YouSaid · the spoken record

AMERASINGHE

lines on the record: 359
first: 1967-09-24
most recent: 1975-09-24
sittings or episodes: 8
sources: un-general-debate

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The pursuit of these policies cannot be arrested, much less reversed, if the most powerful nations of the world continue to give valuable sustenance, comfort and encouragement to the offending régimes, while making a pretence of loyalty to the principles of liberalism, humanitarianism and democracy. The United Nations must demand that this conspiracy end and that efforts to ensure that elementary justice is done to the African majorities of southern Africa are not fatally compromised by equivocation and subterfuge. 93. The Government of South Africa and its accomplices in Africa, the Government of Portugal and the illegal régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, are responsible for the heavy pall of impending disaster that hangs over southern Africa.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“We trust that it will be possible for him to continue while the hope remains, however distant, that Israel will show a change of heart and that twenty-one years of turmoil and turbulence will close with the complete pacification of the Middle East. 92. There is still another area of crisis where the threat to international peace and security, though seemingly not so direct and immediate, is no less dangerous for its very insidiousness. The ultimate consequence of the evil policies of apartheid and white supremacy, which are directed towards the perpetual enslavement of millions of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, could be cataclysmic.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“That guarantee is explicitly offered in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. But Israel, by failing to accept the terms of that resolution, seems to have chosen to place herself beyond the pale of international law-and to set herself above the Charter. What this Organization has a right to expect of Israel is not nine commandments as a retort to the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, but unqualified acceptance of it. 91. My delegation would like to express its appreciation of the patience and perseverance with which the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in the Middle East, Ambassador Jarring, has persisted in the discharge of a most delicate and exacting mission.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“The patient efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General have been foiled and frustrated by Israel’s insistence on direct negotiations with the Arabs. 89. I should like to reiterate the position we took on the occasion of the general debate last year that the recognition that Israel seeks must be the culmination and not the commencement of the process of reconciliation. The United Nations came into being to establish new forms of settlement in conflicts between nations, forms that cannot be reconciled with the claim of a victorious army to dictate terms. Likewise, the right to recognition cannot be asserted through force of arms. 90. We support Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. That right can best be guaranteed by the United Nations.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“Along with these requirements the Security Council has affirmed the need for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem and for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. 88. While two of the Arab nations involved in the June 1967 war have announced their acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, Israel’s response has been the imposition of conditions which are deliberately calculated to defeat the purposes of the Security Council resolution, to avoid compliance with it and to thwart its fulfilment.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“It has affirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East requires not merely the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the June 1967 conflict but, equally, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“The seventeen months that have elapsed since the war of June 1967 have produced on Israel’s part only a defiant display of power on the anniversary of the war, brutal and calculated reprisals against the Arabs — completely out of proportion to any alleged acts of provocation that occasioned them — and undisguised plans and preparations for consolidation of territorial gains. 87. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council at regular intervals since 22 November 1967, together form the gravest possible indictment of Israeli policies. The Security Council has emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“In regard to that other area of crisis, the Middle East, the delegation of Ceylon stated in the General Assembly debate on 12 October last year that the most disturbing feature of the situation then existing was Israel’s unabashed determination to retain control over the vast areas of territory that she had acquired from military operations and to absorb them permanently within her borders by establishing permanent Israeli settlements in them. We stated further that, if the principles of the Charter were to be vindicated, the United Nations must bring all possible pressure to bear on Israel to withdraw to the positions held by it prior to 5 June 1967, and must insist that that withdrawal should not be subject to negotiation or any prior condition.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“First among those pre-conditions recognized by us was to be the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, to be followed by an agreement on interim procedures for ensuring a Status quo, and by the cessation of belligerent activity by all parties and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. 85. We reiterate our conviction that the bombing of North Viet-Nam must be stopped if the momentum for peace is to be created at the conference table in Paris. Those who have intervened in Viet-Nam should realize that they owe a duty not to half a nation and half a people but to a whole nation and all its people. The time has come for honourable redemption of the promise that was held out to the people of Viet-Nam at Geneva in 1954. By that means alone will peace and hope be restored to that unhappy land. 86.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“The principle of self-determination is merely another version of the principle that the internal affairs of a country are primarily a matter of exclusive concern to the people of that country, and that no interference by outside parties is permissible. Last year we drew attention to the proposal made by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, that the internal affairs of Viet-Nam should be settled by discussion among the three parties concerned: namely, the Saigon régime, the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, and the Government of North Viet-Nam, without any outside interference. My Prime Minister suggested that those three parties should meet in the first instance to discuss the pre-conditions for a cease-fire.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“There is abundant evidence to show that, in 1956, such a free choice would have given no less than 80 per cent of the vote to the real liberator of Viet-Nam, who is now treated as an enemy of his own people. That, to our mind, is the clue to the origin of the present conflict in Viet-Nam—that, and not the concern of foreign Powers for the right of self-determination for the Viet-Namese people. It would appear that the Geneva Agreements were repudiated not in the interests of self-determination but in the interests of pre-determination of the type of régime that would be installed in Viet-Nam in the wake of French colonialism. Self-determination will have no meaning or value for the people of Viet-Nam if the price of self-determination is to be extermination. 84.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“In our statement in the general debate last year, we dealt at length with the origins of the Viet-Nam conflict. Our purpose in doing so was to refute the plea that foreign intervention in Viet-Nam, despite the Geneva Agreements of 1954, was designed to ensure for the people of Viet-Nam the right of self-determination. It was precisely the right of self-determination, as constituting the free choice by a people of the form of government and the type of political and economic organization they desired, through the free exercise of the vote, that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 sought to establish. 83. We repeat, today, that strict and scrupulous adherence to the principles and provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 alone could produce a proper settlement of the Viet-Nam problem.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“During the last few years we had reason to believe that the group had served a real purpose and had, in some small way, contributed to increasing rapprochement and growing co-operation between the two super-Powers and their respective blocs despite the unsettling effect of the Viet-Nam war. Our hopes, however, seem to have been premature. Once more today non-alignment has an important and vital function to discharge. Every accession to the membership of the non-aligned group can greatly fortify its capacity to exert a moderating influence, to interpose itself in moments of crisis between the two groups, and to endeavour to effect a reconciliation between great-Power interests on the one hand and the principles of the Charter and the processes which it prescribes for the settlement of differences on the other. 82.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“Several international crises can be called to mind which have spelt the collapse of international morality: Viet-Nam in 1954 and onwards, Suez in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. They serve to remind us that commitment to the principles of the Charter demands more than mere homage to words. 81. Once again today we feel strongly the need for a moderating influence in international relations. This influence can be exerted only by a group of nations committed to neither of the two major ideological and power blocs and their respective supporters. The cold war produced such a group in the form of the non-aligned nations, the only grouping left in the world which, irrespective of all differences and distinctions, can evolve a common philosophy in accordance with the tenets of the Charter.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“The primary responsibility for preserving international peace and security has been entrusted to the members of the Security Council; and among them the effective discharge of this responsibility falls chiefly within the competence of the two super-Powers. It is to them that this Assembly and this Organization must look for the example that is the real test of leadership. For the great majority of Members of this Organization, devoid as they are of the means of protecting themselves from foreign intervention and from encroachments on their sovereignty and territorial integrity, assurances of security must come from the United Nations and its organs alone, thereby rendering obsolete the need for membership of military alliances which is itself, in a sense, a limitation on national sovereignty. 80.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“This right is the main attribute of the sovereignty and independence of a country. It is the only foundation on which a stable international order can be established and maintained. Any diminution or restriction of that right through foreign interference, wherever it may occur and whatever the circumstances, should not be countenanced by the United Nations. The principles of the Charter must be upheld and the right of self-determination restored to the Government and people of Czechoslovakia. It is in the name of the Charter that we call upon the Powers whose armed forces are in occupation of Czechoslovak territory to withdraw their forces from that territory without delay and to leave the people of Czechoslovakia free to determine their own destiny. 79.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“All crises of this nature should be placed in their correct historical perspective if this Organization is to find a means of avoiding similar situations in the future. The history of United Nations Charter violations did not commence on 21 August 1968. The Czechoslovak crisis has to be placed in its proper historical perspective lest it be allowed to serve only as an alibi for other and even more serious derelictions in the domain of international relations and international law. 78. While expressing strong disapproval of the Warsaw Pact Powers’ action in Czechoslovakia, as constituting a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the best service we can render to the Government and people of Czechoslovakia in their present plight is to affirm their right to determine their own affairs free from external pressure.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“It is only with the Members.of the United Nations that the capacity to produce a record of achievement and hope rather than one of failure and disappointment rests. 76. In the course of the general debate in the Assembly last year we identified two main areas of crisis: Viet-Nam and the Middle East. The problems created by the situation in those two areas continue to present a threat to international peace and security. They seem, however, to have been overshadowed by the crisis in Czechoslovakia resulting from the intrusion of the armed forces of five of the Warsaw Pact Powers into that country to arrest a trend in its political evolution which was considered to be inimical to the interests of the socialist system and to its stability and integrity. 77.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“But at least those who are not so hampered cannot fail to recognize and applaud the courage and initiative displayed by the Secretary-General. On behalf of my Government, I should like to congratulate the Secretary-General on this document and to express our high appreciation of his devoted services to the United Nations Organization and to the cause of peace for which he continues to strive tirelessly despite the fatigue of discouragement and frustration. 75. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the document makes gloomy reading. We had the same observation to make in our statement in the general debate at the twenty-second session [1588th meeting] in regard to the Secretary-General’s introduction to last year’s report. We stated then what we might well repeat this year: that the fault lies not with the author but with the material.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“The suggestions that he has, with such admirable candour and clarity, advanced for the mitigation of the most disturbing elements in that situation may not accord with the policies of individual countries, but that should not cause any surprise. Detachment can be expected only of those countries which are not too involved to be embarrassed. The contents of the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General testify to the humanity and sincerity of this conscientious servant of the world community. Those who are committed to courses of action and to policies which are at variance with the Secretary-General’s proposals would neither appreciate nor understand the spirit of compassion that informs this entire document.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“My delegation cannot let this occasion pass without expressing appreciation of the services rendered to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly by its President, His Excellency Mr.Corneliu Manescu, the Foreign Minister of Romania, who discharged with distinction the duty of presiding over a session that extended far beyond the customary period. 74. The General Assembly has before it the document [A/7201/Add.1] which is always awaited with the greatest interest, namely, the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization during the previous year. Secretary-General U Thant has provided us with an incisive analysis and objective assessment of the international situation.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“72. On behalf of the Government of Ceylon and the delegation of Ceylon, as well as on my own behalf, I extend to His Excellency Mr. Emilio Arenales, the Foreign Minister of Guatemala, sincere congratulations on his election as President of the General Assembly at its twenty-third session. From its vast reservoir of talent the Latin American continent has produced in His Excellency Mr. Arenales, as the incumbent of this high office, one who can be relied upon to maintain the high standards and traditions of diplomacy for which his fellow Latins are rightly renowned. We wish him success in his task of guiding us to a satisfactory conclusion of our deliberations at this session and assure him of our co-operation. We also hope he will make a speedy and complete recovery from his present indisposition. 73.”
1968-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 23 (1968)
“The recent events in China have no bearing at all on the right of the People's Republic of China to the seat intended for China in this Assembly and in the Security Council. They neither strengthen nor weaken that right. 78. We hope this Organization will not defer any longer the seating of the People's Republic of China. With this achievement to its credit, the United Nations would be better equipped to face the future with faith in its mission and with confidence in its ability to discharge its sublime trust.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“In all these years, however, it has failed to repair its gravest omission: the proper representation of 700 million of the Chinese people. We associate ourselves unequivocally with those delegations which have preceded us in this general debate and which have urged the seating of the People's Republic of China in this Organization as the lawful representatives of the Chinese people. We have maintained in the past, and we still maintain, that this is a simple matter of credentials, that what we are called upon to approve is the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China and that the Government of the People's Republic of China is alone entitled to represent that country and its people. There should be no doubt as to our policy in regard to Taiwan. Ceylon does not subscribe to the theory of two Chinas.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“It is not the population explosion that inhibits the developed market economies from adopting more liberal policies or from reducing interest rates, extending maturity periods and replenishing the coffers of a now impecunious International Development Association. The population explosion, admittedly, aggravates scarcity and increases privation, but while efforts to check it are being made, there is much more that can be done by the affluent section of the world. Ceylon is paying close attention to this problem and our efforts have already met with some success. In 1966 Ceylon's rate of natural increase fell to 2.3 per cent from the previous year's figure of 2.4 per cent. 77. We have referred to the fact that the United Nations has now come of age.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“I mention these figures to emphasize the importance of some definite and positive measures to be agreed upon at the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to be held at New Delhi next year. 76. Permit me to make a brief reference to that spectre that haunts most of the poorer countries of the world: the population explosion. This is a real problem, but to lay too much emphasis on the population explosion is to divert attention from what is immediately practicable. It is not the population explosion that depresses the prices of our export products and increases the cost of our imports.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“During the same period of seven years, Ceylon's foreign exchange reserves fell steadily from a level of $138 million in 1959 to $59 million in 1966. Foreign aid can provide only very partial and inadequate relief and does not compensate us for the loss in export earnings. I have referred to the slow rate of growth in developing countries during the seven years of the Development Decade. If we take the per capita real income of the country into consideration — which is the most reliable index of the standard of living of a people — in the first seven years of the Development Decade there has been a drop of 3.2 per cent in per capita real income in Ceylon. This decline has been due to factors beyond our control and despite definite improvements in productivity.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“This is not the place for details. Those will be given in the Second Committee where they properly belong, but I should like your indulgence in this Assembly to state a few figures in support of the case for urgent action. I took the Development Decade as the period of reference because of the bright hopes and the bright faith that we had in it. The loss that Ceylon has sustained as a result of adverse trends in world market prices since 1959 has amounted to approximately $340 million over the seven years from 1960 to 1966, which works out at a loss of $48 million a year. In this figure no account is taken of the additional burden we have had to bear as a result of the higher prices of our imports. 75.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“For countries to which a progressive increase in their import capacity must make all the difference between stagnation and growth, it is not sufficient for aggregate export earnings to be barely maintained through increased production and improved productivity. In the case of agricultural products, for which the demand is inelastic, improved productivity results in increased total production and might serve to further reduce world market prices by increasing the supply. 74. Ceylon offers a perfect case study of the effect of adverse trends in world market prices on the economy of a developing country which relies preponderantly on agricultural exports as a source of foreign exchange earnings. Our experience, which is by no means unique, should establish an incontrovertible case for the stabilization of commodity prices.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“It is by contributing to the reduction in economic disparities not by increasing them, it is by putting greater purchasing power in the hands of the developing countries in the shortest possible time through the adoption of bolder and more imaginative policies rather than by adherence to conservative practices, which give only partial relief in measured doses to the developing economies, that the richer nations can best serve their own ultimate interests. 73. Ceylon is one of those countries where improved productivity has brought no corresponding benefits. Although we have succeeded by improved methods in increasing agricultural productivity in the export sector, and particularly in the yields of tea and rubber, this improvement has been more than neutralized by a sharp decline in prices.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“71. The average increase of gross domestic product per head of population of the developing countries during the first five years of the Development Decade was hardly $10, as compared with an increase of $300 per head in the developed market economies during the same period. 72. What these figures mean is that with hardly any sacrifice on their part the developed market economies can spare much more than they have hitherto done to raise the standards of living in the developing countries.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“There would have to be something amounting to a miraculous change for the better, both in regard to the trading terms of the developing countries and the volume and terms of the capital aid they receive, if the 5 per cent annual growth rate to be achieved by the end of the decade were to come even within reach of most of the developing countries. 70. Out of forty-seven developing countries for which comparable data is available, only seventeen have succeeded in achieving a growth rate of 5 per cent. But the thirty countries which failed to achieve this rate of growth together account for 75 per cent of the total population of the forty-seven countries. In fact, for most of the countries the growth rates for the first five years of the Development Decade were lower than the rates achieved in the five years preceding the Development Decade.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“The Development Decade has become the slogan of the new impetus, while UNCTAD has come to be the main hope of the flagging and faltering economies of the developing world. The combined result of the declaration of the Development Decade, with all that it implies, and of three years of effort by UNCTAD has, however, been disappointing. The Development Decade, with only two years more to run, might pass into history as the "Disenchantment Decade" unless the achievements in the second Development Decade redeem the unrealized hopes and promise of the first.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“The declaration of the United Nations Development Decade was meant to marshal world opinion and to serve as a psychological force in support of concerted international action to stimulate the economic growth and development of the developing countries. 68. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in December 1964 as a separate organization to deal with all matters relating to international trade which had a bearing on economic development, with the objective of removing such inequalities and such restrictive practices and policies as hampered economic growth and substituting for them more positive forms of international economic co-operation. 69.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“The other imperfections of the present draft non-proliferation treaty are the omission of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in general against non-nuclear-weapon countries and the absence of any provision for the security and protection of non-nuclear countries from nuclear attacks. 66. Although the political crises that continue to threaten international security claim our immediate attention, the economic problems that beset the developing countries are of equal concern and interest to us. It is a truism to say that sharp economic disparities only accentuate political discontent, whether it be on the national or international scale. 67. The United Nations and its associated organizations have been called upon in recent years to assume an ever-increasing responsibility in this sphere.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“It does not preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons by those who already possess them. The draft treaty limits and reserves a privilege without imposing any restraint on the exercise of the privilege by those for whom it is so reserved. 64. More urgent than a non-proliferation treaty such as has been drafted is the extension of the existing ban on nuclear testing to cover underground nuclear tests as well. This would have the same effect as the present draft non-proliferation treaty and, in addition, would arrest the process of nuclear-weapon development by the nuclear Powers. 65.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“A great deal, it might be said the very future of the United Nations as the custodian of international peace and security, depends on its capacity to act, and act promptly and effectively, in the Middle East situation. If it fails, it would be reduced to the position of a moral refugee. 63. The simultaneous presentation by the United States and the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty presents heartening evidence of the desire of the two super-Powers to cooperate with each other to limit the dissemination of nuclear terror. But the draft remains only an expression of intent. It is incomplete without agreement on the paramount problem of international inspection. It does not bring us any closer to general and total disarmament.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“In the absence of international adjudication on Israel's claim to the right of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, the question remains yet to be settled. The use of force as a means of settlement cannot, however, be countenanced by this Organization. 61. If the principles of the Charter are to be vindicated, the United Nations must bring all possible pressure to bear on Israel to withdraw to the positions held by it prior to 5 June 1967, and must insist that that withdrawal should not be subject to negotiation or any prior condition. 62. The Middle East crisis represents the gravest threat to the prestige and moral authority of the United Nations.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“Those rights and the principles we are called upon to defend in this instance have been clearly stated by us in the emergency special session. The United Arab Republic is entitled to and must have complete administrative control over the Canal, and sovereign territorial rights over it. This Organization should never acquiesce in, nor condone, the taking-away or circumscribing of those rights by the use of force. As regards Israel's claim to the right of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. Ceylon's position has been and still is that the events of 1956 and thereafter did not alter and could not affect the status quo before 1956 so far as the legal rights of any party are concerned. The position prior to 1956 was that the United Arab Republic had the right to, and did in fact, control traffic through the Strait of Tiran.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“Israel's present attitude creates the uncomfortable feeling that it seeks to cling to its acquisitions by stipulating exacting terms for a settlement. 59. The continued closure of the Canal, the reopening of which could be achieved without in the least endangering Israel's security, is a blow directed not merely against the Arab Stales but, in its effect, against all those countries in Asia which rely on this waterway for the movement of commerce vital to their economic interests. A nation that looks to the world for understanding should not hold such a large section of the world to ransom. But let me make it clear that, however severe the strain imposed on us by the closure of the Canal, we would not want to barter away an iota of Arab interests or Arab rights or any important principle in order to secure the reopening of the Canal. 60.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“A nation that could have succeeded in equipping itself with sufficient material, and in preserving in its economy a sufficient measure of strength to invest it with the power and the capacity to inflict such heavy destruction on others, and to acquire and retain such vast territorial gains through military operations as Israel succeeded in inflicting and acquiring in the course of the June war cannot claim that its existence and security were imperilled. We are fully aware that Israel has had, in the past, to face a barrage of threats; but if oral threats over the press and radio could be regarded as aggression to which the only possible deterrent is pre-emptive force, war would be endemic today in this world.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“Ceylon has always supported Israel's right to exist in peace and security. We still support that right. But Israel's demand for recognition by the Arab States as a condition precedent to all negotiations is, in our opinion, imprudent, ill-timed and insupportable. Recognition must be the culmination and not the commencement of the process of reconciliation. 57. If we have correctly understood the Israeli argument or excuse, it is that it cannot withdraw from the territories that it has seized in war unless its security is guaranteed, and that such a guarantee can come only through a settlement reached directly between itself and the Arab world. 58. The six-day war of June this year provides the most telling rebuttal of these arguments and pleas.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“Here we are being treated to the latest exercise in colonization, confirming the worst fears of the Arabs. Actions such as those are not calculated to promote a settlement. 55. The refugee problem has been aggravated. Thousands more Arabs have lost their ancestral homes and are treated like so much human flotsam. The Suez Canal remains closed to international traffic. Its closure not only inflicts continuing and cruel loss on the United Arab Republic; it also imposes a severe financial penalty on all the developing countries east of Suez, which depend so heavily on the smooth movement of traffic through the Canal and which are now compelled to draw on their depleted foreign reserves to pay the higher freight charges resulting from the diversion of traffic around the Cape. 56.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“The efforts of the Security Council and the General Assembly in emergency special session to bring about a peaceful settlement have so far failed. Far from respect being shown for the General Assembly's appeals and decisions we find that, even when they have received a measure of support constituting the nearest approach to unanimity attainable in this Organization, such appeals and decisions have been completely ignored. Worse still, the most disturbing feature of the present situation is Israel's unabashed determination to retain control over the vast areas of territory that it has acquired through military operations and to absorb them, or some of them, permanently within its borders by establishing permanent Israeli settlements in them.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“In South Viet-Nam we find many countries with which we are on the friendliest terms engaged in activities of which we have expressed explicit disapproval. We have done so because we consider the cause of peace to be of transcendent importance. 53. I turn now to the other and equally serious area of crisis, the Middle East. For the third time in the life of the United Nations, fighting erupted in that area. With each outbreak of hostilities the fighting has been heavier, the scale of casualties has been greater and the toll of misery has increased. But whereas on previous occasions some measure of stability was restored and the authority of the United Nations was established despite Israel's refusal to accept a United Nations presence within its own territory, the situation that exists today is infinitely more disturbing. 54.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“In regard to the South, the North Viet-Nam Government's refusal to recognize the status of the Saigon regime and its insistence that the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam be regarded as the sole representative of the people of the South would appear to present some difficulty but should not prove to be an insuperable obstacle. It is another manifestation of the hardening of attitudes that takes place when hostilities are prolonged. That should not make us despair of some easing of the situation resulting from the cessation of the bombing, and in turn producing just that slight change of temper which could lead to the determination of a formula that would permit all those concerned with the situation in the South to be brought together in negotiations. 52.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“First among the pre-conditions for a cease-fire was the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, to be followed by an agreement on interim procedures for ensuring a status quo and by the cessation of belligerent activity by all parties. Other requirements, such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel and the suspension of military aid, followed the provisions of the Geneva Agreements closely. We found, in the course of our discussions with the North Viet-Namese, that they recognized the possibility of dealing with the two situations separately — the situation in North Viet-Nam and the situation in South Viet-Nam — although the two situations constituted one problem. 51.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“In accordance with that principle, my Prime Minister's proposal was that the internal affairs of Viet-Nam should be settled by discussion among the three parties concerned, namely, the Saigon regime, the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam and the Government of North Viet- Nam, and that they should meet without interference from outside sources to discuss, in the first instance, the pre-conditions for a cease-fire. It was his hope that, if such a conference could take place, any agreement emerging from it would have definite prospects of being binding on other countries too, as it would represent the wishes of the people of Viet-Nam as a whole. 50.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“Fundamental to my Prime Minister's proposals was the principle that the internal affairs of a country were primarily a matter of exclusive concern to the people of that country and that no interference by outside parties could be justified. Acceptance of that concept implies acceptance of the principle that the people of a country should not only determine how its internal affairs should be handled but also be free to determine the nature of the political system which it wishes to establish and maintain for itself. There is nothing novel about this proposition or this concept. We all avow it. 49.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)
“That thesis is based on a proposition completely at variance with the intentions of the Geneva Agreements and with the objectives of enlightened policy relating to divided countries — the proposition that they must remain divided according to whether one section wants Communism while the other does not want it. Such propositions and such assumptions can only perpetuate the division of countries and are not calculated to promote peace. If they are to be strictly applied it would mean that every country should be partitioned on ideological lines. 48. My Prime Minister has himself explored the possibilities for bringing the hostilities in Viet-Nam to an end and for starting negotiations to establish peace in that area.”
1967-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 22 (1967)