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1949-09-24
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1973-09-24
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un-general-debate

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  1. By standing steadfast against such a course the international community will promote an eventual understanding of the need to pass from two decades of war to new vistas of peace. The firm attitude of the General Assembly at its last session may have set some realistic tendencies afoot. It would be tragic if a loss of patience or an unconsidered change of position were to prevent them from coming to maturity. 151. In the forthcoming debate on the Middle East situation we shall make further proposals on the international and humanitarian aspects of the current crisis. It is deplorable that the Jordanian Government, whose warlike decision on 5 June provoked the journey of refugees from the west to the east bank of the Jordan, should now be using their plight as an instrument of political warfare.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  2. The conclusion is plain. Arab policy can be simply defined. The aim is to secure Israel's withdrawal by political pressure while refusing any commitment to peace; and thereafter to be free to resume, in more advantageous conditions, and with the aid of new Soviet arms, the attempt at Israel's annihilation which was mounted but frustrated three months ago. That is what current Arab policy is. Everybody in this hall knows this to be true. That the United Nations cannot co-operate with this policy or do anything to encourage it should lie beyond doubt. To ask Israel to exchange security for vulnerability and to put itself in the position most convenient for the next Arab assault would be to violate international prudence and common human morality.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  3. An ominous interpretation of the Khartoum decisions emerges from the article published last week by Mohamed Hassanein Heikel, the leading spokesman of Egyptian policy, in which he said that: "The door to political action in dealing with the immediate stage of the Arab struggle is not closed, but there will be no peace or negotiations with Israel." He went on to say that: "The door to military action is open at all times for those able to take such action, provided they are backed by other Arab States so that their military power will not be undermined by economic pressure. The United Arab Republic, more than any other State, is capable of military action for several reasons. Therefore, fighting is a major possibility in settling the urgent problem. In fact, the main responsibility in military action falls on the air force." 150.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  4. It was the general view of the Assembly in its fifth emergency special session that a radical change in the Arab attitude towards Israel is an essential condition of any movement away from the present situation. While we hope and believe that this modification will ensue, we must acknowledge that it has not yet taken place. At the recent Arab Summit Conference held at Khartoum from 29 August to 1 September, the Arab Governments proclaimed three principles: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace or conciliation with Israel. But recognition, negotiation and peace are the central themes of the Charter system. By rejecting them all, these Governments place their relations with Israel outside the Charter context, and thus forfeit their moral and legal right to invoke the Charter in their own cause. 149.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  5. United Nations organs should take care lest by action or omission they inadvertently sanction or condone this refusal. For our insistence on direct negotiation is not a matter of procedure. The issue is one of principle and substance. A refusal to negotiate is inherently identical with a refusal to live in peace. Surely a process as complex as the transition from prolonged belligerency to peaceful adjustment cannot possibly be envisaged in an atmosphere of ostracism. Indeed, my Government can never regard the state of belligerency as terminated so long as Arab Governments, whatever else they do, maintain their refusal to negotiate a settlement with us. 148.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  6. Indeed, at times it seems, and it may actually be the case, that they tend to take the attitude that the very United Nations presence frees them from any pressing obligation to exert a really serious effort towards a settlement of their differences." 147. There is already evidence that Arab States regard the United Nations as a shelter against the necessity of peace. This is the precise antithesis of what this Organization is meant to he. The United Nations is an instrument for ending conflicts, not an arena for waging them. It expresses its higher ends when it serves as a bridge, not as a wedge. There is no precedent in international life for the refusal of States to recognize another State except for the purpose of exercising a state of war against it.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  7. What the United Nations should strenuously avoid is the tendency to make its existence a substitute for negotiation and a barrier to direct settlement, This danger was frankly discussed by our Secretary-General in his Annual Report to the twenty-first session when he wrote: "In such cases as the United Nations Emergency Force, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the United Nations Force in Cyprus, the crux of the matter from the standpoint of the United Nations is the continuing absence of any earnest resolve on the part of the parties directly involved in the dispute to seek a reasonable way out of it.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  8. The fact that the United Nations was unable to prevent the war has a direct bearing on the question of its capacity and title to impose a peace. The interests of the parties and of the Organization itself require that United Nations action be realistically adapted to United Nations capacities, A call to Middle Eastern States to negotiate the conditions of their future coexistence is the most constructive course which the General Assembly can take.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  9. The collapse of the 1957 arrangements on Gaza and the Strait of Tiran had much to do with the fact that Egyptian responsibility was never directly affirmed or engaged, And our ordeal in May and June teaches us a lesson about the limitations of international guarantees in the present state of the world's power balance. The Middle Eastern peace, with its relevant agreements and provisions for enforcement, must spring up from within the region. It cannot be grafted onto it from outside. The Middle East is not an international protectorate. It is a region of sovereign States which bear the main responsibility for adjusting their mutual relations. 146. These considerations have a direct bearing on the role of the United Nations in the Middle Eastern conflict.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  10. No external declarations or guarantees, no general affirmations of Charter principles, no recommendations or statements by international bodies, however unexceptionable in themselves, can replace the sovereign responsibility of the Governments concerned. I stress this point in the light of proposals such as those, for example, presented by Yugoslavia to other Governments — but not to Israel — according to which there would be a movement away from the cease-fire lines without any direct peace arrangements with the Arab States. 145. No service is done to international causes by seeking clever but ineffectual substitutes for direct and reciprocal national commitments.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  11. The new situation which we seek must differ from the old in several essential respects. We cannot reconcile ourselves again to unilateral belligerency, or be satisfied with intermediate situations which are neither war nor peace. In accordance with all the traditions and precedents of international law, the cease-fire situation must be replaced by peace treaties with the automatic corollary that belligerency is at a permanent end. 144. We agree with those who have said that the fragile and violated armistice lines' must be superseded by accepted frontiers and other arrangements ensuring security against terror, destruction and war. And it is vital, in our view, that the new situation should rest on contractual arrangements which commit and engage the responsibility of Israel and each Arab State.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  12. Thus, for the only time since the creation of the United Nations, the intention to wipe nut a sovereign State had been openly proclaimed. And it had been proclaimed amidst the conditions conducive to its fulfilment. 142. Everyone in Israel and multitudes throughout the world will always recall the darkness of that hour. Only exceptional vigilance and speed in resisting the aggressive design avoided a disaster which would have weighed for ever on the conscience of mankind. Now this memory haunts and inspires our policy for the future. It is our primary duty and supreme resolve to ensure that such a dangerous situation shall never recur. This duty and this resolve must prevail over all other considerations. 143. The lessons of this experience present themselves to us with lucid clarity.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  13. We have been waiting for the right time when we will be completely ready. Recently we have felt that our strength has been sufficient and that if we make battle with Israel we shall be able, with the help of God, to conquer. Sharm-el-Sheikh implies a confrontation with Israel. Taking this step makes it impel alive that we be ready to undertake a total war with Israel." 140. And three days later, us more armoured brigades moved towards Israel, the same message WHS conveyed in briefer words: "If we succeed in respiring the situation to what it was before 1956, there is no doubt that God will help us and will inspire us to restore the situation to what it was prior to 1918.” That is to say, prior to Israel's existence. 141.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  14. The Assembly should reflect that this monstrous and sudden design of aggression was concerted by Egypt against Israel at a time when not a hair of Egypt's head had been touched; when no Egyptian interest had been violated, and when for ten years there had been no clash whatever between Egyptian and Israeli forces. 139. Israel itself during those tense days pondered the issue of survival in deep solemnity of spirit. There had not been many such moments in three thousand years of national history. For what was at issue had been made clear in the words of President Nesser, which will be inscribed on the tablets of history as long as the drama of last June is narrated or milled. For the statement he made on 26 May solves all problems of motive and of responsibility. It reads: "The Arab people wants to fight.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  15. With every hour that ticked away, it became more evident that no organ of the United Nations was going to be able to do anything, or even to say very much, that would assist or even console Israel in its impending ordeal. World opinion was gripped by an ardent but powerless horror as the prospect of Israel's disaster came into view. The moral and historic implications of Israel's possible doom became central themes of agitated discussion throughout the world, A people which had lost six millions of its brethren in an orgy of hatred was now embattled and about to be assaulted in the shelter and refuge of its nationhood.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  16. Troops from Iraq, Kuwait, and Algeria were moving into position in expectation of sharing the glory and the spoils of Israel's annihilation. Two hundred tanks were massed against Eilat at Israel's southern tip. The blockade had cut Israel off from its commerce and maritime contact with the entire eastern half of the world, Israel's economy and commerce were paralysed in a total mobilization of manpower. All that time, the Security Council was listening with patience, and without much rebuke, to frank statements by Arab representatives calmly announcing that a state of war existed with Israel and that that gave the Arab States all the rights resulting from belligerency. 138.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  17. This deed will astound the world. The hour of decision has arrived." 137. By early June Iraq had joined the Egyptian- Jordanian pact to the accompaniment of Nasser's ominous words to Israel: "We are facing you in the battle and are burning with desire for it to start in order to obtain revenge." And so by 4 June the noose had grown intolerably tight. Ninety thousand Egyptian troops with 900 tanks were massed on our frontier with their advance columns a few hours away from Tel Aviv. Forty thousand Syrian troops were poised to strike at Upper Galilee from advantageous positions in the hills* Jordan had trained its artillery and mortars on Israel's population centres in Jerusalem and in the vulnerable narrow coastal plain.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  18. On 21 May Egypt mobilized its reserves. On 22 May a blockade was announced and imposed in the Strait of Tiran. On 1 June the Egyptian Government notified other States in writing that the ground for that action was the existence of a state of war. Operational orders were then issued to Egyptian air forces designating the Israeli targets which they were to bomb, A daily reconnaissance of those targets began. On 25 May Cairo radio had officially announced that "The Arab people, is firmly resolved to wipe Israel off the map". On 30 May Egypt and Jordan signed a pact for the encirclement and strangulation of Israel. On that day Nasser declared that "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are stationed on the borders of Israel. Behind them stand the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan, and the whole Arab nation.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  19. The force of Israel's position and the intensity with which it upholds that position can only be understood against the background of sharp experience. Preoccupation with the consequences of the war should not lead us to forget its origins. The dominant memory in Israel today Is not only of military success but also of the peril and solitude which preceded it. 135. In early May, we still believed it possible to prolong the situation and arrangements which had existed for ten years. Our most urgent concern at that time was to frustrate the terrorist infiltrations organized and launched in growing intensity from Syria. 136. It was then that clouds hitherto unforeseen began suddenly to gather thick and fast. On 15 May Egyptian columns began to move into Sinai. On 17 May the United Nations forces received and accepted a notice to quit.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  20. The reckless decision by President Nasser last May to disrupt all the elements on which a decade of relative stability had rested was not a transient episode. It has led to revolutionary consequences. The previous structure has been shattered beyond repair. Coming after nineteen years of implacable belligerency, the Egyptian move towards swift encirclement and sudden blockade; the Syrian practice of terrorist war; King Hussein's fateful initiative — to which he has publicly confessed — of opening hostilities from which he had every opportunity to abstain, have all contributed to this disruption. A new edifice has to be constructed. It cannot now arise or thereafter endure unless the States of the Middle East decide to build It together. 134.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  21. In similar vein, representatives of diverse traditions and cultures from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas and Australasia raised their voices against reproducing the precarious conditions of early June; in favour of a new and stable regional order; against the illusion that there could be withdrawal from the cease-fire lines except in a context of peace; in favour of establishing accepted boundaries and other arrangements ensuring, security from terror and war; against the ambiguities of an obsolete armistice; in favour of treaties of peace, ensuring security for all. 133. I have here summarized only a small part of the impressive international consensus on the main question at issue. The central logic is that the time is now ripe for constructive innovation.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  22. The Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast summarized it in three short sentences: "... to advocate a political status quo in the region is to seek escape from an ugly situation only to be brought face to face with it once again...the conflict between Israel and the Arab world can be resolved only by means of negotiation. [1540th meeting, para. 47.]... Let but the dialogue begin, and the solutions will follow." [Ibid., para. 49.] 132.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  23. And they guide the Governments of the Middle East away from the debris of past conflicts towards the horizons of a new and better age. Thus, the recent discussions of the General Assembly, with the concurrent expression of massive world opinion, amount to an incisive criticism of the intense and virulent Arab belligerency which has beset Israel for two decades, and which has still not been renounced. Every year the Arab Governments come to the United Nations to complain of Israel’s energetic refusal to disappear. The complaint has begun to evoke the reaction which it merits. 131. The most important operational conclusion of our debates so far is the rejection of solutions based on a return to. the explosive situation of early June. Voices from all five continents have echoed that rejection.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  24. It has rendered emphatic judgement on three central issues: It has declined to "condemn" the resistance by which Israel, through anguish and sacrifice, pulled itself back from the threshold of danger. It has repeatedly dismissed the ridiculous change that Israel's decision to resist annihilation should be defined as "aggression". And it has firmly rejected proposals for restoring a situation which has recently led to one war and which would, if reproduced, lead inexorably to another. 130. These three emphatic verdicts compose an international judgement of deep significance and moral force. They stand before the States of the Middle East as a warning and a guide. They warn against the Illusion that States which proclaim and practise war can receive international indulgence when, having provoked war, they go on to refuse peace.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  25. We shall not commit the irrational course of returning to the political anarchy and strategic vulnerability from which we have emerged. National suicide is not an international obligation. Our road does not lead backward to an armistice eroded by belligerency, destroyed by blockade, undermined by guerrilla war, and corrupted by the avowed contempt of our sovereignty. History summons us forward to a new spirit and structure of relations, for which there is no word but peace. 129. It has been said that the tense and dramatic United Nations debates during June and July did not lead to substantive conclusions. They did, however, shed a clear light on the choices before which we stand. The General Assembly Is not starting its work anew.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  26. Never in the history of nations has progress towards a durable settlement been made in the absence of a will to negotiate. Never has the United Nations approved or condoned a refusal by sovereign States to attempt a direct settlement of their differences. Indeed, repeated recommendations by the Security Council and the General Assembly calling upon the Arab States to negotiate a final settlement with Israel for the establishment of permanent peace have remained unfulfilled, with tragic results, for nearly nineteen years. 128. Our policy of seeking a transition from the cease-fire to a negotiated peace settlement deserves international endorsement and respect. There is no other valid choice. The Arab Governments have had nothing so far to suggest except a return to the situation which prevailed on 4 June. This we cannot accept.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  27. In negotiations with Arab Governments we shall make viable and equitable proposals compatible with the national honour and legitimate interests of all States. We shall also make suggestions for effective regional co-operation, and for the regional and international solution of population problems created by the wars and belligerent policies of the past two decades. We shall, of course, give consideration and make reply to whatever suggestions the other negotiating parties decide to submit. 127. In short, we propose that a nineteen-year-old war be brought at long last to a permanent end by pacific settlement and direct agreement. The principles held valid in all other international relationships must be applied in this case.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  28. The statement made by the representative of the United States [1562nd meeting] fully justifies the rapid convening of the Geneva Conference as the most expeditious way of removing the dispute from the battlefield to the conference table. It will be difficult for peace-loving States to understand why this step should be further delayed. 126. On 19 June [1526th meeting] and on subsequent dates, I described my Government's views, and policies on the Middle Eastern conflict. These have not changed. Until peace is achieved we shall fully preserve and respect the cease-fire agreements. We stand ready to negotiate their replacement by treaties of peace which will ensure the security of all Middle Eastern States and establish conditions of stable co-existence.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  29. We are strengthened in our conviction that there is need for a simultaneous declaration by all parties involved in the fighting of their willingness to end the war by negotiation and to take reciprocal steps towards this end. 125. After all, it is now recognized by all parties that the Geneva agreements must form the basis of a settlement, It is also accepted that all parties involved in the conflict should participate in the negotiation of a settlement. Would it not then be tragic for this cruel war to continue merely because of differences on the sequence and nature of action which one party would take in response to action publicly pledged by the other?

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  30. In both these conflicts, as in all others, every external device, including prolonged international discussion, has been doomed to frustration in the absence of agreement to seek a direct settlement. 124. It is understandable that the Viet-Nam question should so far have dominated this general debate. Hostilities there are constant and intense, no ceasefire has been achieved, and the great-Power relationships are dangerously involved. Last year I expressed the view that "The choice lies between a negotiated solution now, and negotiated solutions at a later date ,.. the price of postponement will be exacted in heavy loss of life; in expanding ... havoc; in the prolonged agony of the Viet-Namese people". [1428th meeting, para. 87.] Nothing has since occurred to change this sombre view.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  31. The times are grave enough. But they do not justify apocalyptic predictions of a third world war. Our age is marked by a constant enlargement of national freedom, by an intensified social conscience, and by a slow but perceptible growth of world community. Conflicts which in other days would have widened into global war are now responsive to factors which limit their duration or scope. Moreover, it has been the general international experience that when issues are submitted to negotiation, a settlement is reached. The converse is certainly true. No resource, no technique, no remedy is ever effective for any dispute in which one of the parties refuses to negotiate with the other. This is the central fact about the hostilities in Viet-Nam and the tension in the Middle East.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  32. 122. Mr. President, Israel warmly welcomes your election to the Presidency of the General Assembly. Our satisfaction is grounded in a deep personal respect. It is farther enlarged by the cordiality which inspires the relations between our countries. Our peoples share the bitter and indelible memories of the European tragedy, They are now united in their instinct for national Independence and international co-operation. Above all, they are both sustained by the vision of a world order in which national and social diversities may be preserved, respected and reconciled. The principles which lie at the root of Romanian foreign policy are thus important for the promotion of international peace and understanding. 123. The international situation which we are now bringing under review cannot be defined in simple terms.

    1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)

  33. We can be sure that he will give due weight to these two facts in the spirit of international responsibility which has always inspired his actions and decisions. Let us express the ardent hope of world opinion that U Thant, having led us so far with grace and distinction, will agree to go with us further along the way.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  34. In so doing they will achieve a vital aim: they will create an international community which will be able to both to respect nationhood and to transcend it in a universal solidarity. Nothing in all human history has ever been more crucial or challenging. 124. The person and office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the chief embodiment of this quest for world community. I know that U Thant is aware of the esteem in which Israel holds him. As he considers the many sincere appeals made to him from this rostrum he will, I am sure, take two facts into serious account. First, the great Powers and our entire membership are unanimous in the confidence which they repose in him. Second, it is by no means certain that any such unanimity or harmony would emerge in the search for a successor in present international conditions.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  35. The world seeks to combine international security with the preservation of individual States. It would be tragic if the survival of mankind could only be assured at a price which men are clearly unwilling to pay — namely, the renunciation of national identity. The United Nations is committed to the proposition that peace is possible in a world of nation-States. Our Charter strikes a delicate balance between national sovereignty and international responsibility. There is, of course, a certain objective tension between these two concepts. To bring them into harmony is the central purpose of our age. We must find a way to live within this duality. Modern statesmen must now act in a double role: as spokesmen of their particular national interests and at the same time as representatives of the wider human cause.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  36. The eight non-aligned members have made valuable contributions in describing the conditions and consequences of a realistic international accord, involving an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations. Some of the basic considerations in this problem were Illuminated at the very opening of our general debate by the Foreign Minister of Brazil [1412th meeting]. 123. The United Nations is going through difficult times, not only because of the conflicts through which it moves, but also because its task is inherently complex. Some philosophers and historians have stated that mankind must now choose between a world-state and annihilation, between political unification and mass suicide. I suggest that there is a third choice. History has more ingenuity than the historians.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  37. We hope that Member States will do more to bring their legislation into conformity with the progress made by the United Nations in this field. We shall give favourable consideration to the appointment of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and to an appropriate celebration in 1968 of the International Year for Human. Rights. 122. There are elements both of tension and of stability in the international climate. It will not be easy to make the stability prevail over the tension. The Geneva discussions on the limitation and control of the nuclear arms race and on complete and general disarmament have revealed both the complexities of the problem and the tangible prospect of its solution. There is reason for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to persevere in its efforts.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  38. Thus, men of good will and progressive outlook throughout the world who recognize the historic role of the USSR in crushing the Nazi perpetrators of the Jewish tragedy in Europe, have expressed a natural desire to see the largest Jewish community in Europe enabled to have access to its own particular heritage and to make contact with others who share it throughout the world, In a Europe increasingly open to movement between its Eastern and Western parts, in a world in which barriers are falling and international contacts are being multiplied, the renewal of contact between kindred communities will become a natural corollary of peaceful coexistence. 121. My delegation hopes that the General Assembly at this session will make further progress towards the formulation and proclamation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  39. It is inevitable that Jewish communities who witnessed and survived this assault feel a profound need to express their mutual solidarity. The wounds of war have not yet been healed. Countless families have been separated and dispersed across different countries and continents, and still cherish the hope of reunion. There is a natural longing of these communities to join together in the expression and further development of the heritage which lies at the root of their identity. These impulses have led to an international interest in the right of Jewish communities everywhere freely to develop their specific culture.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  40. I saw the mountains of women's hair shorn from the bodies of executed victims and the piles of children's shoes torn from their feet before they were committed to the furnace. The Governments and peoples of Europe, and especially of Eastern Europe, who witnessed and experienced the horrors inflicted by Nazism, are our partners in the memory of these fearful acts. We therefore understand their desire to strengthen the stability of that area and to see the region's existing frontiers universally and permanently recognized. We should not forget that the United Nations itself was originally an anti-Nazi coalition charged with the duty of preventing any recurrence of the most fearful anguish that had ever befallen any family of the human race. 120.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  41. There are, for example, the links which Join labour movements together in common aspiration; there are world communities of scientists and scholars; there is a constant mingling together of competitors in cultural and sporting activities. Older, stronger and deeper than any of these are the links which unite religious, ethnic and cultural communities in their devotion to common memory or common faith. 119. There is not much meaning to the idea of coexistence unless the world is increasingly open to the constructive expression of these affinities. Of special significance to my people are the links which unite the Jewish communities of the world in common pride and devotion, and above all in tragic memory. This year I was able, on Polish soil, to visit the scene of the extermination of 6 million of our people by the Nazis.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  42. But coexistence means more than mere abstention from conflict. It has a positive content that can only be expressed by intensified co-operation involving peoples as well as Governments, Never in history have so many men come into direct contact with peoples and experiences beyond their own national environment. International solidarity is composed of countless links which transcend national frontiers. Frequent cultural exchanges, tourist movements on a wide scale, a great increase in the number of international conferences, all help to create conditions in which prejudice, discrimination and hostility are reduced. In addition to national loyalties, there are solidarities of sentiment and interest which have a world arena.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  43. The United Nations has repeatedly endorsed these principles. Two years ago they came before us in the form of a Soviet proposal — which we supported — for the prohibition of the use of force in territorial disputes between States. This year we have Soviet proposals on non-interventions [see A/6397] — in the spirit of resolution 2131 (XX) adopted by the Assembly last year — and Czechoslovak proposals [see A/6393], all demanding the support of peaceful coexistence among States, irrespective of any differences in social systems. But general principles of international conduct are useful only if they are generally applied. We have consistently supported resolutions on non-intervention and peaceful coexistence formulated in universal terms as binding on all sovereign States and in all situations, without loopholes or reservations. 118.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  44. We respect the desire of all Middle Eastern States, Arab or non-Arab, to maintain their lawful sovereignty in peace, refusing all domination or hegemony, whether from outside the region or from within. The principles of separate nationhood, free from domination or hegemony, are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the armistice agreements. We are confident that the destiny of the Middle East lies in the pluralism and diversity of its sovereignties, its cultures and its social systems. In such conditions the East Mediterranean area, at which Europe, Asia and Africa converge, would be ripe for a new emergence of human vitality. 117. Whether this vision can be fulfilled in the present, or, at least, saved for the future, depends on how we interpret the principles of co-existence and peaceful settlement.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  45. All the residual problems left behind by the war launched against Israel eighteen years ago, including those problems created by movements of population in both directions between the Arab States and Israel, could be solved in an atmosphere of bilateral, regional and international co-operation. Thus, in full respect of existing sovereignties, and of the region's creative diversity, an entirely new story never told before would unfold across the Eastern Mediterranean. 116. In our conception the aim of statesmanship in the Middle East is not to change the character or structure of existing States but to change the relations between them. What we seek for ourselves we respect for others.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  46. It would open up communications across our region, expose it to the fruitful interchange of commerce and ideas, unite its sovereign States in great enterprises of development, liberate them all from sterile and bitter controversy and lift from their shoulders the crushing load of an armaments race. Indeed, the negotiation of an agreement on arms limitation might well be the first step leading to a more stable co-existence. Only by establishing peaceful and stable conditions amongst themselves can the States of the Middle East keep the area free from external intervention, such as invariably arises wherever tension grows.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  47. We assume that different social and political systems, different attitudes to traditional culture, are destined to co-exist in the Middle East, as in other parts of the world. What is needed is the consolidation, not the destruction, of existing elements of stability in the Middle East. If our neighbours refuse us recognition and contact, we shall pursue our national development and international vocation as best we can, and with strong prospect of success. While peace is not an indispensable condition of Israel's existence, we hold it to be a high aim fraught with equal benefit to our neighbours and to us. A peace settlement, freely and directly negotiated, would inaugurate a new and glorious chapter in the history of the Middle East.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  48. It is extraordinary that the official rhetoric and policy of some neighbouring States are so little influenced by Charter principles or by agreements which they signed and sealed seventeen years ago. 114. In these circumstances I deem it useful to summarize again my Government's policy for the advancement of peace and security in the Middle East, as well as our own vision of the region's future. 115. We hold that Israel and each Middle Eastern State have an absolute right to maintain their sovereignty and integrity immune from the threat or use of force. We stand for the precise and reciprocal application of Charter principles and of existing agreements. We make no claim against the integrity or the independence of other States. We have no concern with the nature of their regimes.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  49. It is sometimes forgotten that Israel's neighbours have already committed themselves in bilateral undertakings to the strict application of these principles. Seventeen years ago each one of its four neighbours agreed with Israel to move forward towards permanent peace; to regard the armed conflict between them and Israel as permanently liquidated; to abstain for all time from undertaking, planning or threatening any aggressive action by armed forces; to regard the present armistice lines as immune from any change without consent; actively to prevent any illegal crossing of those lines by armed forces or civilians; and to carry out all these engagements until a peaceful settlement between the parties was achieved.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  50. They undermine the central principles of international civility, and they have no chance; of being carried into effect, for they encounter insuperable obstacles in our country's will and capacity to defend itself, as well as in the opposition of the world community to the alteration by aggressive force of legally established and internationally recognized situations. 113. It is not really necessary to formulate new or special principles for peace and security in the Middle East. Nothing is required beyond the precise application of the Charter principles which enjoin respect for the sovereignty of States and the abstention from the use or threat of force against their integrity and their independence.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)