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BANDARANAIKE

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1956-09-24
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1976-09-24
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  1. It was not intended that a peace treaty should be signed until a reunified, demilitarized Germany could be established — no doubt with the consent and will of all the victorious Powers who had succeeded in the course of the conflicts of the Second World War. 142. One has to be realistic about these things. Is there any likelihood of the contract running out in the present situation? Is there any immediate prospect of a reunified Germany? Is there any likelihood that one can contemplate a situation in which the great Powers, who fought the Second World War to ultimate victory and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, will now agree to the setting up of a united Germany in the existing context?

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  2. The Foreign Secretary again made the point that the sanctity of treaties must be respected if the United Nations is to mean anything. He is quite right. If treaties are going to be treated as scraps of paper, of course the world can have no security and we are all left in a state — a very parlous state — balanced between peace and war and wondering what the future is going to bring to us all. But, the Foreign Secretary says, our contract in regard to Germany has not run out — a contract made at a time when the victorious Powers, in a spirit of friendliness, sought to do what they thought at that time was the best possible thing to heal the ravages of war.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  3. Let us carry the case one step further and suppose that there is an outbreak of war; does not the destruction of even those 500 aircraft mark a step forward and a step forward in the right direction? Those are matters that one cannot view in isolation, 140. I do agree that disarmament without controlled stages is a futile concept and a concept which cannot be accepted on mere statements of principle. But there is the point of view that a scheme of controls must not become a system of espionage; and so long as there is force in that argument, it will not do for either of the countries engaged in this conflict to adopt self-righteous tones or self-righteous attitudes and to refuse to face the realities that exist and on which a compromise must be found if the world is to move forward towards peace and prosperity in a real sense. 141.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  4. — 500 aircraft are going to be destroyed in a bonfire when you do not know the production lines and the assembly lines of the great countries that may or may not be preparing for war. There is a great deal of force in that and once can certainly appreciate it; but one must also appreciate, I think, that there is the opposite point of view. And the opposite point of view is that a lot depends upon the number of aircraft that are going to be thrown away and the number of weapons that are going to be placed on this bonfire. What would be the position, for instance, if the number were increased from 500 to — shall we say — 10,000? Would it not significantly affect the argument? And supposing one does not even taken figures in a relative sense.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  5. I do not think that I know sufficient about what it takes to prepare for nuclear tests to express any opinion in regard to that. But supposing it does take many months to prepare for nuclear tests, then does it not follow that when the United States Government resumes nuclear tests in answer to the act of the Soviet Government, it too must have been preparing for many months? Can you have it only one way? In other words, is it fair to take an argument on the basis of bad faith and to present it in that way even though we do deplore the act of both the great countries concerned in the resumption of nuclear tests? 139. Then, again, the Foreign Secretary made the point — which I think is perfectly valid — that it will not do merely to satisfy yourselves by inspection in any scheme of disarmament that — shall we say?

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  6. The non-aligned countries have, each of them, expressed their point of view very clearly and forcibly indeed: and, speaking for the Government of my country, I can only state that I was in Belgrade!^ before I came here, with my Prime Minister, and in the course of her statement my Prime Minister did deplore the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, just as we deplore the resumption of nuclear tests by the United States. It is a retrograde step. 137. But consider the reasoning that follows that. It is suggested that, inasmuch as these nuclear tests must have taken many months to prepare, there is an element of bad faith underlying the resumption of nuclear tests by the Government of the Soviet Union because, while negotiations were going on, the implicit assumption is that preparations must have been made. 138.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  7. Let us take the case of some of the propositions put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, the Foreign Secretary, who spoke a moment ago. For instance, he quite rightly pointed out that the resumption of nuclear tests cannot be regarded by anybody — not by the non-aligned nations or by anybody else — as a step forward or as a step in the right direction. It is so obviously not in the right direction that I do not think much purpose is served by hammering home the point. The assumption that the non- aligned nations have, either out of a sense of fear or out of a sense of politeness, or out of a sense of anything else, refrained from making comments, is simply untrue.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  8. If any country, by virtue of purely indigenous development, were to choose one ideological form of government in preference to another, the choice must rest with that country; and it is a choice which must be respected and with which all nations must learn tr live. 135. One thing that has struck me very sharply, as a newcomer to General Assembly sessions, has been the tendency, which very often arises in this chamber, for delegations representing countries already enmeshed in the cold war to express attitudes and to take up positions based on the rather unrealistic line that there is no other possible attitude except their own. We have seen examples of that in the course of some of the speeches which have preceded my assumption of the rostrum. 136.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  9. The widening ideological conflict makes it all the more imperative to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)] formulated during the last session. 133. When actual arrangements are being made for the transfer of power to dependent countries, it is essential that metropolitan States should be placed under the obligation not to involve colonial territories in cold war arrangements by, for example, the retention of military bases. 134. We do appreciate that the success or failure of one ideology or another is a matter of paramount concern to one or other of the great Powers. But it must be realized, and the great Powers must act in the realization, that the conflict must take peaceful forms.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  10. No, we Want to be in a position to make a direct contribution to the cause of world peace and to the building up of a world order for international security. We think this can only be ensured if the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America can be insulated from external ideological pressures and cold war tensions. These areas of the world do not want to be the cause of any accentuation of world conflict nor to become the battleground for it. 132. It seems to me, therefore, that an ideological truce covering Asia, Africa and Latin America is vital. The basic principle in the relations of the great Powers to these countries must be non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs. For instance, military assistance to countries which need it for their internal security purposes should be given only through the United Nations.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  11. There has been political subversion and attempts to influence forms of government, economic and social systems in one way or another and, in extreme instances, there have been attempts to intervene directly by military action. The examples of the Congo and of Laos reflect the degree of disruption which has been brought into the lives of those nations with further accentuation of world tensions. 130. Most of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America want to be free from cold war pressures. We would like to be left to work out our own destiny and our own forms of social, economic and political life according to the action and interaction of our own internal domestic forces. 131. The reason for this attitude is not just a wish to be left in splendid isolation or to be removed from current world events.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  12. The cold war conflicts of the present day reflect implicitly the tendencies of the great Powers to carry their differences into areas that reject the idea of the cold war in all its forms. Self-determination is one of the governing principles of the United Nations, and if it is to be a reality and not just an ideal, it is essential that the great Powers should refrain from interfering with the processes by which each nation and people choose the kind of Government and the kind of economic arrangements that they like to have. 129. The battle for the minds of the uncommitted world has taken various new forms and has produced curious results. It has sometimes meant intervention — I am sorry to have to say it, but it has — in the internal affairs of those countries.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  13. Both in the United Nations and there is where the concept of peaceful coexistence has developed as a means to weaken the logic underlying this assumption and to establish a modus vivendi to keep the peace. In our view, it would be an over-simplification for either of the great Powers to say of the other, "We are standing by the United Nations and the principles of the Charter, while you are not". Recriminations of that sort will not lead to positive results. So long as each of the great Powers regards its way of life as a kind of religion to be propagated or defended outside its territories with zeal and fanaticism, peaceful coexistence becomes reduced to a phrase that lacks meaning. 128.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  14. Each of the great Powers today follows its own way of life and the political ideology to which it is committed, and with good reason. For the people of the United States of America, a society conditioned toy private enterprise has spelt prosperity and progress and a high standard of living. For the people of the Soviet Union, likewise, a society conditioned by the public ownership of productive enterprise has meant a very high rate of growth and industrial expansion. The essential premise on which the cold war has been built is that these two ideologies of the great Powers must seek extra-territorial victories and that each requires an armoury of inter-continental missiles aimed permanently at the other to preserve its own security. 127. As a non-aligned country, we just cannot accept that premise.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  15. We are convinced that neither of these great countries wants war, in spite of the number of cold war speeches that we have heard in the Assembly during this session. But that does not mean, of course, that either of the great Powers would contemplate for a moment the possibility of negotiating settlements from a position of weakness or at any price. Of course not. 125. The will for peace, though genuine, would not prevent either of the two great Powers from resorting to the use of force in defence of what they cherish and seek to preserve as vital for the well being of their citizens. In the realities of the situation, the fact remains that the actions of one great Power, even if prompted by motives of defence and self-preservation, are open to interpretation by the other that there is an intention to have an aggression made upon it. 126.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  16. We must recognize, in particular, that national policies of the great Powers are not controlled and directed by principles of idealism alone. It is in the nature of international politics that national policies must take account of national interests, and sometimes there is a clash of competitive and conflicting interests. It would be unreal for us to believe that such conflicts of interests can be resolved by an appeal to principles alone. It would be equally unreal, I submit, and indeed positively dangerous to permit these conflicts to remain unresolved. 124. We believe that there is a very genuine desire on the part of the peoples of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union to maintain world peace.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  17. The stage has been reached, I think, today whero we all agree that this is not enough. Countries all over the world are convinced that they cannot live with the cold war any longer. The time has come when it is worth taking a calculated risk to find permanent and general solutions as the only alternative to the appalling risks which are built-in features of the world in 'which we live. 123. The United Nations was founded with a sense of determination and purpose. The ideals for which the United Nations stand are enshrined in the Charter and must continue to inspire our thinking on all international problems. The spirit of idealism in the Charter has not, however, always found expression in tile realities of the current international situation.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  18. The ultimate nature of the weapons available to the great Powers of the world is a compelling reason for the General Assembly at its sixteenth session to find practical ways and means to give effect to the ideals and objectives which prompted the formation of the United Nations at San Francisco. It is imperative to put an end to cold war concepts and to the arms race now in progress if mankind is to survive. 122. Year by year these same questions have arisen before the United Nations General Assembly, but our collective thinking has not resulted in the production of any conclusive answer. From time to time the United Nations has made a useful contribution towards the reduction of tensions and has thereby avoided the danger of an immediate outbreak of hostilities.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  19. First and foremost, I should like to extend to Mr. Slim the cordial congratulations of the Government and people of Ceylon upon his unanimous election to the office of President of the General Assembly at its sixteenth session. 120. There is no single country in the world today that looks forward to the prospect of war without dismay. A world-wide referendum is not needed to establish that the millions of people in all countries do not want war. 121. We meet at a time of crisis, when there is a great danger of the whole world being laid waste by the ravages of nuclear war, and the whole future of the United Nations is at stake.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  20. My country is a small one, a weak one and a poor one, but I venture to think that today, particularly in an Organization such as this, the service that a country can render — that a Member can render — is not to be measured alone by the size of that country, its population, its power or its strength. This is an Organization which expresses itself most effectively by bringing to bear a certain moral force — the collective moral force and decency of human beings. That is a task in which the weak as well as the strong can render a useful service, and I give the Assembly the assurance, on behalf of my country, that as far as we are concerned, every endeavour that we can make in all sincerity to assist in the achievements of those noble ideals for which this Organization stands, will always be forthcoming in the fullest measure.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  21. Today it is needed in the cause of human friendship and of peace. 41. What is peace? Peace is not merely a negative thing — the absence of one set of people trying to kill another set of people. No doubt the prevention of war is a necessary factor for peace, but peace, believe me, is something much more positive than that, for peace in its true sense means human understanding, human friendship and cooperation out of which, indeed, peace in its true form alone can rise. I look upon the United Nations as the one machine available to mankind today through which it can express this unconquerable spirit of man in its efforts to achieve that peace, friendship and collaboration which is, I hope, the object of us all. 42.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  22. Sometimes the feeling comes over me, as I am sure it does over many of us, that the fight is not worth while — that there is, in fact, no hope for mankind to escape the perplexities, problems, conflicts, hatreds and enmities that seem to be arising all about us. But sometimes when I feel like that I am fortified by the thought that through the dark fabric of human history there passes one golden thread of unfailing strength and firmness — the unconquered, unconquerable spirit of man. It has manifested itself through the ages in various, diverse, different ways: first of all, the unconquerable spirit of man fighting for bare survival and existence; later, fighting for various causes — national causes maybe, or the cause of justice, the cause of freedom or the pursuit of truth on the part of the great religious leaders down through history.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  23. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this power-bloc or that power-bloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism. It is not something dishonest; it is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both worlds. It is a position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions. 39. We are supposed to be the “uncommitted” nations. I strongly object to that word. We are committed up to the hilt. We are committed to preserve decency in dealings between nations, we are committed to the cause of justice and freedom, as much as anyone is. That, briefly, is our position in Asia. I trust it will not be misunderstood. 40.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  24. This is an age when we have to live and let live, when we cannot afford to hate each other so much that we are prepared to sacrifice all mankind in the name of peace or for some other reason. We cannot afford to do that today. Within the limits of honour, of course, and those principles which we hold dear, we have to live and let live. 38. That is the philosophy behind the doctrine of coexistence. We in Asia do not hate anybody. We want to be friends with all. We have to build up a new society for ourselves; one, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  25. We are living today, in fact, in a period of transition between two civilizations, the old and the new. During a period like this, all kinds of conflicts arise — ideological, national, economic, political. That has happened in the past, and in the past those conflicts were settled by some nice little war here or there. Today we cannot afford the luxury of war, for we all know what it means. 37. Therefore, the task for us today is a far more difficult one than ever faced mankind before: to effect this transition to some form of stable human society, and to do it amid a welter of conflicts, with reasonable peace and with the avoidance of conflicts that burst out into war, for war is unthinkable today.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  26. There is some misunderstanding of the position of some of our Asian countries, and I wish to explain the position to you fairly. 36. Many of our countries in Asia have re-emerged into freedom after three or four hundred years of colonial imperialist rule. In this epoch of newly gained freedom, we find ourselves faced with a dual problem — a problem within a problem. First, there is the problem of converting a colonial society — politically, socially and economically — into a free society, and then there is the problem of effecting that conversion against a background of changing world conditions. The world is in a state of change and flux today. The world is going through one of those rare occasions — they happen at certain intervals — of a change-over from one society to another, from one civilization to another.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  27. But when great Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, themselves act in a way that has brought on their heads the condemnation of this Assembly, can it not be realized how gravely that confidence is shattered, particularly in the minds of those of us who are small and weak and who had hoped that in this new world we would be able, without national or international brigandage and piracy, to work out our own destiny and to advance toward peace and happiness ? 35. Those are the results of these happenings. I have dealt with the two important problems of today, the problems of Egypt and Hungary — with the position as I see it and the steps that should be taken immediately and also perhaps in the not too distant future. I wish now to say a few words about Asia.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  28. But let us hope that the preservation of peace now and the lapse of time will again restore that confidence that has been so seriously and tragically shattered. We had got into the habit recently of believing that the great Powers of the world were united in upholding peace and decency in dealings between mail and man, between nation and nation. We believed that this great Assembly provided the opportunity for all, great and small, to unite in achieving that objective.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  29. Far more dangers are inherent for the world in the Egyptian situation than in the Hungarian. We deplore both, of course. But this Assembly very rightly came to the conclusion that the problem of Egypt was a more urgent and serious one than that of Hungary, although both are to be condemned and deplored alike. 34. You will see, therefore, the importance of these happenings and how strongly many of us — the vast majority of this Assembly — feel on these matters. It is not too late even now to put things right. It is not yet too late to remedy this situation, although I greatly fear that the bitterness created by these incidents will not be easily forgotten and will not be easily forgiven.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  30. In that way the good name of those countries, as well as, perhaps, world peace, will best be safeguarded. 32. There is a further significance, of course, in these happenings, and I would draw your attention particularly to this. We of Asia who have suffered under imperialistic colonial rule for many centuries are, naturally, extremely sensitive toward anything approaching a resurgence of the spirit of imperialism and colonialism. I hope we are wrong, but we feel strongly that the happenings in Egypt, and perhaps the echo of those happenings in Hungary, are a manifestation once again of a certain resurgence of the spirit of colonialism, the desire of a strong Power to achieve its purposes and to impose its will, even by force, on a weaker Power. 33. Are you surprised that we lay greater emphasis on Egypt than on Hungary?

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  31. Mutual recriminations and the wounding of one another’s feelings by sharp retorts and angry words will not help us very much. But there are certain things to which we cannot be blind. What have we to do now? I have suggested the immediate steps to be taken in Egypt and the immediate steps, on which the Assembly has decided, that should and must be taken in Hungary. 31. I would appeal to the Government of Hungary not to oppose the recommendation of this Assembly that some impartial observers go there in order to observe the situation and to discover the truth or otherwise of the charges that have been made on the one side and equally vehemently repudiated on the other. I appeal that that step be taken, and I appeal to the United Kingdom, France and Israel to withdraw their troops — as indeed they have agreed to do — now without any delay.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  32. Let us learn the lessons which Egypt and Hungary teach us. Let us deal with the immediate, pressing problems and let us gear up the world Organization, if we can, to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. That seems to be the wise course to follow. 29. We gain nothing by undue mutual recriminations and revilings. As a Buddhist, I remember the story of Buddha and the answer he gave to an opponent who came before him and abused him for hours. Pie listened to him patiently and said: “My dear friend, if you invite guests to a banquet and the guests do not come, what do you do with the food that is prepared?” “Oh,” was the reply, “I and my family will consume the food if the guests do not arrive.” So he said to the man who had abused him: “You have offered me your abuse. I am not accepting it. You can take it yourself.” 30.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  33. We decided to recommend that to other countries and to do it ourselves, at the Delhi conference, and our Governments are doing it. My Government has voted for this a few days ago. We are a poor country but we have decided to give what we could give towards relief, in Hungary as well as in Egypt. Budapest needs relief; does not Port Said? They all need relief. If I may be forgiven for using the phrase — and I do not say it disparagingly of anyone — there is no fundamental difference, to my mind, between the thug or rowdy who deals a man one blow and the thug or rowdy who deals a man two blows. Fundamentally, both are worthy of condemnation. That was our attitude regarding Egypt and Hungary. 28. However, let us remember this, Mere dialectics are not sufficient in dealing with these situations.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  34. When the draft resolution as a whole was put to the vote [571st meeting] we followed the only logical course; we abstained from voting, having expressed our views quite clearly and openly from this rostrum. 26. The latest draft resolution [A/3357/Rev. 2] that proposed by Cuba, the debate on which I had the privilege of listening to here yesterday, was passed by a majority vote. Another draft resolution introduced by India, Ceylon and Indonesia [A/3368/Rev. 3] was also passed, I leave it to the ingenuity of the Secretary-General to reconcile the two decisions. However, I feel that the draft resolution introduced by us was more reasonable and logical than certain aspects of the wording of the other draft resolution. 27. The Assembly has also passed a resolution [1007 (ES—II)] calling for relief in Hungary.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  35. You will have noted what we said at Delhi. What we said there was that the USSR troops should be withdrawn and that Hungary should be left free to work out its own destiny. Why should we dictate to any country that it should have elections as we want it to have them? Surely, whether it is a Soviet dictatorship in Hungary, an Anglo-French dictatorship in Egypt or even the dictatorship of the United Nations which militates against the sovereignty of a country, they are all, I think, equally unwise and undesirable. 25. What were we to do with a draft resolution, part of which we agreed with and part of which we disagreed? I asked my representative here to secure a separate vote on the separate parts.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  36. I believe that in the case of some other Asian countries also they had not time to issue instructions to their representatives or even to consider the matter. There seemed such a desperate haste to get something through — a desperate haste which I fail to understand. I do not think that the lapse of a few hours, twelve hours, would have made such an overwhelming difference to the case. 24. With regard to the second draft resolution on Hungary [A/3316] that was moved here, it was like the proverbial curate’s egg, good in parts and bad in parts. We agreed with the request that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Budapest and from Hungarian territory without any delay. We could not quite agree with that portion of the draft resolution that requested that free elections be held in Hungary under the vigilant eyes of United Nations observers.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  37. We go to bed fairly early and we remain there till morning. What could I do? I instructed my permanent secretary to send off immediately a cablegram to our representative here, making certain general suggestions and asking him to consult with other groups with which we associate in taking action. We abstained from voting. That is how that abstention came about. 23. Is it really not possible, when this world Organization discusses subjects of paramount importance, to allow a certain reasonable measure of time for consideration and consultation before important decisions are arrived at? It seems to me a great pity if the urgency of the situation — if I may so call it — demands the taking of action in that horrid manner. That is what happened.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  38. It will interest the Assembly to know that when the very first draft resolution [A/3286] regarding this Hungarian episode was introduced here, it was done in such a desperate hurry, it was sent from the Security Council to the General Assembly so quickly for a vote to be taken within a few hours, that some of us had no opportunity to bring our minds to bear on the problem or even to send instructions to our representatives here as to how they were to vote. I was fast asleep in Colombo when an urgent cablegram from our permanent representative here was received by the Permanent Secretary, asking for instructions as a vote was going to be taken. I had not all the facts or data before me. I could not even get my office open in order to get such papers as were available there at that hour of the night. We arc rather respectable in Colombo.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  39. First things come first, so let us deal with these first problems which I mentioned and which are essential to prevent the possibility — believe me, the probability — of a serious worsening of a situation, which some may feel, superficially, is now assuaged. It is not so. 22. I wish to say a few words about Hungary. There seemed to be a feeling in the minds of some people that some of our countries were indifferent, or even lukewarm, about certain happenings in Hungary. I wish strongly to repudiate this charge. What happened?

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  40. With regard to the general settlement of the rather complicated and complex affairs of Western Asia, that is another matter. I sincerely hope that sometime those troubles also can be settled, particularly those between Israel and its Arab neighbours. I trust that when the bitterness of these incidents has died down to some degree, it will be possible for those primarily concerned at least to have a talk about an honourable settlement of those differences. But I hope that that long-term process will not be mixed with the immediate needs that have arisen today out of this situation. I am not so optimistic as to believe that those differences can be settled at an early date; I do not believe so for a moment.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  41. I am quite sure that Egypt — at least, this is my hope — will not object to the United Nations, under its flag, using whatever material and tackle — and it is rather specialized tackle which is required for this purpose — are available, from whatever source they happen to come, in order to clear the Canal. 20. The withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt immediately and the very quick clearing of the Suez Canal must then be followed by negotiations regarding the Canal on the basis of those six principles to which we have already referred and which presumably still stand. Those are the steps that are necessary to be taken at once. Those are the steps which I hope the United Nations will try to achieve in the course of its deliberations in the days to come. 21.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  42. I take it that, not only for us, but for other countries, Western as well as Asian, it is important that the Suez Canal be cleared as early as possible. I feel that it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations. 19. There is one point regarding that matter, namely, whether the clearing of the Canal should start at once in full force, prior to any substantial withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, or whether it should begin subsequent to that. I hope that such quibbles will not stand in the way of the practice of doing the thing that is necessary. I, personally, feel that a substantial withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory at once would greatly facilitate the further task of clearing up the Suez Canal.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  43. So that it is really not required for a large force of the United Nations to be present before those forces are withdrawn. The first and the most vital thing is a withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory now, as early as possible. If that does not happen, even if under the guise of “volunteers” — and we know what “volunteers” mean — other countries, in order to secure the observance of the decisions of the United Nations, take steps, I fear that the results may be very far-reaching and all our efforts so far be swept away in a moment. 18. There is another important thing, of course: the early clearing of the Suez Canal. That is very important to all of us, particularly to my country. Most of the trade of Ceylon — 75 per cent of it — passes through the Suez Canal.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  44. I wish to say that I think it would be very unwise to follow some principle of a phased withdrawal, a withdrawing of those forces in numbers according to the numbers of the United Nations Emergency Force who enter: for example a hundred United Nations troops going into Egypt and a hundred being withdrawn; two hundred United Nations troops going in and two hundred being withdrawn. There can be no greater mistake than that. 17. The moment that even a token United Nations force is established on Egyptian territory, it will be sufficient occasion, in the interests of us all, for Israel forces to be withdrawn behind the armistice line, and United Kingdom and French forces to be withdrawn from Egyptian territory. I cannot conceive that either Egypt or Israel would make an assault upon forces of the United Nations. I just do not believe it.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  45. I am glad that, substantially, a ceasefire has taken place. But the withdrawal has not yet taken place. A United Nations Emergency Force is already in the process of being established in Egypt in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations in supervising a withdrawal of those forces. I say this, and I say it with all seriousness, that as long as foreign troops — be they Israel, United Kingdom or French — continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the position is one that is fraught with the greatest danger and one that may bring about results leading to a third world war. I wish to say that those forces must be withdrawn now, without any delay.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  46. But it does seem to me at least rather a strange coincidence that those events, in that order, should have so taken place; it is a very unfortunate coincidence. I am glad that the United Nations immediately dealt with the matter and arrived at certain decisions and that those decisions are now in the process of implementation. 15. May I say here that I appreciate very much the fact that even in principle the United Kingdom, France and Israel have accepted the decisions of the United Nations for a cease-fire and for a withdrawal. I only hope that those steps will materialize very quickly. 16. I must tell the Assembly that it is my view, and the view of my colleagues, the other Asian Prime Ministers, that the position is still extremely delicate and dangerous. We do not feel that there is any occasion for undue complacence.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  47. Because it had grievances in the past? Because it feared Egypt's aggression or attacks in the future? Why was this particular moment chosen? I never choose to condemn anyone until condemnation is based on proof. But is it not somewhat difficult to escape the belief that the Israel action, followed by that of the Anglo-French forces, were not altogether unconnected with each other, and that Israel, at the very least, may have thought, in a moment of inspiration, that it was a good moment for it to move, and that an attack by it then would produce action on the part of the United Kingdom and France which would in fact amount to support ? 14. However, as I said, I prefer not to attach motives to anybody. Until something is definitely proved, I prefer not to condemn anyone. It is a mistake to do so.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  48. What we fail to understand is this: why were not negotiations proceeded with on the basis of those agreed six principles to see how far agreement could he reached? I have yet to understand why either one side concerned, or the other, or both, failed to requisition the good offices of the United Nations in order to carry on those negotiations. The matter was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations in order to pursue the method of negotiation as against that of force, which had been threatened earlier. It had reached the point when those negotiations could take place on an agreed basis for discussion. 13. Why did they not take place? Why was it necessary to have the intrusion, before further discussion, of this unfortunate resort to force? Israel made an attack on Egyptian territory. Why, pray?

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  49. But the moment that a majority of the countries assembled at the London Conference decided on international control of the operation of the Canal, fundamental difficulties immediately arose. The mission to Egypt, led by the Prime Minister of Australia, for discussions with Colonel Nasser, was bound, in the circumstances, to prove a failure. I cannot believe that anyone seriously contemplated that it could be otherwise. Thereafter, quite rightly, the Powers more immediately concerned referred this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations and an agreement on certain principles — the six principles, no less — by the United Kingdom, France and Egypt was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in a resolution. [S/3675] 12.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)

  50. These interests I feel could adequately have been safeguarded, while recognizing the right of nationalization and the right of control following thereon, by entering into a convention on somewhat similar lines to the Constantinople Convention of 1888, but with further provisions, if need be, to provide for some consultative or advisory committee whose advice Egypt would have been compelled to seek in dealing with important matters of an operational nature. If there was a disagreement between the two, surely some machinery for arbitration in such instances could have been devised. 11. That would have been the most hopeful method of procedure in order to obtain agreement, while satisfying what both sides claim to be certain fundamental needs.

    1956-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 11 (1956)