously going to try and be positive when it's appropriate to be positive.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, and I think if you look back, you'll recall that that sort of era was about benign interventions, and you'll remember that Robin Cook and Tony Blair had a view on how we could make the world a better place. But I think it's deeper than that, and a lot has been written about the interaction between senior military leadership and policy makers. And I think that how that relationship works is pretty fundamental to the lessons that we learn from the campaigns of the first 20 years of this century, because the military has a very important responsibility to make sure that they receive the right political guidance. And policymakers have a very important responsibility to make sure they give the right political guidance. And the bottom line is that that interaction between those two bodies of people is fundamental to making sure that you either win or lose.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I mean, I think failure is of course a powerful term and I think it's interesting to reflect on whether we failed to win battles we certainly probably didn't succeed in winning wars but we probably didn't fail to win the battles and I also think particularly in the case of Afghanistan that it's too early to say whether it was a failure you know I would observe that 60% of Afghans have been born since 2001 and they will want a very different Afghanistan to the one that the Taliban have inherited.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Indeed, and he wasn't really quite a storming norming as he was. I mean, we arrived in his office at about half past midnight, I think, having flown from the UK. He looked at Mike Wilkes' SCS wings on his arms and he said, Mike, he said, I don't want any dot, dot, dot, special forces. I've got plenty of those. I want tanks. And I remember writing tanks in my notebook, and that was the trigger for the 7th Armour Brigade, which was our first forces to be sent to Saudi Arabia.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I mean I was working at the time for what was called the land deputy joint commander, a general who sadly died now called Mike Wilkes who'd been a former SAS officer. He was the first general officer to travel to Saudi Arabia in late August to talk to General Schwartzkoff about what the Britain could do”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“For sure, yes. I mean, we were going to go into an ambush on a bridge on the road that ran out towards the Glen Shane Pass, which was very notable place. Veterans will know very well what the Glen Shane Pass was like. And it was an extraordinary thing to do. And my company commander came and listened to the orders I gave a few hours later. My platoon sergeant was very much there to make sure they were decent orders to keep an eye on me. But yeah, you were thrown in at the deep end, and it was one of those circumstances where I guess you sink or swim. But people wanted you to succeed. And I think the system around you wanted you to succeed.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“No, and my kit was piled up in my little mini. Probably there was combat dress on display as well. We were a bit naive in those days. But I remember arriving in Ebrington Barracks in Londonry and being told, get uniform on, your company's going on an operation tonight and you'll be commanding your platoon.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes and no. I mean, I only did six months at Santos. I mean, nowadays they do a year, and then before you'd command a platoon, you'd have done a platoon commander's course. And remarkably in those days I was commanding my platoon in Northern Ireland two weeks after I'd finished at Santurst. I was, I think, just eighteen years old. It wrong, drive up the False Road by mistake, but miraculously found my way to London Derry.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“people first and foremost responsibility, interesting places, interesting tasks, you know, Northern Ireland, United Nations tours in Cyprus, and the opportunity to do more things like that.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“What well, I think my father thought a countancy, and he had a good mate who ran Smith and Williamson, and the answer was that I was going to go work for Smith and Williamson. Anyway, three years into it, I was enjoying myself and I wrote to the friend of my father and said, I think I'm going to stay.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I wasn't a terribly successful cadet. It has to be said. I was drawn to the golf course and not to wearing my uniform on a Wednesday afternoon, and I got caught out. So having reached the dizzy rank Alliance Corporal, I reverted to private soldier.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“You were born in Kenya. Yeah, no, he had he did half his life in the army, and then he left and went and worked in insurance in the city. Yeah, I mean, he thought the army was a good career. I think he was rather surprised that I stayed and I profited in it, but nonetheless he thought it was a good thing to do for three years.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Bother why bother with it. Why would I send you to Winchester rather than to go to Oxford? So on the basis of that, it was, I suggest you, young man go in the army for two or three years and then maybe a professional qualification thereafter. But he'd be.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“No definitely not no, I mean it wasn't until I comprehensively ploughed Oxbridge and my father was very clear that Red Brick Universities went on his sheet.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Now, I think that's a very fair observation. And I think particularly my generation, which has served in the campaign since 9-11, we've lost a lot of people killed under our command. And that has a marked effect on you. And I often say that not a day goes by when I don't think of those people who died under my command, and not a day goes by when I wonder whether my plan could have been a better plan. So I think that responsibility of command that comes with the job that I ultimately do is something that a lot of opinion formers don't necessarily understand.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, definitely. Or more. Well, definitely. I mean, particularly when they probably don't know you and they're probably getting things second or third hand. And of course, as is so often the case with modern media, people will take snippets from what you've said. And that's dodgy.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yes, I mean, you are not necessarily in a position where you can answer back. And of course, criticism is painful. But on the other hand, one has to realize that you're communicating nowadays in modern media to multiple audiences, and you can't please everybody. I think what you have to do is to be true to yourself, true to the advice that you're giving, and if you're doing those sorts of things, then I think you can probably find a way through it.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Gosh, I mean, it's mixed emotions. I mean, as you say, I've been institutionalized now for between 43 and 44 years, and it's going to be quite a wrench, I suspect, leaving the institution. But on the other hand, one has to look forwards, and I think there are all sorts of opportunities that will come from that. And I have to confess the last sort of nearly eight years as a chief of staff, first with the Army and now as CDS, have been relentless. And I'm actually looking forward to spending a bit more time with my wife and my family and my golf.”
2021-10-01 · Political Thinking with Nick Robinson · The Nick Carter One · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source