YouSaid · the spoken record

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lines on the record: 130
first: 1961-09-24
most recent: 1963-09-24
sittings or episodes: 3
sources: un-general-debate

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“K the Communist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, would be willing to convince the world of the excellence of their system by example and drop subversion backed by force, drop the exploitation of civil strife which was advertised in the communist doctrine, cease setting man against man, and co-operate with collective action instead of driving the coach and three horses through the whole fabric of co-operative efforts, then and only then would war really be able to fulfil the conditions and purposes of the Charter. So, as long as this doctrine persists, then even coexistence is made precarious and the United Nations itself is in danger. 99. I agree most profoundly with the President of the United States that the United Nations must be saved: whatever its faults, and heaven knows it has them, it is mankind's best hope of peace.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Action is blocked, tempers rise and the result at the end of the day is frustration in the Assembly, which is little if any less dangerous than the paralysis of the Security Council with which we began. I doubt whether anybody would seriously challenge the truth of this analysis. If ever there was a vicious circle, it is this. And what is the way out? 98. I have thought a great deal about this and whether there can be a compromise, but I come back to one solution and one only.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“It comes straight from the published documents of the eighty-one communist parties to the Moscow declaration of 1960. That is the threat to coexistence — the exploitation of civil strife wherever it is found, which is the advertised purpose of the Communist bloc. I am going to analyse the results upon the United Nations. 97. The Security Council is paralysed by the veto, which the Russians have now operated ninety-five times. The Assembly is therefore compelled to act by majority decision against the wishes of the Communist countries. The Communist countries riposte with new ideas to frustrate the will of the majority which they think is unjust or inimical to their interest, ideas such as the "troika". Therefore I come back to what I said before — where nations should be combining, they are in fact dividing.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The situation is bad now, but it would be far worse if it were thought that the United Nations could dictate in matters of internal politics. 95. Certain charges have been made against my country of bad faith toward the United Nations. I reject them absolutely. There is not one shred of evidence on which they can be based or by which they can be sustained. 96. I cannot deny that the United Nations and the Assembly are put in a horrid dilemma. The Nations ought to be able to combine to keep the peace. Why have they failed? There are two answers: because one-third of the world is dedicated to the destruction of the way of life of the other third and because one- third of the world has elevated to the status of dogma the exploitation of civil strife as a means to that end. I did not invent that.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Our reservation with respect to the use of force was due to this: we foresaw that if the United Nations was to provide the slightest basis for the charge that it was intervening in the internal politics of a country and backing one side against another, irreparable damage would be done to the United Nations itself and to its ability in the future to keep the peace. 94. I would ask any representative here to think of his own circumstances, and particularly the smell countries and also those countries where a lot of provincial autonomy is given and enjoyed. The United Nations cannot incur the charge, and must never incur the charge, of being able to interfere in the internal affairs of a country. The small countries would then come to fear the United Nations rather than to trust it.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Our support of the resolution of 21 February, it is true, was conditional. We made it a condition that foroe should not be used to impose a particular political pattern upon the Congolese nation. Now what was the reason for that reservation? It was not made because we differed with the Assembly of the United Nations about the objective. Its objective was a united Congo, and so was ours. Any influence that we may have had over the months in the Congo has been used to influence the Government of President Kasa-Vubu and his Prime Ministers and Mr. Tshombe in Elisabethville to come together.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“And we have paid out millions of dollars in support of this operation. Our troops were not detailed to take part, but, over and above the contribution which we paid toward the enterprise, we transported the troops that the United Nations wanted in our aircraft — constantly, over the months — which certainly ought not to have escaped the notice of the Foreign Minister of Ghana, because we carried a number of Commonwealth troops into the Congo to support the action of the United Nations. 92. We are strongly against mercenaries in the Congo. What did we do? We announced at once that if there were any British nationals in the Congo who attempted . to take part in the fighting on either side, they would lose their British passports. Did any other country do anything comparable to that? 93.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I think the Assembly still feels that the original action was justified, and indeed, through a series of resolutions culminating in the resolution of 21 February 1961, it added to the powers of the Secretary-General, because it decided that, in addition to force being used to repel external aggression, in the last resort force might be used in order to prevent those inside the Congo who were attempting to disrupt law and order from doing so. It is these instructions — of the resolution of 21 February, in particular — that Mr. Hammarskjold was doing his best to interpret and to apply. 91. The United Kingdom, from the very start, has backed the United Nations operation in the Congo to the full, I would invite anybody who doubts it to study the speeches made again and again by our permanent representative to the United Nations.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I remind the Assembly that the reason for the original intervention of the United Nations in the Congo was to prevent external interference designed to exploit conditions of civil war. At this time last year, the Assembly judged overwhelmingly that such external intervention must be stopped for, if it was not stopped, it would bring the independent life of a united Congo to an -2nd. That was the view of the great majority in face of the most dogged communist opposition.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I am very glad that my colleague from Liberia has just mentioned this matter — I think this is the first time it has been done — because the refusal of one or more countries to pay for collective action which has been approved by two-thirds of the Assembly is a serious weakness here. Unless every Member is willing to pay its share, as we shall realize when we come to the budget, we may find it fatal to the existence of the United Nations. 89. The second example of the use of United Nations forces to restrain aggression and interference and to keep law and order is vivid in our minds, and that is the enterprise in the Congo — again, one for which the Communist bloc does not pay and has never paid. 90.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“And, unless wars are to continue which will involve many countries, what other solution is there than establishing some peace-keeping machinery which in defined oases would entail the use of force? 88. So far, our experiments have been halting. There is the United Nations police force on the frontier between the United Arab Republic and Israel. I think the majority of the Assembly would feel that that has contributed to the stability of the area and reduced the danger of war. But — and it is a very big "but" — this force is not supported or sustained by the communist countries.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“If there is to be negotiation — and I profoundly hope that there is — then uninterrupted access to the city and absolute guarantees for the free life of the people must be part ol the settlement. 87. My third illustration of the penalty of departing from the precepts of the Charter brings me closer to the functioning of the United Nations itself and to the organization of collective security and peace-keeping machinery — and let us always remember that the purpose of peace-keeping machinery is to substitute an international machinery so that individual nations do not find it necessary to assert their own rights by their own power. The original conception of the authors of the Charter was that, in the case of a deliberate breach of the peace, the rest would combine against the aggressor.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Twenty-five per cent of the students who wanted to educate themselves came from East Berlin or East Germany into West Berlin or West Germany. Families that are on each side of the frontier are no longer able to meet. Between these people and the life of their choice the last section of the iron curtain has been dropped into place and the key has been turned. The wishes of these people ought to be ascertained by a free vote under international supervision. 86. The most persistent feature of United Nations activities has been the insistence on self-determination, and it is on that principle, in the end of the day, that the problem of Germany and Germany's future will have to be resolved. Meanwhile, there are two and one-half million free people with a passion to remain free.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“And so, while I pledge my country to negotiation, there are two things that we must secure. One is that the people of West Berlin are free to live the life which they have chosen for themselves, and the other is that there are absolute guarantees for that freedom. 85. I must say that the picture painted by my colleague, Mr, Gromyko, of life in West Germany and Berlin was grotesque. Before the crisis was engineered, life was smooth. But look at the dislocation brought about by the division of the city. On each side of the frontier there are people of equal attainments, at equal stages of cultural, economic and industrial 4evelopment. But there were 60,000 workers in employment, earning good money, who came every day from East Berlin into West Berlin.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But there are two aspects of this matter of Berlin which I think it is timely to bring to the notice of the Assembly. 83. The first involves a principle in which I would have thought that everybody in the Assembly has an almost personal interest. It is the principle of self- determination for East Germans and West Germans, for East Berliners and West Berliners. I thought that Mr Gromyko said yesterday — and he will correct me if I am wrong — that the principle of self-determination should not apply in this case, in the case of East Germany. Why not? Is there to be one principle for Asia and Africa and another for Europe, one rule for the British Commonwealth and another for the Russian Empire? I thought that, if a principle was anything, it was universal, 84.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I shall merely remind my colleagues in the Assembly that the Allies of the first war, Russia, France, the United States and the United Kingdom, assumed joint responsibility for the whole of Germany, including the whole city of Berlin, pending the signing of a treaty with a united Germany. That obligation was undertaken solemnly, finely and gladly between Allies. 81. It is certainly arguable that, after sixteen years, there may be a case for change. Bu twhen the contract has not run out — and this contract between us has not run out — then the change must be by consent. 82. Britain will spare no effort to find a basis for negotiation — I can pledge my country to that — and I think that, while we are seeking a basis for negotiation, probably the less said the better.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Without confidence there will not be disarmament. Therefore, I hope that the United States plan will be most carefully considered by the Soviet Union: that it will understand that when we talk of inspection no element of espionage is either talked about or threatened. On the contrary, our purpose is to produce confidence so that physical disarmament may proceed. 80. I turn now to my second illustration, the sanctity of treaties and agreements freely signed, and to the pertinent and typical example provided by the new crisis in Berlin. I shall retrace the history of this matter no more than. I did that of the nuclear talks.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Let us suppose that each side puts 500 aeroplanes into a bonfire. One can inspect such a bonfire, but one cannot, as I understand the Soviet position, inspect what is coming off the supply lines in the factory. How is one to know that the very next day another 500, or even 1,000, aeroplanes will not be produced to replace those that have been burnt? That is one of the difficulties that must be resolved, but it cannot be done by a mere statement of principle — much as one welcomes agreement upon these, because any agreement is better than none. 79. We must face the fact that inspection and control are at the crux of the whole matter, not for their own sake but because, when distrust has been so deep between the communist and free worlds as it has in the past, confidence is the essence of the matter.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But is no use hiding our heads in the sand: when the ostrich does that he not merely looks foolish but is extremely vulnerable. Over the years the difficulty has always been to translate the principles of disarmament into practice, the greatest problem being that of inspection. Yesterday the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union asked whether we accepted the principle of general and complete disarmament. It is one of the objectives named in the Western plan, but there are of course these difficulties of inspection, which I should like to illustrate in two rather telling ways, 78. First, the Soviet Union says that there must be no inspection until all arms are destroyed; that any inspection meanwhile amounts to espionage. Anyone can see how difficult that makes a programme of staged disarmament, yet what else can there be?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Happily, we have still a chance to do better. The President of the United States gave us,, in his address [1013th meeting], a stirring and practical lead in announcing his scheme for general and complete disarmament, the purpose of which was to desire the means of war. My Government fully supports and agrees with that scheme. We are glad, too, that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to agree upon the principles which should govern a disarmament treaty, I have compared those principles with the ones announced following the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth earlier this year and have found no substantial difference. It may be that, at long last, we can take the first halting steps along the road to sanity.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Very few points remained unsettled and the British and United States Governments came forward with proposals to meet the Soviet criticisms, to meet what we thought were legitimate Soviet wishes. Those proposals were never discussed. In place of discussion there came a string of sixteen nuclear explosions, with resultant fall-out all over the world. Those explosions took, of course, many months to prepare. In other words, while one side was negotiating in good faith the other was practising deception. How can there be confidence between nations, how can one hope for peaceful coexistence, under such conditions? I say quite straight to the Soviet Union this: that if this way of negotiating is not renounced by public example we are in for a very bad time — for the world simply cannot survive another example of such double dealing. 77.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I should like, taking one by one the points that the Soviet Foreign Minister made yesterday [1016th meeting], to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the organizing of collective security and, at once, the need to change coexistence into co-operation. My first illustration of the international anarchy that results from ignoring the precepts of the Charter is to be found in the negotiations on disarmament. Galvanized by the threat to humanity created by the exploding of nuclear bombs, and the resultant fall-out in the atmosphere, we at last looked like making a breakthrough in regard to disarmament, which we had been debating off and on for forty years. At last it seemed that we might find it possible to ban nuclear tests. I shall not recall the ingredients of the treaty which so nearly became fruitful in Geneva.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I shall return to that theme in a moment, but would say at once that the United Nations reflects the political divisions in the world: that it is this, and not the Charter of the United Nations, that needs reform. So long as the world is divided the United Nations can be no more than a shadow of what it ought to be. The Soviet Foreign Minister said that we must face this position — must face what he called "realities" — and therefore be content to coexist. I am not. I regard the doctrine of coexistence as the most sterile and negative conception of international life in the twentieth century. What is needed today is not mere coexistence but work towards positive and constructive action between all nations. 76.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The organization of collective security puts upon each nation an obligation to exercise a high degree of restraint. At the best of times that would not be easy. I am bound to confess that today it Is not possible to bring about complete collective security, Why is it impossible for the United Nations to keep the peace today? 75. The reason is that the world is divided by an ideological chasm which is far deeper-"-though the signs were there — than when the authors met to draw up the Charter. When one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of. the other one cannot have true collective security. You may try to establish collective security by majority vote and by action upon it, but immediately one- side speaks of such an intention collective action is condemned and frustrated by every trick in the political pack.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But, basically, there are three ways — and only three — in which we can have peaceful coexistence, The first is if we agree to settle all our disputes by negotiation. The second is if there is absolute respect for treaties and agreements, freely signed. The third is if we are willing to set up collective machinery to keep the peace if it is broken by deliberate intent. 74. Those plain statements ought to suffice. But I must take them further. It is necessary to say that negotiations must not be looked upon as a means for one side to gain victory over the other. Treaties must be kept not only in the spirit but in letter. And when there is an aggression, collective action must be supported by all the rest against the one who breaks the peace.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I have studied the Charter time and time again -- as no doubt other representatives in this room have done — to see whether the fault lies in the Charter. But I doubt if the most skilful draftsmen could improve upon the principles of international living which it expounds or upon the machinery which it lays down for putting those principles into practice. The more I look at the Charter, the more 1 find it a clear and unequivocal guide to sanity, to law and to order. I have no doubt that we should meet together to expand the Security Council and the other Councils of the United Nations in order to reflect the modern composition of the Assembly. Of course we should do that. We all know the reasons why we cannot. 73.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But the balance of power is not the complete safeguard of peace for which men have been searching. For rearmament, where one combination of countries feels bound to match the invention of the other, gains a kind of momentum of its own, and history has shown us how fatally easy it is for that to get out of hand. It is well to remind ourselves that the authors of the Charter saw only one answer to this problem and one remedy for it — namely, disarmament, and disarmament accompanied by collective machinery to keep the peace. 71. We are faced today with the stark choice of whether the civilized world is to live or die. I am bound to say that I see no other way in which we can live than to follow the principles and recommendations of the Charter. 72.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Over the whole hang the hooded clouds of the nuclear bombs which have lately been exploded in Asia and the Arctic. 69. We stand here professing our desire for peace but in fact we are mocked and disgraced by our own performance. 70. The problem which faces us is exactly the same as the problem which faced the authors of the Charter. It is how to deal with an abuse of power by one country or by a combination of countries. The classic answer for keeping the peace is the balance of power. It is true, I believe, that since the last war it has been the balance of power which has in fact kept the peace. It is true, too, that in a nuclear age it is more important than at any other time that no one side should gain an advantage over the other which would tempt an aggressor to act.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Many representatives who have spoken in this hall have reminded us that in 1945 fifty-one Members of the United Nations, sick and disillusioned by the folly and waste of the second world conflict, met together to draw up a Charter, the purpose of which was to save humanity from the scourge of war. Today we in the Assembly are double that number. We are sixteen years older. But would anyone say that we are wiser? The fact is that we have not lifted the scourge of war from humanity. On the contrary, what we have done is to invent weapons incomparably greater in their destructive capacity than anything the world has seen before. And, what is more, wherever one looks in the world today there are quarrels, wars and rumours of war. There is a scarcely a part of the world today that is free from strife.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“): I should like to say at the outset what a pleasure it is for me and my delegation to sit here under the Presidency of Mr. Mongi Slim. He and his country have supported the United Nations through thick and thin. He, personally, has all the qualities of heart, mind and character to enable him to preside over the proceedings of this Assembly. I am afraid that I cannot say that the omens indicate that he is going to have a very smooth time. Nevertheless, I am quite sure that all the delegations here will help him to support the authority of the Chair, thus enabling him to see our work through in a businesslike and harmonious fashion. 68.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)