YouSaid · the spoken record

Pearson

THE RECORD WRITES THIS SPEAKER AS PEARSON

lines on the record: 171
first: 1949-09-24
most recent: 1963-09-24
sittings or episodes: 6
sources: un-general-debate

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Our policies must be based on a sober weighing of facts, however unpalatable. But I for one am not prepared to abandon hope of negotiations within the United Nations to ease the present tension. The three Powers have made a serious proposal that we should begin discussions here and now for the reduction of armaments. We, in our delegation, support this proposal, but we know that one determining factor must be the attitude of the USSR. So I hope that this attitude, as stated by the representative of the USSR last Thursday, will be reconsidered, so that when we sit down in the First Committee to examine this question, the USSR delegation may be able to help us realize, rather than to laugh at, the deepest hopes of mankind. 110.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Of the five Governments which he suggests for this pact he damns three as aggressors, war-mongers, imperialist cliques and capitalist exploiters; but he would have us believe that a pact, a piece of paper, would change all that, restore confidence, produce cooperation and friendship. This kind of argument is an insult to our intelligence; but, of course, it is not meant for us. Once again the United Nations Assembly is used merely as an instrument for political warfare and debased for propaganda purposes. 108. I stress these depressing reflections which the USSR statement of last Thursday provokes, because none of us can escape the responsibility of assessing the attitudes and motivations of the Government of the USSR as realistically as possible, however grim the conclusions resulting from that assessment may be. 109.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Eden, in that great and moving speech which we listened to a few minutes ago, once again re-emphasized that fact, speaking as a representative of a country which did as much as any country to win the last war and is doing as much as any to prevent the next one. 106. The USSR proposal also calls for a general disarmament conference beginning not later than 1 June 1952. Why wait until June? What is this Assembly? It is itself a disarmament conference with a concrete proposal now before it; one which causes Mr. Vyshinsky only merriment. 107. Then, finally, the USSR representative again produces his five-Power peace pact. As Mr. Acheson said the other day, in the United Nations Charter we have a sixty-Power peace pact. Why does the USSR representative think that a new and more exclusive pact would do what the Charter does not do?”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“I should like to read the first paragraph of that proposal which is a follows [A/1944]: “The General Assembly declares participation in the aggressive Atlantic Bloc and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territory incompatible with membership of the United Nations.” 105. It is quite obvious that the USSR delegation does not expect to get much support for that. Even as propaganda it is not very impressive stuff. The whole world knows that the Atlantic Pact is a purely defensive arrangement, in strict accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. It will never become anything else. Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The United States Secretary of State, on behalf of the three Powers, made a serious, constructive and helpful proposal for the regulation, limitation and the balanced reduction of all forces and armaments together with the prohibition of atomic weapons. The first essential step in this process was to set up an international agency to go into every country, including the United States and the USSR, and secure complete information about every form of armed force and armament, including atom bombs. 104. What was Mr. Vyshinsky’s reply to this three-Power disarmament proposal? He could hardly sleep, he said, it made him laugh so much. It was so funny. It makes one wonder whether this pathetic merriment does not conceal an uneasy conscience. When he stopped laughing, Mr. Vyshinsky produced a really serious proposal of his own.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“In our debates and discussions some representatives, notably the Cominform representatives, adopt the strategy and even vocabulary of conflict and others feel it necessary to defend themselves against these tactics. Ideas and words are distorted as in war propaganda and lose their meaning., Peace is used merely as a slogan to divide and disarm the enemy. The victims of aggression, as in Korea, are denounced as aggressors. Dangerous courses are advocated in the name of nationalism, freedom, international law, order or of progress. In such an atmosphere how can our United Nations grow stronger? How, in fact, can it survive? 103. There was a depressing example last Thursday of the depths to which the debates of the United Nations General Assembly can now descend.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Unhappily the necessity forced on free States to protect themselves against the imperialism of the Soviet Union, using as its spear-head the weapon of international communism, has now become the mainspring of national policy. It has forced us into this cold war which now unfortunately colours every subject appearing in the United Nations agenda, whether the election of the chairman of a sub-committee or a resolution on disarmament. As a result,, the United Nations instead of devoting its energy to removing the causes of war and promoting economic and social well-being is now used all too much as an agency for gaining strength in the conflict which now rages and in, preparing for the far worse one which may come. 102.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Many of the States between the two blocs are what we now describe as “underdeveloped areas”. They are receiving a measure, indeed an increasing measure, of technical assistance from the United Nations and technical and economic aid from the various agencies in the free world, including that provided by the Colombo Plan which was set up through the initiative of the Commonwealth of Nations, membership in which my country is proud to play a part. 101. If only the burden of the defence programmes could be reduced a much larger measure of such technical assistance and aid for capital development could and would flow in a far greater stream into under-developed countries and territories.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Indeed, if we took this statement of the USSR representative on Thursday last at face value, it would show that the USSR Government has now decided to abandon the effort completely and to use the United Nations not for the removal of differences, but merely to vilify, to sneer at and to attack those with whom it disagrees. That, in turn, naturally produces a hardening on the other side until diplomatic negotiations of any kind become practically impossible. That is the real tragedy and the real danger of the present position. 100. Between those two blocs other States hover uneasily, form their own small groupings and pursue their own aims inside and outside the United Nations. Some of these aims are peaceful and legitimate but others have little to do with the principles of our Charter.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“As it disappears, we would be forced to rely more and more as a second best on limited and regional arrangements to protect the peace. Such a possibility must certainly be faced. There is no point in deceiving ourselves. The United Nations has great achievements to its credit and will have more, but the vision which once inspired such world-wide and such fervent hope has been dimmed by the dark clouds of political conflict between the great Powers. 99. International relations are now, in a very real and dangerous sense, centred on the conflict between two great blocs, facing each other in suspicion and animosity and fear, with the chasm between them growing wider, and the efforts to bridge that chasm apparently becoming less effective.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The result of that consideration may go far to show whether our Assembly, which now has the authority, will be able to use that authority more effectively against threats to the peace than the Security Council has recently been able to do. 98. If a powerful group in the Assembly opposes this development or if others stand aloof, then the United Nations may become little more than a forum for the expression of world opinion, and an instrument for the conciliation and negotiation of disputes, if any, which do not involve any major Power. Those are important functions, but if they are the only things we can do the whole character of our world organization is changed from the concept proclaimed at San Francisco, and collective security on a universal basis becomes a distant dream.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The action of the United Nations in Korea had to be hastily improvised. It has not even yet a broad enough basis of participation. It has demonstrated weaknesses as well as strength in our Organization. Above all, it has underlined the lesson that responsibilities must be accepted if privileges and powers are to be shared. For this reason, the report of the Collective Measures Committee,5 which was created at the last session [resolution 377 (V)] to study how collective action could most effectively be organized in future against an aggressor, will constitute one of the most important subjects for consideration at this session.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Our relations with the most powerful nation in the world are based on friendship, confidence and mutual respect; they are not, as in some parts of the world, the relations of master and servant. We in Canada occasionally do criticize frankly, but I hope always responsibly, the policies and attitudes of our friends to the south. This I think only reinforces the value of the support which, of our own free will, we give to the United States as, with the United Kingdom and France, she gives leadership to those countries which are trying to preserve the peace, uphold the principles and fulfil the purposes of the United Nations Charter. That is what we are doing today in Korea and thousands of Canadians, fighting there as soldiers of the United Nations, are proud to share in that high endeavour. 97.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Those who broke the peace have been held and driven back, and the lesson of their failure is there for all others to read who may be thinking of aggression. That, of course, is the reason why those others rail against the effectiveness of the United Nations action in Korea, and try to prove it is action by American war-mongers and aggressors. If you can believe that, you can believe anything, but no one believes it except those whose opinions are prefabricated in Moscow. 96. For what has been accomplished in Korea by the United Nations, we should pay a special tribute to the United States, which has carried so much of the burden and which for that reason has been the target for so much of the abuse. No country is closer to the United States geographically, or in any other way, than Canada.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“That fact itself disposes, among other things, of much of the Soviet Union’s familiar glorification of its desire to share its progress with others. How, for instance, can any State boast of its belief in peaceful coexistence and friendly international co-operation when it refuses to take any part whatever in the work of such useful, progressive bodies as the World Health Organization or the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ? 95. On the political side of our United Nations work there have been great achievements. The United Nations has shown in Korea what collective action under strong leadership can do to halt aggression. This demonstration of our collective will and our collective strength has inspired and strengthened the United Nations.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“In our disappointment over some other aspects of the United Nations work, we should not forget that fact. But even this social and humanitarian work is impeded and, indeed, often frustrated by political factors though it should be far above such considerations. 94. It is also held back by the fact that one great group of Powers, which never ceases to boast of its peaceful, humanitarian ideals or its technical advances and social development, is making practically no contribution to that work. Indeed the leader of that group of Powers, the USSR, has refused to participate in the work of a single one of the technical and specialized agencies created by the United Nations for social, economic and humanitarian purposes.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“One should not, of course, jump to the hasty conclusion that we are bankrupt, because we are not, but we are certainly losing some credit. The reply of Mr. Vyshinsky on Thursday afternoon to the statement of Mr. Acheson that morning showed in a dramatic way how far this wastage of assets has gone. 92. The United Nations remains our last best hope for peace but the emphasis, it seems to me, is shifting from best to last. We will have to stop that shift if our world Organization is to survive as an effective instrument to maintain peace and promote security. 93. On the credit side, much valuable though often unspectacular work in the social, economic and humanitarian field has been accomplished. The struggle against hunger and privation goes on and the United Nations is playing a gallant part in it.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“May I begin, as so many others have begun, by expressing the pleasure of my delegation at being once again in this lovely city of Paris, and in this great and hospitable country of France. I confess that our delegation did not support the move to transfer the sixth session of the General Assembly from New York to Paris, but our motives for not doing so will not, I am sure, be misunderstood by our French friends. They were certainly no reflection on the affection which we have in Canada for France, a mother country of the Canadian nation, but were dictated by considerations of that prudent economy which I understand is itself a notable French characteristic. 91. This general discussion provides the opportunity for an annual stocktaking of our world Organization. This year, not much comfort or hope results from that process.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“That blow has been warded off primarily because of the gallantry and courage of the South Korean, United States and British forces. The aggressor has been met on his own ground and on his own terms. Even from evil, however, there may sometimes come good; and the good that has come out of this aggression is the new vitality which has been given to the United Nations. Because of the way in which the challenge has been met, we may now begin to walk the road towards collective security, a road upon which we first set our foot in 1945, a road upon which we may now for the first time advance with vigour and with confidence, the only road which can lead to peace.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“For that purpose we have recruited in Canada a special force: a brigade group, trained and equipped by the Canadian Government for use on occasions when a United Nations appeal is made to which Canada must respond. 160. Our interest, clearly, in the United States proposal for establishing a United Nations force of national components is an obvious and immediate one. We accept that idea and we hope that it can be worked out in practice. But if this is to be done effectively, then every loyal Member of the United Nations must make its appropriate contribution to this new and great effort to put force behind peace and security. 161. The communist aggression in Korea was a blow struck at the very heart of the United Nations.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“As a result there never was any plan into which we could fit our collective security preparations. Consequently when the call came for help in Korea, my country and other countries, did not have at hand land forces earmarked and trained for United Nations use, which could be quickly thrown into that area. Canada was able, however, to send, without delay, naval and air help. We then set about determining how best we could contribute to United Nations forces on the ground. We felt that this was exactly the kind of situation for which Members of the United Nations were supposed to prepare under Article 43 of the Charter. We decided, therefore, that we would take this occasion to put ourselves in readiness not only to meet the appeal in Korea, but to fulfil similar commitments under the Charter in the future.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“We are particularly interested in that part of the United States proposal which would call upon Member States to hold forces in readiness for the use of the United Nations. Certainly the need for such forces was demonstrated by the emergency in Korea. Our own experience in Canada is a case in point. As early as 1946, the Canadian representative at the United Nations said that Canada was prepared to establish immediately its part of the forces referred to in Article 43 and that it would like the United Nations to tell it what military preparations it should make to fulfil its obligations under the Charter. But the Military Staff Committee, which was the agency in this case, was never permitted to function because of the obstructive tactics of the Soviet Union representative.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“On 1 August, there was an end to dramatic walk-outs and in their place we had a “walk-back,” which was equally dramatic because it showed how the United Nations had come to be regarded as a powerful instrument for peace even by those who disliked the peace that it was enforcing. 158. Now the spectre of the irresponsible and unprincipled use of the veto hangs over us once more, together with all the other devices for delay and frustration which have been used by communists all over the world to disrupt the activities of democratic bodies. In these circumstances, the Canadian delegation warmly welcomes the United States proposals, which will make it possible, in appropriate circumstances, to fall back upon the General Assembly as an instrument to express the determination of free peoples to resist aggression. 159.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“Another important step that we can take at this Assembly has already been suggested by the United States delegation in its valuable proposal for the strengthening of the General Assembly. It has always been the view of our delegation that the General Assembly should be a second line of defence for the security of Members of the United Nations when the Security Council is unable to act. 157. Fortunately, when the crisis came in Korea, the Security Council was able to act with speed and force. This decisiveness, made possible because of the fortuitous and temporary absence of the Soviet Union member, forced the Soviet Union Government into a hasty reconsideration of its determination never to sit in the Security Council with any Chinese representative except the one of its choice.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“If the Soviet Union delegation indicates by its readiness to accept this kind of definition, that atomic energy and disarmament negotiations might profitably be resumed, then I think that we should try once again to negotiate an agreement in this field that would be effective and would give us something more on which to base our common security than empty phrases and hypocritical gestures. If, however, the Soviet Union delegation refuses to accept some such definition of international control, then its draft resolution on peace and disarmament will be exposed for what it is — a propaganda manoeuvre designed for purposes far removed from ensuring peace and security. 156.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“One method of securing such clarification would be to introduce an amendment to the Soviet Union draft resolution by including at the appropriate places in that draft resolution some such words as the following: “By ‘strict international control’ is understood a system in which the inspection rights of the international control authority would include: “(a) The right of free access at all times to every atomic energy installation or plant of any kind whatever; and “(b) the right to search for undeclared atomic energy facilities wherever there can be reasonable grounds for believing, in the opinion of the international control authority, that they may exist.” 155. Such an amendment to the USSR draft resolution would, I suggest, act as the touchstone of its sincerity.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“The Canadian delegation has studied his remarks with the care which they deserve — and no doubt other delegations have also — but we are quite unable to determine whether the Soviet Union view of strict international control differs in the slightest degree from what has been previously put forward by the USSR representative, which has been shown to be quite inadequate and unsatisfactory. Therefore I suggest that before the Soviet Union draft resolution on disarmament comes to a vote at this General Assembly, we have the right to ask for a clarification of the USSR conception of international inspection and control as applied to the problem of atomic energy, and indeed to disarmament measures generally. 154.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“My delegation is first of all interested in establishing what precisely is meant by these far-flung proposals, and we think that there is one very simple and direct test of the sincerity of those who have made them. There is one clear question which, if it could be answered by the Soviet Union representative, would go far to resolve our doubts. What does he mean "when he says he is in favour of strict international control of atomic energy, or, indeed, of armaments generally? He used that phrase, “strict international control”, several times in the course of his statement to the General Assembly in introducing the resolution. He spoke at some length to the last session of the General Assembly on the same subject.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“The USSR draft resolution covers a lot of ground, a good deal of which we have been over before in previous sessions of the General Assembly. It speaks of the desirability of concluding a five-Power peace pact, of reducing the present armed forces of these five great Powers by one-third during 1950, that is, during the next three months; this is a transparently insincere and meaningless proposal. The resolution also urges the General Assembly to declare itself in favour of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control for the unconditional implementation of this prohibition. 153.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“This, I confess, would be much easier if we had not had a painfully disillusioning experience with a whole series of USSR resolutions in the past, couched in the most pacific terms, purporting to be contributions to the cause of peace which, on closer examination, have proved to be something else indeed. Nevertheless, the issues of the present time are too grave and the dangers are too acute for us to brush aside any proposal put forward in the name of peace. So we must apply to the Soviet Union proposal some touchstone which will enable us to see whether this is merely an echo of past performances or whether, within it, is to be found some firm ground for a step forward. For if we see the promise of even a short step in the direction of peace, we must not fail to take it. 152.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“It seems to us that the first practical step that we can take for peace is to put the security factor into the disarmament equation. We can disarm if — and only if — we are sure that in doing so we are not exposing our people to dangers from others who say they are disarming but are not doing so. If we are going to disarm ourselves, we must know — by seeing for ourselves and not merely by being told — that other people are disarming as well. We have, in fact, a right to continuous reassurance that the olive branch does not conceal 175 divisions. 151. It is with these considerations in mind that we are bound to examine the draft resolution which the Soviet Union Government has placed before the General Assembly on the subject of peace and disarmament. We should, of course, approach it in a constructive spirit and with an open mind.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“It is the peace that prevails in a state dominated by one party, one political faith, one group of self-perpetuating rulers, one prophet; it is the peace of the policeman and the gaol. 149. We want peace, but not that kind of peace. Nor will we be led by any number of plausible answers to manufactured questions, or by superficially impressive resolutions about the prevention of war, reduction of armaments, the banning of weapons, to put ourselves again in a position where this kind of dead peace can be imposed on us by dictators. It is for genuine peace, based on the absence of fear and the presence of friendship and co-operation, that we long. 150. Furthermore, we are anxious not only to talk about peace and to pass resolutions about it, but to do something about it.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“The present Soviet-sponsored peace propaganda is a tribute to the universal desire for peace which they would exploit for their own purposes. This is a dangerous course, dangerous even to those who hope to profit by it. For people, even the Russian people, deprived as they are of access to the truth about political events, cannot be deceived forever. The game of pinning the name of aggressor on the victims of aggression cannot continue indefinitely and the disillusionment of people who, in their political simplicity, are signing the so-called Stockholm Appeal, will, in the end, act as a boomerang against communist imperialism itself. For sooner or later it will become clear to all, as it is clear to most of us now, what kind of peace the Cominform has in mind.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“Those who fomented the Korean aggression must know now — if they did not know before — that their actions are running counter to the deepest and strongest trends of the age in which we are living. Today the peoples of the world, above all things, long for peace and security. I know that this is true of the populations of our free democracies, and I have little doubt that it is true also of the peoples of the Soviet Union and its associated States. The rulers of the USSR are well aware of this sentiment. It is one of the ironic tragedies of the present world situation that the Soviet Union Government, while pursuing policies of aggression, should be advertising itself as the champion of peace. It has been said that hypocrisy is the tribute of vice to virtue.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“Yet at this very time the Soviet Union delegation has the effrontery to produce in the Security Council resolutions condemning the United States Government for destruction and loss of life in Korea, when the Soviet Union delegation is well aware that, at a nod from the Kremlin, the North Korean aggressors would cease fighting and the bloodshed and suffering would be brought to an end. If the USSR Government were really in the least concerned about the sufferings of the Korean people, it has all along had it in its power, as it has at this moment, to bring to an end those sufferings which were caused in the first place by this communist adventure in aggression. 148.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“The countries of Asia and of the Western Pacific have made an outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations. I think we should now make sure that we gain full advantage of the judgment of these States in charting a course for the future in Korea in the difficult days ahead. 147. Meanwhile, the destruction of the homes of the Korean people and the inevitable casualties to the civilian population which occur when hand-to-hand fighting is going on in a great city, as it is today in Seoul, are bringing terrible hardships to that unhappy country.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“There has been some comment in the Press and elsewhere about the role which the Korean peninsula has historically played in invasions of the Asiatic mainland, so nothing must be done in Korea, as indeed nothing will be done, which holds the least suggestion that any Member of the United Nations has any purpose whatever in Korea other than to establish that country under the full sovereignty of its own people. 146. My fifth principle — and this is a principle which has just been enunciated by my friend, Mr. Lange — is that the free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing those methods of government.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“Thirdly, the Korean people — once peace has been restored — must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage. This, of course, means a Korea without foreign bases and free of foreign military domination. It means a Korea which will be responsible for its own defence within the framework of our collective security system. Above all, it means a Korea which will not be divided and disturbed by subversive communist elements directed from outside Korea. 145. The fourth principle should be that nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united, free Korea which carries any menace to Korea’s neighbours.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“It is our hope that the people of North Korea, having been forced into a perilous and disastrous venture by its communist rulers, will now itself repudiate these rulers and co-operate with the United Nations in bringing to Korea the peace and unity which its people desire. This is the time for the aggressors there to cease fire, to admit defeat. If they do, it may not even be necessary for United Nations forces in Korean territory to advance far beyond their present positions. The United Nations must, however, leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist aggressors of North Korea are not permitted to re-establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people. 144.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“In the first place, as we see it, the general objective of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies: a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people itself governs without interference from outside. This should be achieved by United Nations action and not through decisions reached by certain of its Members. 143. Secondly, the United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout its territory as the firm foundation for democratic institutions and free self-government.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“Events in South Korea, and United States and British soldiers fighting heroically, are rapidly demonstrating that aggression does not pay. It will soon be necessary for the United Nations to show with equal vigour and resourcefulness that it can deal with the problems of the post-aggression period in Korea. The political and economic life of that country must be established on a basis which will enable the Korean people to fulfil the destiny that has been promised to it. As hostilities draw to a close in Korea and the Assembly takes up its new responsibilities there, it seems to my delegation that certain specific principles should govern our decisions and that we should embody these principles at once in an Assembly resolution. 142. What are these principles?”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“The effect of the North Korean aggression within the United Nations itself has been to give overwhelming support to the Organization in this crisis of its existence. It has, however, demonstrated that, with very few exceptions, the Members were not in a position to make that support immediately effective. They were caught by surprise and unprepared to meet at once the demands of the situation. We have, I hope, learned the lesson of this experience. But we have also learned that the United Nations can act in response to a challenge — that it is no longer remote from reality, a mere international talking shop. A new impetus has been given to our world Organization and a new atmosphere has been generated in this Assembly of which we are all, I think, conscious. 141.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“This was not a coup d’état engineered by a minority as in Czechoslovakia, nor a regime imposed by an occupying force as in Romania. This was armed invasion. As such, it came as a shock to peace-loving nations. But it also acted as a stimulus to them. A swift and sudden assault on a peaceful nation had an obvious meaning for us all. Hence the speed and determination with which many of the free democracies, my own country included, have applied themselves to the task of jointly building up our defences against aggression. The countries which have felt obliged to take these steps in self-defence and to preserve the peace will not be deflected from their purpose by any specious manoeuvres designed to weaken and divide them, or to put them once again off guard. 140.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“We may hope, however, that the Chinese people, with their own age-old civilization, with their traditional wisdom and patience, will not walk into the trap. The consciousness of their own great undeveloped resources and the strength of their national feeling will make them justly apprehensive of being exploited by Soviet imperialism. 139. In Korea, where the Soviet army had been present in force and where a communist minority was established in power in part of the country, conditions seemed admirably suited for communist seizure of the whole country. This time, however, the attempt was more open and violent than usual, and this time it met with collective United Nations resistance. That is what makes the aggression in Korea stand out. Despite all propaganda camouflage, the fact that North Koreans invaded the Republic of Korea was clear.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“It is part of the theory of communism that the disruptions and dislocations of a post-war period give to a communist minority its best chance to seize power by force and maintain it by the terror and repression of the police state. Systematically, the forces of communist imperialism, in these last years, have been trying out these theories in the four corners of the world. In countries where they have been able to depend upon the direct support of the Soviet army, they have been successful. Only one country in which Soviet forces were actually present in the post-war period has been able to throw off the control of the Kremlin, and even that country now feels itself to be gravely menaced. Whether or not continental China will be brought into the orbit of this international conspiracy remains to be seen.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“During its brief history, the United Nations has existed under a shadow of fear, the fear that the problems arising out of one great war would resolve themselves not in a peace, but in a new war. As the fifth session of the Assembly opens, this danger has been brought nearer to us by the reality of warfare in Korea. Indeed, as we debate the issues of peace and war in this Assembly, men are fighting and dying in Korea under the flag of and for the cause of the United Nations. We pay tribute to their gallantry and their devotion. 138. This war in Korea is but the continuation by armed and open aggression of the policies that communist imperialism has been pursuing by other means in other places.”
1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)
“In spite of all obstacles, however, the task must be everlastingly continued. Only by so doing could there be maintained, in the minds and hearts of all peoples, faith in the United Nations as the best — possibly the only — hope for the prevention of a war, which, if allowed to occur, would engulf and destroy all mankind.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“If it did not, then its proposal did not achieve anything except, once again, in the field of propaganda. 143. The third proposal was an appeal to the Members of the United Nations — and especially to the permanent members of the Security Council — to settle differences peacefully. That specific obligation had already been assumed by all Member States by acceptance of the Charter. Furthermore, the inclusion of the words “the mighty popular movement… for peace and against the warmongers”, which had a peculiar meaning in the communist lexicon, seemed to bring that proposal also into the field of propaganda. 144. If the practice of introducing proposals for propaganda purposes persisted, the Assembly would find it difficult to make that contribution to peace which was so ardently desired.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“They were willing to accept that test; others would also be judged by their actions and not by their words. 140. That test could be applied, for instance, to the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by the delegation of the Soviet Union (226th meeting). 141. The first proposal, by singling out two Member States for condemnation as warmongers, was obviously intended for propaganda and not for peace. 142. The second laid down, as the condition for prohibition of atomic weapons, a system of adequate and rigid international control. The majority in the Assembly had already translated those words into express conditions which represented the requirements for effective control and prohibition. If the USSR accepted those conditions, progress could be made in that most vital matter.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The repetition of that charge did not make it true, especially when it was made by those who had already worked out a whole network of treaties and alliances in eastern Europe, only a few of which had been registered with the United Nations., 139. If and when the United Nations could organize effective arrangements few defence against aggression on a universal basis, all other alternative and second-best arrangements would have to be scrapped. In spite of all obstacles, all efforts should be directed to that end. Until it had been achieved, however, collective force, on a narrower front, should be put behind the will for peace. The actions of the North Atlantic nations would be the best proof that their intentions were not aggressive.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)