YouSaid · the spoken record

HAMMADI

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314
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1975-09-24
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1982-09-24
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8
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un-general-debate

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  1. Iraq would like to emphasize from this rostrum a number of points previously declared by us on numerous occasions. First, Iraq is not responsible for the armed conflict with Iran to which past events have led; rather, it is the ruling authorities in Iran who bear the full responsibility. Secondly, Iraq is defending its legitimate right to sovereignty, honour and dignity, and is ready to make all the necessary sacrifices to defend those rights. Thirdly, Iran must realize that we shall not sacrifice the rights and interests of Iraq and the Arab nation as a whole. We shall oppose any attempt to interfere in our internal affairs, sovereignty and pan-Arab interests. Fourthly, Iraq realizes fully the importance of preserving international peace and security and world economic interests, in particular those relating to the flow of oil.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  2. If the ruling authorities in Iran do not really intend to expand at the expense of Arab national interests and if they honestly stand for the defence of those interests against the Zionist enemy, then we are entitled to wonder about the reasons for their retention of the three Arab islands, Abu Moussa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb, which Iran occupied in the time of the Shah. 106. In addition, if the Iranian Government really intends to co-operate fruitfully with its neighbours through the establishment of friendly and good-neighbourly relations, then why has it not fulfilled its obligations towards Iraq and the Arab nation, when all in the Arab world gave their blessing to the Iranian revolution when it occurred? 107.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  3. Thus, once again, Iraq was forced to exercise its right to preventive self-defence in accordance with international law, in order to repel aggression. 105. The existing Iraqi-Iranian armed conflict on which the eyes of the whole world are focused represents, as I have shown, an in dissociable component of an established Iranian policy. That policy has been practised by different Iranian Governments throughout history, irrespective of their declared intentions, against Iraq and the Arab nation. What I have shown the General Assembly of the developments that led to this conflict is fully corroborated by the statements of the various Iranian officials. We have already had occasion to reply to those statements in our letters, which have been distributed as documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  4. On 19 September it began to bombard with heavy artillery and bomber planes densely populated areas in Iraq, vital economic establishments, Iraqi and foreign incoming and outgoing vessels in the Shatt-al-Arab and the navigational channels in the river, as well as its approaches in the Arab Gulf. 104. In the face of these savage acts, my Government issued a statement warning the ruling authorities in Iran of the consequences of that escalation and the indiscriminate strikes which they had committed, putting the full responsibility upon those authorities. My Government also explained in that statement that the acts committed by Iran made it necessary to direct preventive strikes against Iranian military targets inside Iran with a view to protecting the safety, security and vital interests of Iraq.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  5. Having exhausted all the peaceful means of persuading Iran to heed its obligations, my Government was left with only one choice, namely, the exercise of self-defence for the purpose of restoring Iraq's sovereignty over the totality of its territory. 103. Despite the fact that my Government had declared through its highest officials that it did not wish to have any war with Iran, that it did not want to extend the conflict beyond the limits of the restoration of Iraq's legitimate rights of territorial sovereignty, and that Iraq did not have any territorial ambitions in Iran, the Iranian Government nevertheless escalated the conflict.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  6. This was done in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Algiers Agreement and article 4 of the Treaty on International Borders and Good-Neighbourly Relations of 1975, which was based on the Algiers Agreement. On that occasion Iraq called upon the Iranian authorities to accept the new situation and act rationally and wisely in view of the exercise by Iraq of its legitimate rights and full sovereignty in all its land territories and fluvial territory in Shatt-al-Arab, as was the case before the Algiers Agreement. 102. The Government of the Republic of Iraq was forced to take the measures I have just indicated since the ruling authorities in Iran persisted in gravely violating their inter-national obligations.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  7. In view of the continual Iranian violations of the Algiers Agreement of 1975 and the insistence upon the justification for those violations, which was made clear by the announcements of official Iranian circles to the effect that the Agreement was suspect, that did not meet Iran's interests and that Iran did not consider itself bound by it, it was established by the Government that the Iranian Government had violated the elements of the comprehensive settlement contained in the Algiers Agreement and that it had terminated it. Consequently, the Government of the Republic of Iraq decided to consider the Agreement and those following and based upon it as terminated on the part of Iraq after Iran had terminated them by word and deed.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  8. Secondly, the Iranian leadership had to realize that striking at cities populated by civilians, as it did in bombarding Khanaqin and Mendili, was neither a simple matter nor a game of violence of the sort with which the Iranian officials entertain themselves at times inside Iran. Striking at Iraqi cities is considered a grave matter which should be avoided by Iran, if it does not wish relations between the two countries to deteriorate dangerously. The rulers of Iran alone will bear the responsibility of those aggressive actions before God, the Iranian people and world public opinion. 99. Thirdly, Iraq has no ambition with regard to Iranian territories. 100. But all those diplomatic notes went unheeded, as we received no response to them. 101.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  9. He was handed a detailed note this time stating three points. 97. First, from our observation of Iranian conduct and reactions, we had reached various conclusions the first of which was that, because of the confusion in Iran and the disordered structure and information sources of the Iranian State, the Iranian leadership might not have been aware of the fact that Iran had encroached upon Iraqi territories in contravention of international law and past agreements between the two countries, including the Algiers Agreement of 1975. If this was so, we advised the Iranian leadership to ask the Iranian authorities responsible for matters of frontiers and agreements in order to ascertain our point of view and thus base its action on knowledge rather than myth. 98.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  10. In that note we stated that the Iraqi military forces, in the exercise of our legitimate right to self-defence, were forced to end the Iranian occupation of Zain Al Qaws and regain the occupied Iraqi territories. 96. In the note, the Government of the Republic of Iraq also expressed its hope that the Iranians would learn from that event and give back the Iraqi lands which Iran had encroached upon in previous times, as was agreed upon in the 1975 Treaty hence avoiding the possibility of wider confrontation between the two countries. But the following days witnessed concentrated military activities by the Iranian military forces inside the Iraqi territories that had been encroached upon. My Government found it necessary once again to call in the Iranian charge d'affaires to the Foreign Ministry on 11 September 1980.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  11. We called the charge d'affaires of the Iranian Embassy at Baghdad to the Foreign Ministry on that date and delivered a note to him. In it we stated that Iranian military units had encroached upon numerous areas of Iraqi territory as was the case, among others, in Zain Al Qaws, and that those encroachments had continued, contrary to the Frontier Treaty of 1975 between the two countries. We requested him to convey to his Government that it should immediately end those encroachments. But the Iranian forces continued their bombardments until nightfall of that day. On the following day, 8 September 1980, the Iranian charge d'affaires was again called in to the Foreign Ministry and we handed him another note.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  12. What I should like to mention now as an example is that during the period from June to September 1980, Iran committed 187 violations and military actions across the Iraqi frontiers against populated cities and villages, roads and border posts. 94. On 4 September 1980 a dangerous turning point in the chain of those violations occurred. The Iranian military forces used American-made heavy artillery of 175 mm. calibre to bombard the towns of Khanaqin and Mendili, causing thereby severe loss of life and damage to property. It is worth mentioning that that concentrated savage bombardment was carried out from the area of Zain Al Qaws which is situated between frontier pillars 46 and 51 deep inside Iraq's territory. 95. At noon on 7 September 1980, there was again the same savage bombardment.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  13. In order to give an idea of the number of those violations, we have distributed to the delegations of Member States a brief account of a sample of the violations and a map indicating Iranian encroachments on our land frontiers—frontiers that were delimited clearly and drawn jointly on the new maps by the two parties, and re-demarcated on the land by building anew the old frontier pillars of 1913, which number 126, and the new additional pillars, which number 593, established in 1975. We shall also distribute a detailed study with maps on the evolution of the legal regime of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier since 1520. 93.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  14. In many Iraqi towns, acts of murder, sabotage and poisoning of water and fishery resources were committed with the support of the Iranian Government. The situation was not limited to such activity. The Iranian acts went further to instigate trouble, sectarian and religious dissension and the commission of acts of plunder in the border areas by groups called "revolutionary guards". 92. It is worth emphasizing that the Government of Iraq addressed numerous diplomatic notes to the Iranian Government through its embassy at Baghdad. In those notes, all the Iranian violations regarding the matters I have mentioned were clearly stated.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  15. It was later established that the new regime in Iran had been harbouring those contrary intentions since the first days of its assumption of power. The Iranian regime recalled to Iran from the United States the leaders of the rebel faction of Barzani, his sons and followers. After the death of Barzani his sons and followers returned to Iran, where they were granted refuge, assistance and permission to use Iranian territory as a base of operations for threatening Iraq and interfering with its internal security and national integrity. 91. Moreover, the Iranian Government has never ceased harming the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries. It facilitated acts of infiltration of a subversive nature.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  16. Iraq pursued all possible avenues with genuine good will to establish relations with the new regime in Iran with a view to achieving fruitful co-operation in all fields. Iraq expressed this sincere intention through Iraqi official statements and through diplomatic channels. 90. But the actual state of affairs indicated that the sincere effort that Iraq was making was being met by contrary intentions which did not preserve the basis that permitted the two countries to establish good and fruitful relations. Moreover, the relations between the two countries were marred by an intentional act on the part of the new authorities in Iran, which aimed at the disruption of the existing relations between the two countries and which dangerously aggravated the situation.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  17. Iraq saw that event as a welcome sign, because it ended a regime whose policies were based on aggression and interference in the internal affairs of others and in particular of Iraq and the Arab homeland. 88. Iraq presented through its President its felicitations to the Iranian peoples, expressing the hope that the new republican regime would work actively for the maintenance of Iran's role in the service of peace and justice in the world and the forging of the strongest relations of friendship and good-neighbourliness with the Arab countries in general and with Iraq in particular. When the new regime in Iran announced its willingness to have Iran join the non-aligned movement, Iraq was the first country to bless that move and declared its welcome to and support for Iran's application to the membership of the movement. 89.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  18. What follows logically from that Agreement is that in implementing it the two parties should have achieved the balanced gains that they had agreed upon. But what happened in fact was that Iran achieved a direct and instant gain as soon as the Algiers Agreement entered into force. Iran's position on the Shatt-al-Arab became that of a partner in sovereignty over a large part of the river on the basis of the new delimitation of the frontier line therein on the basis of the thalweg. As against that, Iran agreed to give up the Iraqi lands which it had previously encroached upon and to stop its support for the secessionist Barzani. 87. Then, the new regime in Iran came to power.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  19. In 1975, however, when the late President of Algeria, Houari Boumediene, took the initiative of communicating with Iraq and Iran and suggesting direct negotiations between them in Algiers regarding all their differences, Iraq agreed to that initiative in the interests of preserving Iraq's security and national unity. Those negotiations met with success and resulted in the conclusion on 6 March 1975 of the Algiers Agreement, which represented a settlement. The political and juridical aspects were balanced in the agreement in a manner that made the impairment of any element thereof a violation of that balance and a reason for the total failure of the agreement. That was explicitly provided in paragraph 4 of the Agreement. 86.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  20. We were inspired by the honour of Iraq and the duty to defend the unity of our homeland. Our people made all the sacrifices required by the battle. 84. The military situation reached a dangerous point when the Shah advanced his military forces on numerous occasions to fight directly against our forces on various fronts with a view to supporting the military position of the agent rebellion. The situation reached a more dangerous level in relation to Iraq's capability when we were surprised by the October war of 1973, in which Iraq had inevitably to participate in consonance with its pan-Arab position and responsibilities. 85.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  21. He began to exercise a direct role in the field in order to dismember Iraq. 83. The Shah's support for the secessionist rebellion was limitless. He provided the reactionary leadership of the rebellion with huge quantities of modern and sophisticated armaments and put at its disposal all kinds of facilities— material, military and political, including the services of his advanced information system. In that respect, the Shah was like Israel, whose Prime Minister declared on 29 September 1980, as reported in The New York Times of the same day, that it had provided Barzani with weapons, equipment and instructors and provided the rebels with training from 1965 to 1975. Iraq, with its devoted sons from all sects, religions and national minorities, fought a vicious conflict against that agent clique and those who stood behind it.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  22. When that demand was met by Iraq's refusal, the Shah unilaterally terminated the Boundary Treaty of 1937. Then, in order to achieve his political aims and territorial demands, the Shah began to exert military pressure, directly and indirectly, thus abandoning the traditional means he had followed in the past to achieve his ambitions. He thought that by military means he could ensure the achievement of his expansionist aims and ambitions. So Iran committed its armed aggression against Iraqi border areas in central and southern Iraq in 1974, regarding which Iraq brought a complaint against Iran before the Security Council. A more dangerous step was exemplified by the broad co-operation which the Shah initiated with the reactionary secessionist rebellion in northern Iraq.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  23. This began with a propaganda campaign in various forms, which was escalated to a political crisis coupled with a consistent and continuous policy of interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, whether through the exportation of plots or the backing of rebellion. 82. The Shah at first began to consolidate Iran's territorial encroachments upon Iraq's land frontiers. Iranian border posts were pushed forward inside Iraqi territory and roads were opened between them in such a way as to include large areas of Iraqi lands inside Iran. All that was done with the support of military forces in order to impose those encroachments by force. Then the Shah began to demand changes in the frontier of the Shatt-al-Arab, contrary to the legal situation then prevailing.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  24. Iraq and the Arab nation were regarded as a sphere of influence for the expansionist plans of Iranian interests. That policy has been followed throughout history by the "Persian State" against its neighbours. 80. When the revolution of 17 July 1968 took place in Iraq, Iraqi-Iranian relations experienced two rival phenomena. On the one hand, the Shah of Iran was being prepared, with great assistance from the West and in particular from the United States of America, to play the role of policeman in the region. On the other hand, the new regime in Iraq was struggling to build up a new society and for the consolidation of national independence. 81. Thus the Iranian regime found its policy of exerting pressure on others met with resistance from Iraq and it was consequently necessary to destabilize Iraq.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  25. In this connection, while Iraq has fully understood its international responsibility, at the same time it has not lost sight of its national sovereignty and pan-Arab duties as a part of the Arab nation. 78. The relations of Iraq with Iran have reached a grave crisis point because of the policies of successive regimes in Iran which have considered Iraq and the Arab homeland, particularly the Arab Gulf area, as a sphere for domination. 79. Those policies have been expressed in different forms appropriate to the particular exigencies of the time. During the rule of the Shah, arrogance, aggression, territorial expansion at the expense of others and attempts to harm Iraq's national sovereignty and the inalienable rights of the Arab nation were a constant pattern.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  26. In order to avoid this phenomenon, which has often led to tension and crisis, it is imperative to found international co-operation on rules that aim at the achievement of common interests within the framework of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. That is particularly true in the case of neighbouring States because the geographical reality imposes upon them a policy of good-neighbourliness. 77. In its relations with Iran, Iraq has adhered firmly to that policy, which is based on a number of realities that arise from the historical and religious ties between the peoples of Iraq and Iran. Our policy has always been and still is favourable to any factor that strengthens the relations between the two countries, avoids the outbreak of crisis and takes account of common interests.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  27. Iraq has been one of the staunchest adherents of the policy of non-alignment, which is based on the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the national sovereignty of all States and the preservation of peace and security in the world. In addition, our foreign policy does not tolerate any interference in the independence of Iraq and the Arab countries, or in our sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal affairs in any form, of any origin or on any pretext whatsoever. In adhering to these principles in its non-aligned foreign policy, Iraq proceeds from a profound need and a long national and pan-Arab experience in this regard. 76. Any disequilibrium in the bases of balance in State relations would certainly impair the rights and sovereignty of one side in favour of another.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  28. On behalf of the Iraqi delegation, I should like to express to you, Mr. President, our congratulations on your election to the presidency of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. I am convinced that thanks to your wisdom and great competence, at this session the Assembly will achieve fruitful and constructive results. 74. I should also like to express our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, who carried out his duties with excellent ability and competence during the thirty-fourth session, as well as during the sixth and seventh emergency special sessions and the eleventh special session. 75.

    1980-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 35 (1980)

  29. The position of Iraq on all the subjects included in the agenda of this session is well known and I shall refrain from repeating it at this time in order to save the time of the Assembly. Our delegation will, as usual, present our views and positions during the deliberations of the Main Committees and in the Assembly's plenary meetings when we discuss various items on the agenda.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  30. We wish to reiterate our firm position that, whether inside the United Nations or elsewhere, the problems of energy should be approached within a comprehensive framework designed to tackle all the principal problems of international economy as decided at the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly in the context of the new international economic order. 334. All attempts to use the energy problem in order to divide the ranks of the developing countries have thus far met with failure, because the developing countries have maintained their unity and their determination to adopt a comprehensive approach in all discussion of the international economy. We have no doubt that the new wave of proposals will meet the same fate. 335.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  31. With a sense of responsibility, Iraq took the initiative of proposing the establishment of an international fund to assist the developing countries in facing the effects of inflation, a fund to which the industrialized countries, regardless of their systems, would contribute annually the equivalent of the inflation which they export to the developing countries. The members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries would also contribute to the fund on the same basis. 333. Proposals from various quarters are made from time to time calling for the consideration of the energy problems in isolation from other important issues.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  32. Iraq fully supports the liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe and the front-line African States in their just struggle to attain this goal which the United Nations has advocated for so long. 332. Western imperialist circles continue to conduct a well-planned and vicious campaign in a vain attempt to blame certain petroleum-exporting developing countries for the economic problems besetting the capitalist countries. These same circles do not hesitate to blame the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for the imported inflation of the developing countries, notwithstanding all the available evidence and statistics to the contrary.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  33. The Conference deepened the progressive character of non-alignment and adopted firm and clear positions against colonialism, imperialism, racism, including Zionism, and all other forms of foreign domination. Iraq, which considers non-alignment the cornerstone of its foreign policy, is contributing actively and constructively to support the movement at all levels and is looking forward to 1982, when it will play host to the next summit conference of non-aligned countries. 331. Among the most important goals and principles of the non-aligned movement are total support for and assistance to the liberation movements in southern Africa in their final efforts to put an end to colonialism and racism in the continent.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  34. World Zionism and those supporting it, particularly the United States, will bear the responsibility for the dire consequences in all spheres of the collapse of peace and the outbreak of war. We will never accept capitulation, whatever the price. The peoples of the world and peace- loving States should discharge their responsibilities before it is too late. 330. Iraq fully supports the non-aligned movement and is working actively to increase its role and effectiveness and its march toward the establishment of a new system of political and economic relations in the world. The great success of the Sixth Conference of the movement in Havana is a source of deep gratification for us.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  35. It has provided and continues to provide all help it can to the Palestinian people in the struggle against the Zionist invasion. Despite all the Zionist and the imperialist attempts directed against our Arab nation, our struggle will continue and grow in strength until our just goals are attained and our usurped rights are restored. The Arab nation will not be deflected from this course by treaties and schemes concocted to the exclusion of the people directly concerned, with the aim of usurping their rights and liquidating their cause. In the event of the outbreak of war and the collapse of peace in our region, the Arab nation can never be held responsible, because we are defending our legitimate rights, our land, our very existence and our civilization.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  36. The Arab Kings and Presidents at the Ninth Arab Summit Conference, as well as the meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States in Baghdad at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Economy, declared their categorical rejection of these agreements. They condemned the Egyptian regime, the Zionist entity and the United States, and decided not to deal with those agreements and to reject all their political, economic, legal and other consequences. Today, this international Organization is called upon to stand firmly against all attempts to involve it in the implementation of unjust provisions which the United Nations had no role in formulating. 329. Iraq has always considered the Palestinian question to be the central and pivotal question in its foreign policy.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  37. This constitutes a clear denial of the role of the Organization and an intentional disregard of its resolutions, although the Organization has been playing a central role in this question. Today, our Organization is asked to act as a witness and a party to schemes and conspiracies perpetrated by Zionism and United States imperialism against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. 328. The Arab nation rejected from the outset the Camp David agreements. It also vehemently rejected the unilateral peace treaty and considered it to be an aggression causing great harm to the rights and interests of the Arab nation.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  38. We warn against any attempts to give international legitimacy to that unjust treaty, which ignores all the United Nations resolutions relating to the Palestinian question and the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, such as their right to regain their homeland, their right to self-determination, the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Arab territories without any gains, and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. All the contacts and consultations between Egypt and the Zionist entity with the support of the United States have been held outside the framework of the United Nations and not within it.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  39. Lastly, the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries decided by consensus to condemn the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, The Conference also referred the question of suspension of Egypt's membership in the movement to the Co-ordinating Bureau—in its capacity as a special committee—to examine the damages caused by the Egyptian Government to the Arab nation and the Palestinian people, and to present a report to the Foreign Ministers of the movement in 1981, when a decision will be taken regarding the status of Egypt in the movement. 327. Ever since the signing of the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, attempts have been made to involve the United Nations, in one way or another, in their implementation.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  40. We wish to recall that the Arab States, as represented by the League of Arab States, vehemently rejected those agreements in their entirety during the meeting of the League Council in Baghdad from 27 to 31 March 1979. The same position was taken by the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers convened at Fez from 8 to 12 May 1979 and the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned States in Colombo from 4 to 9 June 1979. 326.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  41. The tragedy in southern Lebanon and the daily open aggression, death and destruction against civilian targets and the Lebanese and Palestinian population constitute irrefutable evidence of the insistence of Israel on its expansionist aggression against the Arab nation with the full support of the United States. We are now witnessing the most modern United States F-15 planes making daily raids against our defenceless people in Lebanon and hurling death and destruction at them. Where is the peace which the Zionist circles and their allies are persistently proclaiming? 325. We call upon the United Nations to reject and condemn those agreements, which totally flout the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the years on the Palestine question and the situation in the Middle East.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  42. In fact, the size of the United States naval presence in the region has recently increased. The escalation of the United States military presence in the region has as its aim the strengthening of ties and cooperation with the racist regimes in southern Africa and the creation of an axis between those regimes and Egypt and Israel in order to suppress the national liberation movements and protect United States imperialist interests. 324. It has become clear, particularly since the signing of the separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the signing of the Camp David agreements, that the aim of all these agreements is to heighten tension in the region and impose capitulation on the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and not the reverse.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  43. In other words, Sadat made it clear that he wanted Egypt to be an alternative to Iran but on a more massive scale than Iran during the days of the Shah. 323. Cairo was visited by numerous United States military delegations for this purpose in order to work out the details of the large-scale shipment of military hardware to be received by Egypt from the United States as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peaceful settlement. How can one reconcile a peaceful settlement with the United States weapons transactions which have begun to threaten the security of the Arab and African countries? The United States leaders do not hesitate to issue open threats to the effect that they are prepared to use force in the Arab area, and especially in the Arabian Gulf, if their interests are exposed to ' danger.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  44. Those sources affirmed that the Egyptian President requested 300 F-16 fighter-bombers, hundreds of tanks and missiles, and thousands of military personnel carriers and trucks. In return, Sadat would undertake to ensure the stability of the area extending between Algeria and Afghanistan and from the Mediterranean to Somalia. Sadat stressed that he would not use those weapons in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Should the United States respond to Egypt's request, Sadat would contribute to the establishment of a military balance in the Middle East through Egypt's force and distribute the Soviet weapons in Egypt's possession among the small friendly States in the Middle East and Africa. The United States sources added that Sadat's thinking was for him to be the policeman of the area and for his role to extend beyond his near neighbours.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  45. If the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is really a treaty of peace, why is there a continuous flow of United States weapons, more highly sophisticated than ever before, to the Israeli military establishment in larger quantities than ever before? The requests of the Egyptian regime for United States military weapons expose the area to the dangers of a new war and leave the door wide open for United States military presence and an escalation of tension in the Middle East. 322. The United States press reported that Sadat had expressed his willingness to play a major military role in support of the West if he were provided by the United States with modern weapons worth billions of dollars. Responsible United States sources said that Sadat had made this offer to United States Secretary of Defence Harold Brown during a long meeting between the two.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  46. The Camp David agreements and the separate treaty, as well as the exchange of letters that accompanied the treaty, contradict United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem, since those letters confirmed Israel's control over Arab Jerusalem, which the Zionist leaders stress will remain for ever the capital of Israel. Those separate agreements also violate the resolutions of the General Assembly on the right of those Palestinians who have left their lands since 1948 as a result of the Zionist aggression, which has continued through the 1967 aggression. These agreements give Israel the right of veto on the return of the Palestinians who left the occupied territories in 1967. The rights of the Palestinians who were the victims of Zionist aggression in 1948 were totally ignored. 321.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  47. On this matter, the Zionist leaders have always insisted on the fact that this constituted nothing more than a limited, local administrative government relating to the people, and not to the land. 319. The pressures on the Palestinian people to force them to accept the formula of autonomy, which were created by the treaty of capitulation and continue with the support of the United States, violate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to their inalienable rights which have been recognized by the General Assembly in numerous resolutions. 320.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  48. in the event of conflict between the obligations of the parties under the present treaty and any of their Other obligations, the obligations under this treaty will be binding and implemented." This provision nullifies any obligations undertaken by the Egyptian Government in support of the Palestinian cause in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations and of the non-aligned movement. The Egyptian Government did not stop at withdrawing its support from this issue of the destiny of the Palestinians under the agreement, but it also took it upon itself to speak and negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians regarding the autonomy formula proposed by Israel, which had been categorically rejected by the Palestinian people.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  49. Notwithstanding the fact that this treaty is a bilateral agreement, its effects on the Palestinian question, the Arab world and the international community are grave indeed. The treaty is in essence a tripartite alliance which basically contradicts the United Nations resolutions on the Palestinian question and runs counter to the interests of the Arab Palestinian people and the interests of all Arab States. Its aim is well-known to all since the Camp David agreements set up its framework with the goal of perpetuating Zionist occupation, liquidating the Palestinian question and imposing domination on the Arab States. 318. Article VI, paragraph 5, of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty provides that: " . . .

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)

  50. In this context I wish to refer to agenda item 121, entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", proposed by our delegation this year in document A/34/142, which reflects the mounting Zionist expansionist attempts to impose capitulation on the Arab nation through the use of every method of terror and blackmail, including nuclear blackmail. I trust that this question will receive the attention it merits from the General Assembly at its current session. 317. The Zionist schemes for imposing occupation and capitulation on the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, with full support from United States imperialism, culminated in the signing of a separate peace treaty on 26 March 1979 between the Egyptian Government and the Zionist entity.

    1979-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 34 (1979)