YouSaid · the spoken record

Arce

THE RECORD WRITES THIS SPEAKER AS ARCE

lines on the record: 100
first: 1946-09-24
most recent: 1949-09-24
sittings or episodes: 3
sources: un-general-debate

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“If such an agreement were to be arrived at, it was necessary to reduce the effects of other even more dangerous weapons, such as rumour, intrigue, political jealousies, arbitrary measures and unbridled ambition. 159. Mr. Arce stated, on behalf of the delegation of Argentina, that it would do everything in its power to bring about such a truce.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Political difficulties appeared and disappeared; technical progress was a consequence of unending study and work and could not be held back. A step in any given direction was followed the next day by a step in the opposite direction. There should be no cause for alarm, however, since the forces of nature could be used in various ways and human genius would always contrive some means to eradicate or reduce the bad effects and to make use of the good. 158. Mr. Arce proposed a truce during which the United Nations might pursue its efforts for the realization of its primary aim, peace, pending the working out of an agreement on all types of weapons, both atomic and non-atomic.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“In view, however, of the fact that doubts had repeatedly been expressed, it was desirous of securing some decision which would safeguard the unquestionable right of the United Nations to settle matters pertaining to its own constitution; those were matters concerning which no privilege could be invoked, since they were within the competence of the United Nations itself, which had laid down the procedure governing its decisions. 157. The “Peace Assembly” quietly proceeded with its discussions in spite of rumours and reports of all kinds. Mr. Arce felt, personally, that the General Assembly was right in not allowing itself to be swayed by the political difficulties that had emerged in one of the areas into which the international field was divided.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“When the facts leading to a negative attitude on the part of the General Assembly were not serious, as in the case of States which had not as yet obtained the support required under the Charter, a mere postponement might be sufficient. The reasons for a negative decision might disappear. Mr. Arce was convinced that in the end the United Nations would admit all countries showing a desire to co-operate in the task of maintaining peace. The General Assembly must emerge from the impasse which it had reached. With that purpose in mind, the Argentine delegation intended to submit to the First Committee certain solutions which it was considering. 156. The Argentine delegation felt that the provisions of the Charter on that question were clear.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Hence the General Assembly should take up the defence of the principles of the United Nations and finally reach a decision with respect to all pending applications for admission to membership in the Organization. 154. The Argentine delegation would be very pleased to see all peace-loving countries admitted to the United Nations. Even though some of them were not admitted in consequence of a negative decision of the General Assembly — the only organ with the right to postpone their admission — the Argentine delegation would prefer a final decision to the shameful spectacle of more than a dozen States knocking at the doors of the United Nations without the latter condescending to reply. 155. The General Assembly could, but was not bound, to bar any State from admission to the United Nations.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Next to the question of the maintenance of peace, the admission of new Members was the most important subject to be considered by the General Assembly, since the acceptance of all, or at least most of the States still outside the Organization, was a decisive factor in the strengthening of peace. 153. When every country in the world had the right to be heard before the Assembly of the United Nations, no Power, however great, would dare to defy the world, as represented in the United Nations. Any attempt to do so would merely condemn that Power to the execration of all free men of the world including those living within its own borders.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Should the contrary prove to be the case, the Argentine delegation would feel compelled to renew its proposal the following year and would attempt to convince the representatives that the sole purpose was to seek a clarification of those provisions which in practice had given rise to contradictory interpretations. 151. The much discussed assessment of the powers of the General Assembly was one of the questions most vital to the life of the United Nations; Mr. Arce deplored the fact that its importance had failed sufficiently to impress itself upon those States, Members of the United Nations which enjoyed no privileges. 152.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The delegation of Argentina had not wished to shoulder so heavy a responsibility; it had withdrawn its proposal and was prepared to accept less extensive and even provisional solutions. It hoped, however, that its confidence would not be deceived. 150. Should the attitude of Argentina contribute to the removal of even one of the difficulties dividing the great Powers, the delegation of that country would feel satisfied with the procedure adopted in accordance with the principles of peace and harmony put forward by its Government.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“When a text was open to doubt or when, through abuse of power, it was given an entirely false interpretation, it was more advisable to amend it so that it would clearly express what had been decided and thus establish the procedure to be followed thereafter. 149. The Argentine delegation had renewed its request (A/970) before the opening of the fourth session of the General Assembly. It had been argued in the General Committee that the subject might give rise to heated debates and that the current session of the General Assembly, already named the “Peace Assembly”, was aiming at solutions based on effective international co-operation which might be prejudiced by the Argentine proposal.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Thus the least important question might become a question of substance simply at the wish of any one of the permanent members. 146. The use of the double veto as well as of the hidden veto showed that the permanent members of the Security Council believed themselves entitled to interpret the Charter in their own way in so far as it referred to the powers which had been granted them. So long as there was no revision of the Charter, that view must be noted. 147. The delegation of Argentina felt that in both cases there was an abuse of power and hence had asked at earlier sessions of the Assembly that a general conference should be convened under Article 109 of the Charter to discuss various questions and to proceed to the revision of the Charter if the conference considered it advisable or necessary. 148.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“In accordance with the procedure of the double veto, whenever a doubt arose as to whether a question was one of substance or of procedure, and therefore whether it was or was not subject to the veto, it must be resolved by a prior decision which required the affirmative vote of the five permanent members. That method of resolving doubt was provided for neither in the Charter nor in the Council’s rules of procedure. Consequently, it had no legal value. The correct procedure in such cases should be to seek guidance from Article 18 of the Charter which dealt with voting in the General Assembly. 145. The Security Council had preferred to depart from the Charter and to adopt its own interpretation, basing itself solely on the fact that that was the solution appearing in the Declaration of the permanent members.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“They would have to wait for a better time, but, in the meantime, it should be recognized that the Security Council was claiming the right to interpret the Charter in regard to its own powers; it was to be hoped that it would not deny the same right to the General Assembly, in other words, to the United Nations. 143. No such prerogative as the double veto appeared in the Charter; it was based on the San Francisco Declaration. That Declaration had not been incorporated in the Charter as a key to interpretation, nor had it been approved by the San Francisco Conference. Hence, the double veto was a new privilege which the permanent members of the Council conferred upon themselves, though without any legal justification. An examination of the text of the Charter led to a diametrically opposite conclusion. 144.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The permanent members of the Security Council answered those arguments by saying that the Council was implicitly empowered to interpret the scope of the powers granted to it and that, consequently, no other authority of the United Nations had the right to discuss the validity of its decisions concerning the application of Article 27. 142. It should be pointed out that the issue was not an interpretation but a modification of the Charter. As yet, however, so few representatives claimed that the permanent members of the Security Council had exceeded their powers that it was useless to make attempts which were doomed beforehand.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“That document, which bore the signatures of the Governments of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, stated: “The first group of decisions” — the document was referring to questions of substance — "will be governed by a qualified vote — that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members.” 140. Accordingly, in pursuance of an explicit provision of the Charter and of the equally express opinion of the Governments of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, all decisions of the Security Council which had been held valid although they had obtained the affirmative vote of only four of the permanent members, were null and void. 141.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Such an interpretation led the representative of Argentina to call the so-called hidden veto by a name which was more accurate in the light of the Charter and the facts, to wit, a furtive or shame-faced affirmative vote. 138. That arbitrary interpretation constituted a new privilege for the permanent members, which appeared to seek their own convenience and to escape their responsibilities, rather than to promote the general interest of the United Nations. 139. Mr. Arce recalled the Declaration subscribed to by the five permanent members in San Francisco, for that Declaration was apparently the Gospel of the veto.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The Charter made no mention of a veto; nor did it speak of negative votes intended ipso facto to void a decision which had been approved by seven or more affirmative votes. The Charter spoke of decisions adopted by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Under the Charter, any decision which had not obtained the affirmative votes of the five permanent members had no legal force. 137. Nevertheless, the Security Council, using an arbitrary interpretation, had accepted as valid resolutions which had obtained the affirmative vote of only four permanent members, provided the fifth permanent member had taken refuge in abstention.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The first of those had been regarded with favour by those who considered that the end justified the means. Mr. Arce held a completely different view. The so-called hidden veto was actually a veto, despite the fact that the permanent member which resorted to it, not wishing to cast an affirmative vote, took refuge in abstention. In fact, it was not a hidden veto, because nothing attracted greater notice than a permanent member which abstained from voting. It could be said that it was morally inadmissible for the permanent members to abstain from voting. They had accepted a responsibility under the Charter, and hence should always cast a vote, whether yea or nay. 136. It was easy to show that an abstention was, in effect, a veto.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“That privilege was bound to create, and did in effect create, sectors or spheres of influence, as in the era of the balance of power. The expansion or contraction of those spheres of influence might affect privileged States which were proposing to exercise, in their own interest, the privilege granted to them, but the other nations were kept in constant fear, waiting for the spark which would once again ignite a horrible war. 134. Mr. Arce would not discuss the disadvantages which had been demonstrated in practice by the use of the veto; they were well known to all the representatives as well as to those who followed the proceedings of the Security Council in the Press. But certain drawbacks could not be passed over in silence; he was referring to what had been called the hidden veto and the double veto. 135.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It was clear that such a course of action would be in greater harmony with Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter, concerning the sovereign equality of all the Members, than with Article 23, which conferred the privilege of permanent membership on certain States designated by name. 132. But what could not be accepted was the privilege commonly known as the veto. The use of such an extraordinary power might be justified in a case involving the political interests of the State concerned, if any decision of the Security Council were likely to harm those interests. It was absolutely unjustified, however, in cases involving the interests of other States or in connexion with the most varied and most insignificant questions. 133.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“For while the permanent members of the Security Council might doubt the sentiments of some of the fifty-four other Member States, they could not doubt the political experience of those States; consequently the one Council where they would remain indefinitely, even if no such privilege were granted in the Charter, would be the Security Council. 131. The fifty-four other Member States were at least as much concerned with world peace as the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the indefinite re-election of those members would be in the nature of an insurance policy which the other States would willingly sign and maintain without any external compulsion.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Arce did not dispute the privilege of membership conferred upon particular States under Article 23 of the Charter. But whereas the Charter did not require that those States should be given similar treatment in the Economic and Social Council, they were re-elected whenever there was an election. And although the Charter did not require that they should be given five of the seven vice-presidencies of the Assembly, that always happened. 130. Such conduct in organs in which the various States had no special privileges whatever clearly showed the consideration given to the great Powers notwithstanding the silence of the Charter in that regard. In those circumstances, the fact that the members which enjoyed the privilege to which Mr. Arce had referred were reelected, showed a fortiori that they would be re-elected to the Security Council.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“They must therefore be revised, clarified, modified or deleted or, if in the course of debate agreement were reached on a single interpretation of a controversial provision, that provision must be retained. 127. It was necessary, in the second place, because a provision which had been approved in spite of serious differences of opinion or under the pressure of special circumstances, had turned out to be bad or inoperative in practice; it was therefore advisable to reconsider it. 128. Those differences had arisen both in regard to the sphere of action of the Security Council and in regard to the interpretation of the powers of the General Assembly. 129. The energy with which the Argentine delegation had fought the privileges granted to certain members of the Security Council was a matter of common knowledge. Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The representative of Argentina felt that such references proved that no one deliberately set out to violate the Charter. The diversity of points of view provided a sufficient explanation of those charges, and showed the advisability, if not the necessity, of undertaking a study of the provisions which gave rise to such controversies. 126. The undertaking of such a study did not imply that those provisions must be modified in accordance with a given point of view. It was necessary, in the first place, because provisions which had been approved without great difficulty four years previously had in practice been subjected to the most contradictory interpretations.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Argentina was prepared to fulfil the obligations arising out of its international commitments, but that did not prevent it from working for the settlement of differences, no matter how deep-rooted such differences might be. Argentina would never give up the hope that agreement might be reached, and even if all paths appeared to be blocked, Argentina would still be ready to work for peace. Recent events furnished authentic proof of the purposes of the Argentine Government and of the aims which inspired the policy of the delegations which had represented it previously and of the delegation which represented it at the current session. 125. Representatives of all the groups and voicing all the tendencies existing in the General Assembly had made frequent references to violations of the Charter.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Arce preferred to associate himself with those speakers who dealt with the success achieved rather than the mistakes made by the Organization although, in the last analysis, both groups were solely concerned with serving the cause of the United Nations. 123. The Argentine Government was particularly interested in the improvement of the Organization and, as in the past, it was always prepared to co-operate in the task of ensuring peace among nations, of promoting liberty among peoples and of improving the social conditions of individuals. 124. Even in the very darkest moments, the Argentine delegation had never lost sight of the noble purpose of seeking good for the sake of good alone without considering less worthy interests.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“A policy of plain speaking, of calling a spade a spade, was the best service to the United Nations. 121. Mr. Arce then proceeded to take stock of the period which had already elapsed, of the defects which had been noted and of the results achieved. The United Nations was a living organism which thought, spoke, acted, succeeded and made mistakes. It was an organism which must develop and be perfected if it were not to disappear. Although its disappearance would not necessarily result in the disappearance of its component parts, it would destroy the aims which had inspired its formation and structure. If the nations wished to profit by experience, they must at all costs prevent the eclipse of the Organization. The United Nations must not be destroyed. 122. Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“First, because the purpose of maintaining peace, which was the primary objective of the Organization, required a wider rather than a more narrow field of action; it called for the admission of all the nations of the earth; it required that the war which for six years had devastated large areas of the earth should be forgotten and that thoughts should be concentrated solely on peace, which could be more easily preserved with a greater number of nations associated in the achievement of that noble aim. 120. The second reason was that if the peace were unfortunately broken, it would be much easier to restore it if there were a greater number of associated nations. Moreover, it was imperative that possible aggressors should be fully aware that in such an eventuality they would have to face a union of nations already in being.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“But if that purely formal consideration could be disregarded for a moment, and if the political significance of that gathering of the nations and the peace of the world were borne in mind, then it would be seen that that gathering was also — and must be — the annual gathering of Member States determined at all costs to survive, whether by retaining the existing Organization or by establishing another which would be better able to ensure collective security, order, justice and social progress. 119. That consideration should be borne in mind for two important reasons.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It was partly for the purpose of fulfilling that duty that Mr. Arce had risen to speak. 118. For the fourth time since the entry into force of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations had assembled in order to deliberate. When the Organization had been established in San Francisco, it had been decided that its Members should meet together annually. According to the terms of the Charter, the current session was the fourth regular session of the General Assembly.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Mr. ARCE said that the difficulties which clouded the international horizon could be traced to causes both within and without the United Nations but that some, if not all, of those difficulties had been successfully resolved. 116. Those which divided the great Powers, or which were the outcome of their conflicting interests, were beyond the sphere of action of the United Nations. The most the other States were able to do was to offer their good offices and to emphasize the responsibility of the great Powers in maintaining peace. 117. On the other hand, the differences which arose within the Organization were more within the scope of Member States, which were in duty bound to study them, to publicize them and, whenever possible, to suggest a method or methods which appeared best calculated to resolve them.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“In thinking over these matters, I remembered that one of the Soviet representatives in the Security Council referred to those of us who attacked the veto as “hot-headed”, and I thought sadly how much we, on our side, fed the lack of a representative capable of marshalling all the arguments against the veto with the serenity with which Mr. Vyshinsky defends it. That is all I have to say for the moment.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“For example, they are complaining now of the United States’ action in bringing the question of Greece before the Assembly after it had been withdrawn from the Security Council’s agenda. They have no cause to complain. They showed the way last year when, in order to help their comrades in the wandering Spanish Government, they requested the withdrawal of the Spanish question from the agenda of the Security Council in order to bring it before the Assembly. There is this difference, however: while the case of Spain does not threaten world peace, that of Greece — as Mr. Vyshinsky is well aware — may be the powder keg which will once again touch off a weald war.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“Just then, the aeroplane in which the representative of the Soviet Union was travelling, driven by a hurricane like that which has unfortunately just devastated the State of Florida, encountered an air pocket and went down as far as the River Plate just long enough to reprimand Argentina for not having consented to withdraw its Ambassador from Madrid. Mr. Vyshinsky knows as well as I do why we did not withdraw him, and he knows better than I do that the Assembly’s recommendation regarding Spain was adopted in disregard of the San Francisco Charter. I maintain: in disregard of the Charter; for Mr. Vyshinsky remembers the provisions of that Charter when the action of his colleagues annoys him; but the Soviet representatives, beginning with himself, have not the least objection to violating those provisions when it suits them.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“Fortunately I was present and can vouch for the calmness with which he referred to Argentina after his giddy flight round the world which began in the United States, crossed the Atlantic, traversed several countries of Europe: the United Kingdom, France, Greece and the Ruhr; of Africa: Egypt and the Sudan; of Asia: Turkey, Iran, China and the Korean peninsula, and returned via the Pacific to his point of departure where, according to the representative of the Soviet Union, people are cynical and everybody has taken to conspiring against the USSR. As he had overlooked Australia, a country which is situated in the southern hemisphere in the same latitude as my own, I presumed that we might also escape his notice. But it was not to be.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“As for the Members of this Assembly, you may begin work without prior revision of the Charter by considering the applications for admission from new Members, bearing in mind the results of the various votes taken in the Security Council and without concerning yourselves with the illegal and vicious procedure which the Council seeks to impose on the General Assembly in defiance of express provisions of the Charter. I was not a little surprised to find that among the many bouquets Mr. Vyshinsky distributed yesterday in his amiable speech he thought it necessary to present one to us. In accordance with the diplomatic practice still in use, I must therefore, before concluding my speech, express my thanks.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“But if the veto is persistently used to exempt Member States from compliance with the decisions taken by the Security Council for the maintenance of peace, the veto will serve only as a device to win adherents and to divide the world into two or more blocs. The United Nations, first formed in 1942 to win the war and organized in 1945 to win the peace, will cease to exist and will be replaced by the “Disunited Nations”, unless tine majority decides to take drastic action to show potential aggressors that such adventures may cost them dear. Let the great Powers bear this in mind, and let them for one moment forget their selfish interests and think of the welfare and the fate of mankind.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“If the General Assembly does not amend the Charter in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108, or does not decide to convene a conference to discuss the whole subject fully as provided in Article 109, there is only one course that gives hope of progress within the framework of the Charter. The “Big Five” must determine to use the veto strictly in accordance with the Charter and, as agreed at San Francisco, with the sole purpose of avoiding coercive action or the use of force against themselves. In that case, we could temporarily overlook the disadvantages involved and get on with our work.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“The only one of their present privileges which would be retained by the “Big Five” would be the right to a permanent seat on the Council. By the first method, three members could force the Security Council to take no action; on the other hand, nine members would enable it to take action. By the second method, four votes would be required to take no action and eight votes to take action. In the latter case, if one or more of the great Powers objected to the action proposed, the decision would rest with the States Members as a whole. As may be seen, both methods take into account the interests of the great Powers and the interests of world peace. The second method is more democratic, but the first is more expeditious.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“The permanent committee would have to take a decision within three days on the pending resolution, voting for or against it without debate after bearing two statements: one by a representative of the majority which adopted the resolution, and the other by a representative of the great Power or Powers which objected to its adoption. The organization of the permanent committee would not entail any expenditure or inconvenience for Member States, since those Members not having permanent delegations accredited to the United Nations could be represented by their diplomatic or consular agents in Washington or New York. The only decisions which could be referred to the committee would be those adopted in accordance with the powers granted to the Security Council in Chapters VII, VIII and XII of the Charter.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“However, this is no reason for not putting forward some suggestions, even though they are only the result of personal study. There are two methods of breaking the deadlock created by the veto. The first would leave decisions in the hands of the Security Council and require the affirmative vote of three-fourths of its members, without veto. The second would give any of the great Powers the right to object to a resolution adopted by two-thirds of the members of the Council; the resolution would then remain pending until a permanent committee of the Assembly, composed of all the States Members, had ratified or rejected it Resolutions not supported by two-thirds of the States Members would be void.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“And as the Pan- American system has no international police force, there would be no difficulty in proceeding in this way. But we shall discuss this matter in the Political Committee; I make this explanation only to put an end to mistaken interpretations and possible intrigues. I should not like to conclude this critical statement showing our lack of faith in palliatives without at least suggesting the remedies which I personally should be inclined to advise. This is a subject which falls within the province of the conference which we have proposed and which would be convened, not to please Tom, Dick or Harry, but to discuss the matter at length and to adopt the most appropriate decisions, not excluding those likely to protect the interests of the great Powers.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“The unanimity supported by Argentina at Rio de Janeiro does not constitute a veto, or a measure making it impossible to adopt resolutions, as occurs in the case of the rule requiring the unanimity of five members out of eleven in the Security Council. The nations which favoured the resolution would have been entitled to put it into effect, however many States had dissented. In the League of Nations unanimity prevented action without the previous approval of all. The unanimity of five members out of eleven required by our present Charter prevents action without the previous approval of those five members. The unanimity advocated at Rio de Janeiro does not prevent the American nations, whatever their number, from taking action if they consider it desirable.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“The five-member unanimity rule established in the United Nations Charter is intended to force the majority, however large, to waive its rights mid bow to the will of the minority which, its purpose achieved, proclaims to the world that everyone thinks as it does, when in reality the exact opposite is true. Thus the unanimity rule may be very useful as a tool to construct a “new style” democracy, but it is of no use for the establishment of security and the maintenance of peace. On the contrary, it will inevitably lead us to war. At the time of the Rio de Janeiro conference, Argentina’s attitude was represented as contradictory, far defending the unanimity rule at Petropolis while attacking it at Lake Success, Such a contention is not merely wrong; it is childish.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“Experience shows that when the decisions of a corporate body depend upon the will of one of its members, it is very difficult to prevent that one member from trying to bring everyone round to his way of thinking. He knows that without him there can be no solution, and if he suspects that the others are anxious to find a solution, he creates difficulties in order to impose his will, or to obtain as neatly as possible what he wishes. He becomes an arbiter. The discussions arc prolonged, the arbiter conceals what he thinks until the last moment; the Press tries to guess the enigma from his most trivial statements, until finally he either kills the proposal with his negative vote or magnanimously accepts the “compromise” most favourable to his interests from among the many compromises offered to secure his consent.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“Nor should we forget — and this is much more important — the futile conflict which would inevitably arise if a State affected by an illegal decision of the Security Council refused to obey it We must avoid anything which might undermine the prestige of the United Nations, and nothing can undermine it more than the adoption of capricious resolutions in violation of the Charter. The veto is often referred to as the unanimity rule. The name is resonant and expressive, but far horn concealing the drawbacks of the veto, it makes them more obvious. In passing, I might point out that the unanimity in question is the unanimity of five members out of eleven, which is a unanimity sui generis.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“Without consulting the Assembly and without awaiting ratification by the States Members, the Security Council will have amended the Charter and granted its permanent members a third and new privilege, for the amendment will be a de facto amendment. Sir Carl Berendsen, our distinguished New Zealand colleague, pointed out a short while ago how the veto might operate when he referred to the possibility of a representative of the “Big Five” being detained at a party, at his hotel or on the golf course.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“But such a decision has no legal value, nor has any resolution of the Security Council on matters of substance within its competence which does not obtain the affirmative vote of the “Big Five”, even if it does obtain the affirmative vote of the six nonpermanent members. Abstention by one of the great Powers is therefore sufficient to prevent the adoption of decisions. If the Security Council persists in adopting this method of interpreting the abstentions of permanent members, it will be abetting a form of deception tending to cloak the harmful effect of the veto, and the great Powers which resort to abstention for this purpose will, in the end, encourage this attitude in open contravention of an explicit provision of the Charter.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“It has been said that this is a political manoeuvre intended to mitigate the attacks levelled against the veto. In order that decisions taken by the Security Council on matters of substance should be valid, they require an affirmative vote of seven members including — and here I quote the actual words of the Charter — “the concurring votes of the permanent members”. When a vote is to be taken on a resolution before the Council, if one of the permanent members abstains because, he does not wish to vote in favour of it but has no special interest in its rejection, and if the seven required votes are obtained, including those of the other four great Powers, the resolution passes as though it had been legally approved. In this way the number of vetoes is reduced and a smaller target is exposed to the attack of hostile critics.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“For example, if the United Nations were to seek to exert pressure on one of the great Powers, inaction could be used to avoid friction which might lead to war. But in the majority of cases action is required for the maintenance of peace. To offset the misuse of the veto, what should have been established was a counter-veto placed in the hands of those nations now lacking the authority to exercise the veto or of those entitled to use it, who believe that this is a time for action. In that case, the veto would have served to defend the legitimate national interests of the great Powers, and the counter-veto to defend the interests of mankind and peace. I consider that one of the most serious errors committed by the Security Council with regard to the veto is the attempt to conceal its use.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)
“Before signing the Charter all the nations, great and small, enjoyed this same right to repel aggression, cither individually or collectively. From all this it follows that before San Francisco the great Powers enjoyed the right of veto on terms of equality and of full freedom of action. The small nations on their part enjoyed the right of individual or collective legitimate defence, depending on whether or not they had allies. On the other hand, the veto, having been legalized by the Charter, can only benefit potential aggressors. It was not worth while establishing an international organization to achieve such a result. In their eagerness to defend the interests of the great Powers, the authors of the Charter forgot those of mankind. The veto is useful chiefly as a means to inaction, an attitude which may be desirable in some cases.”
1947-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 2 (1947)