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Ponnambalm

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1966-09-24
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1966-09-24
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  1. President, and with my fellow representatives, some memorable lines from an ancient Tamil Hindu classic, the Purananuru: To us all towns are one, all men our kin. Life's good comes not from others' gift, nor ill; Man's pains and pain's relief are from within .., We marvel not at greatness of the great, Still less despise we men of low estate.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  2. My only excuse, if excuses are necessary, is our growing impatience with the delays and impediments that are obstructing the early fulfilment of our expectations of the United Nations as the ultimate palladium of our liberties. We meet and move here in these precincts with genuine feelings of friendship, equality and oneness. If these sentiments are carried back and made to influence, if not govern, national perspectives and policies, then one feels sure that with every succeeding year that we foregather here, the distinct and discernible gaps separating Member States will tend to narrow and disappear. It is this ideal of oneness that I believe has inspired and sustained man throughout the ages. 195. As I leave this rostrum, may I share with you, Mr.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  3. I do not in any way wish to imply that the security of the affluent is threatened by the needy, but it must be realized by all of us that illiteracy, malnutrition and disease pose as great if not a greater threat to international understanding and amity as the manufacture and proliferation of highly sophisticated and lethal weapons on which the major Powers seem to be anxious to spend billions of dollars in the fond but receding hope that they are thereby ensuring security and peace in the world. 194. You will forgive me if, in the course of my survey of the international scene, I happen to have struck a somewhat unorthodox note.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  4. May I conclude these observations by saying that we must boldly face the stark truth that the widening chasm between the standards of living of the developed and the developing countries constitutes a greater menace to international peace and security than the traditional conflicts of interests or the clash of ideologies. For, between conflicting ideologies some accommodation might be possible, prompted by the necessity of avoiding mutual co-extinction; but between plenty and penury there can be no peaceful co-existence.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  5. I should like to commend for the consideration of this Assembly certain measures which can be adopted on a regional basis and which so far have not received the attention they deserve. I would particularly press the need for the organization of regional payments unions among the developing countries. While it would stimulate trade among the countries of a region, it would not subject them to the harsh dictates of the world's payments situation or the individual balance-of-payments problems of the members of the group. 193.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  6. We sincerely trust that this compelling necessity will be adequately appreciated by the capital-exporting countries, thereby inducing them to modify their present policies and to provide economic aid to the public sectors. 191. If the theory of aid as being a temporary expedient designed to carry the recipient country to the take-off stage or the stage of self-sustained growth is seriously meant, then I would venture to suggest that the practices of the past have been at sharp variance with the theory. Such a theory would require not the financing of individual projects selected at will for their bankability, but the financing of an integrated programme of economic development calculated to transform the economy as a single and indivisible whole. 192.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  7. I should also like to add the hope that the problem of international liquidity will find an early solution which will provide the developing nations with a fair share in the increased reserves that are created so that it will correspondingly enhance their purchasing power for development purposes. 190. The public sector in the newly independent countries, for reasons historical, political and economic, finds it imperative to undertake the major burden of the responsibility for economic development. This is due to the very low capital formation in their private sectors, for which reason their Governments have consciously assumed the responsibility for controlling "the commanding heights of the economy".

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  8. While I would like to acknowledge with deep appreciation the assistance that Ceylon has received from many friendly countries and from international institutions, I should like, however, to add on a broader canvas that it has been estimated that the developing countries have the capacity to absorb productively about $3 billion more annually than they now receive. The actual picture shows that the flow of economic assistance to developing countries has remained unchanged since 1961, although the commitment undertaken at the Conference of Trade and Development by each of the developed nations was to transfer annually 1 per cent of its gross national income to the developing countries. 189.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  9. Urgent and adequate measures of compensatory financing to combat both a decline in export earnings and an increase in import prices of manufactured articles should, I feel, be devised in order to grant relief for any deterioration in a country's terms of trade as a whole, I should also like to commend for general and agreed acceptance a policy of periodical review and rephasing of debt-servicing obligations that would take into account the ability of the debtor to meet his obligations. 188.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  10. To strike an individual note, may I say that my country is harassed by balance-of-payments difficulties rendered even more complex by deteriorating terms of trade. We are at present experiencing one of the most serious slumps in our export prices. Forms of relief available in such situations are inadequate and unrealistic and, I would submit, require immediate reappraisal.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  11. They are: first, inadequate capital inflow; second, terms of credit which are tending increasingly to become onerous despite isolated attempts at granting relief by way of interest- free loans, extended periods of maturity, and, in some cases, by repayment in local currencies; third, deteriorating terms of trade which in the context of chronic balance-of-payment difficulties upset all development plans by reducing the import capacity of countries; fourth, growing uncertainties in regard to, and for fear of interruption in, the matter of aid; and fifth, the growing burden of debt-servicing which tends to absorb an increasing proportion of the income capital and of export earnings. 187.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  12. While Ceylon welcomes the institutional advances made by the setting-up of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the establishment of the Asian Development Bank, I am constrained to state that the progress made by UNCTAD in the two years of its existence is, in practical and concrete terms, not very encouraging. There was a time when two years was regarded as a moment in the life of a nation; but in the fast-moving world of this nuclear and space age, two years can be of great importance in the economic development of a nation. 186. May I be permitted to focus the attention of this Assembly on the broad features of the problems that affect developing countries.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  13. We are more than half-way through the decade and I regret to state that the mid-term appraisal of the programme shows that the prospects of achieving the target remain bleak. Indeed it is doubtful whether there can be an improvement even on the record of the second half of the 1950s. Unless some radical changes in the policies and practices governing the flow of capital to the developing countries take place, the term "Development Decade" will, I fear, remain an empty slogan without giving even the mild psychological satisfaction that slogans sometimes bring. International efforts for the promotion of the economic development of the developing countries remain ill-co-ordinated and incoherent, and fall short of the requirements of the prospective recipients of economic aid.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  14. But I regret, and my regret must be shared by practically all the developing countries of the world, that no concerted effort has yet been effectively mounted to prevent the increasing disparity between the standards .of living of the peoples of the industrialized and those of the developing countries of the world. Herein lies the grave danger of a pronounced polarization between the "haves" and the "have-nots". It was the apprehension of this danger that led the General Assembly to designate the 1960's as the United Nations Development Decade, by the end of which the rate of economic growth of the developing nations was to be accelerated to reach a minimum of 5 per cent per annum.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  15. We have understood and appreciated over the years that one of the primary means of lowering international tension, removing suspicions and jealousies and creating better understanding among the peoples of the world would be through an organized and planned scheme of accelerated development of the economies of the developing countries. I should like to state that the specialized agencies of the United Nations and its various regional economic commissions have done useful work, and I venture to think that, if the financial resources available to them had been greater, more significant advances in various spheres might have been achieved. 185.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  16. It is a matter of deep regret that the recent diversion of the International Court of Justice should have very nearly shattered the hopes of the international community that the Court would progressively become the instrument to bring into conformity any errant member of that community. I sincerely hope that any aberration on the part of any one or more members of the Court will not make any of us abandon our hopes of refashioning that institution as the ultimate civilized means of settling disputes without recourse to force and thus moving towards the final evolution of the rule of international law. 184. I should like now to turn shortly to the economic and social aspects of the activities of the United Nations.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  17. While I am of course aware that we are far from having reached the ideal of world government,' I think it within the ken and grasp of civilized man to transmute the municipal concept of the rule of law into a framework of international coexistence. I had cherished the hope that the quintessence of the world's juristic talent, which one assumed to be embodied in the International Court of Justice, would make of that body not merely an important organ of the United Nations but the faithful mirror of the international social conscience, not only compelling the obedience of Governments but also commanding the respect and admiration of the peoples of the world.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  18. No peace-keeping operation or peace-building effort can have secure foundations unless, in the final analysis, it leads to a recognition that the stability of international society is as much dependent on recourse to legal institutions as is the stability of any municipal society. That learned disquisitions about the ultimate responsibility for establishing and preserving world peace can never bring into being the required identity of interests between individual States and the international community is a truism. The most profound concept that the development of human institutions in an erring world has produced is the concept of the rule of law. All civilized societies have come to accept this as a categorical imperative for organized existence.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  19. Speaking before this Assembly last year, I referred to the fact that there should be available to the United Nations, for the furtherance of peace-building activities, a forceful and representative political task force which can step in and mediate even before a dispute has had time to deteriorate into a disruptive one. This, in the view of my delegation, would contribute immeasurably towards strengthening the peace-building capacity of this Organization. It is therefore gratifying to me to note that the Secretary-General himself has recently stressed the need for the United Nations to continue the longterm task of building the peace if it is to equip itself for helping countries to keep the peace. My delegation whole-heartedly endorses this observation of his and pledges itself to work towards the achievement of this end. 183.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  20. It is true that the interposition of peace-keeping forces after there have been breaches of international peace has been a significant achievement of the United Nations. My delegation nevertheless feels, as it has always felt, that this Organization, as the final repository of the hopes and aspirations, particularly of the smaller and weaker nations of the world, cannot allow itself to rest content with intervention only after a breach has actually occurred. 182. A much more significant contribution to international understanding and peace and security can be achieved only when the United Nations engages in peace-building operations calculated to eliminate the underlying causes creating the tensions which eventually lead to breaches of the peace.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  21. But v/e make the suggestion because we are sincerely convinced that a stage has been reached in the growth of this Organization where a peace-keeping operation required by the general will of the international community should no longer be dependent on the uncertain or shifting interests of individual Member States or on the continuing generosity of a few, but that it should be financed by a mandatory levy based on a scale which takes into consideration the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council, the degree to which particular States are involved in the events or actions leading to such a peace-keeping operation, and the economic capacity of Member States, particularly of the developing countries. 181.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  22. Indeed, the founding fathers of this Organization seem to have contemplated the necessity for such a review of the Charter within ten years of its coming into force and included the mandatory provision in Article 109 that, if no conference for the review of the Charter has been held before the 10th annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the Charter, a "proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly". 180. Ten more years have passed and we have not seriously addressed ourselves to the consideration of this question. I need hardly assure you that my delegation would not have ventured to make a suggestion of this nature if it felt that its acceptance would, even remotely, tend to undermine the stability or reduce the strength of this Organization.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  23. While we fully recognize and concede that the Charter is a solemn international treaty, we think the time is ripe for a significant and helpful study to be made with a view to making the basic provisions of the Charter reflect the realities with which we are confronted. This could be achieved by discussion and negotiation in a spirit of give-and- take and in a manner acceptable both to the major Powers and to the smaller States.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  24. If, for instance, a situation arises where the collective will of the international community is expressed by a near-unanimous resolution of the General Assembly calling for the mounting of a peace-keeping operation, with only one permanent member of the Security Council alone dissenting, is such a decision to be frustrated or even completely defeated by the lack of appropriate financial support resulting from a juridical interpretation of a provision of the Charter as it stands? This, as I have observed above, is in keeping with neither the immediate needs nor the enduring interests of the Organization.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  25. Having regard to the changes that have overtaken us in the last twenty years in the relationship of the great Powers inter se and in the rise to nationhood of half a hundred more countries, we seem as yet to be working on too narrow a canvas. The truth of the matter is that what is required is a close and fearless re-examination of the provisions of the Charter itself.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  26. Conscious of their role in the united and combined effort which brought them victory in the last world conflict, the five major Allied Powers assumed — wrongly, as time has proved — that this unanimity in the pursuit of victory over a common enemy would endure as the basis for the fashioning of a world order. This view was reflected in the provisions of the Charter, the overriding feature of which was the assumption of the unanimity of the five great Powers. Subsequent events have shown clearly that the friends of one day may well emerge as the cold war antagonists of another, thus rendering nugatory the very basis of some of the important provisions of the Charter. 179. What is more, the membership of the United Nations has grown beyond all expectations and is now more than double its original number.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  27. which has been engaged in a comprehensive survey of the subject of the authorization and financing of peace-keeping operations, has, in spite of its unremitting labours for over two years, been unable to make any positive recommendations or even indicate any acceptable guidelines for the future. I should have thought it not beyond human ingenuity to find a solution which is equitable as well as acceptable. To be able to do so one would have to reach out for the genesis of the problem without any inhibitions. In the view of my delegation, the core of the matter is a political one, in the sense that the difficulties which confront us on the questions of the authorization and of the financing of peace-keeping operations stem from a built-in structural weakness of the Organization itself.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  28. The financing of these operations is today in such a parlous and perilous state as to lead to the Secretary-General’s grave concern for the very future of this Organization matter which can no longer be ignored by any Member State, large or small, without grievous consequences to the fabric of world peace. While sturdy common sense and an abundant goodwill have helped temporarily to tide over the financial difficulties that arose over the operations in the Congo, it is a source of great disappointment and disquiet to us, the smaller States, to find that the Special Committee of Thirty- Three.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  29. History will record that, in given situations of breaches of or threats to international peace and security, the United Nations has, by hasty compromise or reluctant goodwill, been able to intervene and interpose its forces effectively to the general satisfaction of the world community. Whilst this may be a source of gratification to this Assembly and a manifestation that the human will for peace has been able to successfully override ideological and other differences, nevertheless it is not a comforting situation for this Organization to find itself in.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  30. We have in mind here situations where majority populations in multiracial States have been and are still being subjected, by reason of colour or race, to barbarous and sub-human treatment by potent and powerful minorities. In such circumstances it will become necessary for the world body to treat such cases as a challenge to the international community as a whole and to take such action as will bring home to the Governments of the countries concerned that they cannot conduct even their so-called internal affairs in complete and flagrant defiance of the basic norms of civilized government. 178. In an otherwise rather sombre and somewhat gloomy picture of the international situation, the one field of operations where over the years the United Nations can be proud of its achievement, is that of peace-keeping operations.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  31. We are convinced, from its past record, that the present Rhodesian challenge is one which the United Kingdom can meet and overcome with honour to itself and satisfaction to all of us. 177. While I am on the subject of the problems of southern Africa may I be permitted to state here once again our firm opposition to and condemnation of the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa. The minimum requirements of civilized existence in an international community necessitate that an organization such as the United Nations under extreme circumstances, intervene in matters occurring within the national boundaries of a State.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  32. I venture to think that the United Kingdom, which has assisted in the achievement of independence by over 700 million people throughout the world on the basis of self-determination and majority rule should now not find it difficult and beyond its power and ingenuity to do likewise in regard to the people of Rhodesia, thus making yet another notable contribution to peaceful decolonization, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. No ties of so-called. kinship or sentiment will, I hope, deter the United Kingdom from fulfilling its obligations both to the Rhodesian people and to the international community.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  33. However, let me here express the hope that, should the United Kingdom Government succeed in ending the rebellion, on no account should the provisional and constitutional government that is intended to be set up thereafter be headed or dominated by the very perpetrators of the rebellion. This would be unacceptable not only to the majority of the people of Rhodesia itself, but to us in the international community. Britain's primary responsibility would be to restore direct constitutional administration by Whitehall for a period, however short, during which appropriate arrangements could be made for the majority of the population to choose a representative and responsible government of its own choice, on the basis of one man, one vote.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  34. At the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom himself undertook that, if before the end of this year this rebel regime is not brought to an end and constitutional government restored in Rhodesia, he would come before the Security Council to invoke the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Ceylon, for its part, would be prepared to give its unqualified support to such a step. The use of a necessary degree of force might yet be the shortest and the quickest way to end this rebellion. If such a step were to be taken by the United Kingdom, we are convinced that it would have the support and co-operation of the vast majority of the Member States of the United Nations. 176.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  35. May 1 add, speaking for the Government of Ceylon, a member of the Commonwealth, that Member States of the United Nations should not passively look on without adopting more effective measures to bring about a speedy end to what is an explosive and an intolerable situation. 175. The then British Foreign Secretary, I believe, undertook last year in the Security Council to come before that body again and ask for mandatory sanctions in order to achieve its objective, should this become necessary.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  36. Events of the last twelve months, however, have shown that the Smith regime has survived and even if, as Prime Minister Wilson claimed at the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London, the economy of Rhodesia has been adversely affected — and this, I may add, is not borne out by the report of the Sanctions Committee of the Heads of Commonwealth Governments — yet the policy of voluntary sanctions is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to bring the regime to an end or even to render the Head of the regime unpopular enough to compel him to resile. The net result has been a serious deterioration in the relationship that existed amongst the various members of the international community as regards African affairs.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  37. The United Kingdom Government demurred at the time in the firm belief, misguided as subsequent events have proved, that voluntary economic sanctions alone would be sufficient to achieve our common objective. At this stage we are not concerned to question the motives that animated the United Kingdom Government in its decision, but perhaps we may be allowed now to say with conviction that since the United Kingdom is legally the administering Power, the unilateral declaration of independence was an act of rebellion which could most speedily and effectively have been brought to an end by the use of force by the United Kingdom in much the same way as it has dealt with rebellions in various other parts of its once far-flung empire. 174.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  38. Immediately after independence was unilaterally declared on 11 November 1965, the Government of the United Kingdom summoned an urgent meeting of the Security Council, at which the British Foreign Secretary made a personal appearance and solicited the support of the United Nations in working out a scheme of voluntary sanctions against Southern Rhodesia which it was hoped would make the Government of Mr. Smith non-viable and thus compel the return of Rhodesia to constitutionalism. It is well known that a very large number of the Member States of this Organization considered that an immediate recourse to a minimum degree of force could have brought the illegal regime to an end.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  39. This Assembly will recall its resolution 2012 (XX) of 12 October 1965 in which the international community, without a dissentient voice, expressed its deep concern and apprehension at the probability of a unilateral declaration of independence by that regime, called upon the United Kingdom to take all measures necessary to prevent it and, in the event of such a declaration, to take all steps necessary to put an immediate end to the rebellion and to transfer power to a representative government. 173.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  40. Rather would I earnestly suggest that a better atmosphere would be created and a more realistic approach made by our facing up to the realities of the situation as they exist today and by our attempting to seek a solution that would lead to an immediate detente. 172. Another instance of a situation that is a threat to international peace and is likely to develop into a major conflict involving the continent of Africa is the situation that has been prevalent in Rhodesia for the last twelve months, consequent upon the illegal and unilateral declaration of independence by a racist minority regime determined to entrench its supremacy over the vast majority of the people of that country.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  41. It may well be that there were reasons, both psychological and otherwise, for certain of the major Powers to have resisted the inclusion of the question of Viet-Nam as an item in the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly. This is all the more reason for every effort to be made and every nerve to be strained by Member States, both individually and collectively, to bring about the beginning of negotiations as a prelude to an agreement and to the final establishment of peace in that part of Asia and thereby in the world. 171. The hour is too late and the consequences are too grave for us to indulge now in the luxury of entering into any research as to who is responsible, and to what extent, for the present tragic situation in Viet- Nam.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  42. The coexistence of nations with differing ideologies is today too elementary to be emphasized, and it may well be that, as it happened in Yugoslavia, there could evolve in Viet-Nam a strong national structure and government which, whatever its ideology, may choose to remain both independent and neutral. The serious offer made on behalf of the Government of the United States of its readiness actively to participate in a phased and planned withdrawal of all foreign troops is a matter that needs to be pursued, I feel that prompt and purposeful action must be taken here and now by the international community to explore the implications of this offer in order to make it a practical reality. 170.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  43. A condition precedent to the establishment of such a neutralized Viet-Nam would be the complete and absolute withdrawal of all foreign troops, wherever they may be found in that country, as specifically laid down in the Geneva Agreements of 1954. 169. The people of Viet-Nam have manifestly shown a desire to be masters in their own land and to manage their own affairs, without the assistance or the interference of any. foreign Power. It would be more than salutary for us to acknowledge and accept this fact and for the Viet-Namese to decide upon the form of government which best suits them. If any of us were to be too concerned about the particular ideology which should appeal to the Viet-Namese people as a whole, we might unwittingly push them into accepting the very ideology which we do not want them to accept.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  44. This was adverted to by the President of France in a recent speech in Cambodia, and emphasized by his Foreign Minister in his speech here. It is to be hoped that even countries not yet represented in the United Nations will accept this as a most important objective in the achievement of international stability in that area. We have a good example in the experience of one of our fellow Member States whose neutrality has been guaranteed by the great Powers and who has solemnly pledged itself to a policy of strict neutrality, and, what is more important, has scrupulously observed it — I refer to Austria.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  45. I pose a question: Should not the representatives of a small group of non-aligned nations make it their endeavour, under the auspices of the United Nations, to visit Viet-Nam and the capitals of the countries directly interested, with a view to persuading these Governments of the urgent necessity of overcoming their mutual suspicions and mistrust, thereby promoting an atmosphere in which they can better appreciate the narrowness of the gap that still divides them? 168. This Assembly will recall that one of the principal objectives of the Geneva Conference of 1954 was to ensure the neutralization of Viet-Nam and the complete dissociation of both North and South Viet-Nam from any military alliance or entanglement with any foreign Power. This seems to be the one matter on which there appears to be unanimity of opinion among all of us.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  46. The condition precedent to the initiation of negotiations suggested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, namely, cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam by United States and South Viet-Namese aircraft, appears to one to be acceptable to the Government of the United States, provided there is some response from Hanoi. There is no question but that no fruitful talks or purposeful negotiations can be commenced or carried on in an atmosphere of active hostilities including heavy aerial bombardment.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  47. We understand that the leader of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet- Nam is prepared to join in the formation of a broad-based democratic government. This offer is one that is deserving of scrutiny with a view to exploring the possibilities of its acceptance. In this context it will be recalled that one of the major obstacles to the commencement of negotiations has been the position of some of the contending Governments that they would not accept the National Liberation Front as a party to the negotiations. However, Ambassador Goldberg in his address appears to have eliminated this obstacle as far as the Government of the United States is concerned when he said that this matter would not be "an insurmountable difficulty". 167.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  48. To attribute motives or to suspect the professions of intention of Governments may be an easy intellectual or political exercise, but I feel a more constructive approach to the situation would be to accept the offer of the United States as a challenge and examine its possibilities, particularly since it is our view that the intervention of the United States in Viet-Nam has not been motivated by the classic colonial objectives of territorial expansion or the establishment of strategic bases. Whilst those of us in the wings have taken up varying attitudes ranging from the critical and the supercilious to the noncommittal and the laudatory, there are some not unhopeful signs that the time is not too distant when the parties most directly concerned may well be persuaded of the imperative necessity of coming to the conference table.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  49. I can think of no situation more pregnant with explosive possibilities and danger to international peace than the present situation in Viet- Nam, and it therefore behoves us to explore every possibility that would result in at least a progressive reduction of the scale of active hostilities until they are eventually terminated and a rapprochement is reached leading to the early stabilization of the situation in the whole of that unhappy land. 166. I feel that one should examine very seriously, realistically and constructively the proposals that have been put forward in this Assembly by the representative of the United States of America in what appears to us to be a genuine desire on its part to reach a settlement in Viet-Nam.

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)

  50. The International Commission for Supervision and Control has over the years forcefully brought to the notice of the world the dangerous situation that was developing in Viet- Nam, and yet no effective steps have been taken by those directly concerned to halt these alarming trends. It is therefore not surprising that the conflict has developed into one of unparalleled gravity, where the armed forces of several Member States are locked in combat on foreign territory. For us small nations who are forced to view the situation from afar, this inaction on the part of the great Powers seems difficult to understand or appreciate. Is the international community to sit by and await the passing of another year, during the course of which the struggle may well erupt into a global conflict?

    1966-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 21 (1966)