YouSaid · the spoken record
Bevin
THE RECORD WRITES THIS SPEAKER AS BEVIN
- lines on the record
- 127
- first
- 1948-09-24
- most recent
- 1950-09-24
- sittings or episodes
- 3
- sources
- un-general-debate
Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections
“Markos, in Greece, as long as he had been approved, had been a peace-lover. The fact that he was fighting with foreign assistance against the duly elected Government of his country had been quite irrelevant. Suddenly, however, he had ceased to be peace-loving. Yugoslavia had also been peace-loving as long as it had found favour, but had become a warmonger overnight. The Chinese Communists were so far peace-loving; so were the North Koreans. But at any moment they might cease to be peace-loving and become warmongers. Czechoslovakia had become peace-loving overnight, in February 1948. The world knew that Czechoslovakia, in all its history, had never been anything but peace-loving. “Peace-loving”, then, could be made a word of ill-omen, just as “warmongering” signified independence of Moscow. 27. There were many other verbal perversions.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It had sought to create in each of the democracies a group charged to attempt disintegration and destruction, while at the same time it kept its own doors tightly closed because it could not permit the truth from the outside world to reach its people. Not only was no one in that country permitted to entertain an opinion which was unacceptable to the Government, but, behind those closed doors, the Government was pursuing a policy designed to ensure that words, in the minds of the people of the Soviet Union, should have a meaning directly contrary to their meaning for the rest of the world. Thus peace was apparently peace only when it produced results approved by the Politburo. The possessors of independent opinions were labelled warmongers. That produced some curious results.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Could the Western Powers really be expected supinely to permit the development of that policy to lead to such results as had been seen in Czechoslovakia and in the other countries mentioned? If the USSR Government expected by such methods to convince the Western Powers of its sincerity, it was deluding itself. The Western Powers would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union; one step towards promoting confidence would be for the Government of that country not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. 26. No country had more successfully carried out its imperialistic policy under a new disguise than the USSR.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“In Hungary the freely elected Government had been undermined; in Poland no free elections had ever been allowed to take place, in spite, of the undertaking given at Potsdam. Finally, in the Assembly where the great democrat, Jan Masaryk, had been a familiar figure, a reference must be made to the disappearance of everything that he and his father and President Benes had stood for in Czechoslovakia. 24. If all that was the price of peace, then in Mr. Bevin’s view it was a very high one. Indeed, he would go further and ask whether it was really peace. 25. The Western Powers were fully aware of the USSR’s intention to use its agents and the Cominform to upset the economy and political structure of every Western Power. It could not be denied that that was the deliberate policy of the Government of the Soviet Union.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Only the determination of the Western Powers to combine to give effect to the principles of the United Nations in the face of that possible aggression had brought about a partial solution, of the problem, which unfortunately had not yet been satisfactorily settled. 23. Looking back over the previous years, and re-examining the policy pursued in Europe, the question arose whether any other course could have been followed by the Western Powers, Greece had been threatened. Mr. Vyshinsky had visited Romania, abolished the Government and installed another under the domination of his Government. Bulgarian independence had been destroyed and the opposition leaders liquidated.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“For a whole year they had proceeded together to feed two and a half million people by air communications rather than submit to USSR pressure. They had done everything possible to settle the problem, including bringing it before the Security Council. The then President of the Council, Mr. Bramuglia, together with his colleagues, had made great efforts to find a way out. The solution they had proposed had been accepted by the Western Powers but it had been vetoed in the Security Council by the USSR representative. In Mr. Bevin’s opinion, the actions of the Government of the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin had been designed to persuade the world that that Government was prepared to risk war rather than be denied its objective, which was the complete and illegal control of Berlin.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The Assembly should consider where the initial responsibility for precipitating the crisis in Berlin lay. It had not lain with the United States, France or the United Kingdom. The entire world had been thrown into a state of apprehension by the action of the Government of the USSR, which had sought to use its power of blockade to starve two and a half million people and to bring pressure on the other three Allies. It could hardly be claimed that that action was in keeping with the proposals submitted to the Assembly at its 226th meeting. No one had known the intentions of the Government of the Soviet Union, or what incident it had been trying to provoke. The other three Powers had displayed much patience.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Bevin asked all delegations to study the reply given to that proposed treaty by the Government of the Soviet Union and, by that reply, to test the sincerity of the proposals it had submitted to the Assembly at the 226th meeting. 21. Later, Mr. Marshall had brought forward his plan for the relief of Europe, and in London, in November 1947, had renewed his Government’s offer of a treaty of disarmament. Once again, Mr. Bevin asked students of international affairs to study impartially the proceedings of those negotiations and then decide where the danger to the world peace really lay. 22. Credit had. been claimed for the United Nations in the report of the Secretary-General for the settlement of the Berlin incident. That was perhaps an over-simplification.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It had been prepared, of course, to give full consideration to any other proposals that might be made on the subject. 19. Seven weeks had gone by, but the only response had been speeches similar to the one made by the USSR representative at the 226th meeting. That was not negotiation; that was not trying to find a solution; that was not doing business in international affairs. Ministers could not be expected to sit, week after week, month after month, simply to be abused and told that they were warmongers. 20. Prior to that meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Byrnes, then Secretary of State for the United States, had put forward a draft treaty, the provisions of which were designed to contain Germany for forty years, and so to eliminate any possible danger of war or of conflict between the Allies within that period. Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Bevin turned next to the question of Germany. It was a subject which had caused great concern during the third session of the Assembly and was still causing concern; it had a great bearing on the discussions which would take place during the current session. 18. The four great Powers had undertaken to bring about a peaceful Europe, and the United Kingdom Government had always striven to give effect to the undertaking. Before the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1947, it had given months of consideration to every facet of the situation in Germany. As a result, the United Kingdom delegation had placed before its colleagues on the Council of Foreign Ministers its proposals for a basis on which a peace treaty with Germany might be drawn up.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Bevin said he had made it clear, during the debate at the third session of the Assembly, that if it were found impossible to proceed on a universal basis, as had been hoped, an attempt must be made to proceed with those who would co-operate. That conclusion had been reached because so much remained to be done as a result of the war, and it had been proved to be true. 16. The North Atlantic Powers were a community. They had a similar civilization. They all adhered to the basic principles of liberty and democracy. They did not rely on secret police. They believed in government by the people and for the people, uncontrolled by any dictatorship. It was therefore a natural development that those Powers should come together, but they had taken care to come together within the framework of the United Nations. 17. Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Bevin would take the opportunity to deal with some of the reflections which Mr. Vyshinsky had made (226th meeting) upon the United Kingdom Government and other Governments in relation to the parts they had played in their foreign policies and in the promotion and conclusion of the Treaty of Brussels and the signature and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty. 14. The North Atlantic Treaty was one of the great events of history. The threatening language which had been used by Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech had been heard by the General Assembly year after year. It was a constant repetition of untruths, made in the hope that if they were reiterated often enough, someone would believe them. 15. Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“There had already been co-operation between the Italians and the Ethiopians in trade and development, and there was evidence that if such co-operation were allowed to grow naturally, the whole community would benefit. 11. With regard to Italian Somaliland, the United Kingdom maintained the proposal it had submitted in the First Committee during the second part of the third session. 12. Turning to the question of Tripolitania, Mr. Bevin wished once more to make it quite clear to the Assembly that the United Kingdom had no desire to remain in that territory. His Government as the occupying Power was prepared to do anything it could in helping to reach a solution. The interests of the local inhabitants must be given full consideration, and it was greatly to be hoped that there would be no delay in producing a solution to the problem. 13. Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“In order that internal affairs might be carried on, a local administration had been established. That did not in any way prejudice the Assembly in dealing with the problem. 10. With regard to Eritrea, Mr. Bevin said that it was the British Commonwealth which had liberated that country and Abyssinia. At the second part of the third session of the General Assembly, after full consideration and study, the United Kingdom had made clear its attitude towards that problem and, although it had given further study to the whole problem, its position in principle remained the same. The United Kingdom Government supported Ethiopia’s claim to Eritrea, except in regard to the Western Province. It was firmly convinced that, provided proper protection was assured to the Italian minority, a great step could be made towards peace in that area.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The report was impressive in its impartiality, as also for its solemn condemnation of the conduct of certain Governments. 8. The General Assembly would be called upon to deal with the question of the former Italian colonies. The colonies had been under military occupation since 1943 and failure to arrive at a settlement had been a great obstacle to their political and economic development. The United Kingdom had had to operate a military occupation under the terms of the Hague Convention, and it was unfair to the people living in those territories to handicap them further by failure to decide the issue. 9. During the war, at the time of the great fight of the desert-, when the United Kingdom had been almost alone, a solemn pledge had been made to the Senussi. That pledge must be honoured.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It was to be hoped that it would henceforth be left alone in peace and would be free to hold elections without interference. Mr. Bevin trusted that Greece would find it possible to be generous to those of its people who had been misled. 7. Greece had been a signatory to the five peace treaties signed in 1947. Unfortunately it still had no agreement with its neighbour, Albania. That little country had been used as a base for attacks on Greece. Mr. Bevin would urge Greece to settle, its differences with all its neighbours in a spirit of conciliation. In that connexion, the United Kingdom Government was indebted to the Members of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, whose report it had received and read. He would ask representatives to study chapter V of that report, which gave the conclusions of the Committee.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“The United Kingdom delegation was grateful to President Truman and his Government and to the Congress of the United States for the generous assistance which they had extended to Greece when its independence and integrity had been seriously threatened, as also for the timely help they had extended to Turkey when that country had been subjected to a war of nerves. 6. The efforts of the Greek people to maintain their free institutions, the sacrifices made by the Greek Army, the patience shown despite a flow of abusive language and propaganda, all evoked the same kind of admiration the United Kingdom had felt for Greece when, in the early days of the war, that country had faced the fascist hordes and when those who currently abused it had concluded a treaty of friendship with Hitler. Greece had paid a heavy price for liberty.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It was to the credit of the Assembly that it had made tremendous efforts, session after session, to try to reach a solution of the problem of Greece, and Mr. Bevin was convinced that the whole world realized that the promotion of civil war anywhere, or interference from outside, was contrary to all the principles of the United Nations. At the meetings of the Security Council in London in 1946 it had been made quite clear that Greece must be allowed to settle its own affairs and develop its own institutions in its own way.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Acheson had said (222nd meeting), the conscience of the world was developing, and it was realized that universal co-operation could and did produce better results than could be attained by merely waiting for world collapse. The United Kingdom was consciously planning, thinking and trying to work out schemes to avoid the devastating and blind operation of economic forces visiting doom upon the people. 5. One of the handicaps of the United Nations had been the refusal by certain Powers to abide loyally by its decisions, but in spite of that some achievements had been realized during the previous year. The United Kingdom was happy to be able to note some improvement in the situation in Greece.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Every step that had been proposed for the rehabilitation of the world, such as the Marshall Plan, any scheme devised to raise the standard of life throughout the world, such as that of assistance to underdeveloped countries, had met with virulent and abusive propaganda of the kind to which the world had become accustomed. 4. Sooner or later, however, people would learn that things were not inevitable in the world. The great slump of 1929 would not inevitably recur. Mr. Bevin was convinced that the prophets of disaster and doom would be disappointed. A large area of the world had learned to co-operate; it had profited by past experience and was consciously resorting to measures to counteract the operation of blind forces. As Mr.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Scarcely any problem which had been referred to the organs or to the subordinate agencies of the United Nations had-been approached or dealt with in an objective way. The hopes of the United Nations had been given a grave set-back by Mr. Molotov’s speech during the Assembly in 1946, in which he had described what he called the two tendencies. It had been clear, from that speech, that one section of the United Nations was firmly convinced that the non-communist area of the world was bound to fall victims to its own contradictions, that no genuine co-operation would be received from the USSR Government. That had been borne out by events.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“It had been confidently assumed that if the great Powers could, in spite of their widely differing economic systems, find a basis upon which they could co-operate, there would be a reasonable chance of succeeding in giving effect to that principle of universality. He had come to the current session with a slight hope that in the course of it the General Assembly might take a step forward in that direction. The speech the USSR representative had made at the 226th meeting, however, could scarcely be called encouraging or likely to help in the achievement of that objective. It must be remembered that unless there was a firm universal foundation based on understanding between the five great Powers, there was little chance of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the subordinate agencies proving effective. 3.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“Mr. Bevin recalled that in his speech to the General Assembly at the third session, he had made it clear that the United Kingdom was disappointed with the progress of the United Nations. He felt that it might yet recover its original spirit, but he was bound to point out that the apparent incompatibility existing between the great Powers had made it impossible to find a satisfactory basis for a world peace structure. It Was useless to nourish delusions; the facts must be faced. 2. The United Nations had been created to achieve universality. That had been the conception behind the League of Nations, but it had never been achieved.”
1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)
“There must be agreement with those with whom agreement was possible; work with those with whom work was possible; understanding and trust with those willing to enter into trust and understanding. It might be, after all, that if world government could not come as had been hoped, out of those very regional structures to which the nations might now turn there might yet grow that world government for which humanity yearned and for which it had been striving and struggling for so long.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“After the San Francisco Conference hopes had been high, and it had been felt that finally, with all the mistakes of the League of Nations as a thing of the past, a new instrument had been created which would avoid those same mistakes. It had been felt that the terrible experiences which the world had suffered would lead all statesmen to co-operate. Perhaps hopes had been set too high. Nevertheless, it was better to have difficulties now than to live in a fool’s paradise, and, when the critical moment came, have the instrument break. There might still be time to learn a way to provide means to overcome difficulties such as were now revealed. But, if it were found in the end that it was not possible to proceed on a world basis, as had been hoped, it would be necessary to proceed on a regional basis.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“He was neither a warmonger nor a pessimist. He still pinned his faith on the ordinary peoples of the world, who would not be deceived in the end by either dialectics or slogans. They might be confused for a time, but, in the end, the simpler folk would discern the truth. Perhaps that was the reason why so much of the truth was denied to so much of the world. Mr. Bevin urged that the common people should have all possible freedom of movement, freedom of information and contact, so that they could learn that among ordinary people in other countries, as well as in their own, there were no such things as aggressors. It was not the simple people who wanted to fight. It was not they who wanted to take other people’s homes and territories or who wanted to dominate.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“However, Britain claimed a right, on behalf of the people of Great Britain, to develop its State as it felt necessary and as it considered to be in the best interest of the well-being of its own people and in accordance with democratic traditions. If that could be conceded and understood by the five great Powers in the world, then a great deal of the cause of conflict could be removed and the East and West could live together. Mr. Bevin said that he had not been impressed by the attack on the United States of America. If the representatives of the USSR had any feeling for the simple people of Europe or of the world, if they had been animated by anything but an out-of-date, backward, unscientific doctrine, they would have been the first to applaud the great and unselfish contribution to world recovery that had been made.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“His Majesty’s Government was responsible for the safety of its people and must accept that responsibility. The representative of the United Kingdom then made another statement which he hoped would remove a great deal of apprehension. It was necessary, because so much had been said about communism and capitalism and social democracy and the rest, that the people were confused. He declared that no question was raised over the fact that the USSR was a communistic State. It was not the United Kingdom’s business; that was the USSR’s business. The United Kingdom could not object to the United States existing as a capitalist State. That was not its business.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“That was an old trick which had gone on through the years, as anyone knew who had studied history. Those who made accusations were generally creating a cloak for what they intended to do themselves. That was a very important consideration to keep in mind. Mr. Bevin, on behalf of his Government, solemnly declared that if the USSR Government was living in fear of any aggression by the United Kingdom on the territory of the Soviet Union, it might rest in peace. The United Kingdom would never indulge in any such aggression. On the other hand, if, having obtained an assured security in their own territory, the USSR then used the territory of other States and the people of other States to prepare attacks upon the United Kingdom, a very different situation would be created in which Great Britain could only look to its defence.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Had the disarming and the containing of Germany against aggression under a treaty for forty years been accomplished, what a feeling of confidence that would have given throughout Europe, and how every little State in Europe would have grown up and developed! But it had been refused because of the Lenin doctrine, because convulsions could not have followed if a solid basis of that character had been established between the four Powers. Further, in the development of the Western Union, Mr. Bevin had told Generalissimo Stalin in Moscow quite frankly that the United Kingdom would co-operate with its neighbours just as the Generalissimo had done — a policy about which the United Kingdom had made no complaint. The United Kingdom was co-operating with its friends. It was not suggesting an attack on anyone.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Such a thought had never entered the heads of those concerned. But he could give the assurance that it had been decided to build a union — a Western Union — which could stand on its own feet and rally its own people against any aggression that might be launched against it, from wherever it might come. Mr. Vyshinsky had referred to Germany. With regard to the German situation, the United Kingdom had desired — and desired now — a peace treaty for a united Germany, If the USSR Government really did fear a renewed German aggression, why did it turn down the proposal made by Mr. Byrnes of the United States for a four-Power treaty which was to have contained Germany for forty years? That proposal had been re-introduced at a subsequent meeting of the four Powers by Mr. Marshall, when he succeeded Mr. Byrnes.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States will be inevitable. That means that if the ruling class — the proletariat — wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by military organization also.» That quotation could be found in Generalissimo Stalin’s work entitled The Problems of Leninism. Could Mr. Vyshinsky wonder, therefore, that the United Kingdom was cautious about accepting at its face value his statement that the policy of the USSR was one of expanding and strengthening international co-operation with other States that did not think as it did? In that connexion, it had been said that the treaty the United Kingdom had made with France and the Benelux countries was directed against the Soviet Union. Mr. Bevin denied it.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Vyshinsky might say on the platform, by the Marxist- Leninist conception that there could be no final agreement with non-Communist States; was everything that the Soviet Union Government did to be regarded as tactics, and did it adhere to its given purpose, whatever it said in the process? The United Kingdom was entitled to ask that, because it was striving in the United Nations to clear the ground and to obtain the confidence upon which its actions could be based. In the writings of Lenin himself, it was said: «We are living not merely in a State, but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist States for a long time is unthinkable. One or other must triumph in the end.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Civil war must cease to be an instrument of foreign policy, and assassination and all the rest must be tabooed by everybody associated with the United Nations. All that kind of attack must cease, and it should not even be condoned for one minute. Otherwise, it would not be possible to regard with confidence any resolution which might be put forward. Mr. Bevin then addressed himself directly to the USSR delegation and declared that in all solemnity the United Kingdom did not know where it stood with regard to the USSR resolution. What was the motive that had actuated the resolution? Was it a compromise to get over a difficulty and then to go back again, because everything seemed to be motivated, notwithstanding what Mr.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“If a policy of security were built up correctly, the numbers of armies was a matter which settled itself automatically, and there would be no fear of anyone over-arming. It was too expensive, it was too costly, it was too silly, in view of the present economy and the demands of the people, to go on making munitions and arming people. A start should therefore be made with the Military Staff Committee. Then atomic energy should be considered. All weapons should be dealt with. All countries should be open to inspection. The world should be opened and light and knowledge let in; if it were known what others were doing, the question of physical arms would settle itself. Disarmament presupposed a cessation of the attacks upon national institutions and internal political affairs.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“But it was not going to be deceived by any specious resolutions. As a result of bitter experience, the United Kingdom believed that a feeling of security and confidence alone would lead to disarmament. It did not believe that the converse was true. Since Mr. Vyshinsky apparently took the opposite view, he should tell the facts about the armed forces of the USSR. It had been said that they now numbered between three and four millions. Before the war, they were nearer one million. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had run down almost to its pre-war position. The insecurity of the world had compelled the United Kingdom Government to arrest that downward movement. But where should disarmament begin? What was the basis on which to start? The basis of disarmament was collective security.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“But, nothing had occurred which gave any sense of assurance, either in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations or in the Atomic Energy Commission. The threat of the war of nerves hung over the nations in the activities of the Cominform and other associated bodies. Even in Paris, when there was a meeting to discuss the Marshall Plan objectively, there had been a threat that if it were held, it would be very bad for those concerned. All those things had contributed to uncertainty. To restore confidence now — and confidence was necessary — deeds, not words, were needed. If the deeds were shown and proof given of good faith, the United Kingdom would not be slow to enter into any rational discussion, provided it could expect a spirit of compromise and understanding for mutual interests.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“But in the United Kingdom the Labour Government, elected in 1945, had bent all its energies to complete economic rehabilitation. It could claim without boasting that no country in the world had submitted itself more willingly to voluntary discipline, nor made a greater collective contribution to restore its working life than the United Kingdom had done. But yet through no wish or fault of its own — and that was tragic — it had now been forced to turn from the work of reconstruction and to divert a part of its resources to the production of munitions, which had been virtually abandoned in 194 5. In its concern for the economic and social well-being of the people, the United Kingdom Government had come near to neglecting their safety, which it had been hoped might have been secure in the hands of the United Nations.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“In many parts of the world democratic institutions had been attacked through either the Cominform or the local Communists acting under direction. An onslaught had been made, directly and indirectly, on the rights of peoples and individuals. All were denounced as warmongers and as everything that was bad. And yet, when anything was done or said in return, a resolution was introduced into the General Assembly to stop the retaliation because it was offensive. It was the democracies who were the victims of the «cold war», waged almost ever since the Second World War ended. Mr. Bevin said he had already quoted the figures of the terrible war losses in the United Kingdom, and he acknowledged that terrible losses had occurred in other countries, including the USSR.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“The blame for the woes the Greeks had suffered could not be pinned on the United States and on the United Kingdom, who had merely been trying to assist the Greek people to reconstruct their own lives and defend their own country. All knew of the desire on the part of Greece’s northern neighbours for territorial aggrandizement at Greece’s expense; that had never been disguised. It could not be expected that those things would be forge ten. And if the « cold war » was to stop — and the United Kingdom had not been in it, except to defend itself — let those who started that war of nerves lift the finger and order it to be stopped. It would be stopped; and the stoppage would be of great benefit to the United Nations and to the world.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“With all the abuse about «monarcho-fascist governments», the poor people of Greece had never had a chance since the war ended; Greece had not had a moment’s respite either from its neighbours outside or from their accomplices within. The Greeks had been treated by the USSR and by their northern neighbours and friends as if Greece had been an enemy country and if ever a country fought for the Allies in the war Greece had done its share and deserved to be respected. The people of Greece now were unable to sleep in their beds at night with safety. They had been driven out of the villages. There were thousands of refugees.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Why should there be an attack upon the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans? Why should not the United Nations at least watch over — even if it could not fully protect — the inviolability of Greece’s frontiers? The Council of Foreign Ministers had had a right to assume, when the Balkan treaties had been decided and the agreements and treaties signed, that Greece’s frontiers would be inviolate; that there would be no interference with the internal life of Greece; that it would be left free by its northern neighbours to develop in its own way; that Greece would have its elections, develop parliamentary government and evolve the kind of life it wanted.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“It was difficult, if not impossible, to have any useful exchanges between Governments when there was not even a possibility of the normal contact between the individual citizens of the countries concerned. Mr. Vyshinsky had claimed that contacts between friendly nations of the West were all part of a «cold war» against the USSR. That, said Mr. Bevin, was utter nonsense. There had been a war of nerves, but it had not been instituted by the West. It had begun immediately hostilities ceased. What of the war of nerves on Turkey which had kept that country mobilized so long? Why the perpetual war of nerves involving actual fighting against the lawfully elected Greek Government and the valiant and sorely tried Greek people? The reason was known. It was that the Soviet spider wanted Greece within its web.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“The United Nations were invited to put their security in the pool with a nation which would not and was determined not to reveal to the world what it was doing. That looked like a proposal to the Assembly to induce the rest of the nations to disarm while the USSR maintained absolute secrecy about its own military strength and activities. . That was not a situation conducive to confidence or to collective security. For the people of the United Kingdom it was impossible to divorce the Government from the people. The Government was the people. It was unthinkable that Governments! should draw closer when the people were deliberately kept further apart.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Vyshinsky must forgive the United Kingdom if it was suspicious. His country was a sealed book; no one knew what was happening there. But in the United Kingdom there was a free Press; free access was open to the world. Mr. Vyshinsky could and did quote anything which appeared in print in the United Kingdom about what happened on that side and, in some cases, what did not happen. He had promoted three British subjects, of whom the country had scarcely heard before, to the great pre-eminence of being warmongers. One of them represented the very ancient place called Cambridge, and every student, every professor and everyone else in that University would wonder what that terrible man had been doing before Mr. Vyshinsky discovered him. But who could say what was happening inside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“Why should it be penalized for remaining in that community: a community of nations which had taken their place as original Member, of the United Nations? Such a criterion was not applied to any other country remaining in any other community. Yet Ceylon had been refused admission. The blocking of countries such as Ceylon, Ireland, Transjordan and Italy, for totally irrelevant reasons, produced an acute sense of frustration and, though perhaps not the most important, it was in some ways the most striking example of the exercise of a power which should only be used in the most solemn and exceptional cases. In the light of his comments about the USSR attitude to security, disarmament, atomic energy and the veto, Mr. Bevin asked in what spirit the latest proposals put forward by Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech should be regarded. Mr.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“It was difficult to see how the vital interests of any one great Power could in any way be affected if there were general agreement on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council not to employ their privileged veto so as to block the admission of any State which was found to be worthy of admission by the normal majority of members of the Security Council. Four of the five permanent members had already agreed to forego their privilege in that connexion; but still many States were penalized by the intransigeance of the fifth State. The most striking example was that of Ceylon. Ceylon was a State which had only recently emerged into independence but which, nevertheless, had elected to remain in that great and historic community of free nations which was the British Commonwealth.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“In some circumstances, therefore, it could be admitted that the veto was necessary and even useful. During the second part of the first session of the General Assembly in New York, at the end of 1946, the United Kingdom had recognized that it was unwise to try to amend the Charter so as to restrict or eliminate the veto, but rather to put forward a code of conduct in the light of which it should if necessary, be exercised. Could not the Organization even now progress along that path and gradually build up some system of case law based on precedents which would define the circumstances in which it was or was not proper to exercise the veto? The admission of new Members provided an example.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“That lack of co-operation, so obvious on those grave subjects to which he had referred, had almost never been absent at any level of international political activity. There had been, in that connexion, much discussion about the use of the veto. The United Kingdom Government had consistently held the view that where the vital interests of the countries were in question, the veto was not in itself an evil. It was the abuse of the veto which was the root of the trouble. In other words, that abuse was the most striking instance of the basic fact that progress was unobtainable unless a real attempt was made to regard the majority view as something to which individual views should in general defer, if it were not a question of life and death or of one party being put in a demonstrably difficult position.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)
“It was evident, for example, in the field of disarmament where, although certain progress had been made, work had reached a point where further progress did not seem likely. It was evident with regard to the Military Staff Committee, where the disagreement revealed, both as regards general principles and other matters, showed how remote the prospects of an early agreement were. Mr. Bevin wished to say, with all the solemnity at his disposal, that if the black fury, the incalculable disaster, of atomic war should fall upon the world, one Power alone, by refusing its co-operation in the control and development of those great new forces for the good of humanity, would be responsible for the evils which might be visited upon mankind.”
1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)