YouSaid · the spoken record

Scott Cliff Asness

lines on the record: 171
first: 2015-02-21
most recent: 2015-02-21
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

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“One or two now will be long term. If inflation goes up, this goes up because earnings growth will move when inflation, we believe.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“But right now, Schiller P's are around the 25 without mean reversion. I mean to get about a 4% real return historically on stocks from here.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I try. I mean, you know, you implicitly forecast a lot of things, but if I forecast we want to forecast 2,000 things and take tiny bets on all of them. I'm especially not a fan of trying to forecast big giant things. Occasionally something like the tech bubble will force me into a corner where there's no other bet to make either bet it goes up or down. But by and large, we try to diversify. And if we do have to forecast, forecast as cowardly as possible.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah, I'll be specific. Without mean reversion in prices, because that's too much about forecasting. Some people, I probably believe in a little mean reversion and PEs and real bond yields, but that's forecasting and guesswork.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“They got much less of it and they had to take on more risk to get it because their portfolios were more concentrated. So there is a case that it's a little more pessimistic than your case, a case that justifies higher prices today, but it also comes with a lower expected return. The lower expected return is not wrong when prices or higher returns are lower in this world, but it's rational.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“So we look at the overturns like people got those from BOGO when they weren't. They were getting it from their stockbroker with more risk. So along the lines of what you said, and I build on that, I'm not dismissing that. I'd say in the history we look at of stock returns, perhaps people required a much higher gross level because they didn't get all of it.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Oh, that was insane. But at large costs concentrated portfolios, so riskier with a lower average return because the costs are much bigger. Trading through a broker at the old brokerage costs.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Purchase cluster. The way to own stocks, and this is the behavioral part, was generally far more concentrated portfolios. I don't think many people before, let's call it the 70s, owned the index.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“That becomes. It's certainly possible. The argument I like best is that people required a much higher return prior to call it the last 30 years. Because some behavioral and some structural. Structural is it was far costlier to tone stocks. You know, we all act like there was these Vanguard Jack Bogle 10 basis point index funds forever when there weren't.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Which, you know, that I think I'll trust your numbers is certainly something like that. I find that to be a little less of a knock. These things can wander away from normal for so long that it does impress upon people why you don't want to trade over this, even overhaul a 30-year horizon. If I ever find an investor, give me a 50-year lockup, maybe I'll use the cape to try to forecast things.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“So we got lower returns than normal, where his measure is very good for forecasting But to actually make money by being an active trader, you don't want to use the Schiller PE with a 10-year horizon.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“This is not a knock on Bob because he'd be the first to tell you not to use his stuff to time the market and actively trade. If you did from when he first started saying it, I don't think you made money. I think round trip, I don't think we ever got back to 96. No.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Exuber Got Queenspan in trouble in'96. The Greenspan said it, tanked the market, and then had a retreat from it. I think that was quietly Bob's fault, which I would find so much fun if I were Bob.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And by no means, and just to reiterate, am I predicting the U.S. turns into Japan from 90 to pretty much still now, maybe 90 to 2000 at the worst? But is it possible? Yeah. So I am willing to say it's a quite expensive market versus history. That's a different statement. Bubble has a level of assurance. It has a level of insanity. It has a level of you should go out and short. People forget, again, Bob Schiller's done tremendous work, but he started saying it at least in 1996.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Bond real yield using forecasts of inflation, talk about U.S. bonds are perilously close to zero They bounce around. That is about as low as they've ever been several times in history. That's pretty bad. Zero is pretty bad. Can I come up with a scenario where these bonds do okay over the next 10 years? Well, I don't call this a plausible scenario. Can I come up with is not my best guess?”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And then I decided I'd rather make money than finish the book. There you go. And no one wants a book. Hey, there was a bubble, and I called it, but I forgot to tell you real time. But I was writing this thing, and I wrote articles on it that, thank God, were out there. But that I'd call a bubble. Let me give you a current example of something that I think is a very expensive market, but people call a bubble all the time as the bond market.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Price. I was willing to call that a bubble I wrote something I called a partial book draft that never, you asked me earlier. I've never written a book. I tried once. You don't want to write a book about something being a bubble and have it start to crash around you. I kept revising the book for about six months”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And this was real time. And we have the papers to show it during the tech bubble, we tried very hard to say, could we be wrong about this? What if you assumed the high end of Wall Street earnings worth, which was insane assumptions at the time? They weren't going to happen, but assume them. Assume people are willing to accept less on stocks than the past, because the less you'll accept in return, the more you can pay in price. That was counterintuitive because everyone was assuming you would go on forever. Let's assume it's rational in an efficient markets world. We couldn't get close to the current”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“At least he might not go as far as say they don't occur. He'll say we can't really prove they've occurred. I think there was a definite bubble in tech stocks. I think, and I won't accuse Bob Schiller directly of this. I love Bob. I don't know what he does, but I think people on the irrational side use the word bubble too much. And certainly on the Wall Street side. There's a bubble in everything. I had a presentation where I had throw up like 20 headlines from bubbles in markets to bubbles in individual stocks. We have dumbed down the word bubble. The definition I like of bubble. Is it still subjective, but it's I can't come up with any plausible future scenario where this yields a return that's even remotely acceptable. It could be a low return.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“This is a great way to explain how I'm in the middle of Bob Schiller and Gene Fama. Gene will tell you, and I've recently had this conversation with him again, there's nothing he'll look back on and say, yeah, it was definitely a bubble. And he's very intellectually consistent. No matter how strongly you feel and how smart you think you are, you don't want to argue with Gene. It's pretty hard to beat. I still don't agree with him on this, but you won't do a public debate. No, I would run from that and hide. But I do believe bubbles occur.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“But it certainly felt that way. And again, it's not all we do. For instance, momentum was good enough to offset value for much of the late 90s. Not 99. Value is so bad. So I cut my teeth, at least at my new firm, not originally at Goldman, on fighting the tech bubble, and I still have the scars of that. I fought a lot of battles since then, but that was still the worst.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We launched AQR in late 1998 after very good run at Goldman. And the first thing we did, and Kwanso, it's very diversified, but implicitly did, was fight the tech bubble. Value investing did not have a very good 1999 to say the least. Pretty terrible. But 99 was a crescendo of doom. And I don't mean to be melodramatic. No, no, it's a phrase.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“The other camp, the inefficient, the irrational camp, as typified by Bob in his sharing in the Nobel Prize, but it's certainly broader than Bob is, and I'm just using the example of value, cheap beach expensive because people make errors. If something is doing poorly, they think it'll go on forever, and it should be, you should pay less for it, but not as much. This would be a terrible English sense, but not as much, less as the actual price. It goes too far. And vice versa, things that are going well”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Yeah. Another, exactly right, another camp, and that would be consistent with an efficient market. You can make more if you take more risk. And that's not a violation. Sure, that's not inefficient.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We had a similar, you know, we've worked together forever, so our perspective is similar in that sense. But we also had a similar history. And I would say we started out as Fama's students and are incredibly schooled by him in that efficient markets way of thinking. I wrote my dissertation early on on momentum trading, which is already a bit heretical for the efficient markets hypotheses. Today... This big fight about why certain things have worked historically, like cheap beating expensive. One camp, the Fishian Markets Pharma camp, says, well, if Cheap wins, it's because it's riskier.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, it was fun. I co-wrote that with John Liu. He's one of my founding partners, and also both of us had Fama as co-chairs of our dissertation.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“That's where you can find it. Yeah, I wasn't really avoiding you, but I must tell you, you having so many amazing people, many of which I consider people I study, wore me down. It said I want to be part of this group.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I don't think you will ever find a market maker in these kind of markets and these kind of trading who buys at a price they know is above the equilibrium price or sells at a price they know is the true price out of duty And I don't think it's any less than it was before. I think they used to run away before. So I'm not saying they're wonderful. I'm saying they're precisely as cowardly and venal as they've always been.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Profitable as it was. I am still perfectly fine. I would like to see it be voluntary, but if I were setting up an exchange, I probably would make that not allowed. I think the confidence would be larger than the gain to that. So I think it's a bad idea, though I could make a more geeky economic argument that if it's disclosed, it's okay. I'd like to see that stopped. The other part of them running away. I think they do run away. I'm not taking issue with your facts. I just think market makers have always run away. I think this fantasy that in the old days they would take a loss for the team.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“You get into a gray area when people are paying for it. If it's disclosed and they're paying for it, you could make a caveat emptor article that we all know are being front run. And these profits, it's a competitive world. These guys are hyper-competitive with each other. So they then try to undercut each other and providing more competitive liquidity. And you've got a better pool.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Neither of those are jokes. Those are quite serious and accurate statements. But I will agree with you on the first one, and I'll take a little issue with the second one about them running away. When it comes to information they're not supposed to have, if anyone has private information that they're not supposed to have, that should be stopped. I think that's a relevantly tiny part of what goes on, and I think traders have attempted to do stuff like this since time immemorial. There was probably someone outside of Rome doing this 2,000 years ago. But if we find a place that someone's finding information. That's private, that's using them. They're jumping ahead of me or you, that should be stopped. Well,”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“They get out of the way. They raise their offer. On ethical front running is you have some information that someone's about to trade that you shouldn't have. But observing trades and saying, where there's something that's probably something else, so we're going to start to move the price, that's gone on forever. It's just rational. Anyone making a market's going to do that? So it's not a blanket defense, but we think most of what they do is provide trading liquidity cheaper.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“So by and large, and I think everyone, almost everyone agrees with this, I shouldn't say everyone, but from Vanguard, Gak Bogle, other people have looked at this, agree they've lowered costs for investors. There's always been market making. There's always been a middleman. We might all not love a middleman, but there's always been someone to do this. They do it cheaper than the more monopolistic specialists and old market makers used to do it. Things that look like front running that scare people. market makers used to do once someone starts to buy a lot”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I like geek equations, but that little C for the speed of light should not be in any finance equations, yet it does show up occasionally. But most of their need for speed, and I sound a little too top gun there, but most of their need for speed comes from having to beat other high frequency traders. It's an arms race. Yes, it is an arms race, but to be the one that execute Barry's trade.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Or else you or I could sneak in and get too good of a deal on them. They got to move it with the market. So they are canceling correcting constantly. Why do they have to trade at near light speed? I still laughed at the speed of light. It has something to do with my industry. It shouldn't. We're not in physics. Well, it's how fast.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“There's nothing perfect. I'm not excusing all behavior and saying nothing wrong goes on. But that's true of every industry, of every group. I'm not sure HFT is worse either. Most of what goes on in HFT, which also explains most of the behavior that scares people, is about making markets. They make most of their money by if Barry wants to trade, comes to the market, they will take the other side of Barry's trade. And then they will try to hedge that risk. And why do they have to trade high frequency? Well, they put out a bid in an offer. They'll buy it for somewhat less than they'll sell it to Barry. I'm going to use you as my example go away. Now let's say the market moves a little bit. They got to change those bids and offers.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We're an SFT, a slothful frequency trader. And, you know, we've been, I'll be honest, I've been trying to be very clear and careful about this. We have been a public defender of high-frequency trading, and we are quantitative, so it's easy to confuse those two. We're defenders. We don't think there's anything wrong with it, but we don't want people to think we're doing something where we're not. We're not high-frequency traders. It is my belief that...”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I think it's very strategy specific. You got to really grill your managers. If you are inclined to look for stock picking skill and you are thrilled with someone's track record, it's not that hard to figure out if it was mainly small cap and microcap stocks and they're way too big for that now. If they were a currency trader of any kind, you don't have to be a quant, but if they were a currency trader, maybe it's not that crazy that they can take in. It requires some thought, but I think it's one of the key things that should be asked. Are you past the point where you can manage? The answer is going to be very different for different people, but it's always a good question.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We have done that to various strategies. We are blessed in having fairly large capacities as quants. We trade very diversified portfolios, big cap stocks, countries, currencies. But we have closed some arbitrage strategies, mergers and converts. We've opened and closed them. We've closed them whenever the market wasn't amenable to more capital. We've closed some, I wouldn't call them high frequency, but faster trading strategies because those tend to hit capacity faster. And there is no strategy we wouldn't close at some point. Because there's no strategy. This is an obvious statement that still upset some people. There is no strategy that doesn't get worse past a certain minimum necessary point as it gets bigger.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And there are some people who defy all the odds and just keep going. But some of the very large hedge funds are this effect, doing well for a while, and then the money just pours in. And I'll say it, I'll say it even when it's us. It's probably too much.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“In that sense, it's not that crazy. I think there's a negative reason, too, that investors of all types, of all stripes, institutional, high net worth, retail chase performance. Too much. They chase short term performance and they chase multi-year performance. And certainly that's indicative. And all I'll sequel, I prefer it when mine is good. I whine about this much more when it's going against me than when it's going for me, but I think people should spend a lot more time on the process, whether it makes sense if they have a very long-term track record, but I think people chase too much. And particularly people seem to look at three to five year horizons and chase them. And one of the few things that we actually know about three to five year horizons in finance is that's about the horizon things tend to mean revert, not continue.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Of your big firms It's part of my language now. That's beautiful. It's a fat head with a The industry has gotten more like that over time. Part of it is for good reasons. Part of it is for bad reasons. I do think if the market is not perfectly efficient and some people can beat it, it's still a pretty narrow group. It's still pretty efficient and a pretty narrow group of people who can beat it. So a handful of...”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Quote unquote, I'm impressed. No, I've known Jack for a while. He's kind. The mutual fund version of this is called a multi strategy fund. Jack, I actually asked him about this afterwards because if Jack Bogle says something nice about your strategy, you want to be able to quote it. And we mutually agreed how I could quote him. And I'm very fond of this. I did not convince Jack to invest and recommend hedge funds. Jack doesn't like tilting away from market cap in long only. He doesn't like, you know, he's a straight down the line. Yeah, that's a separate issue, but he's straight down the line. So I'm not that persuasive. But I got him to say that what we do in hedge funds because of the transparency and the fee structure is the hedge fund he hates least.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“The anchor, of course, immediately asked me about fees, which he was told not to. And I had to look like the most evasive guy known to man. I kind of said, we think they're low versus the industry, and I kind of looked down and prayed he didn't continue, which he didn't. That was not my high point of media.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“I have no idea. I know they once sent me on TV where I had not passed my Series 7. I shouldn't take too much time here, but I had passed it at Goldman. It expired. We weren't a broker dealer. And then we started doing funds. I had to retake it. So they told me, don't talk about fees. It's one of the things you're not allowed to talk about if you haven't passed the test. Right.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We don't want risk. We want return. But that's how you get return from them taking more risks. So after you hedge out that market exposure, they're not quite doing enough to really move your portfolio that much. But there has historically been in our data some excess return. So I call this a tepid defense. First, I've criticized him as being too net long, not a good enough deal But then when others have made comparisons that the 6041's not terrible, the 100% stock is a terrible comparison. I think it's been too negative. I think the truth is there are good strategies. They just don't do it as a good enough deal at an aggressive enough way to make it a good deal for investors.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Stock market goes up 10% a day. You expect 4% on your hedge funds. But if it goes down 10%, you expect to only lose 4%. So 100% stocks is a bad comparison in general. That guy who bet against Warren Buffett is discovering this. It wasn't my bet, so I'm allowed to, it's not ex post. It could have been bad for Warren, too, if we had a bear market. It's just a bad comparison. And in five, six years of bull markets, it's a terrible comparison for hedge funds. 60-40 is much better, but it's still about 20% more long stocks than hedge funds have been historically, even before the last few years. You can show this. And when the market goes up 15% a year for five years, that's 3% a year of a drag. So I think that's a much better comparison. But if you do the actual dollar for dollar, you end up critical.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“And then they charge a ton for it. So this is self serving because it's kind of how we do it, but we think hedge funds should fully hedge and then charge less. We wrote this paper that's critical. Some of the criticisms of hedge funds, the worst ones are when they compare them to 100% stocks. Now, their net long, long-term, about 40% of the stock market, and geeks speak a 0.4 beta.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, on the Little Brother comment, I think that's mostly right, but I'm going to take a little issue with that. Here's the criticism. I think hedge funds. Do a lot of very good strategies that make economic sense and have evidence behind them for getting fees and for getting hedging, merger arbitrage, lending capital after a situation has occurred. You have liquidity risk. You have a deal blow-up risk. You get paid for that. Convertible arbitrage is largely, I think, a liquidity premium. Trend following and managed futures on momentum. Part of what we do. We think it works. There are others. Good strategies. They do impartially not fully hedged, which is weird and adds to the price. Because effectively you're getting part of your return from an exposure you should get more cheaply.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Well, first, I've been a schizophrenic on the hedge fund industry. It's kind of like having a little brother. Not that they're my little brother, but if someone else picks on your little brother, you defend them. And if your little brother's having a good day, you punch him. We started out in the year 2000. This is 15 years ago. We wrote a paper called Do Hedge Funds Hedge. When I was a younger whippersnapper and I got yelled at by half the big names in hedge funds, it was both fun and scary. And we said they're two net long. The word hedge implies they're hedging. And they were about 40% net long stocks, meaning if you went long a dollar and short, 60 cents You're still 40% exposed. That might be a good idea for total returns, but you shouldn't pay 220 for that because you can get net long from Jack Bogle. 6040.”
2015-02-21 · Masters in Business · Masters in Business: AQR Scott Cliff Asness (Audio) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source