YouSaid · the spoken record

Stan Miranda

lines on the record: 74
first: 2025-08-25
most recent: 2025-08-25
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: podcast

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We couldn't get access to them. So we did some alternative things like the Tiger Globals of this world, but we didn't have much early stage at all. And that did really well thanks to the tech bubble that we rode. But today, you don't get early stage from those managers because it's a tiny percentage of their overall book. They're getting the early stage somewhere in their house, not necessarily in your portfolio, but they're accessing the best early stage so they have proprietary insights and access to the late stage. So you want to invest in their late stage. And we do. But we don't get any of the early stage venture capital. And it's our assertion that's a much higher return because it's higher risk. But you want it. There's lots of data that you pick the right timeframe, late stage is the same as early stage returns. But if you adjust for tech bubbles, tech bubbles included in both the beginning and the end.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Learning there is more about the asset class than the individual managers because of the Kleiner Perkins Association that we believe what everybody else believed, which was if you weren't in the top eight, 10 managers, you just didn't go there. And you needed the early stage. The early stage was really”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“In the extreme focus in biotech or China or emerging technology because these were deep experts. It's inefficient. What do we learn there? We learned that there's a lot of risk other than equity beta in these portfolios. China, there's geopolitical risk. And biotech, there's basic regulatory risk. Small company size risk, unprofitable or profit tomorrow company risk and all of those are risks that you're going to get paid for. But you're way ahead of your budget when the market goes down you give so much back. Public equities, we're learning from individual managers through time how difficult that really is today.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We started life with equities actually saying this is too hard. We're just going to go with Mr. Vanguard. That's the best way. Nine basis points. We know what's going to happen here. But then we thought, wait a minute, this is 30% of our clients' portfolios. We're not generating alpha for. We've got to crack this. So we started with the private equity approach to public equity investing, as you'd expect us to, because that's deep fundamental analysis and that's the only possible explanation for how you could have security selection alpha. That worked actually from about 2005 to about 2009 when it stopped working because growth was introduced and the value factor killed the private equity style managers. I'm not naming managers that we necessarily invested in, but that was the SPOs and the CVNs and value X. That was a bad factor trait. We migrated into the growth sector and we believe.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Commodities is a great one. Okay. As we say today, it's a graveyard of failed investment decisions because almost every strategy that we were looking at had commodities in there. And they're active commodities, not passive commodities, because you learn about commodities. There's no yield. There's no income. So over time, they actually go down because of economy as a scale. It turns out in commodities to know enough about what you're investing in, you have to specialize. So you just do energy commodities and you are whip sawed all over the place. So it's up 80, down 60. You have to own four or five of them. But they go out of business after three years. That was a big learning. So we don't do commodities today. That's a whole asset class learning. And there's more specific learning about individual managers and every asset.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“How many experiences do they actually have? And how are you capturing that inside your organization so one individual gets the benefit of another individual's reps? The most important thing is not just how many mistakes you've made, but did you stop analyze it, codify it, and teach it? Did you educate your team about why that was a bad idea, why you succeeded with certain managers?”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Really, three things. Number one is Malcolm Gladwell phenomenon that the team has to have had a lot of reps. It's really important and it's really hard in asset management because of the timeframes. Secondly, it was narrowing down your field of investment choices through quantitative techniques, mainly beta and factor analysis and multiple regression, which goes way back in my history, in my blood. And then thirdly, very importantly is knowing the psychology of a great asset manager. So it's psychometrics, basically. On the reps, I always think, who do you want doing heart surgery on you? You want somebody who's done a lot of them, right? And so it's the same in the asset management world. If we've got a client, some big institution, first question they should ask us, who's making these decisions on asset managers?”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“When you apply this concept of there's a best way of doing things to manager selection, in addition to those couple of criteria you mentioned, how did you go about the process for manager selection for an asset classes?”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“The big retail publicly listed asset managers that are in the business of turning out 40 new funds every year. You went with the concentrated specialist entrepreneurial owner operated asset managers who had the bulk of their balance sheet in their own funds. So their skin was in the game. And so those were the three platforms that we followed. And that was enough work. Really, the focus in the early years was just being a deep expert on every asset class. We always had a benchmark that we wanted to beat for every asset class. So in hedge funds, it was Blackstone's BAM outfit. Their performance was ahead of everyone else's. We just had to make sure that we could beat them on each asset class.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“After 19 years at Bain, you just had an appreciation for the fact that there was a best way of doing almost anything. I'm an academic purist. And our mission is to take the most advanced proven institutional investment approach to our clients. The endowment model in our definition may not be your definition may not even be David Swin's definition, but it had three pillars. Number one, high static risk. So static means no market timing. And that was definitely David Swinson platform, but also the high meant it's long-term money. You can take the volatility. Secondly, multi-asset class diversification with a bias towards illiquid assets, but not necessarily defining as illiquid, but just you can take higher risk, you can take the illiquidity, let's go for it. So that was certainly the second pillar. And something we definitely copied of the Yale model was that you don't give money to.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“First of all, you're right that almost all our clients want something highly customized. And the primary reason that would make sense is that they had a very different risk profile or they had particular biases against their current balance sheet of property and private equity, and so they'd have a different allocation. But in the end, the private equity GPs ended up doing something that looked a lot like the endowment model and, of course, the institutions did. Even the customization is generally about asset allocation and not about which asset classes are included. Almost all asset classes are included in almost all client portfolios, even the private equity GPs today. So the customization came down to really sizing of managers or simple allocation decisions, whether it's 8% private debt versus 10% private debt.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“It was always the endowment model. We were always going to have all asset classes. It's just that most of our clients were overweight private equity, so that was low on the list initially. But we had the full endowment model by 2003. We only started investing in private debt in 2009. That was asset class after the initial set. But we had hedge funds, fixed income, liquid credit, private equity, including venture and property. That was our lineup in the end of 2003, beginning of 2003.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Hit the $100 million target with a mix of high net worth individuals, private equity GPs mainly, and smaller institutions. And then the next year, Wolf Fox and I said the same thing. We hired John Collis, who's just retired after 20 years, who ran Europe. And we started adding clients in the institutional market, mostly in Europe at that point. We hit 400 million in 2004. We were calibrating how much we grew by. And in 2005, we hit 1.5 billion. A lot of institutions, a lot of private equity GPs, and we shut and we got our Excel turned into more institutional technology and so forth. The next year was $3 billion. We capped ourselves about $1.5 billion a year until the global financial crisis. But even in that year, we added one and a half and we lost one and a half. So we flatlined then. And then since then, carried on growing, we let off the $1.5 billion limit.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“So we had to get $25 million in year one, or something called U.S. Blue Sky Laws that would have made our legal bills just astronomical. We hit $25 million at the end of the year just by adding the two asset classes absolute return and municipal bonds for the US taxpayers. Then in year two, we'd hired people like Will Fox, who's still running North America with us today. And we said we're not paying ourselves anything. If we don't get to $100 million, recognizing that break-even was probably $300 million, if we didn't have the momentum, we weren't going to carry on. But in that second year, 2003, we actually got institutional clients. They were the institutions that knew about the Yale model, the endowment model. They were a little bit rebels. They weren't the traditional people who are worried about what somebody else was going to think. And so they were going to hire the new guys on the block. Gonville and Keys College, Cambridge hired us that year.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“We believed in something we called steel from the best. But it was also more euphemistically called triangulation. So we just talked to a lot of people. And that was the only confirmatory or it was something that would narrow down the universe. So we literally had a database where we had a number of hits on this particular fund. But that just got us down to the six or so final candidates for any particular strategy. But also it had to be rooted in some deep insights about each asset class. And it always started there, not with the managers. That was another topic we picked up with friends at McKinsey Investment Office, at Yale and at Stanford Endowments, family offices. And we talked to them, you know, what do you avoid in this asset class? What do you focus on in this asset class? But in the end, it was our data-driven analysis. We hired whatever we needed as time went on, rooted in investment decision making, but we weren't necessarily hired.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“On each of those, how did you go through the process of blank sheet of paper, asset class that a lot of other people understand and know about, but you don't yet, and you need to learn and get up to speed?”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Tutor and Caxton. And so we were off to the races. We just went to the next asset class and the next asset class and the next asset class, pulled out a blank sheet of paper, reminded ourselves what the Swenson book said, but really pulled out a blank sheet of paper and said, how do we invest in municipal bonds? Or's the right way? Should it be high yield, what duration? Every single aspect of every asset class we just started from scratch and analyzed it very deeply.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“One of the things I learned evolution global partners was to take things slow because we took it really fast there. The backers were bondermen and culture of TPG and buyers and Schlein of Kleiner Perkins. And then there was a Bain investment with John Donahoe. And they were just pushing us so hard. We hired 35 expensive people overnight, built these two offices. It never spoke together. It was not a good way to build a business. So I took it really slow. We started with three employees with one in Boston and two in London. We just chose the very next asset class and it was right on the back of the tech bubble. Nobody wanted any more equity exposure. So what did the doctor order? Absolute return hedge funds. We just started studying the hedge funds space. It was very much the market neutral and so equity market neutral strategies, merger arb, fixed income arb. And we just found and we got access to just through relationships things like”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“7.7 million dollars. You can do the math on 43 clients. They weren't giving us their whole balance sheets at that point in time”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Couldn't get to the cost in many cases of the assets. We went through the manager's End of the story around the founding is that I had a set of friends that had the exact same problem. They were mostly private equity GPs. So before evolution on global partners, I was at Bain building their private equity, consulting practice, which meant we did due diligence on mostly buyouts. And then we did all the post acquisition operating value added work. I knew the European private equity world cold, so it was the Premieras and CBCs and BC partners, but also Blackstone and Bain Capital. These were all clients and friends and classmates, and there were 43 of them to be precise on April 1st, 2002 that signed up, recognizing that Stan and Paul knew very little about anything other than maybe private equity, but they trusted us to figure it out.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Generally, no benchmarks. If you did find a benchmark, it was the wrong benchmark. So Conflict of interest issues. Transparency iss”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“What we learned, number one, were just the conflicts Number of golden products or Citibank products. It was just If they did Third party managers.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“Please enjoy my conversations with Stan Miranda from 2023 and Jenny Heller from episode seven back in 2017 and a follow-up in 2021. Great to see you. Thank you, Tep. Why don't you take me back to the founding of partners? Okay, this is right after the...”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source
“This week's summer series is a multifamily office tufer with Stan Miranda, co founder and chairman emeritus of Partners Capital, and Jenny Heller from Brandywine. Both firms started as multifamily offices that have evolved in different ways. Partners Capital has grown and scaled as a leading OCIO while Brandywine has remained a boutique with a fixed set of family clients.”
2025-08-25 · Capital Allocators · CIO Greatest Hits: Multi-Family Offices – Stan Miranda (Partners Capital) · IDENTIFIED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT · source